Firstrand Bank Limited v Mqambeli N.O and Another (17111/20) [2021] ZAWCHC 266 (20 December 2021)

85 Reportability
Trusts and Estates

Brief Summary

Execution — Sale in execution — Application for special execution of property — Executor of estate unable to pay mortgage bond due to lack of funds — Child heir's refusal to consent to sale raises concerns about best interests of the child — Court mandates further investigation into child's circumstances and representation — Sale of property not granted without consideration of child's rights and welfare.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


The proceedings were an unopposed application for default judgment brought in the Western Cape High Court, Cape Town, in the roll commonly referred to as the Third Division. The applicant (described in the heading as the plaintiff) sought a money judgment for the outstanding mortgage debt, together with interest and costs, and further sought an order declaring immovable property specially executable, authorising the issue of a warrant of attachment and execution by the sheriff, and regulating the sale of the property (including a request for a sale without a reserve price, alternatively the fixing of a reserve price, and further directions if a reserve price were not achieved).


The applicant was Firstrand Bank Limited (FNB). The first respondent was Bukani Gladwell Mqambeli N.O., cited in his capacity as executor in the deceased estate of the late Thembeka Ethel Batala (formerly Mqambeli) (Estate No 001442/2019). The second respondent was the City of Cape Town Municipality, cited due to its interests as local authority in relation to the property.


The matter came before Thulare AJ for determination on the papers as an unopposed default application. Although the relief sought was framed as routine debt enforcement, the court treated the papers as raising issues requiring further investigation because the mortgaged property formed part of a deceased estate in which a minor child was an heir, and the child was reported to have refused to consent to an attempted sale.


The dispute’s general subject-matter was therefore the enforcement of mortgage debt against a deceased estate, coupled with an application for special execution against residential immovable property, intersecting with children’s constitutional and statutory protections in circumstances where the affected child was not before the court and relevant information about the child’s position was absent from the papers.


2. Material Facts


In February 2006 and October 2006, the deceased registered two mortgage bonds in favour of FNB as security for monies lent and advanced. The mortgaged property was Erf 112871 Cape Flats, situated within the City of Cape Town. The bonds and associated obligations required monthly payments, and included a term that, upon default, the full outstanding amount would become payable and FNB could seek an order declaring the property specially executable.


The deceased died in December 2018. Following the death, payments on the bond ceased. On FNB’s version, it communicated with the executor, who reported that there were no funds in the estate to service the bond obligations.


FNB also alleged that the executor had been unsuccessful in selling the property, notwithstanding having secured a buyer, because the Master did not approve the sale as a minor child heir refused to agree to the sale. FNB’s papers further alleged that the property was not the minor child’s primary residence because it was vacant. FNB contended that a sale by public auction was prudent to avoid vandalisation and to limit financial loss to the estate arising from increasing arrears and municipal charges.


At the time of the application, the arrears were stated to be R93 723.34, equating to approximately 26 months’ instalments since November 2018.


The court identified several material uncertainties on the papers. It was not clear whether the executor was also the child’s care-giver as contemplated in the Children’s Act 38 of 2005, nor were the whereabouts of the child disclosed beyond the statement that the property was vacant. The reasons for the minor child’s refusal to consent to a sale were also not before the court. The court regarded these missing facts as materially relevant to determining whether the drastic remedy of special execution ought to be granted in the circumstances.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions concerned whether, on an unopposed default basis, the court could grant the relief sought—particularly an order declaring the property specially executable—where the papers disclosed that a minor child heir was affected and had refused to consent to a sale, but where the court lacked information enabling a proper consideration of the child’s position.


The dispute primarily involved the application of law to fact, and a value-laden assessment anchored in constitutional and statutory norms. The court was required to assess the implications of section 28(2) of the Constitution (the paramountcy of the child’s best interests), related constitutional provisions invoked in the judgment, and provisions of the Children’s Act dealing with children’s participation and access to court, against the factual matrix presented in a mortgage enforcement context.


