Coyne Healthcare (Pty) Ltd v Coyne and Others (18586/2021) [2022] ZAWCHC 54 (19 April 2022)

80 Reportability
Contract Law

Brief Summary

Interdict — Non-solicitation and confidentiality — Applicant sought interdicts against former CEO to prevent solicitation of customers and disclosure of confidential information post-termination of employment — First respondent had signed a contract containing non-solicitation and confidentiality clauses — Court assessed evidence under the Plascon-Evans rule, finding no grounds to dismiss the first respondent's version as untenable — Interdicts granted to protect applicant's legitimate business interests and confidential information.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


The matter was an application in the Western Cape Division of the High Court, Cape Town, in which the applicant, Coyne Healthcare (Pty) Ltd (“Healthcare”), sought final interdictory relief against the first respondent, Mr Kevin Geoffrey Coyne, and (in related respects) against the second respondent, Natroceutics SA (Pty) Ltd (“Natroceutics”). The interdictory relief ultimately pursued on the papers was confined to the restraints sought in paragraphs 6 and 7 of Part B of the notice of motion, namely a non-solicitation interdict operative until 28 January 2023, and an interdict restraining the use or disclosure of confidential information.


The procedural history included that Healthcare had initially sought interim relief in Part A, but that interim application was struck from the roll for lack of urgency with costs in November 2021. By the time of the hearing of the Part B relief, Healthcare did not persist with other substantive relief originally sought in the notice of motion (including relief relating to alleged interference with third-party contracts and the return of a laptop), save insofar as those issues were mentioned in the papers.


The general subject-matter of the dispute concerned post-employment restraints in an employment context. Healthcare relied on restraint-like provisions in Mr Coyne’s earlier written employment terms (including a non-solicitation clause and confidentiality provisions), contending that Mr Coyne’s subsequent role at a competitor (Natroceutics) and certain developments in the market justified interdictory protection.


Because the relief sought would have had final effect, the court approached factual disputes on affidavit in accordance with the Plascon-Evans rule.


2. Material Facts


Healthcare operated in the complementary and alternative medicine sector and was ultimately owned by a Swiss entity, Phytoceutics International AG (“PIAG”). Mr Coyne had been active in the relevant industry since 2005, had developed products and conducted consultancy activities through Coyne Consulting CC, and had been involved in establishing Healthcare (initially as a close corporation in 2013 and later as a company in 2016).


Following Healthcare’s conversion into a company, PIAG acquired all the shares in Healthcare from Mr Coyne’s wife and mother-in-law. Mr Coyne became Chief Executive Officer of Healthcare and remained in that role until the termination of his appointment on 28 January 2021, after serving a six-month notice period following his resignation in July 2020.


The operative contractual framework relied upon by Healthcare included a letter of appointment dated 25 July 2016, which contained a non-competition and non-solicitation clause (clause 27) and an extensive confidentiality clause (clause 17). In 2019, with the knowledge and consent of PIAG’s controlling personnel, a salary review occurred, resulting in a substantial remuneration increase for Mr Coyne. A new written contract was drawn up and countersigned by Mr Coyne’s mother-in-law as a director of Healthcare, intended (on its terms) to replace and supersede the 2016 letter of appointment.


A central factual feature was that the 2019 contract did not contain a non-solicitation clause, although it did contain a differently worded confidentiality provision. Healthcare contended that the 2019 contract was invalid because it had not been approved as required by section 75 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, given the circumstances in which it was concluded. Mr Coyne initially contended that Healthcare was estopped from relying on invalidity because it had implemented the 2019 contract in practice (including paying remuneration in accordance with it and holding him to its notice provisions), but that reliance on estoppel was abandoned at the hearing.


After leaving Healthcare, Mr Coyne became CEO of Natroceutics, which operated as a competitor in the same broad sector, supplying products to retail pharmacy chains (including Clicks and Dis-Chem), health shops, and medical practitioners. The evidence accepted for purposes of the application indicated that products in this sector were commonly generic in nature with variations, and that competition occurred through branding and price, with multiple manufacturers’ products stocked side-by-side.


Healthcare pointed to the termination of its distribution agreement with BetterYou as indicating solicitation or improper conduct. On Mr Coyne’s version (which the court held had to be accepted on the papers), BetterYou’s representative approached him after he had moved to Natroceutics; he took advice and directed that the inquiry be handled by others at Natroceutics, did not attend the meeting with BetterYou, and BetterYou ultimately terminated its agreement with Healthcare on the basis of a contractually contemplated change in management. The court recorded that, in the months between Mr Coyne’s move and the institution of proceedings, Healthcare was unable to identify any customer lost to Natroceutics.


