About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: Western Cape High Court, Cape Town
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: Western Cape High Court, Cape Town
>>
2021
>>
[2021] ZAWCHC 169
|
|
Bock N.O and Another v Erasmus and Others (3257/2021) [2021] ZAWCHC 169 (27 August 2021)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE
TOWN)
CASE
NO: 3257 / 2021
In
the matter between:
RALPH BOCK
N.O.
IGNATIUS
VILJOEN N.O.
(in
their capacities as trustees of the CRL Family Trust IT 3891/96)
First Applicant
Second
Applicant
and
MR JOSEF
ERASMUS
MRS HENRIETTA
DAWN LENA ERASMUS
THE
SALDANHA BAY LOCAL MUNICIPALITY
First Respondent
Second Respondent
Third
Respondent
Coram:
Wille, J
Heard:
4
th
of August 2021
Delivered:
27
th
of August 2021
JUDGMENT
WILLE,
J:
INTRODUCTION
[1]
This is an application primarily for an order for the ejectment of
the respondents
[1]
from the
subject property.
[2]
This,
in terms of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful
Occupation of Land Act.
[3]
Further, a monetary judgment is sought in respect of certain arrear
rental, penalties and water usage costs, allegedly due
by the
respondents. In addition, a punitive costs order is pursued
against the respondents’ attorney of record.
[2]
The respondents contend for an oral agreement concluded with the
applicants.
Put in another way, the respondents aver that they
occupy the property with the consent of the applicants. This,
in the form
of ‘tacit’ consent. The alleged terms
of this oral agreement also seek to expunge the respondents liability
to
the applicants for any arrear rental and other charges. The
respondents seek to remain on the subject property. The
applicants deny the presence of the oral agreement contended for by
the respondents.
[3]
The respondents progressed a number of alleged procedural
irregularities and also
raised a shield in connection with the
applicants alleged lack of authority. The procedural
irregularities complained of
have no merit and will accordingly not
be dealt with in this judgment. As far as the authority issue
in concerned the following
is apparent from the material before me:
that it is abundantly clear from the papers that the applicants act
in their representative
capacities as trustees of the trust
[4]
and that the trust authorised the institution of these
proceedings.
[5]
THE
FACTUAL MATRIX AND AGREEMENTS
[4]
The parties concluded a written sale agreement
[6]
for the sale of certain as yet undivided immovable property. The
purchase price was agreed at (2.1) million rand. The
purchase
price was computed as follows: the land, together with the
fencing thereon, was priced at (1 5) million rand and
a certain
piggery business
[7]
, made up the
balance of the purchase price in the sum of R 600 000,00.
[8]
[5]
It subsequently emerged that the sale agreement was void for want of
compliance with
certain legislation dealing specifically with the
sub-division of agricultural land. As a direct result thereof a
separate
lease agreement
[9]
in
respect of the property was prepared. This separate agreement
was negotiated and signed. It is common cause that
the property
described in the lease agreement was erroneous and the agreement
should have reflected the rental property as reflected
in the
subsequent addendum thereto. Nothing turns on this.
[6]
The material terms of the lease were the following: that the
property was leased
to the respondents for the purposes of continuing
with a piggery business: that the lease commenced on the 1
st
of March 2016 and endured for a period of (12) months until the 28
th
of February 2017: that the lease would terminate upon the sale
of the property to the respondents: that the lease would
be
subject to the parties entering into an agreement for the sale of the
piggery: that the respondents would make payment
of the
purchase price of the piggery in full and, thereafter in addition,
make a payment towards the deposit in respect of the
purchase price
for the property.
[7]
The relevant agreed terms as recorded in the lease agreement were as
follows:
that the rental would be R10 000,00 per month:
that the rental would be payable on or before the 3
rd
day
of every month: that the respondents would be liable for the
costs of electricity, water and gas used, this payable directly
to
the relevant service provider: that the respondents were not
entitled to undertake any alterations or to erect any buildings,
installations, irrigations systems, structures or build dams or roads
without the applicant’s prior written consent and,
that the
parties agreed that they were desirous of entering into a sale
agreement for the property.
[8]
Further, it was agreed that the applicant would apply for the
sub-division of the
property and that any sale of the property would
be subject to the successful sub-division of the property from the
farm. A
payment structure was prepared and agreed. This
reflected the payments that the respondents were required to make,
which
included the sum of R600 000,00 as the purchase price for the
piggery and the sum R400 000,00 (as the deposit), for the now
styled ‘option’ to purchase.