A further issue, treated as pertinent by the court, was whether procedural and institutional steps should be taken to ensure the child’s interests were properly represented and investigated before any order capable of depriving the child of an inherited asset was considered, including the possible appointment of a legal representative at state expense where substantial injustice might otherwise result.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court grounded its approach in constitutional and statutory child-protection provisions. It referred to section 28(2) of the Constitution, emphasising that a child’s best interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child. It also referred to section 28(1)(h) regarding the assignment of a legal practitioner at state expense in civil proceedings affecting a child if substantial injustice would otherwise result, as well as the broader constitutional framing in sections 7(1) and 8(2) and the preamble.


On the facts presented, the court considered that the application implicated the rights and interests of a minor heir to the deceased estate, and that the papers did not provide sufficient information to satisfy the court that granting special execution would not prejudice the child. The court treated the child as an “interested person” by virtue of being an heir, and held that the absence of facts concerning the child’s circumstances and stance meant that the relevant circumstances had not been placed before the court for proper consideration.


The court specifically identified the need for further investigation into whether the executor was the child’s care-giver within the meaning of the Children’s Act, noting that “care” includes guidance and assistance in decisions appropriate to a child’s age and development and the maintenance of a sound relationship with the child. The court regarded the reported refusal by the child to consent to the sale, coupled with the executor’s intention to sell property to which the child was an heir, as raising concerns that required independent investigation and reporting in the interests of justice.


The court relied on provisions of the Children’s Act concerning children’s participation and access to court. It referred to section 10, which recognises a child’s right, where of suitable age and maturity, to participate in matters concerning the child and requires that the child’s views be given due consideration. It also referred to section 14, which provides that every child has the right to bring, and to be assisted in bringing, a matter to court within the court’s jurisdiction. These provisions supported the court’s conclusion that the child’s voice and circumstances could not be disregarded in a process potentially resulting in the loss of estate property to which the child had an interest.


The judgment also recorded the court’s concern that FNB’s papers did not address certain bond provisions concerning life assurance (clause 13), and described the bank’s “silence” on insurance provisions as significant in the context of the case. While the court did not resolve factual questions about insurance on the papers, it treated the omission as part of a broader concern that the application did not adequately engage with circumstances relevant to justice in a matter affecting a child.


In addition, the court articulated an evaluative view that the best interests of the minor child placed at least some duty on FNB to inform relevant institutions, and it emphasised the court’s role as upper guardian of children, particularly where children’s interests arise in the administration of deceased estates. The judgment connected these concerns to the practical risks faced by minor children affected by deceased estates and noted the need for appropriate governance and oversight, including observations directed at the legislative framework.


In light of the inadequate factual foundation on the papers to assess the child’s interests, the court concluded that it was necessary to obtain further information through institutional mechanisms, including investigation and reporting by relevant bodies, before the matter could properly be adjudicated.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court did not grant the default relief sought at that stage. Instead, it ordered that the matter be referred for investigation and report to Legal Aid South Africa, the Family Advocate, and the Department of Social Development.


The matter was postponed to 15 March 2022 for the filing of reports by Legal Aid South Africa, the Family Advocate, and a social worker.


The court further directed the Registrar to serve a copy of the order on the Minister responsible for the portfolio of the Administration of Justice, Legal Aid South Africa, the Family Advocate, and the Department of Social Development for attention.


No order as to costs was made.


Cases Cited


No reported cases were cited in the judgment.


Legislation Cited


Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (sections 7(1), 8(2), 26(1), 28(1)(h), 28(2))


Children’s Act 38 of 2005 (sections 10 and 14)


Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The court held that, because the application affected a minor child heir and the papers did not place sufficient information before the court to enable a proper assessment of the child’s interests, it was not appropriate to grant the relief sought on a default basis at that stage. The court held that further investigation and reporting were required to ensure that the child’s rights and best interests were properly considered.


The court accordingly referred the matter to Legal Aid South Africa, the Family Advocate, and the Department of Social Development for investigation and report, postponed the matter for those reports, directed service of the order on specified institutions and the relevant Minister for attention, and made no costs order.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The judgment applied the principle that a child’s best interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child, as contemplated by section 28(2) of the Constitution, and that this principle must be practically engaged when court orders may affect a child’s rights and interests.


