Hyprop Investments Limited v A & M Investments (Pty) Ltd (21528/2021) [2022] ZAWCHC 266 (29 December 2022)

80 Reportability
Land and Property Law

Brief Summary

Eviction — Commercial lease — Nature of lease agreement — Dispute over whether lease was for fixed term or month-to-month — Applicant sought eviction of respondent from commercial premises, asserting that the lease had terminated at the end of September 2021 — Respondent contended that the lease was indefinite and required notice for termination — Court held that the lease was for a fixed term, and upon expiration, the respondent was in unlawful occupation; eviction order granted.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


Introduction


The proceedings were an opposed application for eviction brought in the Western Cape Division of the High Court. The applicant, Hyprop Investments Limited, sought an order evicting the respondent, A & M Investments (Pty) Ltd, from commercial exhibition space situated within the Cape Gate Shopping Centre complex in Brackenfell.


The application followed the respondent’s continued occupation of the premises after the expiry of a sequence of written agreements regulating the occupation. Although the respondent delivered a notice of intention to defend timeously, it failed to file opposing papers within the required time periods, leading to case-management steps and a later application for condonation.


The dispute concerned the legal character and duration of the parties’ lease arrangement. In particular, the court was required to determine whether the respondent’s occupation after September 2021 was governed by an indefinite month-to-month lease (requiring notice to terminate), or whether the lease was for a fixed term that terminated automatically by effluxion of time at the end of September 2021, rendering the respondent an unlawful occupier liable to eviction.


Material Facts


Hyprop Investments Limited was the registered owner of the immovable property comprising the Cape Gate business complex, which included the Musica Court Exhibition Space occupied by the respondent. The respondent conducted business from that exhibition space and remained in occupation throughout the period relevant to the litigation.


On 12 March 2021, the parties concluded a written exhibition agreement at Cape Gate. This agreement was expressly for a one-month period, commencing on 1 March 2021 and terminating on 31 March 2021. The respondent took occupation under that agreement and remained in occupation thereafter.


It was common cause that there were no written agreements or written addendums covering the months April, May, and June 2021, but the respondent continued occupying the premises during those months. The applicant conceded that, for those months, there must have been a tacit agreement or tacit extension permitting continued occupation.


Subsequently, the parties concluded further written extensions in the form of addendums. On 21 July 2021, they signed a written addendum extending the arrangement for 1 to 31 July 2021. On 5 August 2021, they signed a further addendum extending it for 1 to 31 August 2021. On 3 September 2021, they signed another addendum extending it for 1 to 30 September 2021. The conclusion and terms of these written agreements and addendums were not in dispute.


On 16 September 2021, the applicant’s sales representative informed the respondent it was required to vacate by 30 September 2021. The respondent then engaged the applicant by email, including requests that it be allowed to remain and expressing a desire for a longer-term arrangement. On 19 October 2021, the respondent was advised that the applicant did not intend entering into a further lease agreement and that the respondent had to vacate by 1 November 2021. The respondent did not vacate and remained in occupation.


A factual disagreement arose as to whether the relationship after September 2021 was governed by an indefinite month-to-month lease. The respondent placed reliance on an email dated 28 October 2021 from the applicant’s sales manager referring to a “month-to-month agreement”, contending this indicated an ongoing periodic lease. The applicant, by contrast, relied on the express fixed-term wording of the written addendums and contended there was no further agreement (tacit, implied, or written) after the September 2021 addendum expired.


The respondent also raised a contention (in substance) that the applicant’s notices to vacate and/or notices of non-renewal were not validly given because relevant individuals allegedly lacked authority. In light of the court’s conclusion on the nature of the lease, this became unnecessary to decide.


Separately, the respondent’s procedural non-compliance was material. The application was issued and served during December 2021. The respondent filed a notice of intention to defend on 22 December 2021 but did not file opposing papers. The applicant obtained an order on 3 March 2022 (under a practice directive mechanism) directing the respondent to file opposing papers within 10 days. The respondent still did not comply and only filed opposing papers later, prompting a condonation issue and a postponement-related costs issue.


