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[2022] ZAWCHC 231
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C.G and Others v Momentum Retirement Annuity Fund and Others (7777/2021) [2022] ZAWCHC 231 (10 November 2022)

SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
and
SAFLII
Policy
FLYNOTES:
DEATH BENEFIT AND LIFE PARTNER
Pension
– Death benefit – Allocated to life partner of
deceased – Ex-wife and children aggrieved by allocation
–
Effect of decision by Pension Fund Adjudicator – Discretion
of board of pension fund –
Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956
,
s
37C.
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN
CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
CASE
NO: 7777/2021
In
the matter between:
C[....]
G[....]

First Applicant
B[....]
G[....]

Second Applicant
H[....]
G[....]

Third Applicant
S[....]
G[....]

Fourth Applicant
JOHANNA
CHRISTINA DE SWARDT

Fifth Applicant
And
MOMENTUM RETIREMENT
ANNUITY FUND

First Respondent
MOMENTUM METROPOLITAN
LIFE LIMITED

Second Respondent
PENSION FUNDS
ADJUDICATOR

Third Respondent
C[....]2
A[....]

Fourth Respondent
Coram:

Hockey, AJ
Date of hearing:
18 August 2022
Date
of judgment:      10 November 2022
JUDGMENT
(HANDED DOWN ELECTRONICALLY)
HOCKEY,
AJ
[1]
This matter concerns the distribution of a
death benefit in the sum of R1 201 277.00 by the first
respondent following
the death of its member, Mr. B[....]2 H[....]2
G[....] (“the deceased”), on 27 December 2018. Ms
C[....]2 A[....] (“A[....]”),
who was regarded as the
life partner of the deceased at the time of his death was allocated
the entire death benefit. A[....] is
cited as the fourth respondent
in these proceedings.
[2]
The first to third applicants are children
of the deceased, born out of the marriage to the fourth applicant.
The deceased and the
fourth applicant were divorced on 24 April 2008.
In terms of the divorce order, the deceased paid monthly maintenance
to the fourth
applicant in the amount of R12 000.00 per month
until the death deceased. At the time of the deceased passing the
third applicant
was a minor for whom he paid an additional amount of
R5 000.00 to the fourth applicant towards the minor’s
maintenance
and upkeep.
[3]
The deceased’s mother was cited as
the fifth applicant herein when this matter was instituted since she
was also a dependent
of the deceased who contributed a monthly amount
of R5 000.00 towards her upkeep. The mother of the deceased had since
passed away
and is no longer a party to these proceedings.
[4]
The board of the first respondent (“the
board”) allocated the entire death benefit to A[....]. The
first respondent
is a retirement-annuity fund and the second is the
administrator and underwriter of the first respondent.
[5]
Aggrieved with the allocation of the entire
death benefit to A[....], the applicants lodged a complaint with the
third respondent,
who is the Pension Funds Adjudicator (“the
adjudicator”) established and constituted in terms of section
30B of the
Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 (“the Act”). The
complaint was dismissed which led to the applicants instituting the
current
proceedings.
[6]
The application is opposed only by the
first respondent.
Background
facts
[7]
The following facts were presented to the
board about the deceased and his estate.
[8]
Upon the death of the deceased, the G[....]
Testamentary Trust (“the trust”) was created by virtue of
his will. The
deceased bequeathed his estate to the trust, of which
his three children (the first to third applicants) are income and
capital
beneficiaries. The trust received R41 418 384.93
from the deceased estate, including R7 072 097.06 from
various
policies of the deceased.
[9]
The trustee of the trust informed the board
that the trust would continue to make monthly payments to the third
and fourth applicants
in the amounts of R5 000.00 and R12 000.00
respectively. In addition, the trustee further advised that the trust
would
make monthly payments to the first and second respondents in
the amounts of R7 000.00 and R8 000.00 respectively.
[10]
From about 2015, the deceased and A[....]
were involved in a relationship. An investigation by the forensic
department of the second
respondent confirmed that the relationship
between the deceased and A[....] was similar to that of a married
couple.
Legal
principles
[11]
The
applicants brought this application in an effort to review and set
aside two decisions “
of
the first and/or second respondent
”
[1]
dated 12 June 2020 and 7 October 202 respectively, and also to review
and set aside the decision of the adjudicator in dismissing
the
applicants’ complaint. The application was instituted in terms
of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000
(“PAJA”),
alternatively the common law, as well as in terms of section 30P of
the Act.
[12]
Counsel for the respondents pointed out
that the first decision of the first respondent, which was a
preliminary decision dated
12 June 2020, is irrelevant and has no
direct external effect. For the purposes of this application only the
second decision, dated
7 October 2020, is relevant. In terms of both
these decision the entire death benefit was allocated to A[....].
Preliminary
points raised by the first respondent
[13]
Furthermore, counsel for the first
respondent pointed out that the decisions of the first and second
respondents are
res judicata
because these decisions have been adjudicated by a competent tribunal
in the form of the adjudicator. In this regard, reference
was made to
section 30 O(1) of the Act which provides:
“
Any
determination of the Adjudicator shall be deemed to be a civil