In relation to confidentiality, Healthcare’s concerns (as inferred from the founding papers) related to Mr Coyne’s knowledge of customer and trade connections, pricing structures, and product composition. The respondents disputed misuse or disclosure. The court assessed whether the information relied on by Healthcare was truly confidential and whether misuse had been shown.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions the court was required to determine were whether Healthcare had established a basis for final interdictory relief restraining Mr Coyne from soliciting customers and restraining him from using or disclosing Healthcare’s confidential information.


The dispute required the court to determine issues of application of law to fact under the evidentiary constraints applicable to final relief on motion, including the resolution of material factual disputes under Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 623 (A).


A further legal issue concerned the effect of the 2019 employment contract on the enforceability of the 2016 non-solicitation clause, including whether the 2019 contract was invalid for want of statutory compliance under section 75 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, and whether any remedial doctrine (in particular estoppel) could overcome non-compliance with statutory validity requirements. Although estoppel was not pursued, the court also addressed (and rejected) the suggestion that it should validate the 2019 agreement in the exercise of a discretion under section 75(8).


In respect of confidential information, the legal question was whether Healthcare had proved the requirements for an interdict protecting confidential information, including whether the information had the requisite quality of confidentiality and whether improper use or threatened misuse had been shown on the evidence.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court began by emphasising that the relief sought in paragraphs 6 and 7 would have final effect, which required the evidence to be evaluated under the Plascon-Evans approach. Accordingly, where disputes of fact existed, the application had to be decided on the respondents’ version unless it was so far-fetched that it could be rejected on the papers.


On the non-solicitation restraint, the court dealt first with the contractual foundation. Mr Coyne argued that the 2016 non-solicitation clause had been displaced by the 2019 agreement, which superseded prior agreements and omitted any equivalent restraint. Healthcare’s response was that the 2019 agreement was invalid because it had not been approved in compliance with section 75 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 in the circumstances. The respondents’ earlier reliance on estoppel was abandoned after reference to authority stating that statutory formalities required for validity cannot generally be overcome through estoppel, and the court proceeded on the basis that estoppel did not assist.


The court also rejected an invitation to validate the 2019 agreement by exercising discretion under section 75(8). The court’s reasoning focused on the shareholder-protective purpose of the statutory regime and considered it inappropriate to validate a replacement contract that removed a restraint provision without properly informing the shareholder. The court accepted that communications may have left the shareholder’s directors with the understanding that the material change was confined to remuneration, and that validating the agreement in those circumstances would undermine the objective of shareholder protection.


Having reached the position that the 2016 non-solicitation clause remained relevant, the court nevertheless held that Healthcare had not established that Mr Coyne breached it, nor that there were reasonable grounds to apprehend a breach warranting an interdict. The court accepted the respondents’ explanation of the nature of competition in the sector and the retail environment, noting that chains stock multiple brands and that the “ultimate customer” is the high-street shopper, such that it did not follow that stocking a competitor’s products would entail ceasing to purchase Healthcare’s products.


The BetterYou episode was specifically assessed through the Plascon-Evans lens. The court held that Mr Coyne’s version—that BetterYou approached him, that he directed the inquiry away from himself after taking advice, and that he did not attend the relevant meeting—was not inherently improbable and could not be rejected on the papers. On that accepted version, the court concluded that no actionable infringement of the non-solicitation clause had been demonstrated. The court added that, even if an argument could be made that clause 27(a) might be implicated by BetterYou’s appointment of Natroceutics as distributor while Mr Coyne was its CEO, the court would in any event be unwilling to enforce it in that context because it would operate as a purely anti-competitive measure not justified by any demonstrated need to protect proprietary rights.


On the confidentiality interdict, the court noted the breadth and uncertainty in the notion of “confidential information” and referred to established discussions in the case law, as well as to Amler’s formulation of the essential characteristics of confidential information and the elements required for interdictory relief. The court distilled the requirements that needed to be met, including that the applicant must show a protectable interest in information that is not public knowledge, is of economic value, and is subject to a duty of confidence, together with improper possession or use.


Applying these principles, the court concluded that Healthcare had not identified confidential information of the required character and had not shown misuse. It was not persuaded that Healthcare’s customers constituted confidential information, given that they were discernible from publicly available sources and could be observed through ordinary retail distribution channels. The court was likewise not persuaded that any personal relationships with buyers had cognisable economic significance in the given market setting, particularly in the absence of evidence of any customer losses.


Similarly, the court rejected the proposition that the suppliers of raw materials were confidential, accepting evidence that such suppliers were well-known internationally and openly marketed themselves in trade contexts. With respect to pricing structures, the court held there was no evidence of disclosure or misuse, and considered that such information is time-sensitive and, if protectable at all, would primarily be valuable as a short-term “springboard”; by the time of the hearing, any such springboard utility had in any event elapsed because Mr Coyne had already been employed by Natroceutics for about a year.


As to alleged “trade secrets” in product composition, the court reasoned that the products appeared to be variations of generic alternative medicine products made by many manufacturers, that Healthcare had not shown copying, and that in any event labelling laws required disclosure of components, undermining any claim to confidentiality in the formulation.