[9]
The material terms of the ‘piggery’ agreement were, inter
alia, the following:
that the ‘sole proprietorship’
piggery business was sold to the first respondent: that the
purchase price was
in the agreed amount of R600 000,00. This,
plus a deposit for the purchase of the property.
[10]
It is common cause that the respondents took occupation of the
property
[10]
, for the purposes
of operating the commercial piggery, as agreed. Thereafter, the
sub-division application was initiated.
Finally an
addendum
[11]
, was signed to
the lease agreement in terms of which, inter alia, the respondents
commercial occupation was only to commence upon
payment of the full
purchase price of the piggery, as agreed. During the course of
November 2018, the respondents erected
a structure on the farm, in
which they now live. This residential occupation of the farm
and the manner in which this occurred
is the subject of the core
dispute between the parties and in my view, is one of the main issues
that falls to be decided.
The applicants contend for the
unlawful residential occupation of the property, whilst the
respondents contend for the lawful residential
occupation of the
property.
THE
ALLEGED DISPUTES OF FACT
[11]
The respondents deny any knowledge of the proposed sub-division prior
to signing of the sale
agreement. They say that the applicants
withheld certain crucial information from them so as to induce and
mislead the respondents.
This, in order to assist the
applicants in procuring the sub-division of the property from the
farm. Significantly, they
do not say which crucial information
was withheld.
[12]
The respondents contend for an oral agreement which preceded the
signing of the lease agreement.
It is averred that the terms of
the oral agreement were, inter alia, the following: that the
respondents would lend their
co-operation to and with the
sub-division application, which application would not take longer
than (1) year: that once the
sub-division was approved, the
parties would again negotiate in good faith to conclude a fresh sale
agreement
[12]
, in respect of
the property on the same terms, save that the price would now be
market related and, that in the event that the
parties were unable to
agree, the price would be determined by a suitably qualified
appraiser of agricultural land.
[13]
[13]
In addition, they say that they would be liable to pay to the
applicants the rental as agreed
for (1) year only and, if the
sub-division took more than (1) year, then in that event, the
respondents would be entitled to remain
in occupation of the
property. This, without the payment of any rental, until the
sub-division was granted.
[14]
The applicants, in turn contend that there are no factual disputes at
all and that the averments
by the respondents have been orchestrated
for the purposes of conceiving defences in respect of both the money
judgment and the
eviction claim. Put in another way, the
applicants say that the respondents have no defences to the claims as
formulated
in the applicants’ application.
DISCUSSION
THE
EXTENSION OF SECURITY OF TENURE ACT
[15]
The respondents rely on the Extension of Security of Tenure Act
[14]
,
to the extent that it provides for certain statutory protections for
defined ‘occupiers’ in eviction proceedings,
by
requiring, inter alia, specific procedural steps before an eviction
order may be granted. The first enquiry in this connection,
is
to establish whether the respondents qualify as ‘occupiers’
as defined. Further, in this case the issue of
‘consent’
bears scrutiny. A rebuttable presumption of consent is created
where a person has continuously and
openly resided on land
[15]
,
for a period of at least (1)year.
[16]
Once and if, this presumption is rebutted, and if the person
sought to be evicted has not demonstrated any other right to
occupy
the land, then in that event, the eviction proceedings fall to be
governed generally by the Prevention of Illegal Eviction
from and the
Unlawful Occupation of Land Act.
[17]
THE
PREVENTION OF ILLEGAL EVICTION FROM AND THE UNLAWFUL OF OCCUPATION OF
LAND ACT
[16]
The applicants contend for the application of this latter
Act.
[18]
This
involves a (3) stage enquiry, which encompasses the following,
namely: that it must be determined whether the occupier
of the
property in question has any extant right to be in occupation.
Indeed, if the occupier has such a right, then the
application
falls to be refused: that in the event that the occupier of a
property has no lawful right to be in occupation
thereof, then in
that event, it is to be determined whether it is just and equitable
for the occupier to be evicted and finally:
that in the event
that it is indeed just and equitable for the occupier to be evicted,
then in that event, the terms and
conditions of such eviction fall to
be determined by the court.
[17]
As a general proposition, the authorities dictate that failing any
right in law being established
by the respondents to occupy the
subject property, the applicants would be entitled to the granting of
an eviction order.
This of course, if the applicants have in
turn, complied with all the procedural requirements for an order of
eviction. All
that then remains is for the court to determine
the timing of the eviction order.
