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[2021] ZAWCHC 137
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Sigcawu v S (A47/2021) [2021] ZAWCHC 137; 2022 (1) SACR 77 (WCC) (28 July 2021)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
AFRICA
(
WESTERN
CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN
)
(Coram: Henney
J et Pangarker, AJ)
[Reportable]
Case
No: A47/2021
In
the matter between:
KHANYISO
SIGCAWU
Appellant
and
THE
STATE
Respondent
Date
of hearing: 16 April 2021 and 17 June 2021
Date
of Judgment: 28 July 2021 (to be delivered via email to the parties’
legal representatives)
JUDGMENT
Henney,
J et Pangarker, AJ
Introduction
[1]
The appellant was charged in the regional court sitting at Caledon
with one count
of murder, that was committed on 15 September 2012 at
or near Villiersdorp in the district of Caledon. He unlawfully
and
intentionally killed the deceased by shooting him with a firearm.
He was legally represented during the proceedings and on 29 March
2019, and convicted by the regional magistrate on the above-mentioned
charge.
[2]
He was sentenced to a period of 15 years imprisonment of which two
years imprisonment
was suspended for a period of five years on
condition that the appellant is not convicted of murder or a
competent verdict thereto,
committed during the period of
suspension. An application for leave to appeal the conviction
and sentence was dismissed by
the regional magistrate, and on
petition to this court, leave was granted in respect of conviction
only.
Grounds
of appeal
[3]
The appellant’s grounds of appeal against his conviction was
that the court
erred in finding that the state has proven its case
beyond reasonable doubt, and in particular that the court erred in
relying
on the evidence of a dying declaration of the deceased. That
the court erred in finding that there was no material discrepancies
or improbabilities in the evidence of the state witnesses more
particularly that of the evidence of Qaqamba Vali (“Nana”),
with respect to the last time she had seen the appellant prior to the
murder. That the court erred in finding that this witness
was an
honest, reliable and credible witness. That the court erred in
finding that Nana’s evidence supports the evidence
of the dying
declaration. Lastly, that the court erred in finding that the version
of the appellant was improbable and by rejecting
the version of the
appellant.
[4]
After hearing the appeal on 16 April 2021, we directed the registrar
to bring the
following notice to the attention of the parties:
“
On
a perusal of the proceedings and the consideration of the arguments
presented by the parties during the hearing of the appeal,
the Judges
wish to invite the comment of the counsel for the appellant as well
as the state on the following issues:
1)
Whether the Magistrate was correct to admit the hearsay evidence
without properly dealing with
it on the basis of the provisions of
section 3
(1)(a) and or
3
(1)(c) of the
Law of Evidence Amendment Act
45 of 1988
. See in this regard,
S v Ndlovu
2002
(2) SACR
325
SCA at 341b – 342 (e) para [17] and in particular,
S v
Ramavhale
1996
(1) SACR 639
(A) although this case dealt with the
admission of hearsay evidence in terms of
section 3(1)(c).
2)
The state’s counsel submitted that on the basis of the decision
of
S v Aspeling 1998(1) SACR
it was held that such evidence
could be admitted in terms of
section 3(1)(a)
in circumstances where
the defence counsel admitted to the submission of such evidence.
The question to consider is whether
such admission or acquiescence
were reasonable under the circumstances where this was the only
evidence upon which the court convicted
the appellant.
See
in this regard
S v Halgryn
2002
(2) SACR 211
;
Saloman &
Another v
S
2014
(1) SACR 93
(WCC) where given the circumstances
of this case, whether the attorneys failure to object to this
evidence during the trial, was
reasonable given the incriminating
nature of the hearsay evidence (See
S v Ramavhale
).
3)
Given the circumstances under which the evidence was admitted, can it
be said that the appellant
had a fair trial.
The
parties are required to indicate to the Judges whether they wish to
present further argument during a hearing of the matter
(either in
open court or virtually) or whether they merely wish to present a
further post hearing note regarding these issues.
The
parties are requested to file their further heads on or before
14
June 2021
and similarly, indicate whether they wish to have a
further hearing on the matter as prescribed to above.”
[5]
The parties in the light of this notice filed further heads of
argument dealing specifically
with these issues and a further hearing
of the appeal dealing with the issues raised in the notice to the
parties dated 7 June
2021, was held on 17 of June 2021. I will deal
with these issues raised by the court later on this judgment.