judgement of any court of law had the matter in question been
heard
by such court, and shall be so noted by the clerk of the register of
the court, as the case maybe.
”
[14]
The effect of section 30 O(1), therefore,
is that the adjudicator’s determination is binding and
enforceable until set aside,
and the attempt to review the first and
second respondent’s decisions is futile.
[15]
Counsel for the respondents also drew
attention to section 230 of the Financial Sector Regulation Act 9 of
2017 (“the FSR
Act”), the relevant portion of which
provides:
“
(1)
(a) A person aggrieved by a decision may apply to the Tribunal for a
reconsideration of the decision by the Tribunal in accordance
with
this Part.
(b)
A reconsideration of a decision in terms of this Part constitutes an
internal remedy as contemplated in
section 7(2)
of the
Promotion of
Administrative Justice Act.
”
[16
]
The
“
Tribunal
”
referred to is the Financial Services Tribunal and “
a
decision
”
is defined in section 218 of the FSR Act to include a determination
of the adjudicator.
[2]
Section
230 of the FSR Act therefore provides for an internal appeal as
contemplated in section 7(2) of PAJA. In effect, therefore,
the
applicants did not exhaust their internal remedy first before taking
the decisions of the respondents on review.
[17]
For these reasons, counsel for the first
respondent submitted in his heads of argument, and I agree, that the
first and second prayers
of the notice of motion, relating to the
decisions of the “
first and/or
second respondents
” should be
dismissed. This submission has merit, as the decision of the
adjudicator is binding and enforceable, which implies
that it serves
no practical purpose to review the decisions of the board. In any
event, counsel for the applicants abandoned the
review of the
decision of “
first and/or the
second respondent
” contained in
prayers 1 and 2 of the notice of motion and proceeded only in respect
of the appeal in terms of section 30P
of the Act.
Section
30C of the Act and the appeal provision in terms of section 30P
[18]
Section
37C of the Act confers a discretionary power on a pension fund to
distribute pension benefits on the death of a member after
the needs
and dependency amongst the deceased’s dependants and nominees
have been identified. In the first instance, it is
incumbent on the
board to identify the dependants of the deceased as well as the
persons whom the deceased may have nominated to
receive the proceeds
of the death benefits. The fund, acting through its board, must
distribute the death benefits in a reasonable
manner and in
accordance with the provisions of section 37C.
[3]
[19]
The relevant part of section 37C of the
Act, provides as follows:
“
(1)
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law or in
the rules of a registered fund, any benefit . . . payable
by such a
fund upon the death of a member, shall, . . . not form part of the
assets in the estate of such a member, but shall be
dealt with in the
following manner: If the fund within twelve months of the death of
the member becomes aware of or traces a dependant
[4]
or dependants of the member, the benefit shall be paid to such
dependant or, as may be deemed equitable by the fund, to one of
such
dependants or in proportions to some of or all such dependants.
”
[20]
The
discretion conferred upon the board of a pension fund under section
37C trumps the mere wishes of the deceased member, even
where such
wishes are expressed in a nomination form or a testamentary
instrument. Murphy J summed up the position in
The
Municipal Workers Retirement Fund v Mabula and Another
[5]
as follows:
“
Section
37C of the PFA is intended to serve a social function. It was enacted
to protect dependency, even over the clear wishes
of the deceased.
Its purpose is to alleviate, in part, the financial hardship in which
the deceased's dependants might find themselves
on the loss of their
source of income and support. The effect of the section is that the
fund is expressly not bound by either
a will or a nomination form.
The section specifically restricts freedom of testation in order that
no dependants are left without
support and the fund is expressly not
bound by a will, nor is it bound by the nomination form. The
provision explicitly denies
the member of a fund the right to
determine how the benefit is to be disposed of by the fund.
”
[6]
[21]
The
adjudicator, whose decision is on appeal
in
casu,
has
the power to interfere with the pension fund’s decision. His or
her powers are conscribed in chapter VA of the Act, and
his or her
duties include disposing of complaints
[7]
lodged in terms of section 30A (3) the Act. In terms of chapter VA,
the adjudicator is enjoined to investigate any complaint, and
in
terms of section 30M he or she must, after the completion of such an
investigation, send a signed statement containing his or
her
determination and the reasons therefore to all parties concerned, as
well as to the clerk or registrar of the court which would
have had
jurisdiction had the matter been heard by a court.
[22]
The High Court, in turn, has jurisdiction
to consider an appeal against a determination by the adjudicator in
terms of section 30P
of the Act. The section provides:
“
Access
to court
.-
(1)
Any party who feels aggrieved by a determination of the Adjudicator
may, within six weeks after the date of the determination,
apply to
the division of the High Court which has jurisdiction, for relief,
and shall at the same time give written notice of his
or her
intention so to apply to the other parties to the complaint.
(2)
The division of the High Court contemplated in subsection (1) may