Legal Issues


The central legal question was whether, on the proper construction of the parties’ arrangements and conduct, the respondent occupied under a fixed-term lease that ended on 30 September 2021, or under an indefinite periodic (month-to-month) lease requiring reasonable notice of termination.


This primary question involved the application of legal principles to largely common-cause facts, particularly the interpretation and effect of the written agreement and addendums, the significance of the tacit arrangement during April to June 2021, and the impact (if any) of post-expiry communications and ongoing occupation.


A secondary issue concerned condonation for the late filing of opposing papers and the appropriate costs consequences of the respondent’s non-compliance with the rules and a prior court order.


A further issue arose regarding costs, including whether the applicant was entitled to costs on the High Court scale despite a contractual clause consenting to magistrates’ court jurisdiction and providing for attorney-and-client costs, and how to reconcile the applicant’s choice of forum with the parties’ contractual costs regime and the court’s discretion.


Court’s Reasoning


On the nature of the lease, the court identified two different legal consequences depending on whether the arrangement was periodic or fixed term. If the arrangement was an indefinite periodic lease, it would continue until terminated by reasonable notice, with a month’s notice generally regarded as reasonable for a monthly lease (as described with reference to authority cited in the judgment). If the arrangement was a fixed-term lease, it would terminate automatically by operation of law at the end of the agreed term, without the need for notice.


Although the applicant conceded that a tacit agreement must have existed for April to June 2021 due to continued occupation without written addendums, the court treated that concession as not determinative of what followed. The court considered the later addendums for July, August, and September 2021 to be express written agreements for fixed, defined periods, with clear additional dates recorded in each. The court held that, whatever the position might have been during the earlier unwritten months, the subsequent written addendums established a fixed-term contractual framework for the later periods, culminating in the September addendum ending on 30 September 2021.


The court rejected the respondent’s reliance on the 28 October 2021 email referring to a “month-to-month agreement” as demonstrating an indefinite periodic lease. It reasoned that, read in context, the email appeared to communicate the applicant’s position in practical terms—namely that it would not continue with further monthly extensions—and it did not override the express wording of the written addendums. The court emphasised that, irrespective of what an employee may have “thought or opined”, the written addendums recorded the respondent’s entitlement to occupy only until 30 September 2021.


The court also addressed, to the extent it arose, the notion of a further tacit agreement after September 2021 while negotiations were underway. Relying on authority referenced in the judgment, it accepted the applicant’s contention that a willingness to negotiate or engage about a possible further lease does not, without more, constitute a binding extension or new agreement. The court noted that it was not the respondent’s pleaded case that a new agreement had in fact been concluded after September 2021, and the correspondence demonstrated that the respondent understood it lacked a right to remain and was instead requesting indulgence and a new arrangement.


In addition, the court relied on contractual provisions in the exhibition agreement (clauses referred to as 6.1 and 6.3) to support its conclusion that the respondent could not rely on alleged variations not reduced to writing and signed, and that reliance on waiver or estoppel was contractually excluded in relation to unrecorded terms or representations. These clauses reinforced the primacy of the written addendums and the absence of any valid written extension beyond 30 September 2021.


On that basis, the court concluded that the parties had entered into a fixed-term exhibition agreement, which terminated by effluxion of time on 30 September 2021, and that the respondent was thereafter in unlawful occupation. Having made that finding, the court considered it unnecessary to decide whether the applicant’s representatives were authorised to issue a notice of non-renewal or whether reasonable notice had been provided, because notice was not required where the contract ended by effluxion of time.


On the procedural issue of condonation, the court recorded that the respondent failed to file opposing papers after giving notice of intention to defend and then failed to comply with an order compelling the filing of those papers within 10 days. The respondent’s explanation included late awareness of the order, the unavailability of counsel due to hospitalisation, and the attorney’s absence on pilgrimage. The court expressed serious concerns about the lack of a full and specific explanation, including the absence of any explanation for the initial failure to file opposing papers after the notice to defend. The court also found that the applicant suffered prejudice, as the late opposing papers contributed to postponement and delay.


Despite these concerns, the court exercised a discretion to allow the opposing papers in the interests of justice, but imposed costs consequences on the respondent for the chamber book application, the condonation application, and wasted costs occasioned by the postponement.