[19]
Put in another way, the just and equitable enquiry does not
necessarily militate against the granting of the eviction order,
but
confers a discretion upon the court to decide on how much time the
respondents ought to be granted, before they need to vacate
the
property as a result of an order for their eviction.
FACTUAL
DISPUTES IN MOTION PROCEEDINGS
[18]
It is trite that in motion proceedings, if material facts are in
dispute, a final order may be
granted only: if the facts stated
by the respondent: together with the facts alleged by the
applicant (that are admitted
or conceded by the respondent), justify
such an order.
[20]
This,
notwithstanding, a court must nevertheless follow a
-
robust common sense approach
- and not hesitate to decide an issue on affidavit merely because it
is difficult to do so.
[21]
That having been said, a bare denial in general terms by a
respondent is not good enough to defeat an applicant on motion.
THE
JUDGMENT SOUNDING IN MONEY
[19]
The respondents contend for the position that they bore no knowledge
that the sub-division was
still due to take place, prior to the
signing of the sale agreement. This on the face of it, is not
consistent with the respondents
narrative that the applicants
manipulated the respondents only for the purposes of obtaining the
said sub-division. These
(2) versions are irreconcilable with
each other.
[20]
Turning now to the allegations by the respondents that the agreed
purchase price for the property
was exaggerated. This is not
fully engaged with by the respondents at all, save in an attempt to
reinforce their argument
in support of the oral agreement. This,
insofar as it may have a bearing on the re-purchase agreement
contended for by the respondents.
The respondents have failed
to put up any credible evidential material in support of their
averments in this connection.
Very little probative weight, if
any, can be attached to the respondents latter averments in
connection with the value of the property.
[21]
The respondents case on this score is, inter alia, the following:
that the Land Bank ‘informed’
them that the property was
only worth between R300 000,00 to R400 000,00. This tiggered a
notice
[22]
, at the instance of
the applicants. The respondents however refused to provide any
corroborating documentary evidence in
connection with these
allegations. Moreover, the respondents contended that according
to them the farm is now worth between
an additional R300 000,00 to
R400 000,00. Again, this leaves a lot to be desired.
[22]
I say this also because the purchase price in terms of the sale
agreement is the sum of (1.5)
million rand for the land and the
fencing. This price was arrived at based upon a property
valuation in the amount of (2.7)
million rand. This price was
inclusive of the piggery which was valued at approximately R600
000,00. Further, a
professional
valuer specializing in farm property valuations
determined the value
of the property to be the amount of (1.8) million rand.
[23]
Of equal importance is the issue of the sub-division of the farm.
The respondents say that
the first applicant gave them an assurance
that the application for the sub-division of the property from the
farm would not endure
for longer than (1) year. This again, in
support of the oral lease contended for on behalf of the
respondents. Present
is the objective evidence that the first
respondent was specifically told that the sub-division could take up
to (2)years, this
prior to the signing of the sale agreement.
The correspondence that emanated thereafter, clearly demonstrates
that the first
applicant bore no knowledge of how long the
sub-division would take, given the extensive involvement of certain
town planners in
this exercise.
[24]
What is abundantly clear to me, is that the first applicant was never
in a position to make any
representations or give any assurances
regarding any time period for the granting of the proposed
sub-division of the property,
from the farm.
[25]
One of the further core issues in connection with this application,
goes to the allegations by
the respondents (in support of an oral
lease with the applicants), which would transform, if upheld, into
consent to occupy the
property. The averments by the
respondents in this connection are, inter alia, the following,
namely: that the written
lease is tainted, void, illegal and
unenforceable by virtue of the applicants’ motives as evidenced
in their application:
that there was an oral lease in terms of
which the respondents would only be liable for rental for a period of
(1) year and thereafter
the respondents were entitled to occupy the
property, absent the payment of any rental.
[26]
It is common cause that the respondents took commercial occupation of
the property after the
initial agreements were signed
[23]
,
but significantly, not any ‘residential’ occupation. In
this context, the respondents aver that they took commercial
occupation before there was even talk of a lease agreement.
Despite this, the lease agreement is thereafter concluded, in
terms
which contradict, the terms of the oral lease contended for by the
respondents. The lease agreement also provides that
it will
terminate upon the sale of the property to the respondents. Absent
is any provision that rental payments will cease
to be made after (1)
year.