It applied the principle that children who are of suitable age and maturity have a right to participate in matters affecting them and that their views must be given due consideration, as recognised in section 10 of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005, and that children have a right to bring and be assisted in bringing matters to court in terms of section 14 of that Act.


The judgment reflected the principle that courts must ensure that relevant circumstances are before them before making orders with significant consequences for children, and it emphasised the court’s protective role over children in proceedings that could result in deprivation of property in which a child holds an interest as an heir.


It further applied the constitutional framing that rights in the Bill of Rights may bind juristic persons where applicable, in terms of section 8(2) of the Constitution, in a context where a financial institution sought relief with potential consequences for a minor child affected by the execution process.

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[2021] ZAWCHC 266
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Firstrand Bank Limited v Mqambeli N.O and Another (17111/20) [2021] ZAWCHC 266 (20 December 2021)

IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN
CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
CASE
NO: 17111/20
In the matter
between:
FIRSTRAND
BANK LIMITED
PLAINTIFF
AND
BUKANI
GLADWELL MQAMBELI N.O. EXECUTOR IN THE ESTATE
LATE
THEMBEKA ETHEL BATALA (FORMERLY MQAMBELI)
ESTATE
NO 001442/2019
FIRST
RESPONDENT
CITY
OF CAPE TOWN MUNICIPALITY
SECOND
RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT DATED 20
DECEMBER 2021
THULARE AJ
[1] This was an
application for an order by default, moved in the unopposed roll
commonly referred to as Third Division, for a sum
of money plus
interest and costs and also, on the same papers, for an order
declaring Erf 112871 Cape Flats situated in the City
of Cape Town
(the property) specially executable and the authorization for the
Registrar to issue a warrant of attachment and the
Sheriff to execute
such warrant. The application is further for the Sheriff to sell
without a reserve price or in the alternative
for the court to set
the reserve price and in the event that the reserve price is not
achieved to authorize that the property may
be sold at any subsequent
sale to the highest bidder without a reserve price.
[2] On 3 February
2006 and 2 October 2006 Thembeka Ethel Mqambeli (the deceased)
registered two mortgage bonds in favour of the plaintiff
(FNB) as
security for monies lent and advanced to her. The deceased bound as
security for the debt, the property. In terms of the
bonds and the
debt the deceased was to make monthly payments to the plaintiff in
discharging the amounts lent and advanced. The agreement
included a
term wherein in the event of failure to pay the monthly repayments,
the full amount owing would be payable and that the
plaintiff may
seek the order declaring the property specially executable.
[3] The deceased
passed on in December 2018 and as a consequence there were no
payments made on the bond. In its founding affidavit,
FNB indicated
that it communicated with the Executor, who is cited as the first
respondent in these proceedings. According to FNB,
the Executor
reported that there were no funds in the estate to pay the bonds and
the Executor has been unsuccessful in selling the
property, even
though he had secured a buyer, because the Master did not approve the
sale as the minor child who is the heir refused
to agree to the sale.
FNB alleged that the property was not the minor child’s primary
residence as it was vacant. According to
FNB it was prudent for the
property to be sold by public auction as soon as possible to avoid
vandalisation of the property and to
limit the financial loss to the
estate due to increasing arrears, rates and taxes on the property. At
the time of the application
the arrears were R93 723.34 which
was approximately 26 months instalments since November 2018.
[4] Section 28(2) of
the Constitution provides:
“
2.
A child’s best interests are of paramount importance in every
matter concerning the child.”
Section 28(1)(h)
reads:
“
28.
(1) Every child has the right-
(h) to have a legal
practitioner assigned to the child by the state, and at state
expense, in civil proceedings affecting the child,
if substantial
injustice would otherwise result;”
Section 7(1)
provides:
“
Rights
7. (1) This Bill of
Rights is a cornerstone of democracy in South Africa. It enshrines
the rights of all people in our country and
affirms the democratic
values of human dignity, equality and freedom.”
Section 8(2)
provides:
“
Application
8. (2) A provision
of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to
the extent that, it is applicable, taking
into account the nature of