On costs for the main application, the court considered the contractual costs clause, which both recorded consent to magistrates’ court jurisdiction and provided for enforcement costs on the attorney-and-own-client scale. The court accepted that such clauses exist to protect a party forced to incur legal expenses to enforce contractual rights, and it held that courts should be slow to interfere with validly agreed contractual cost provisions absent a showing that enforcement would be against the interests of justice. The respondent, however, did not place facts before the court showing undue prejudice or injustice if the clause were enforced.


At the same time, the applicant had chosen to litigate in the High Court and sought costs on the High Court scale. The court accepted that, as a matter of principle, a High Court must hear a matter properly brought before it even if it falls within the magistrates’ court’s jurisdiction, and that the cost consequences of forum choice may be addressed through an appropriate costs order. The court was not persuaded that the applicant’s preference for High Court motion proceedings, based on speed compared to magistrates’ court action proceedings, justified departing from the parties’ agreement on costs. The outcome was therefore a costs order on the magistrates’ court scale, albeit on the attorney-and-client basis and with specified additional costs consequences stemming from the respondent’s conduct.


Outcome and Relief


The court granted condonation for the late filing of the opposing affidavit, but ordered the respondent to bear the costs consequences associated with its defaults and the resulting postponement.


The court granted an eviction order requiring the respondent and all those holding under it to vacate the commercial premises known as the Musica Court Exhibition Space at Cape Gate Shopping Centre by 17h00 on Friday, 13 January 2023. It further authorised the Sheriff to evict the respondent and those holding under it if it failed to vacate by that deadline.


The respondent was ordered to pay the costs of the application, including costs of the chamber book application, the condonation application, and wasted costs of the postponement on 9 June 2022, on the scale as between attorney and client, but specifically on the magistrates’ court scale, with counsel’s fees (where employed) on the higher tariff.


Cases Cited


Airports Company South Africa Soc Limited v Airport Bookshops (Pty) Ltd t/a Exclusive Books 2017 (3) SA 128 (SCA)


Tiopaizi v Bulawayo Municipality 1923 (AD) 317


Barkhuizen v Napier [2007] ZACC 5; 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC)


Pareto Ltd and Another v Coffee Junction CC (24773/2010) [2011] ZAWCHC 11 (24 February 2011)


Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd And Others v Mpongo and Others 2021 (6) SA 403 (SCA)


Legislation Cited


Magistrate’s Court Act 32 of 1944 (including section 29(1)(b))


Rules of Court Cited


Practice Directive 37(19)


Held


The court held that the parties’ relationship, as governed by the written exhibition agreement and its later addendums, constituted a fixed-term lease arrangement that terminated automatically on 30 September 2021 by effluxion of time. From that date onward, the respondent remained in occupation without legal entitlement and was accordingly an unlawful occupier liable to eviction.


The court further held that, given the fixed-term expiry, it was unnecessary to determine disputes concerning the adequacy of notice of termination or the authority of particular representatives to give notice of non-renewal.


On procedure, the court held that condonation for the late filing of the opposing affidavit would be granted in the interests of justice, but that the respondent’s defaults warranted adverse costs consequences. On costs more generally, the court held that the parties’ contractual costs agreement should not lightly be displaced, and the applicant’s choice of High Court forum did not justify High Court-scale costs; the court mitigated forum prejudice through a costs order on the magistrates’ court scale.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


A fixed-term lease terminates automatically by effluxion of time when the agreed period ends, and no notice of termination is required where the parties have agreed on a definite expiry date. Upon expiry, the relationship of lessor and lessee ceases and continued occupation is unlawful absent a further valid agreement.


A periodic lease (including a month-to-month lease) continues until lawfully terminated by notice. In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, termination requires reasonable notice, assessed contextually, and commonly a month’s notice is treated as reasonable for a monthly lease, though there is no rigid ratio.


Where parties have concluded express written agreements for defined periods, later written addendums extending the term for further defined periods will be given effect according to their wording, and earlier tacit arrangements will not, without more, convert the subsequent fixed-term written extensions into an indefinite periodic lease.