[27]
On their own version, the respondents concede that the agreed rental
was not paid as any of the
payments so effected, were made by an
entirely discrete entity.
[24]
This notwithstanding, the first respondent agrees to enter into an
acknowledgement of debt
[25]
,
which provides for, inter alia, the following: that the agreed
monthly rental and the monthly water accounts are payable
monthly in
advance and he further acknowledges that an amount of R438 436,21 is
due, owing and payable. Moreover, the correspondence
that was
subsequently exchanged between the parties during this time must be
taken into account, when dealing with the purported
disputed factual
issues.
[28]
I say this also because
, the applicants’
position regarding the existence of the lease agreement and
accordingly, the respondents liability for the
rental and water
charges is very much the subject of corroboration in the
correspondence at the instance of the attorneys for the
applicants.
It is significant that despite legal representation, the respondents
failed to take issue with the version by
the applicants as set out in
these letters. A major shift involving a general denial, only
occurred upon the filing of the
affidavits in opposition to the
application.
[29]
By way of example, in a letter
[26]
,
the respondents’ attorneys of record advanced the following:
‘…
our
client is currently lawfully renting certain agricultural land…’
This
with reference to the lease agreement. The first respondent’s
position as far as the oral lease is concerned is
highly improbable,
not supported by the objective facts and may be safely rejected.
[30]
A further analysis of the papers reveals a diverse position taken by
the respondents regarding
their ownership of the piggery. The
piggery agreement stipulates that the entire piggery operation
(lock-stock & barrel),
is sold for an amount of R600 000,00.
Further, it was agreed that the respondents would pay an
additional amount in the amount
of R400 000,00 as a deposit for
a first option to purchase the property. Similarly, the
different versions put up by
the respondents on this score are
mutually destructive of one another.
[31]
This because, on the one hand, they aver that they purchased
completely different assets from
the first applicants’ son and
they did not in fact purchase anything from the sole proprietorship
as identified in the written
piggery agreement. This, also
against the backdrop and the addendum agreement. The latter
being in confirmation of
the factual position that the respondents
had not yet paid the full purchase price for the piggery. In
addition, the payment
and allocation of the price in connection with
the piggery business is confirmed by way of the various letters that
passed between
the attorneys on behalf of the parties. The
position now taken by the respondents as formulated in their opposing
affidavits,
contradicts this objective evidence and is accordingly
inherently improbable in the circumstances.
[32]
As far as the re-purchase agreement is concerned, as a matter of
logic, the existence of the
re-purchase agreement is premised upon
the contention that the initial agreed purchase price was
unrealistically high or exaggerated.
Because the foundation for
the re-purchase agreement has been euthanized, the entire existence
of the re-purchase agreement
falls to be rejected. Similarly
the existence of this re-purchase agreement arises for the first time
in the respondents’
opposing papers.
[33]
This beseeches the question whether the unqualified oral agreement
relied upon by the respondents
falls to be inaugurated at all.
I mind that the oral agreement contended for has no merit for, inter
alia, the following
reasons: that the respondents cannot
entirely wish away the prior existence of the written lease
agreement: that even
if the terms of the written lease
agreement do not find application, the tacit lease clearly applied
for the payment of the rental
in the amount of R10 000,00 per
month, together with the water charges.
THE
EVICTION PROCEEDINGS
[34]
The respondents’ case is that ESTA finds application. In
order to succeed with this
argument the respondents must have been in
lawful residential occupation of the property. The respondents
may well have enjoyed
the rights to the commercial occupation of the
subject property for a farming enterprise. Residential
occupation is however
an entirely discrete issue. Absent lawful
consent to residential occupation, the provisions of PIE must find
application.
It is so that the respondents indeed resided on
the property. This, since at least November 2018.
[35]
This occupation was under severe protest from the applicants and
undoubtedly absent their consent,
which was brought to the
respondents attention. The consent chartered for by the
respondents is totally contrary to the correspondence
and the other
communications that were exchanged during this period. The
consent granted in terms of the written lease was
limited strictly to
the commercial occupation for the purposes of the pig farming
operation. Besides, the written lease strictly
prohibited the
erection of any structures, save by prior written consent. Such
written consent is absent the papers.
[36]
It must be so that at best for the respondents, they commercially
occupied the property in accordance
with a tacit lease. This,
on the same terms as contained in the written lease. In turn,
this would govern the relationship
between the parties. The
building of residential structures at the instance of the
respondents, commenced in earnest upon
the first applicant’s
departure to Botswana. Prior to his departure, the first
applicant met with the first respondent
and informed him, in terms,
that he was not permitted to erect a residential structure on the
subject property.