the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right.”
[5] The
circumstances in this case raised a few issues that were pertinent to
the just adjudication of the matter. It was not clear
from the papers
as to whether the Executor was also the care-giver of the child as
defined in the Children’s Act, 2005 (Act No.
38 of 2005) (the CA).
Care, in the CA, includes guiding, advising and assisting the child
in decisions to be taken by the child in
a manner appropriate to the
child’s age, maturity and stage of development as well as
maintaining a sound relationship with the
child. The papers reveal a
serious problem. The Executor intended to sell the property to which
the child is an heir, and the child
refused to consent to the sale.
In my view, the question of the care of the child needs further
investigation and report by a Social
Worker, in the interests of
justice.
[6] Section 10 of
the CA read as follows:
“
Every
child that is of such an age, maturity and stage of development as to
be able to participate in any matter concerning that child
has the
right to participate in an appropriate way and the views expressed by
the child must be given due consideration.
Section 14 reads:
“
Every
child has the right to bring, and to be assisted in bringing, a
matter to a court, provided that matter falls within the jurisdiction
of that court.”
[7] The child has
the right to have access to adequate housing [section 26(1) of the
Constitution]. The child’s mother, the deceased,
took reasonable
measures within her available resources to provide the realization of
this right of the child, in her lifetime. It
follows, in my view,
that the child cannot be deprived of the property, through a special
execution by an order of court, when that
court did not consider all
the relevant circumstances. In this matter, the child is an
interested person, as an heir, and I did not
have facts to satisfy
myself that the child would not be prejudiced by the sale. The
reasons for the child’s refusal to the sale
remain unknown to the
court. In my view, what was taken into custody and control by the
Executor upon his appointment and what he
did therewith in
furtherance of the liquidation, distribution and administration of
the estate is one of the relevant circumstances
to be considered
whether under the circumstances, the sale of the property was a just
order to be granted. In my view, the appointment
of a legal
representative at state expense to represent the interests of the
child in this matter is called for.
[8] Clause 13 of
both Mortgage bonds read as follows:
“
13
LIFE ASSURANCE
If any life
assurance is taken out by the Bank by agreement with the Mortgagor,
or if any such assurance is ceded to the Bank as additional
security
for the indebtedness secured under this Bond, the following
provisions shall apply-
13.1 the Mortgagor
shall do whatever is necessary to enable the Bank to take out the
assurance, if applicable;
13.2 the Bank may
take such steps as are necessary or desirable to procure the noting
by the assurer of the cession, if applicable,
including the execution
on behalf of the Mortgagor of a separate document of cession.
13.3 if the
assurance is or becomes invalid for any reason the Mortgagor shall
immediately do whatever is necessary to enable the
Bank to take out
equivalent assurance or, at the option of the Bank, shall do whatever
is necessary to take out equivalent assurance
and to cede it to the
Bank, and the provisions of this clause shall apply to such
substituted assurance.
13.4 the Bank may at
any time exercise any right under the assurance, including without
limitation, the right to convert the assurance
to fully-paid up
assurance and the right to surrender the assurance.
[9] The silence of
the Bank on this provision, and other provisions on insurance and
their application to the case, were simply too
loud to be
disregarded. This is but one of the many cases that indicate that the
Legislature needs to intervene in the space of estates
left by
deceased parents to minor children. The current framework allowed for
a hostile mindset to prevail over the best interests
of children.
Blood is no longer on its own sufficient to rest with the impression
that children whose parents are deceased were in
honest and good care
with relatives. This matter illustrates that we cannot trust the
Banks to intervene where such need arise to
assert the paramountcy of
the best interests of children.
[10] Experience in
civil child law taught that too many children burden the national
fiscus in being rendered homeless and poor the
moment their parents
die, irrespective of the estate left by their parents. These children
are often dumped with maternal grandparents
in foster care
placements. These children are beneficiaries and heirs of their
parents’ estates. These deceased estates are often
sufficient to