A party’s willingness to negotiate for a further lease or extension does not, without a concluded agreement, amount to a binding extension or new contract. Continued discussions and requests for indulgence do not themselves establish a tacit lease in circumstances where the occupant’s communications reflect awareness that it lacks a right to remain.


Where a contract contains non-variation and related clauses requiring amendments to be in writing and signed, and excluding reliance on waiver or estoppel for unrecorded terms, a party’s attempt to rely on informal communications to establish different contractual terms faces significant difficulty, particularly where the written agreement’s wording is clear.


In costs, a court retains an overarching discretion and must exercise it judicially in light of the facts. However, where parties have agreed to contractual cost consequences, a court should be slow to interfere unless enforcement would cause injustice; and where a litigant elects a forum that may increase costs, the court may mitigate prejudice through an appropriate costs order, including limiting costs to a lower court scale despite High Court litigation.

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[2022] ZAWCHC 266
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Hyprop Investments Limited v A & M Investments (Pty) Ltd (21528/2021) [2022] ZAWCHC 266 (29 December 2022)

SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
and
SAFLII
Policy
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
WESTERN
CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN
Case
Number: 21528/2021
In
the matter between:
HYPROP
INVESTMENTS LIMITED
(Registration
Number:
1[...])

Applicant
and
A
& M INVESTMENTS (PTY) LTD
(Registration
Number:
2[...])

Respondent
Date
of Judgment: This judgment was handed down electronically by
circulation to the parties’ legal representatives by email.
The
date and time for handing down judgment is deemed to be 10h00 on 29
December 2022.
JUDGMENT
DE
WET AJ:
[1]
This is an opposed eviction application where the issue in dispute is
whether the
respondent was renting a commercial space owned by the
applicant on a month-to-month basis for an indefinite period, or
whether
the rental agreement was for a fixed term period which
resulted in it automatically terminating at the end of September
2021.
The
factual matrix:
[2]
The applicant is the registered owner of the immovable business
complex known as Cape
Gate, situated at Erf 1[...], Brackenfell,
Western Cape (“the property”).
[3]
The respondent is a company with its principal place of business at
Musica Court Exhibition
Space, Cape Gate Shopping Centre (“the
exhibition premises”) which is located within the property. As
the owner of
the property, the applicant had the required
locus
standi
to launch the eviction application.
[4]
On 12 March 2021 and at Cape Gate, the respondent, represented by
Muhammad Ahtsham
(“Ahtsham”) and the applicant,
represented by Amanda McCarthy, concluded a written exhibition
agreement in relation
to the exhibition premises. The exhibition
agreement was to endure for a period of one month, commencing on 1
March 2021 and terminating
on 31 March 2021.
[5]
The respondent took up
occupation of the premises in terms of the exhibition agreement
and
is still in occupation thereof. There were no written agreements or
addendum agreements in respect of April, May and June 2021
between
the parties, but it is common cause that the respondent continued
occupying the exhibition premises during these months.
[6]
On 21 July 2021, the respondent, represented by Ahtsham and the
applicant, represented
by Zoe Ganz, concluded a written addendum to
the exhibition agreement,
inter alia,
extending the exhibition
agreement for a further month period, it being from 1 to 31 July
2021.
[7]
On 5 August 2021 and 3 September 2021 respectively, the parties
concluded two further
written addendums to the exhibition agreement,
inter alia,
to further extend the exhibition agreement for two
periods being from 1 to 31 August 2021, and then from 1 to 30
September 2021.
The conclusion and terms of the exhibition agreement
and the addendums thereto are not in dispute.
[8]
On 16 September 2021 the applicant’s sales representative
advised the respondent
that it was required to vacate the premises on
30 September 2021. This sparked the respondent into action. Mr
Ahtsham, the sole
director of the respondent, addressed email
correspondence to Mr Buckle, the sales manager of the applicant, with
the subject “Unhappy”.
In the email, he stated that:
“…
I
just want to explain my story, we came from Canal walk to your mall
referred by Canal walk, we feel let down by your mall because
we
spend so much money on improving our kiosk and we did all demands
coming from Kim, now to be asked to leave the mall because
our
offerings not needed it is sad, we don’t have any other place
to go, my staff will be out of work and we are happy in
your mall,
its so sad to see that leasing has giving the kiosk by mr price offer
but not us and we have been paying our rental
on time. I am willing
to pay R 30 000.00 for a lease each month our business is slow but we
trying to improve always, I did not
also send my turnover to leasing
but with no success.
In all fairness we have to get an
offer because I was never approached for a full lease i even said we
will take away anything they
not happy with, but i cant move until i
get other place please can you help us i beg of you.
We
have not had 1 complaint we are on time and professional we have good
relations with tenants too. All I ask for 1 year give
us that 1 year
if you not happy we then leave but i believe every income can help
the mall i even ask for a shop if that is possible,
we are legal in
the country and we are going to expand to the US as franchise.”
(
sic
) (my emphasis).
[9]
On the same day, the respondent was advised that his request had been
escalated to
ascertain whether “a plan” could be made for
the respondent to rent the premises for a further one-year period.
[10]
On 20 September 2021, as no response was forthcoming, Mr Ahtsham send
yet another email stating:

I
am just following up on feedback as I am getting worried its getting
to month end.”(sic)
.
[11]
On 19 October 2021, the respondent was advised that the applicant did
not intend entering into
a further lease agreement with the
respondent and that it had to vacate the property by 1 November 2021.
The respondent failed
to do so and is still, more than a year later,
in occupation of the property.
The
parties’ respective contentions:
[12]
It is the applicant’s case that the exhibition agreement is
clear and unambiguous. The
exhibition period was for the period 1
March 2021 to 31 March 2021. The addendum agreements subsequently
concluded, were all three
for fixed term periods, the last one being
from 1 September 2021 to 30 September 2021. No further agreement, be
it tacit or implied,
was concluded between the parties, even on the
respondent’s version, after the last fixed term agreement came
to an end on
30 September 2021. The respondent is therefore in
unlawful occupation and the applicant is entitled to an eviction
order.
[13]
The respondent opposed the relief sought by the applicant on two main
grounds, namely.
13.1
That the lease agreement between the parties is an indefinite lease
on a month-to-month basis and therefore
the applicant was required to
give, at least, a month’s notice to the respondent of the
termination of the agreement and
that the applicant failed to do so.
13.2
That the applicant’s correspondence to the respondent requiring
the respondent to vacate the premises
at the end of September 2021
and later, in subsequent correspondence, by 1 November 2021, amounted
to a formal notice of non-renewal
of the lease agreement and neither
Mr Buckle nor Mr Oliphant, was authorised to provide such notice to
the respondent on behalf
of the respondent.
The
nature of the lease:
[14]
If the exhibition agreement and later addendums constituted an
indefinite month-to-month lease,
reasonable notice would be
calculated, with reference to the work of WE Cooper
[1]
,
as set out in the matter of Airports Company South Africa Soc Limited
v Airport Bookshops (Pty) Ltd t/a Exclusive Books
2017 (3) SA 128
(SCA) at para 18, as follows:

A
periodic lease continues until it is terminated by notice given by
either party. In the absence of agreement to the contrary,
notice
must be given a reasonable time before the date on which a party
decides to terminate the lease. The period of such notice
must be
such that the lessor has a reasonable opportunity of letting his
premises or the lessee of finding other premises. A day’s

notice is considered reasonable in the case of a daily lease; a
week’s notice in the case of a weekly lease; and a month’s

notice in the case of a monthly lease, but there is no fixed ratio
between the period of the lease and the notice period.”
[15]
If the lease was for a fixed term period and such
period came to an end, the position is that the lease
terminates
automatically by operation of law
[2]
.
De Villiers AJ in Tiopaizi v Bulawayo Municipality 1923 (AD) 317 at
326 aptly stated the legal position in such situation as follows:

If
parties agree upon a definite time for the expiration of the
contract, it follows that no notice of termination is required.
The
contract expires by effluxion of time and with it the relationship of
lessor and lessee ceases.”
[16]
It was conceded by counsel for the applicant that
for the months of April, May and June 2021, there must
have been a
tacit agreement or an extension of the initial exhibition agreement
in respect of the exhibition premises. This tacit
agreement,
according to counsel for the respondent, changed the exhibition
agreement into an indefinite month-to- month exhibition
agreement and
the applicant therefore had to provide the respondent with a month’s
notice for it to lawfully cancel the exhibition
agreement. It was
common cause that if it was an indefinite lease agreement, the
applicant gave short notice of cancellation.
[17]
In support of its argument that it was an indefinite lease agreement,
the respondent relied heavily
on the fact that Mr Buckle, on 28
October 2021, after the exhibition agreement had expired according to
the applicant in terms
of the fixed term addendum, advised the
respondent as follows:

After
much deliberation and weighing our options a business directive has
been taken to not allow a further extension of your month-to-month

agreement. I realise that this is unfortunate news and that it will
have a real financial impact on us both, but the decision is
final
and won’t be reconsidered in any further deliberations  .
. Your team will be required to vacate the mall at the
end of the
weekend as Nicolas requested a while ago. . .”
[18]
In my view, having regard to the express and unambitious wording of
the three addendum agreements
and regardless of the tacit agreement
that existed in respect of April, May and June 2021, the parties
entered into further fixed
term agreements in respect of July, August
and September 2021. In the final fixed term exhibition agreement, it
is recorded, as
was the case in respect of the previous two
addendums, that the reason for the addendum(s) was to add additional
dates, those being
from 1 to 30 September 2021. Whatever the
situation was prior to the further addendum(s) being signed, is in my
view irrelevant
and does not change the terms of the addendum(s)
entered into between the parties.
[19]
The respondent’s reliance on the email of Mr Buckle of 28
October 2021 that there was an
indefinite month-to-month exhibition
agreement is misplaced and I am not convinced that Mr Buckle was of
the view that the parties
had entered into an indefinite
month-to-month exhibition agreement. To me, it rather appears that he
was simply reiterating what
Mr Oliphant, the general manager of the
applicant, had already advised the respondent on 19 October 2021 in
layman’s terms:
the applicant would no longer be entering into
monthly addendums with the respondent and it had to vacate the
exhibition premises.
In any event, whatever Mr Buckle may have
thought or opined, the express wording of the addendum to the
exhibition agreement is
that the right of the respondent to lawfully
occupy the exhibition agreement would cease on 30 September 2021.
[20]
Insofar as it was argued, although not stated as such in the opposing
papers, that a further
tacit agreement was entered into between the
parties after the termination of the exhibition agreement whilst the
respondent tried
to negotiate with the applicant a further lease
agreement, I agree with counsel for the applicant, with reference to
the matter
of Barkhuizen v Napier
[2007] ZACC 5
;
2007 (5) SA 323
(CC), that any
willingness by the applicant to engage with the respondent with a
view of possibly extending the lease agreement
or entering into a new
lease agreement, did not result in any further agreement being
entered into.
[3]
It was also not
the respondent’s case that a new agreement was entered into or
that an extension was granted. In fact, the
contents of the
correspondence between the parties shows that Mr Ahtsham knew that
the respondent had no right to remain in occupation
of the premises.
He was simply begging the applicant, for various reasons, to enter
into a new lease agreement with the respondent
after the exhibition
agreement had terminated on 30 September 2021. He further did not
complain that the applicant had given the
respondent short notice of
termination, nor did he state that the respondent was entitled to a
month’s notice in order for
the exhibition agreement to be
validly cancelled.
[21]
The uncontested terms of the exhibition agreement and further
addendums, further and in any event,
sets out in clauses 6.1 and
6.3
[4]
, that no amendments or
variations of the agreement(s) will be valid unless reduced to
writing and signed by both parties and that
the respondent is
precluded from relying on waiver on the part of the applicant or
estoppel in respect of any term or representation
not recorded in the
agreement.
[22]
In the circumstances, I find that the parties had entered into a
fixed term exhibition agreement
which terminated by operation of law
on 30 September 2021 and that the respondent is in unlawful
occupation of the exhibition premises.
In light of this finding it is
not necessary to deal with the whether the applicant’s
representatives had the necessary authorisation
to issue a notice of
non-renewal to the respondent or whether the applicant provided the
respondent with reasonable notice.
Condonation:
[23]
The application was issued and served during December 2021. The
respondent filed a notice of
intention to defend on 22 December 2021
but simply failed to file opposing papers. The applicant, due to the
respondent’s
inaction and in terms of Practice Directive
37(19), obtained an order on 3 March 2022 in terms whereof the
respondent was ordered
to file its opposing papers within 10 days of
service of the order. The respondent failed to comply with this order
and only filed
opposing papers on 18 May 2021.
[24]
According to the respondent its failure to comply with the order was
because of its attorney
of record only becoming aware of the order on
25 March 2022, at which stage its chosen counsel was hospitalised and
unable to assist.
Its attorney of record was further on pilgrimage
and out of the country for a period of two weeks during the end of
April and the
beginning of May 2022.
[25]
The respondent offered no explanation whatsoever as to why it failed
to file opposing papers
after it delivered a notice of intention to
defend and its explanation for its failure to comply with the order
of 3 March 2022
for a period of about 2 months lacks specificity. It
appears to me that the opposing affidavit was only filed because of
the matter
being set down to be heard on the unopposed role on 9 June
2022. Whilst the applicant had an opportunity to reply to the
opposing
papers, it was nevertheless prejudiced by the conduct of the
respondent as the filing of the opposing papers at that late stage