consider the merits of the complaint made to the Adjudicator
under
section 30A (3) and on which the Adjudicator's determination was
based, and may make any order it deems fit.
(3)
Subsection (2) shall not affect the court's power to decide that
sufficient evidence has been adduced on which a decision can
be
arrived at, and to order that no further evidence shall be adduced.
”
[23]
Section
30P affords a party who is dissatisfied by the ruling of the
adjudicator a complete re-hearing of the matter. This entails
that
the court is not confined to the record which was before the
adjudicator, but may include additional evidence or information.
As
held in
Meyer
v Iscor Pension Fund
[8]
:
“
From
the wording of s30P (2) it is clear that the appeal to the High Court
contemplated is an appeal in the wide sense. The High
Court is
therefore not limited to a decision whether the adjudicator's
determination was right or wrong. Neither is it confined
to the
evidence or the grounds upon which the adjudicator's determination
was based. The Court can consider the matter afresh and
make any
order it deems fit. At the same time, however, the High Court’s
jurisdiction is limited by s 30P (2) to a consideration
of ‘the
merits of the complaint in question’.
”
Submissions
by the applicants
[24]
The essence of the grievance of the
applicant’s grievance is that the entire death benefit was
allocated to A[....] solely
on the basis that she was involved in a
relationship with the deceased with whom he had lived before his
passing. They also take
issue with the fact that they were not
consulted, nor were they provided with information upon which the
board relied to make a
decision.
[25]
The applicants also take issue with the
degree of dependency of A[....] upon the deceased. They aver that
there was no proper investigation
and consideration of what the
deceased and A[....] respectively contributed to their joint
household, what A[....]’s assets
and liabilities are and what
her maintenance requirements were. Furthermore, it is alleged that
the relationship between A[....]
and the deceased had broken down and
terminated before the latter’s death, a factor which, they say,
was not properly investigated.
In essence, the applicants allege that
when the decision was made to allocate the entire death benefit to
A[....], it appears that
the conclusions reached are irrational and
not supported by the facts of this matter.
Discussion
[26]
The board on the present matter identified
the first to fifth applicants as well A[....] as dependants of the
deceased. As already
stated, the fifth applicant has since passed
away and she is no longer a party to these proceedings. The remaining
applicants,
however, dispute that A[....] was a dependant of the
deceased, and is therefore not entitled to share in the death
benefits.
[27]
The deceased had nominated the trust as
beneficiary of his death benefits, but the board correctly concluded
that such nomination
was of no force and effect as the death benefits
must be distributed in terms of section 37C which serves a social
purpose, and
as such, a member of a retirement fund cannot nominate a
juristic or inanimate entity (such as a trust) to receive a death
benefit.
[28]
As already alluded to, an appeal under
section 30P, which is a rehearing of the applicant’s complaint,
affords them the right
to present any relevant information to the
court, irrespective of whether such information was part of the
record when the adjudicator
made his decision. The applicants had
been afforded the record in terms of Uniform Rule 53 pertaining to
the decision which they
initially sought to be reviewed in terms of
the notice of motion. They had the right to supplement the
information therein with
any new or additional information for
consideration by this court. The complaint that the applicants were
not consulted or given
an opportunity to make submission relating to
the allocation of the death benefits, in my view, has become moot. To
the extent
that they failed to place additional information in front
of this court is (if such additional information exist), is of their
own making.
[29]
Regarding the complaint that no proper
investigation was conducted before the death benefit was allocated to
A[....], it is undisputed
that an investigation did in fact take
place. The board did obtain an affidavit from the fourth applicant.
Despite the first applicant
denying that in her founding affidavit
she was contacted by an investigator, she retracted this statement in
her supplementary
founding affidavit wherein she admits that an
investigator had interviewed her. The retraction was made after the
applicants received
the record containing the decision of the board,
which included a forensic investigation report. It was reported that
the investigator
spoke to first applicant who advised that she knew
her late father had a relationship with A[....], but her father never
mentioned
anything about marrying A[....]. The report also revealed
that the investigator had spoken to both the second and fourth
applicants.
[30]
In addition the forensic investigation
report also discloses that the investigator interviewed several
persons who knew the deceased
and A[....]. These individuals confirm
that the two were living together and there is evidence that they
were engaged to be married.
What is indisputable is that the deceased
and A[....] had been living together for several years prior to the
demise of the deceased.
They initially leased a premises where they
lived and later bought a property together which was registered in
the name of A[....].
It is common cause that the deceased paid an