Finally, the court explained that other relief in the notice of motion (relating to alleged unlawful interference with contracts and return of a laptop) had become unnecessary to determine. The applicant accepted that interference relief would require referral of disputes to oral evidence, but indicated it would not pursue such referral if unsuccessful on paragraphs 6 and 7, which was the outcome.


5. Outcome and Relief


The application for interdictory relief in terms of paragraphs 6 and 7 of the notice of motion was refused. The court dismissed the application in its entirety.


The court ordered that the application was dismissed with costs, including, in respect of each respondent, the fees of two counsel.


Cases Cited


Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd [1984] ZASCA 51; 1984 (3) SA 623 (A).


Philmatt (Pty) Ltd v Mosselbank Developments CC [1995] ZASCA 154 (29 November 1995); 1996 (2) SA 15 (SCA); [1996] 1 All SA 296 (A).


Van Castricum v Theunissen and Another 1993 (2) SA 726 (T).


Meter Systems Holdings Ltd v Venter and Another 1993 (1) SA 409 (W).


Telefund Raisers CC v Isaacs and Others 1998 (1) SA 521 (C).


Legislation Cited


Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 75 and section 75(8).


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The court held that, because the interdictory relief sought would have final effect, disputes of fact on affidavit fell to be determined under the Plascon-Evans approach. On that basis, Healthcare failed to establish, on the acceptable version of the facts, that Mr Coyne had breached the non-solicitation provisions in the 2016 employment terms or that an interdict was justified on an apprehension of breach.


The court further held that Healthcare failed to establish a protectable claim to confidentiality in the information relied upon, and in any event failed to show improper use or disclosure by Mr Coyne. The identity of customers and suppliers was not shown to be confidential in the market context described, pricing information was not shown to have been misused and was in any event time-sensitive, and product composition was not established as confidential given the generic nature of products and legally required disclosures.


The application was dismissed with costs, including the fees of two counsel for each respondent.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The judgment applied the principle that where final relief is sought on motion and material factual disputes arise, the matter must be decided on the respondents’ version unless that version is so far-fetched or untenable that it can be rejected on the papers, as articulated in Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd [1984] ZASCA 51; 1984 (3) SA 623 (A).


The judgment accepted the principle, drawn from Philmatt (Pty) Ltd v Mosselbank Developments CC [1995] ZASCA 154 (29 November 1995); 1996 (2) SA 15 (SCA); [1996] 1 All SA 296 (A), that where a statute prescribes formalities for validity, a failure to comply with those formalities cannot generally be cured through estoppel. Although estoppel was abandoned, the judgment proceeded in line with that proposition.


In relation to section 75 of the Companies Act, the judgment proceeded on the basis that statutory provisions designed for shareholder protection should not be undermined by validating conduct where material contractual changes were made without properly informing the shareholder, and it declined to validate the relevant agreement under section 75(8) in the circumstances presented.


For the protection of confidential information by interdict, the judgment applied the established requirements that the applicant must demonstrate a protectable interest in information with the necessary quality of confidentiality, a duty of confidence, knowledge (in the relevant sense) on the part of the respondent, and improper possession or use. It also endorsed the core characteristics of confidential information in this context as being useful in trade, not public knowledge but limited to a restricted class, and objectively of economic value to the claimant, and it evaluated the claimed information against those characteristics on the evidence.

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[2022] ZAWCHC 54
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Coyne Healthcare (Pty) Ltd v Coyne and Others (18586/2021) [2022] ZAWCHC 54 (19 April 2022)