caused the further postponement of the matter to the opposed motion
role.
[26]
Although I have serious concerns regarding the explanation tendered
by the respondent for its
failure to comply with the rules and orders
of this court, I have decided, in the exercise of my discretion, to
allow the opposing
papers in the interest of justice on the basis
that the respondent bears the applicant’s cost in respect of
the chamber book
application, the condonation application and the
costs occasioned by the postponement of the application on 9 June
2022.
Costs
of the application:
[27]
The exhibition agreement contains a generic
consent to jurisdiction clause which reads as follows:

The
parties agree to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate’s Court in
respect of all matters, disputes and claims arising out
of this
Agreement, although such matters may exceed or be outside such
jurisdiction. The Exhibitor be responsible for any legal
costs
incurred by the Centre Management in enforcing the terms of this
Agreement, on the Attorney and own client scale of charges.

[28]
Ostensibly this clause was included to protect a party such as the
applicant against a situation
where it is out of pocket as a result
of being forced to expend legal fees to protect its right of free and
unencumbered occupation
of its property and the known difficulties
experienced by property owners when faced with unlawful occupiers
refusing to vacate.
The respondent placed no facts before the court
that it would be unduly prejudiced or would suffer an injustice
should the contractual
agreement’s terms in respect of costs be
enforced.
[29]
In my view, where parties have entered into a valid and binding
agreement pertaining to legal
costs in the event of a party breaching
the terms of the agreement, a court should be slow to interfere with
such agreement unless
it can be shown that enforcing such terms would
not be in the interests of justice. It would consequently be for the
party facing
a possible adverse cost order, to set out facts why the
court should exercise its discretion contrary to the express
agreement
between the parties in the case of a written agreement.
Such circumstances may include issues such as the unequal bargaining
power
of the parties at the time of entering into the agreement, the
quantum of a claim, the forum wherein compliance is sought and the