amount in excess of R500 000.00 towards the purchase price of
this property.
[31]
A further issue which the applicants
alleged were not properly investigated is the allegation that the
relationship between the
deceased and A[....] had terminated before
the death of the deceased. The applicants acknowledged that A[....]
and the deceased
had a tumultuous relationship and that there were
occasions when the deceased would go and stay at his house in
Gansbaai after
disagreements. The two would mend their relationship
and the deceased would move back to their shared home.
[32]
According to the first respondent, it was
precisely because of contradictory versions of the relationship
between A[....] and the
deceased that they decided to conduct their
own forensic investigation, which investigation concluded that the
relationship between
the deceased and A[....] was like that of a
married couple. The deceased did in fact go to stay at his house in
Gansbaai a few
days before his passing, but I agree that this is not
indicative that his relationship with A[....] had terminated.
[33]
Both the forensic investigation report as
well as the reasons for the final decision of the board which are
contained in the very
comprehensive letter from the fund dated 7
October 2020 are indicative that the board gathered a considerable
amount of information
before they made their decision to allocate the
death benefits to A[....]. The board clearly considered all relevant
factors pertaining
to the identified dependants. In paragraph 11 of
the letter, they stated:
“
The
trustees take the following factors into account when looking at each
dependant’s dependency needs:
·
Nature and extent of material support
·
Financial need
ü
Special circumstances
ü
Other sources
ü
Ages
ü
Future income-earning capacity
·
Nature of relationship with [the]
deceased
·
Amount available for distribution
·
Wishes of the deceased.”
[34]
The letter then proceeds to state what the
board found in applying the above factors. I quote verbatim what
these findings are:
“
12.
The Deceased’s mother (C de Swart):
She
qualifies as a dependent as she received R5,000 per month from the
Deceased. She has no source of income and will continue to
receive
R5,000 from the Trust. Considering the nature of her relationship
with the deceased (being his mother) and the fact that
her financial
dependency needs will be met fully through the R5,000 she will
continue to receive from the Trust, the Trustees of
the Fund decided
to allocate 0% of the benefit to her.
13.    The
Deceased’s ex-spouse (S G[....])
She was married to the
Deceased and their marriage was dissolved by a divorce order granted
on 24 April 2009. She qualifies as a
dependent as she received
monthly maintenance from the Deceased in the amount of R17,000 for
herself and her minor son, H G[....].
According to the Trustee of the
Trust, she will continue to receive R12,000 for herself as the
Deceased had a duty to maintain
her for the rest of her life.
Considering the nature of her relationship with the Deceased (being
his ex-spouse), her age and the
fact that her future financial
dependency needs will be met through the Trust continuing to pay her
R12,000 per month for the rest
of her life, the Trustees decided to
allocated 0% of the benefit to her.
14.
The Deceased’s life partner (C A[....])
According
to the Fund’s information, she was the Deceased’s life
partner and she lived with him since 10 June 2015.
Due to the
Trustees receiving contradictory information relating to the nature
and permanency of her relationship with the Deceased,
the Trustees
appointed the Fund’s Administrator’s Forensics Department
to investigate this matter. The Forensics Department
interviewed
various persons that were not related to either C A[....] or the
Deceased, who confirmed that their relationship was
similar to that
of a married couple. The Trustees were comfortable with the
independence and impartiality of the persons interviewed
and accepted
the finding of the Forensics Department. Ms A[....] is employed and
she and the Deceased were co-dependent on one
another for their
household financial needs. It is in that regard that she qualifies as
a dependent in the first instance. In the
second instance, she
qualifies as a dependent by virtue of the fact that she was his life
partner. Section 1 of the Act defines
‘spouse’ to include
a permanent life partner for purposes of the Act and reads as
follows:
“’
spouse’
means a person who is the permanent life partner or spouse or civil
union partner of a member in accordance with the
Marriage Act, 1961
(Act 68 of 1961), the recognition of Customary Marriages Act, 1998
(Act 68 of 1997), or the Civil Union Act,
2006 (Act 17 of 2006), or
the tenets of a religion”. Considering the nature of her
relationship with the Deceased (being
his life-partner), her age and
level of income (being in her early fifties which does not give her
many working years ahead of
her prior to reaching the normal
retirement age), and the fact that she will not receive anything from
the Deceased’s estate,
including the Trust which has assets
worth over R40 million, the Trustees decided to allocate 100% of her
benefit to her. She will
receive the entire death benefit in the
amount of R1,207,277.
15. The Deceased’s
major son (B G[....])
He is a child of the Deceased and therefore
qualifies as a dependent. According to the Fund’s information,
he is employed
and earns about R66,000 per annum. He was financially
dependent on the Deceased and now receives R8,000 per month from the
Trust.
He is an income and capital beneficiary of the Trust with
assets worth approximately R42 million. Considering the nature of his