Republic of South Africa
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
Case No. 18586/2021
Before:  The Hon. Mr Justice Binns-Ward
Date of hearing:  16 March
2022
Date of judgment: 19 April 2022
In the matter between:
COYNE HEALTHCARE (PTY) LTD
Applicant
and
KEVIN GEOFFREY
COYNE
First Respondent
NATROCEUTICS SA (PTY)
LTD
Second Respondent
JUDGMENT
BINNS-WARD
J:
[1]
The only substantive matters that require
determination in this application are the applicant’s prayers for
interdictory relief
in terms of paragraphs 6 and 7 in Part B of the
notice of motion in the following terms:
6.         The first
respondent be interdicted and restrained until 28 January 2023
from, either on his behalf or for any other person, directly or
indirectly approaching, canvassing, soliciting or otherwise
endeavouring
to entice away from the applicant any of its existing
customers and any person or Company who to the first respondent’s
knowledge,
during the two years preceding 29 January 2021, had been a
customer of the applicant.
7.         The first
respondent be interdicted and restrained from utilising, exploiting
and/or directly or indirectly divulging and/or disclosing to any
third party any of the applicant’s confidential information,
including
but not limited to the terms of any contract the applicant
has with any third party.
The applicant does not persist in seeking orders on the papers in
respect of the other substantive relief sought in its notice of
motion.  Its application for interim relief in terms of Part A
was struck from the roll with costs for lack of urgency in November
2021.
[2]
The relief sought by the applicant on the
papers would have final effect if granted, and accordingly, the
evidence falls to be assessed
consistently with the rule in
Plascon-Evans
.
[1]
That means that where a dispute of fact arises in the evidence
adduced on affidavit, the application must be decided on respondents’
version unless the respondents’ evidence on the issue is so
palpably far-fetched and untenable that it can be dismissed out of
hand on the papers.
[3]
The applicant company, to which I shall
hereafter refer as ‘Healthcare’, carries on business in the
complementary and alternative
medicine sector.  It is a wholly
owned subsidiary of a Swiss registered company, Phytoceutics
International AG (‘PIAG’).
Prior to its conversion into a
company in 2016, Healthcare was a close corporation.  The
members of the close corporation were
the first respondent’s wife
and mother-in-law.  Healthcare, the close corporation, was a
family business conducted by the
first respondent and his wife and
mother-in-law.
[4]
The first respondent, Mr Kevin Coyne, has
been active in the industry in Cape Town since 2005.  He
developed and successfully
launched his first ‘nutrition product’
in 2007.  In 2011 he established a consultancy business in the
sector, which he conducted
through a close corporation, Coyne
Consulting CC, which is still in existence.  He registered
Healthcare as a close corporation
in 2013.
[5]
Through his involvement in the industry,
the first respondent became acquainted with Mr Gerhardus (Gert)
Hoogland, who had his
own business in the complementary and
alternative healthcare sector, Pharma Plan.  Hoogland sold
Pharma Plan in 2013 and emigrated
to Switzerland, but he and the
first respondent remained in contact and continued to exchange
business ideas.
[6]
It was during the ongoing conversations
between Hoogland and the first respondent that the idea was floated
of Hoogland obtaining
an interest in the close corporation’s
business.  The proposition arose in the context of the interest
shown by a third party
at the time (2015) in acquiring Healthcare’s
business.  The first respondent sought Hoogland’s advice
concerning the third
party’s approaches.  Coyne was at that
stage intending to emigrate to Portugal, and he and Hoogland then
conceived the idea
that the close corporation should be converted
into a company to be held by an offshore entity in which the two of
them would, either
directly or indirectly, have an equal proprietary
interest.
[7]
After Healthcare’s conversion to a
company, PIAG, of which Hoogland appears to be the controlling mind,
acquired the all the shares
in it from the first respondent’s wife
and mother-in-law.  The first respondent averred that he had an
oral agreement with
Hoogland that he would have the option of
acquiring a 50 per cent shareholding in PIAG for the same
consideration as that for which
PIAG had acquired the shares in
Healthcare from his wife and mother-in law.  The taking up by
the first respondent of his contemplated
half share interest in PIAG
was deferred pending implementation of his plan to put in place an
offshore trust to hold it.  Whether
that plan was ever
implemented is not apparent on the papers, but according to the first
respondent, his relationship with Hoogland
soured a few years after
PIAG’s acquisition of Healthcare when Hoogland declined to honour
their understanding concerning first
respondent’s right to acquire
a 50 percent holding in PIAG.
[8]
After the conversion of Healthcare into a
company, the first respondent took up an appointment as its chief
executive officer.
The terms of his appointment were negotiated
with the directors of PIAG, Hoogland and Rosen.  His wife and
mother-in-law were
appointed as directors of the company and also
employed by it as consultants.  The first respondent remained
engaged as Healthcare’s
CEO until 28 January 2021, when his
appointment terminated after he had served out a 6-month notice
period after submitting his resignation
in July 2020.
Healthcare declined the first respondent’s request to be released
from the requirement to serve the full period
of notice.
[9]
The terms of the first respondent’s
appointment as Healthcare’s CEO were entrenched in a letter of
appointment dated 25 July 2016
signed by the first respondent and by
his mother-in-law representing the applicant company.
[10]
The non-solicitation interdict sought in
paragraph 6 of the notice of motion, quoted above, is founded on
clause 27 of the first respondent’s
forementioned contract of
employment.  It provided as follows:
NON-COMPETITION AND
NON-SOLICITATION
During the term of the
employment or if the employment relationship is terminated for any
reason for up to two (2) years after such
termination, you shall not:
a)
enter
into any professional or financial agreement with or provide services
to an existing customer or associate of the Company or
expected
customer or associate where negotiation and contact has already been
made with such expected customer or associate at the
time of
termination;
b)
either
on your behalf or for any other person, directly or indirectly
approach, canvass, solicit or otherwise endeavour to entice
away from
the Company any of its existing customers; and
c)
directly
or indirectly approach, canvass, solicit or otherwise endeavour to
entice away from the Company or any of its customers any
person or
Company who to your knowledge has been during the two years preceding
the termination of the employment contract a customer
or employee of
the Company or its customers.
[11]
The relief sought in paragraph 7 of the
notice of motion is founded on clause 17 of the first respondent’s
forementioned contract
of employment and also in Healthcare’s
proprietary right to the Company’s confidential information that is
protectable in common
law.  Clause 17 provided:
CONFIDENTIALITY
·
As
a condition of your employment you hereby agree to treat as
confidential any information and knowledge about the Company, its
products,
operations and any information which is said to be
confidential, which is attained in the course or employment with the
Company.
·
The
Confidential Information is of strategic importance to the business
of the Company and the Company accordingly has a legitimate
proprietary and commercial interest therein which the Company is
entitled to protect;
·
should
any of the Confidential Information become available to a competitor
of the Company, it could cause the Company considerable
financial
loss;
·
the
only effective and reasonable manner in which the Company’s
legitimate proprietary and commercial interests in the Confidential
Information could be protected so as to avoid financial loss to the
Company is by way of you furnishing the confidentiality undertakings
provided for in the paragraph below.
·
you
shall not during your appointment/employment by the Company or at any
time thereafter, either yourself utilise and/or directly
or
indirectly divulge and/or disclose to any third party (except as
required by the terms and nature of your appointment/employment
with
the Company) any of the company’s Confidential Information;
1.
you
shall not derive any benefit, whether directly or indirectly, from
the Confidential Information, Nor, without limiting the generality
of
the aforegoing, be engaged, involved, concerned or interested,
whether directly or indirectly, in the economic exploitation, whether
by marketing, promoting, advertising or selling in any manner
whatsoever, the Confidential Information;
2.
you
shall treat as confidential all confidential information which a
third party has in terms of any contract made available to the
Company and which has become known to you in the course of your
duties under this agreement, and you shall not divulge to other third
parties any information regarding such Confidential Information
contrary to the terms of the aforesaid contract;
3.
any
documents or records(including written instructions, drawings, notes
or memoranda) relating to the Confidential Information of
the Company
which all created by you or which come into your possession during
the existence of this agreement shall be deemed to
be the property of
the Company and shall be surrendered to the Company on demand, and in
any event on the termination of your ‘s
(sic) appointment by the
Company and the Company will not retain any copies thereof or extract
thereof.
·
Should
you leave the Company at any time for any reason no Company
information, documentation or property of any type or description
may
remain in your possession, even where these may have been of your own
creation.
·
All
work in the Company is strictly private and confidential and must be
treated as such even after the termination of your employment.
Under
no circumstances may details of any work including the names of
clients be repeated to any persons outside the office. Whilst
in the
office, no clients may be given the name of other clients or any
details relating to their affairs. Any breach of this confidentiality
will result in the (sic) immediate disciplinary action which could
result in the suspension or termination of your employment.
·
Without
prejudice to any other rights which the Company may have in law, you
acknowledge that the Company can proceed to claim for
breach of
confidentiality in the form of a penalty/fine which will be an amount
of not less than R50 000.00 (Fifty Thousand
Rand), and that the
Company shall be entitled to recover such amount, and any associated
recovery costs, from the employee in respect
of such breach.
·
Additionally,
legal procedures for a Civil Damages Claim will be instituted against
you by the Company.
[12]
During 2019, and with Hoogland’s consent,
the first respondent commissioned a salary review of Healthcare’s
employees, including
himself.  An independent consultant was
engaged to undertake the review of the first respondent’s
remuneration.  The
directors of PIAG were notified of the salary
review and acquiesced in the resultant very substantial increase in
the first respondent’s
remuneration.
[13]
The first respondent caused a new contract
of employment to be drawn up to reflect his altered remuneration.
The contract was
approved and countersigned by his mother-in-law in
her capacity as a director of the company.  According to its
terms, the new
contract replaced the letter of appointment agreement
concluded in 2016 and its provisions superseded the terms of any
previous agreement.
[14]
The 2019 agreement did not contain a
‘non-competition and non-solicitation’ clause.  It did
contain (in clause 21) a differently
worded confidentiality
protection clause.
[15]
The first respondent sought to meet the
applicant’s claim for relief in terms of paragraph 6 of the