conduct of the parties during the course of the litigation to mention
a few.
[30]
The applicant however, despite the consent clause, elected to
institute an application for eviction
in the High Court and requests
costs on the High Court scale. The parties were afforded an
opportunity to submit further submission
in this regard as it was not
addressed in the papers or heads of argument.
[31]
The parties appear to be in agreement that the applicant could not
institute an application, as opposed
to an action, for ejectment in
the Magistrate’s court with reference to s 29(1)(b) of the
Magistrate’s Court Act 32
of 1944 and that it was entitled to
launch an application in this court even if the value of the right of
occupation fall within
the jurisdiction of the Magistrate’s
court.
[5]
[32]
It is trite that the court has an overriding discretion when it is
required to make costs orders
and that such discretion must be
exercised judicially with refence to the factual matrix of the matter
at hand.
[33]
The applicant’s contention that action proceedings in the
Magistrate’s court would
have taking significantly longer than
application proceedings in the High Court and that it was entitled to
elect to institute
proceedings in this court, do not in my view
justify a departure from the agreement pertaining to costs between
the parties.
[34]
In the circumstances the following order is made:
1.
Condonation is granted for the late filing
of the opposing affidavit.
2.
The respondent and all those holding title
under it is ordered to vacate the commercially leased premises known
as, Musica Court
Exhibition Space, Cape Gate Shopping centre, cnr of
Okavango and De Bron Roads, Cape Gate, Cape Town situated at Erf
1[...], Brackenfell,
more commonly known as Cape Gate Shopping
Centre, on or before 17h00 on Friday, 13 January 2023.
3.
In the event of the respondent failing to
vacate the aforesaid property, the Sheriff of this Court is ordered
and directed to evict
the respondent and all those holding title
under it, therefrom.
4.
The respondent is ordered to pay the costs
of this application, including the costs of the chamber book
application, the condonation
application and the waisted costs
occasioned by the postponement of the application on 9 June 2022, on
the scale as between attorney
and client, on the Magistrate’s
court’s scale, with counsel’s fees, where so employed, on
the higher tariff.
A De Wet
Acting
Judge of the High Court
Coram:

De Wet AJ
Date
of hearing:

31 October 2022
On
behalf of the Applicant:

Adv J Bence instructed by
Pepler
O’Kennedy
Email:
andre@pro.legal
On
behalf of the Respondent

Adv P Gabriel instructed by
ZS
Incorporated Attorneys
Email:
waleed@zsinc.co.za
[1]
The
South African Law of Landlord and Tennant 2
nd
edition pp 65 -66
[2]
See
Glover
Kerr’s Law of Sale and Lease
(4
th
Edition) 23.3.1
[3]
In
this regard in the matter of
Pareto
Ltd and Another v Coffee Junction CC
(24773/2010)
[2011] ZAWCHC 11
(24 February 2011) at para 28 it was
held that:
Counsel
for respondent also referred me to the case of Barkhuizen v Napier
[2007] ZACC 5
;
2007 (5) SA 323
(CC), specifically at pages 330 to 341, where the
court dealt with the principle the constitutional value of equality
and dignity
may prove to be decisive when the parties’
relative bargaining positions is in issue. However, the court in
Barkhuizen
was considering this principle within the context of a
contract
already
concluded
and
where there was certainty as to the precise terms thereof. In the
instant matter, the “term” relied upon by the
respondent
boils down to nothing more than reliance on something other than an
identified constitutional value. The respondent
seeks to elevate a
willingness to negotiate to the status of an obligation on the part
of the applicants to provide the respondent
with a reasonable
opportunity to rent the premises for a further five years on
reasonable basis. Since the respondent cannot
(and therefore
correctly does not) allege that the written lease agreement was
varied whilst it was still in existence, the respondent
must rely on
events which took place subsequent to June 2010 when the written
lease expired. There is nothing on the papers before
me which took
place subsequent to June 2010 which indicates that such a term
exists. At best, the respondent has demonstrated
that the applicants
indicated a willingness to negotiate. That does not translate into a
binding contract to do so.
[4]
Clause
6.1 states: No amendments, variations or consensual cancellation of
this agreement, or of this clause, will be valid unless
reduced to
writing and signed by the parties hereto. In particular, no
representations of whatsoever nature has been made to
either party
to this agreement – save for what is contained herein. No
waiver on the part of Centre Management will prejudice
Centre
Management’s rights in any way whatsoever.
Clause
6.3 states: Centre Management shall not be bound by an express or
implied term, representation warranty, promise or the
like not
recorded herein, and the Exhibitor waives the defence of estoppel in
this regard.
[5]
The SCA in the matter of
Standard
Bank of South Africa Ltd And Others v Mpongo and Others
2021 (6) SA 403
(SCA) in this regard held that a High Court was
obliged to hear a matter brought before it, even where the matter
fell within
the jurisdiction of a Magistrates' Court and that the
prejudicial consequences of the choice of forum could be mitigated
by an
appropriate costs order.