relationship with the Deceased (being his son), his age and level of
income (being in his twenties which gives him many working
years
ahead of him), and the fact that any financial dependency needs would
be more than fully met through what he stands to receive
from the
Trust (being the income and capital beneficiary), the Trustees
decided to allocate 0% of the benefit to him.
16. The Deceased’s
major daughter (C G[....])
She is a child of the Deceased and
therefore qualifies as a dependent. She did not live with the
Deceased. She is a registered student
at the University of South
Africa under the LLB program and she is employed as a bartender. She
received R7,000 per month from
the Trust and she is an income and
capital beneficiary of the Trust with assets worth approximately R42
million. Considering the
nature of her relationship with the Deceased
(being his daughter) her age and level of income (being in her
twenties which gives
her many working years ahead of her), and the
fact that any financial dependency needs would be more than fully met
through was
she stands to receive from the Trust (being the income
and capital beneficiary), the Trustees decided to allocate 0% of the
benefit
to her.
17. The Deceased’s
minor son (H G[....])
He is a child of the Deceased and therefore
qualifies as a dependent. According to the Fund’s information,
he is still a school-going
learner. He lives with his mother, S
G[....]. He was financially dependent on the Deceased and now
receives R5,000 from the Trust.
He is an income and capital
beneficiary of the Trust with assets worth approximately R42 million.
Considering the nature of his
relationship with the Deceased (being
his son), his age, and the fact that any financial dependency needs
would be more than fully
met through what he stands to receive from
the Trust (being the income and capital beneficiary), the Trustees
decided to allocate
0% of the benefit to him.”
[35]
The comprehensive nature of the letter
dated 7 October 2020 with its content leads one to conclude that the
board did in fact conduct
a thorough investigation and took into
account all the relevant and pertinent information that was at its
disposal. I agree with
counsel for the first respondent that the
applicants cannot complain that the principle of
audi
alteram partem
was not adhered to. The
applicants were furnished with the board’s preliminary finding
and were given a reasonable opportunity
to furnish the board with all
relevant information. They also had such opportunity when they lodged
their complaint with the board.
[36]
As for the dependency of A[....] on the
deceased, I have already dealt with the fact that they lived together
and shared a common
home. The applicants complained that A[....] is
employed and earned a higher income than that of the deceased when he
was alive.
In this regard, the board concluded in its final decision
as follows:
“
Ms
A[....] is
employed and she and the
Deceased were co-dependence on one another for their household
financial needs. It is in that regard that
she qualifies as a
dependent in the first instance. In the second instance, she
qualifies as a dependant by virtue of the fact
that she was his life
partner. Section 1 of the [Pension Funds] Act defines ‘spouse’
to include a permanent life partner
for purposes of the Act
.”
[37]
It is without doubt that the co-habitation
between the deceased and A[....] entailed that they shared household
expenses, such as
for utilities, food, household maintenance, etc.
Without the contributions of the deceased, A[....] has to carry such
expenses
on her own.
[38]
It is clear that the board took into
account that the trust will continue to meet the applicant’s
financial needs. This is
the case despite the applicant’s
averment that the deceased estate may have a cash shortfall of R9.4
million which may necessitate
the sale of certain assets. The end
result, as concluded by the adjudicator, would still be that the
applicants would be far better
off than A[....]. The death benefit
which was allocated to A[....] in the amount of R 1 201 277.00
is insignificant in
comparison to the assets held by the trust. I
agree with the adjudicator’s conclusion that the board’s
decision regarding
the distribution of the death benefit is both
reasonable and equitable.
[39]
The
adjudicator is in full agreement with the board’s decision to
allocate the full amount of the death benefit to A[....],
based on
the same reasons. I am mindful that with the discretion conferred on
the board in section 37C of the Act, the board’s
decision
cannot be interfered with without more.
[9]
The adjudicator, or the court, can interfere in circumstances where
it is demonstrated that the board took into account irrelevant,