notice of motion on the
basis that the non-solicitation clause in his
2016 contract of employment had been rendered redundant when he
concluded the 2019
contract that did not include an equivalent
provision.  Healthcare contended, however, that the 2019
agreement was invalid by
reason of not having been approved by the
shareholders of Healthcare, as required in the circumstances by
s 75
of the
Companies Act 71 of 2008
.
[16]
The first respondent responded by
contending that the applicant was estopped from asserting the
invalidity of the 2019 agreement because
it had implemented it in
various respects, notably by paying him the remuneration stipulated
therein, holding him to the altered
leave provisions and requiring
him to serve out the 6-month notice period that did not have an
equivalent in the 2016 agreement.
At the hearing, however, Mr
Miller
,
who appeared for the first respondent together with Ms
Stansfield
,
advisedly abandoned any reliance on estoppel after his attention had
been drawn by counsel for the applicant, Mr
Manca
SC, assisted by Mr
Elliot
SC,
to the judgment in
Philmatt (Pty) Ltd. v
Mosselbank Developments CC
[1995] ZASCA
154
(29 November
[1995] ZASCA 154
;
1995); 1996 (2) SA 15
(SCA);
[1996] 1 All SA 296
(A);
[1996] 1 All SA 296
(A), in which FH Grosskopf JA stated, with
reference to Rabie
The Law of Estoppel
in South Africa
106, and the
authorities there referred to, that ‘[g]enerally, where a statute
requires that certain formalities have to be complied
with in order
to render a transaction valid, a failure to comply with such
formalities cannot be remedied by estoppel’.
[17]
Mr
Miller
did attempt, albeit without evident conviction, nonetheless to
persuade me to declare the 2019 agreement to be valid in the exercise
of the court’s discretion in terms of
s 75(8).
I made it
clear at the time that it would be inappropriate to do so in
circumstances where the excision of the non-solicitation
clause had
been effected without informing the shareholder.  The exchanges
between the first respondent and Hoogland on the
subject would have
lulled PIAG’s directors into understanding that the only material
change being effected to Coyne’s terms of
employment was to his
remuneration.  It is apparent that the director of Healthcare
who insisted on Coyne serving out the 6-month
period of notice
provided for in the 2019 agreement did so ignorant of the existence
of the 2016 agreement and acting on the basis
of the 2019 document
which the first respondent had represented, and probably believed at
the time, was the applicable agreement.
It would defeat the
object of the provision, which is directed at shareholder protection,
to validate the replacement contract containing
amendments to Coyne’s
originally negotiated engagement agreement to which the directors of
the shareholder company, PIAG, would
probably not have agreed had
they been alerted to them.
[18]
The question then is does the evidence
prove that the first respondent has breached the non-solicitation
clause or that the applicant
has reasonable grounds to apprehend that
he will do so if not interdicted.  I am not persuaded that it
does.
[19]
After leaving the applicant’s employ, the
first respondent took up an appointment as the chief executive
officer of the second respondent.
The second respondent is a
competitor of Healthcare.  It was established at more or less
the same time as the first respondent’s
resignation from Healthcare
became effective.  It makes a number of products that are
equivalent to but different to those sold
by the applicant.  As
in the case of Healthcare and other similar enterprises which
manufacture products in the complementary
and alternative medicine
sector, the second respondent sells them to pharmaceutical outlet
chains such as Clicks and Dis-Chem as
well as to health shops who
specialise in selling alternative medicine products and to medical
practitioners who prescribe and supply
such products for their
patients.  The identity of such medical practitioners is easily
ascertainable on the internet.
[20]
The first respondent has convincingly
explained that there are any number of comparable product ranges
manufactured by a number of
producers locally and abroad.  They
compete by individualising the compound composition of commonly known
remedies, resulting
in the availability to the retail buyer of a
choice made up of a variety of refinements of generic products.
The principal
method by which a manufacturer distinguishes its
products from those of its competitors is by price and branding.
[21]
The respondents illustrated by way of
photographs of the competing products of Healthcare and the second
respondent as they would
appear to a shopper in a pharmaceutical
store that there is no danger of the applicant’s products being
confused with those of
the second respondent.  The major
pharmaceutical chains, which, as mentioned, are the main customers of
businesses like those
of the applicant and the first respondent,
stock products from multiple producers to give shoppers a choice.
Anyone who has
ever shopped for toothpaste or deodorant in a
supermarket or pharmaceutical store will have first-hand experience
of the set-up described
by the respondents.  It is the high
street shopper who is the ultimate customer.
[22]
Accordingly, it does not follow that
because Clicks and Dis-Chem now stock the second respondent’s
products, they will stop purchasing
those of Healthcare.  Indeed,
as emphasised by the first respondent, it is telling in the
circumstances that the applicant has
not been able to identify a
single customer lost to the second respondent in the seven months
that intervened between Mr Coyne’s
engagement as the second
respondent’s CEO and the institution of these proceedings.
[23]
The applicant has shown that BetterYou has
terminated its distribution agreement with Healthcare.
BetterYou is not properly
described as a customer of Healthcare.
It does not purchase Healthcare’s products.  It contracted
with Healthcare to
distribute BetterYou’s products.  To bring
the non-solicitation clause in the first respondent’s 2016 letter
of appointment