meet the needs of the children. The benefits of these estates are,
however, often enjoyed by other blood relations
through greed and
sometimes even by institutions in the financial sector generally
through omissions of doing what is known to be
the right thing to be
done. The common law is not common to speak justice for all South
Africans.
[11] Unless it
becomes peremptory for the Master to also report to Legal Aid South
Africa or the Legal Practice Council’s Committee
responsible for
pro-bono work, and the Department of Social Services every estate
where a minor is affected, and an exemption is
provided only when
such child has a legal representative of their own choice, blood
relatives and financial institutions will continue
to unduly benefit
from estates to which, but for the failure of the justice system,
they would not ordinarily be entitled. Children
whose estates left by
their parents may make them not to qualify as they may not be
indigent, will continue to be dumped on the State
welfare system
while others unduly enjoy the deceased estates.
[12] In my view, the
best interests of the minor child in this matter cast a duty on FNB,
at least to inform Legal Aid South Africa
and the Department of
Social Development about its experiences in this matter around and
about the child. The property is in Cape
Town and the Executor is
alleged to be in Butterworth. The whereabouts of the child were not
disclosed, save to indicate that the
property was found vacant. The
child could be living in the streets in order to survive. FNB does
not care and it appears according
to them the child, its fate and
future, is none of their business and it also should not be this
Court’s business. Their obsession
is to sell the house and recover
money and nothing more.
[13] In this matter
FNB lacks the drumming of an African heartbeat. Doing business in
South Africa, one wonders if FNB knows how to
spell
Ubuntu
and
can be considered and trusted to be a worthy stakeholder in
constructing a democratic and Constitutional South Africa’s
jurisprudence
that speaks to and provide answers for an African
child, especially an orphaned child. Re-imagining a different way of
knowing, seeing,
being and doing, to create a post-colonial and
post-apartheid South Africa, requires of us to be a nation at work,
every day, in
order to realise our ideal into reality.
[14] Over and above
section 7(1), 8(2) and 28(2) and the provisions of the CA, this
duty’s genesis is also found in the preamble
to the Constitution:
“
We
therefore … establish a society based on democratic values, social
justice and fundamental human rights.”
In this matter the
voice of the child is treated like an irritating mosquito in the
juristic ear of FNB. It is either to be ignored
or slapped out of
existence by the court order sought. The child’s rights do not
feature even as o footnote in the script of the
Bank. FNB finds it
difficult to even acknowledge that the child has a name and did not
mention it even once in the papers. FNB does
not care as to where the
child is living, and did not want even the court to at least know.
FNB sought to sell the child’s home
left as an estate in which the
child is an heir, without the child being heard by the court when the
child objects to the sale at
the instance of a person who appears to
be the child’s Uncle.
[15] Unless the
courts intervene, the rights of children, especially to their
deceased parents’ estates, will remain academic exercises
at
conferences and lecture halls which in time will just remain
ineffective and irrelevant talk-shops. For the rights of the children
to enjoy recognition and protection in the world of business and real
life in general, courts should assert their position as upper
guardians of children especially in the administration of their
deceased parents’ estates. In the roundness of time, the
Legislature
should enter the space and ensure that those who are
placed in charge of estates in which children are affected, are held
to account
for those estates through proper governance systems. The
Administration of Estates Act, 1965 (Act No. 66 of 1965) need some
attention
for it to mitigate the mischief in this case.
[16] For these
reasons I make the following order:
(a) The matter is
referred to both Legal Aid South Africa, the Family Advocate and the
Department of Social Development for investigation
and report.
(b) The matter is
postponed to 15 March 2022 for LASA, the Family Advocate as well as a
Social Worker’s report.
(c) The Registrar is
to cause a copy of this order to be served on the Minister
responsible for the portfolio of the Administration
of Justice, Legal
Aid South Africa, the Family Advocate and the Department of Social
Development for his attention.
(c) No cost order is
made.
DM
THULARE
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
Counsel: Advocate
Celeste Tate