improper or irrational factors, or where its decision can be said to
be one that no reasonable body of trustees properly directing

themselves could have reached.
[10]
This is not such a case and the adjudicator’s decision
therefore cannot be faulted, in my view. The applicants did not make

out a case for the setting aside of the adjudicator’s decision,
and the application falls to be dismissed.
[40]
As for costs, there is no reason why costs
should not follow the outcome.
[41]
In the result, I order that the application
is dismissed with costs.
S HOCKEY
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
Appearances
:
For the
applicant:
Adv LJ Smit
Instructed by

De Vries De Wet & Krouwkam Attorneys
For the
Respondents:       Adv S Khumalo SC
Instructed
by
Shepstone & Wylie Attorneys
[1]
The
decisions referred to was actually that of the board and is dealt
with as such. In any event, counsel for the applicants abandoned
the
review of these decisions and only persisted with the challenge of
the decision by the adjudicator.
[2]
Section
218(d) of the FSR Act refers to “
a
decision of a statutory ombud in terms of a financial sector law in
relation to a specific complaint by a person
”,
and the Act is included in Schedule 1 of the FSR Act as “
a
financial sector law
”.
[3]
See
University
of Pretoria Provident Fund v Du Preez
2015
JDR 1978 (GP) at para 12
[4]
“
Dependent”,
in relation to a member is defined in section 1 of the Act as:
(a)
a person in respect of whom the member is legally liable for
maintenance;
(b)
a person in respect of whom the member is not legally liable for
maintenance, if such person-
(i)
was, in the opinion of the board, upon the death of the member in
fact dependent on the member for maintenance;
(ii)
is the spouse of the member;
(iii)
is a child of the member, including a posthumous child, an adopted
child and a child born out of wedlock.
(c)
a person in respect of whom the member would have become legally
liable for maintenance, had the member not died;
[5]
(96855/16)
[2017] ZAGPPHC 1153 (7 December 2017)
[6]
Ibid
at para 7
[7]
"Complaint" is defined in section 1 of the Act as meaning
“a complaint of a complainant relating to the administration

of a fund, the investment of its funds or the interpretation and
application of its rules, and alleging-
(a)
that a decision of the fund or any person purportedly taken in terms
of the rules was in excess of the powers of that fund
or person, or
an improper exercise of its powers;
(b)
that the complainant has sustained or may sustain prejudice in
consequence of the maladministration of the fund by the fund
or any
person, whether by act or omission;
(c)
that a dispute of fact or law has arisen in relation to a fund
between the fund or any person and the complainant; or
(d)
that an employer who participates in a fund has not fulfilled its
duties in terms of the rules of the fund; but shall
not include
a complaint which does not relate to a specific complainant”.
[8]
2003
(2) SA 715
(SCA) at para 8
[9]
See
Gerson
v Mondi Pension Fund and Others
2013 (6) SA 162
(GP) at para 28
[10]
See
Letsoalo
v Lukhaimane NO
JDR 2018 0277 (GP) at para 20