[37]
The absence of the applicants consent is recorded and emphasized in
contemporaneous correspondence.
Significantly, the respondents,
never rebuffed the absence of consent to reside on the property.
These denials only materialized
in their opposing affidavits.
[38]
In another throw of the dice, the respondents contend for the
position that their ‘rights’
to occupation of the
property, were never formally, nor expressly terminated. I
disagree. One is dealing here essentially
with an issue of
commercial occupation and the mere service of the application,
operates in law, as an effective termination of
any underlying
agreement in terms of which the respondents may have enjoyed any
rights to the commercial occupation of the property.
JUST AND EQUITABLE
[39]
In my view this is one of the core issues which requires more careful
scrutiny. On this
score, the applicants contend for the
following: that the respondents have to a large extent, failed
to pay rental and water
charges for more than (5) years: that
they out of their own volition unlawfully erected a residential
structure on the subject
property: that the applicants
bore
some kind of duty to accommodate the respondents for an extended
period of time: that this occurred without any remuneration
and
at enormous cost to the applicant trust: that
the
respondents have known for more than (3) years that the applicants
were not prepared to countenance their unlawful residential
occupation of the property and that they descended to be the subject
of an eviction application.
[40]
The respondents’ peculiar personal circumstances are the
following: that the second
respondent is gainfully employed as
a teacher earning as salary of approximately R18 000,00 per
month: that the respondents
are both in good health: that
their daughter is about to reach the age of majority and that the
respondents contend for the
position that they are not in a financial
position so as to enable them to obtain any alternative
accommodation. This latter
averment is not underpinned by any
evidential material and very little, if any, probative weight falls
to be attached to these
latter allegations.
[41]
I need to attempt to strike a balance between the interests of the
applicants and that of the
respondents, as the latter are undoubtedly
unlawful residential occupiers on the subject property. It is
indeed so, that
when
dealing with the ‘just and equitable’ enquiry, the
respondents do not have to establish a right of occupation to
resist
an eviction on the basis that the result, is not just and
equitable. This notwithstanding, I need to apply a
constitutional ‘lens’ to the respondents initial and
continued unlawful residential occupation of the property.
[42]
In my view, considering and applying the principles as set out in the
Constitutional Court in
Scribante
[27]
,
viewed through the lens of fairness and equity, there is no reason
for upholding the legal conclusion that the applicants’
real
rights in and to the property should be diluted by the respondents’
disputed personal rights to unlawfully residentially
occupy the
subject property. Considering the historical and continued unlawful
residential occupation of the property by the respondents,
viewed
within the proper constitutional context, I am of the view that
preference should be given to the applicants’ position.
[43]
I say this also because, the property was the subject of a commercial
occupation in accordance
with a suite of commercial agreements and
there are no weighty factors that afford the respondents protection.
In my view,
the lawful commercial occupation enjoyed by the
respondents, could not have morphed into that of lawful residential
occupation
in view of the provisions in the commercial suite of
agreements and the cascading legal effects thereof as a result of
activities
taking place in connection with the proposed sub-division
of the property, from the farm.
[44]
Section 4(7) of PIE, grants to a court the power to decide whether an
unlawful occupier should
be evicted, the test being whether it is
just and equitable to do so. All relevant circumstances should
be considered and
in giving this power to a court, the legislature
has expanded upon the provisions of section 26(3) of our
Constitution
[28]
, in terms of
which no-one may be evicted from their home without an order of court
made after considering all the relevant circumstances.
[45]
It must be so that this responsibility must be viewed through a
‘constitutional lens’
and our courts are enjoined to
decide on unique cases, not on principles of the law of property, but
on principles of fairness
and equity. Wallis JA, in
Changing
Tides
[29]
,
held
that an eviction order may only be granted if it is just and
equitable to do so and that
in
considering whether an eviction is just and equitable, the court must
come to a decision that is just and equitable to all parties.
[46]
In my view, the true test is to determine if the applicants’
rights to this property fall
to be diluted in view of the
circumstances and the unique facts of this case, with reference to
the principles of justice and equity.
Considering the
circumstances of the respondents, coupled with the manner and
duration of their unlawful residential occupation
of the property,
justice and equity undoubtedly demand that the applicants’
rights of ownership should not be derogated for
an extended period,
in favor of the respondents’ unlawful residential occupation of
the property.