The
evidence and common cause facts
[6]
It is common cause that the deceased was shot and killed on the
evening of 15 September
2012, and that there was no evidence of any
eyewitnesses who observed the killing of the deceased. After the
shooting of the deceased,
who was also known as Mambush, the first
witness that arrived on the scene was Charlene Fortuin (“Fortuin”),
who stayed
opposite the deceased. It was about 11 PM on a Saturday
night, when she heard five shots going off, whereafter the deceased
called
out her name. She went outside, where she found the deceased
on the pavement and she observed that he was shot. She asked him what
happened and she told him “ …
Dat
Kaizer wat by the municipality werk het hom geskiet”
[1]
.
[7]
Fortuin further testified that she did not know who the deceased was
talking about,
but she knew the Nana that he was referring to when he
said it is “…
Kaizer
van Nana
”.
[2]
The deceased was a taxi driver and he requested her to call the other
taxi owners to tell them what happened to him. At that stage,
a
police van came driving down the road, she stopped them and then she
spoke to a police man known as Booysen.
[8]
She also observed that the deceased was shot in his stomach. When the
deceased told
her that he was shot by Kaizer who works for the
municipality, she did not know who that person was. She also did not
see anybody
at the time when she went outside after the shooting. The
next witness that testified was Booysen, a police sergeant who was
stationed
at the uniform branch in Villiersdorp. He testified
that some stage he also worked at the municipality in Villiersdorp
and
the municipal workers were known to him. He knew the
appellant and he lives in the same area as the appellant. He is
known
to him as Kaizer.
[9]
He confirms the evidence of Fortuin that on the evening of the
shooting on 15 September
2012 between 10pm and 11pm, he was on duty
and that he went to a scene where a shooting had taken place. The
person that had been
shot was known to him as Mambush who was a taxi
driver and he was still alive at that stage. He enquired from him
what had happened
and he stated that he had been shot by Kaizer, the
man that worked at the municipality and the deceased told him that he
should
know him.
[10]
According to this witness, he initially did not know who it was that
the deceased was referring
to, and the deceased told told him “…
Kaizer
is werksaam by die munisipaliteit, jy behoort hom te ken”
[3]
.
The
witness says that after this explanation it was not still clear to
him who this Kaizer was, until the deceased further explained
that he
(Kaizer), was involved in a relationship with Nana. It was only
thereafter that he realised who this Kaizer was that the
deceased was
referring to. In court, he pointed out the appellant, as the person
that they were referring to. After having received
the information
from the deceased he and Adams immediately went to the appellant’s
house, but they could not find him there.
Thereafter they went to
Nana’s home and they also could not find him there.
[11]
On the same day, of which was on 14 January 2019, the investigating
officer, Warrant Officer
Adams (“Adams”) also testified.
He also arrived at the scene, where he found Booysen, who at that
stage, was still
speaking to the deceased. He also spoke to the
deceased because he knew him. The deceased also told him that it was
Kaizer that
works for the municipality, Nana’s boyfriend, that
shot him.
[12]
Adams testified that he knew who Kaizer was and knew that he used to
work for the municipality.
He further stated that he interacted with
him on a previous occasion. He also knew who this Nana was that the
people were referring
to. He and Booysen, after the deceased were
taken away from the scene by the ambulance, immediately went to the
place of the appellant.
When he arrived at the appellant’s
place, the door was open and he noticed that the bed was unmade.
Thereafter they went
to the place of Nana, where he was told that she
had seen the appellant about a week ago.
[13]
The appellant was only arrested in December 2017. After he spoke to
Nana in 2012, he did not
immediately take a statement from her. The
matter was postponed to 15 January 2019 for Adams to trace further
witnesses, including
Nana and take statements from them. At that
stage, the statement of Nana was not yet taken. The matter was
postponed to 26 February
2019 and thereafter once again to 11 March
2019, where Adams was recalled as a witness.
[14]
It emerged that he had only taken a statement of Nana after he had
given evidence on 14 January
2019. During further cross
examination, he was confronted with the statement of Nana insofar as
it contradicted his version.
From this, it emerged that he was
never at the house in the early hours of the Sunday after the
incident, but only Booysen, and
that he had only seen her a day or
two after the incident. It furthermore emerged that Nana had
told him in her statement,
after he had testified, that it is not
correct that she had seen the appellant about a week before the
incident, but on the day
before the incident, when she indeed spoke
to him. Adams corrected himself and did not dispute the version
of Nana where
it contradicted his version. He testified that
the incident happened a long time ago and that he could not remember
all the
details.
[15]
Qaqanba Vali, also known as Nana confirmed that the appellant was her
boyfriend and that he is
known as Kaizer. The deceased was known to
her only as a taxi driver. She was aware of the fact that he was shot
and killed on
15 December 2012. At that stage, she was no longer in
the relationship with the appellant. After the relationship ended
they still
got on very well; they greeted each other when they saw
each other and they still maintained a good relationship and were
friends.