to bear, one would have to characterise BetterYou as
an ‘associate’ of Healthcare.
[24]
During his conduct of the business of Coyne
Consulting CC, the first respondent established commercial
relationships with certain
overseas product suppliers, namely
BetterYou, Nelsons and Similasan.  Coyne Consulting CC had been
importing BetterYou products
since 2012 for supply to Dis-Chem.
His dealings with Nelsons and Similisan stretched back even further.
He transferred
the business he did with these suppliers to Healthcare
when he assumed the position of chief executive officer of Healthcare
after
its conversion from a close corporation into a Company.
[25]
The first respondent has testified that
during May 2021 he was approached by the person with whom he used
principally to deal at BetterYou.
The person concerned had
contacted him to enquire about the possibility of appointing the
second respondent as a local distributor.
The first respondent
avers that, apparently mindful that any such appointment could give
rise to problems with his previous employer
and having taken legal
advice, he informed his interlocutor that he should rather discuss
the matter with other persons in the second
respondent company.
That was the course that was followed, and after a meeting between
representatives of BetterYou and the
second respondent, which the
first respondent did not attend, and a following due diligence
exercise conducted by BetterYou, a distribution
agreement was
concluded and BetterYou terminated its contract with Healthcare.
The reason given for BetterYou’s termination
of its contract with
Healthcare was a change in the management of the applicant.
That was a factor stipulated in BetterYou’s
contract with
Healthcare that would entitle it to cancel the distribution
agreement.
[26]
The first respondent’s evidence
concerning the approach from BetterYou is not inherently improbable.
On the contrary, it is
evident that he had a long-standing personal
connection with contacts at BetterYou, and therefore understandable
that, when he left
Heathcare and took up employment with another
company carrying on business in the field, BetterYou might choose to
follow him.
No infringement of the non-solicitation part of
clause 27 of the first respondent’s letter of appointment was
involved on
the version set forth in the first respondent’s
answering affidavit.  Applying the rule in
Plascon-Evans
,
that is the version that must be accepted for the purpose of deciding
the matter.  It is not a version that can be rejected
on the
papers.
[27]
Insofar as it might be arguable that
sub-clause (a) of clause 27 pertained in the context of BetterYou’s
engagement of the second
respondent as its distribution agent in
circumstances in which Mr Coyne was Natroceutics’ CEO, I would not
be willing to grant
an order enforcing the clause.  To do so
would, in my judgment, be a purely anti-competitive measure not
justifiable by any
demonstrated need for the reasonable protection of
the applicant’s proprietary rights.
[28]
For these reasons, the application for
relief in terms of paragraph 6 of the notice of motion will be
refused.
[29]
Turning now to address the claim for
interdictory relief to protect the applicant’s confidential
information.
[30]
The term ‘confidential information’ has
a very wide but not very clearly defined import.  What might be
comprehended as ‘confidential
information’ in the relevant
context has been discussed in a number of reported judgments
[2]
and it would be a supererogation to retraverse that well-trodden
ground here.  Harms,
Amler's
Precedents of Pleading
9
th
ed. (LexisNexis 2018) offers the following succinct statement of the
essential characteristics of ‘confidential information’
in the
sense relevant in proceedings such as these: ‘Information is
considered confidential … if it is (i) useful – that is,
if it
involves and is capable of application in trade or industry; (ii)
(objectively determined) not public knowledge or public property
but
known to a restricted number of persons; and (iii) objectively
of economic value to the plaintiff’.
[3]
[31]
The essential elements that a litigant
claiming interdictory relief to protect its confidential information
has to allege and prove
are set forth in
Amler
supra,
[4]
as follows (cited authorities omitted):
‘
(a)      The plaintiff
must have a proprietary, quasi-proprietary or other legal interest in
the confidential
information.
(b)       The information must have had
the necessary quality of confidentiality.
(c)        A relationship, usually
contractual, between the parties, which imposes a duty (expressly,
impliedly or tacitly) on the defendant to preserve the confidence of
the information. An example of a contractual relationship is
that
between employer and employee or between partners and business
associates.  A plaintiff in a delictual claim may, for example,
rely on the fact that the defendant is a trade rival who obtained
information in an improper manner.
(d)       The defendant must have had
knowledge of the confidentiality of the information and its value.
(Actual knowledge is probably not required.)
(e)        Improper possession or
use of the information, whether as a springboard or otherwise,
by the
defendant.
(f)        Damages suffered, if
any.’
The last-mentioned element does not apply in these proceedings, which
are for only interdictory relief.
[32]
The terms of the interdictory relief sought
by the applicant do not specify the nature of the confidential
information for which it
seeks protection, but the evidence in the
founding papers suggests that its concerns go to the knowledge by the
first respondent
of its trade and customer connections, its pricing
structures and its trade secrets in relation to the composition of
the products
that it manufactures.  The applicant pointed to
certain factors that might support its suspicion that the second
respondent
was established as a vehicle through which the first
respondent would be able to carry on business in competition with
it.
The first and second respondents have denied that there is
any substance to the applicant’s suspicions.  The respondents’