COSTS
[47]
The applicants vigorously contend for a costs order ‘
de
bonis propriis’
against the respondents’ attorney of
record because of the disruptive and frivolous technical approach
adopted to the opposition
to the application. I disagree.
I must however record that the entire approach by the respondents
entire legal team,
leaves a lot to be desired. Whether this
approach amounted to a material departure from their responsibility
of their office
has, in my view, not been clearly demonstrated.
What is abundantly clear is that the unfortunate approach adopted by
the
respondents legal team, most certainly necessitated the need for
the employment of (2) counsel on behalf of the applicants.
ORDER
[48]
In the result the following order is granted:
1.
That
an order is hereby issued out evicting the first and second
respondents and all those occupying under or through them, from
the
property (known as the remaining farm adjoining ‘Matjes Fontein
Number 169’ situate at Saldanha Bay, Malmesbury
Division,
Western Cape), (the ‘property’).
2.
That
the first and second respondents and all persons who occupy the
property through or under them, shall vacate the property by
no later
than the last day of November 2021, failing which the sheriff of the
court is herein hereby authorised to evict the first
and second
respondents and all persons who occupy the property through or under
them, from the property.
3.
That
the first respondent and the second respondent, jointly and
severally, the one paying the other to be absolved, are hereby
ordered to pay to the applicants the sum of R624 041,00 by no later
than (10) days from date of this order.
4.
That
the first respondent and the second respondent, jointly and
severally, the one paying the other to be absolved, are hereby
ordered to pay to the applicants interest,
a
temporae
morae
,
on the sum of R624 041,00.
5.
That
any further amounts due owing and payable, from the 1
st
of March 2021 to date of final vacation of the property by the
respondents, shall be held over and stand over for later
determination.
6.
That
the first respondent and the second respondent, jointly and
severally, the one paying the other to be absolved, are hereby
ordered to pay the costs of and incidental to this application, on
the scale as between party and party (including the costs of
(2)
counsel where so employed), as taxed or agreed.
E.
D. WILLE
(Judge
of the High Court)
[1]
The
first and second respondents (hereinafter referred to as the
respondents, unless otherwise specifically indicated).
[2]
The
name of the main parent farm is ‘Matjes’.
The
‘farm’ in turn is known as Farm Number 169 (the ‘farm’).
This
is made up of the remaining extent of the farm styled –
‘Adjoining Matjes Fontein’ - in extent 478.30389
hectares.
The
‘property’ is a yet to be sub-divided portion of the
farm and in extent about 43 hectares (the ‘property’).
[3]
Act,
19
of 1998 (hereinafter referred to as ‘PIE’).
[4]
The
CRL Family Trust.
[5]
A
copy of the ‘letters of authority. and a resolution signed by
all the trustees is annexed to the founding affidavit.
[6]
The
sale agreement.
[7]
This
will be referred to as ‘the piggery’.
[8]
A
discrete agreement was subsequently concluded with the respondents
for the sale of the ‘piggery’ business.
[9]
The
lease agreement.
[10]
This,
during March 2016.
[11]
The
‘addendum’
[12]
They
contend for an ‘agreement to agree’ at a later stage.
[13]
The
‘re-purchase’ agreement.
[14]
Extension
of Security of Tenure Act, 62 of 1997
.
[15]
As
defined or categorized.
[16]
Section
3(4)
of the
Extension
of Security of Tenure Act, 62 of 1997
.
[17]
The ‘
Unlawful
Occupation of Land Act’. (‘PIE’)
[18]
Act,
19
of 1998.
[19]
City
of Johannesburg Metro Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39
(Pty) Ltd
2011 (4) SA 337
(SCA) at paragraph 74.
[20]
Plascon
Evans v Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd
[1984] ZASCA 51
;
1984
(3) SA 623
(A) at 634.
[21]
Truth
Verification Testing Centre CC v PSE Trust Detection CC and Others
1998
(2) SA 689
(W) at 698H-J.
[22]
In
terms of rule 35 of the Uniform Rules of Court.
[23]
During
March 2016.
[24]
An
entity styled ‘
Jaymo
Enterprises’.
[25]
During
October 2018.
[26]
During
June 2020.
[27]
Daniels
v Scribante
2017 (4) SA 341
(CC).
[28]
The
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.
[29]
City
of Johannesburg v Changing Tides 74 (Pty) Ltd and others
2012
(6) SA 294
(SCA).