[16]
She confirmed the evidence of the police that in the early hours of
the Sunday morning after
the incident, they came to her place to
enquire about the whereabouts of the appellant. The police still
believed that they were
in a relationship, but she told them that
they were not and they requested her to give them his telephone
number which she did
not have at that stage. She however told the
police that there are still some documents of the appellant and his
telephone number
might be between those documents.
[17]
After searching through the documents, she found his telephone number
which she gave to the police.
She testified that she last saw the
appellant on the day before the incident. They only greeted each
other and he told her that
he is going to friend of his. That was the
last time that she had seen him before he made telephone contact with
her on the Sunday.
This was after the police had been to her
place to look for the appellant. He called and said that the
police might come
to look for him at her place, and he said if the
police would ask her about the incident, she must tell them that she
does not
know anything about it, which she in any event did not know
about.
[18]
She asked him what he did and he said he will explain to her a later
stage. About a month after
that, he called her again and asked her to
buy him some airtime for his cellular phone. She once again asked him
what he did wrong,
and he told her that he will explain it her to at
a later stage. She saw him again for the first time when she
testified in court.
According to her, the reason why the police came
to look for him at her place was because they knew that she was
involved in a
relationship with the appellant for a very long time.
They must have thought that she would be the first person that would
be able to tell them where to find him. She did not know if the
appellant was acquainted with Mambush.
[19]
She furthermore confirmed that the appellant worked for the
Theewaterskloof municipality at some
time. She further testified that
the relationship came to an end when she became pregnant after she
was involved in a relationship
with another man, while he was
incarcerated. She denied that she had last seen the appellant
in June 2012, and that he had
been in the Eastern Cape since August
2012. She also denied that she ever spoke to Booysen or Adams during
the early hours of the
Sunday morning after the incident, but spoke
to a Mr. Nthandiso, also a police officer.
[20]
The appellant testified and confirmed that he is known as Kaizer and
further confirmed that Nana
was his girlfriend with whom he had been
in relationship for a very long time. He also confirmed that he
worked for the Theewaterskloof
municipality from April 2007 until
June 2011. He knew the deceased as Mambush who was a taxi driver. He
left Villiersdorp in August
2012 because his elderly mother was ill.
[21]
At that stage, he was unemployed and his mother passed away in 2018.
He was therefore in the
Eastern Cape on 15 September 2012 and
thereafter found work in Port Elizabeth in March 2014 as a contract
worker. He was eventually
arrested on 26 December 2017 in the Eastern
Cape. He furthermore testified that he had gone to hospital to visit
Nana during June
2012 to see the child and he never saw her again.
When he left his home in Villiersdorp, he made no arrangements and he
merely
locked his place and left his property. He denied that
he was involved in the killing of the deceased.
Evaluation
[22]
Mr Sebueng in his heads of argument submitted that the court a quo
was wrong to rely on the evidence
of Nana, in the light of the
contradictions in the evidence between her and the two police
officers Adams and Booysen and the evidence
regarding the time when
she spoke to the appellant. I do not agree with Mr. Sebueng’s
submission that this witness
was not credible and reliable. On the
contrary, she impressed the court as an honest witness, she had a
better recollection of
the events than Adams, who only took a
statement from her about seven years after the incident, and after he
had testified in court
for the first time on 14 January 2019.
[23]
Adams, at a later stage when confronted with the discrepancies
between her evidence, conceded
that her evidence was correct. She was
adamant during cross-examination that the appellant indeed had called
her the next day after
the police had paid her a visit in order to
inquire about the appellant’s whereabouts. Her evidence,
although she states
that she did not speak to Booysen, is consistent
with the evidence of Booysen, who said that she was known to him. Her
evidence
is also consistent with the undisputed evidence that it was
known that she was associated with the appellant, which is not in
dispute
because the appellant it seems was involved in a relationship
with this witness. It would only have been the most logical and
rational
thing for the police in the light of what the deceased had
told them, to go to the place of this witness to look for the
appellant,
based on the deceased’s spontaneous and unsolicited
utterances made to them. Her evidence is therefore consistent with
the
surrounding circumstantial evidence and the court a quo was
correct to find that this was a credible witness.
[24]
Regarding the question whether the court was correct to accept the
evidence of the deceased’s
so-called dying declaration, which
points to the fact that the appellant was responsible for the
shooting and subsequent killing,
this evidence is clearly hearsay
evidence. The admissibility of this evidence was not called into
question and the regional magistrate
did not, it seems, deal with the
question of admissibility of this hearsay evidence on the basis of
the provisions of the Law of
Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 (“the
LEAA”).