evidence cannot be rejected out of hand, but ex hypothesi even were I
to accept that the applicant’s suspicions were well-founded
it
would not affect the result of this part of the case.  The
applicant is in any event not seeking to bar the first respondent
from continuing in the second respondent’s employment.
[33]
I related earlier in this judgment that the
applicant and the second respondent deal essentially with the same
customers.  Those
customers are the obvious ones for any
enterprise manufacturing the type of product that the applicant and
the second respondent
do and in the nature of things they do not
purchase and stock product exclusively from any single manufacturer
but rather from a
number of suppliers so as to be able to offer a
range of choice to their retail customers or patients as the case
might be.
I am not persuaded that the identity of the
applicant’s customers is confidential information.  On the
contrary, it is something
that anyone walking past the shelves in any
of the many stockists of its products will be able to see for
themselves.
[34]
I also do not consider that the contacts or
personal relationships that the first respondent might have had with
buyers at any of
the applicant’s customers is likely to have had
any cognisable economic significance.  It seems to me that such
connections
are unlikely in the given context to cause any customer
to stop purchasing Healthcare’s products and buy those of the
second respondent
instead.  I reiterate that the applicant has
not been able to offer evidence proving the loss of even a single
customer.
[35]
I am also not persuaded that the identity
of the suppliers of the raw materials used in the manufacture of the
applicant’s products
is confidential information.  The first
respondent has testified, convincingly, that the suppliers of raw
materials are well
known internationally and that many of them
advertise themselves regularly at various trade fairs and conventions
to which producers
such as the applicant and the second respondent
are routinely invited.
[36]
There is no evidence to support the notion
that the first respondent has divulged or misused the knowledge that
he had of the applicant’s
pricing structures.  That is in any
event the sort of information that changes with time to adapt to
changing costs and market
conditions.  If it had a protectable
value, the information could only be of use in a springboarding
situation, and the time
for that has passed now that the first
respondent has already completed a full year in the second
respondent’s employ.
[37]
The applicant has also failed to establish
that the first respondent has misused any information concerning the
make-up of its products
during his employment with the second
respondent.  It is admitted that the second respondent
manufactures certain products that
are equivalent in material
respects to some of the applicant’s products, but it seems to me
that those products are merely varieties
of generic products made by
any number of manufacturers of alternative medicines.  The
applicant has not shown that any of the
second respondent’s
products are copies of the products that it makes.  The
components of the products made by alternative
medicine manufacturers
are required by law to be disclosed on the labelling of the products
and accordingly the information is not
confidential.
[38]
For all these reasons I have not been
satisfied that the applicant has made out a case for the relief
sought in paragraph 7 of
the notice of motion.
[39]
The applicant had also sought, in para 8 of
its notice of motion, an interdict restraining the first and second
respondents from unlawfully
interfering with the applicant’s
contracts with third parties, and in particular, the distribution
agreements between the applicant
and BetterYou, Nelsons and
Similasan.  I have already discussed the circumstances
concerning BetterYou’s cancellation of its
contract with Healthcare
earlier in this judgment.  According to the first respondent,
Nelsons also showed some interest in
concluding a distribution
agreement with the second respondent, but it has failed to follow up
its initial exploratory approaches.
The respondents deny that
they have had any dealings with Similisan.  The applicant
accepted that it could not obtain relief
in terms of paragraph 8 of
its notice of motion without a referral of the pertinent disputes of
fact on the papers for determination
after the hearing of oral
evidence.
[40]
The second respondent, represented by Mr
Miltz
SC
and Mr
Smith
,
opposed the reference of any issues to oral evidence.  They
argued that the disputes of fact were eminently foreseeable and
that
in any event the applicant had failed to define the issues it sought
to have referred to oral evidence.  It has ultimately
become
unnecessary to make any determination on those contentions because Mr
Manca
intimated that the applicant would not press its application to refer
any matters to oral evidence if it proved unsuccessful in obtaining
interdictory relief against the first respondent in terms of
paragraphs 6 and 7 of the notice of motion.
[41]
The same goes for the relief sought in
paragraph 9 of the notice of motion for an order directing the first
respondent to return the
laptop issued to him by the applicant when
he was in its employ.  There was a dispute between the parties
concerning ownership
of the device.  The first respondent
averred that he had had the information stored on the laptop
professionally deleted after
his departure from the applicant
company.
[42]
In the result an order will issue in the
following terms:
The application is dismissed with costs, including, in respect of
each of the respondents, the fees of two counsel.
A.G. BINNS-WARD
Judge of the High Court
[1]
Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints
(Pty) Ltd
[1984] ZASCA 51
;
1984 (3) SA 623
(A) at
634E-635C.
[2]
See, for example,
Van
Castricum v Theunissen and Another
1993 (2) SA 726
(T) at 730-736;
Meter
Systems Holdings Ltd v Venter and Another
1993 (1) 409 (W) at 426-432 and
Telefund
Raisers CC v Isaacs and Others
1998
(1) SA 521
(C) at 528-531.
[3]
At p.93.
[4]
At pp.93-94.