[25]
Mr. Lewis who appeared for the respondent submitted that in the
absence of any challenge to the
admissibility of this evidence in the
court a quo, the only question that this court on appeal has to
consider is whether the court
a quo based on this evidence, was
correct to convict the accused of the murder of the deceased beyond
reasonable doubt. He
submitted that this evidence, even though
it was not emphatically dealt with by the regional magistrate in
terms of the provisions
of the LEAA, seems to have been admitted in
terms of the provisions of section 3(1)(a) of the LEAA.
[26]
In her judgment on conviction
[4]
,
the regional magistrate recognised that the State relies on the dying
declaration made by the deceased that the appellant was
the person
who had shot him with a firearm. The evidence indicates that the
declaration was made to 3 witnesses, the neighbour
Fortuin and the
police officers Booysen and Adams. She found that the dying
declaration amounts to hearsay evidence and that caution
should apply
when admitting this evidence as it is improbable that a person who is
about to die would make a false statement.
[27]
It is required of the person to whom such a statement is made, that
he/she is a competent witness,
is aware that the person is about to
die, and that the statement must be made by the victim. Not only was
the statement made to
Booysen, Adams, but also Fortuin who reached
the deceased very soon after he was shot. The regional magistrate
goes on to find
that the evidence of the witness Nana supports the
version of the deceased and she consequently convicts the appellant
as charged.
[28]
It is apparent from the judgment that the regional magistrate as said
earlier, did not deal with
section 3 of the LEAA, but rather applied
the common law rule relating to hearsay. The issue of hearsay in
civil and criminal trials
is governed by section 3 (1) of the Act. In
our view, the regional magistrate was required to deal with the dying
declaration and
the admissibility thereof as hearsay evidence, in
terms of section 3(1) and not the common law.
[29]
The introduction by the prosecutor of the deceased’s dying
declaration was met with no
objection thereto by the appellant and
his attorney. The submission by respondent’s counsel is that as
there was no objection
by the defence, section 3(1)(a) applies in
that the appellant and his attorney consented to the admissibility of
the hearsay evidence
against the appellant.
[30]
In S v Aspeling
[5]
, the court
considered section 3 (1)(a) in circumstances where the defence
attorney accepted information which was communicated
by the
prosecutor from the Bar in relation to the opinion of the pathologist
who had conducted a post-mortem examination which
was already before
the court.
[31]
The court found that the attorney’s acquiescence to the
admission of the evidence implied
an agreement to the admission, and
thus the admission of the evidence was not irregular. In our view, in
the absence of an objection
to the introduction of the evidence, the
admission thereof as against the appellant, was consented to in terms
of section 3 (1)(a)
of the Act. The admission of the evidence in
terms of section 3(1)(a) should be distinguished from the probative
value of the evidence.
Once hearsay evidence is admitted, it becomes
part of the totality of the evidence which must be evaluated (Mnyama
v Gxalaba)
[6]
. Despite her
failure to consider section 3(1), the regional magistrate nonetheless
in her judgement approached the hearsay evidence
with caution. She
considered the admissibility of the evidence and found the deceased’s
declaration to be supported by the
evidence presented by the witness
Nana, and the independent witnesses to whom the deceased made the
declaration of the identity
of his assailant. She thus made a proper
assessment regarding the weight or probative value of the evidence.
[32]
In our view, as there was no objection to the admission of the dying
declaration, the silence
of the appellant and the attorney amounted
to an agreement to the admission thereof in the trial. The dying
declaration and identification
of the appellant as the shooter was
supplemented and supported by the version presented by Nana and the
evidence considered holistically.
[33]
If the admission of the hearsay has not been consented to or, where
the court in our view has
inadvertently admitted the hearsay
evidence, such as in this case by not applying the provisions of
section 3, then the court still
has a discretion to allow the hearsay
evidence in terms of section 3 (1)(c), which must be governed by the
interests of justice.
In circumstances where it would be absurd and
not in the interest of justice to have regard to such evidence.
In this regard,
the court is alive to what was said in R v
Hepworth
[7]
, the following was
said:
“
A criminal trial is not a
game where one side is entitled to claim the benefit of any omission
or mistake made by the other side,
and a judge's position in a
criminal trial is not merely that of an umpire to see that the rules
of the game are observed by both
sides. A judge or an administrator
of justice, he is not merely a figure head, he has not only to direct
and control the proceedings
according to recognised rules of
procedure but to see that justice is done.”
Section
3 (1) (c) of the Act which states that:
Subject to the
provisions of any other law, hearsay evidence shall not be admitted
as evidence at
criminal or civil proceedings, unless-
(a) each party
against whom the evidence is to be adduced agrees to the admission
thereof at such proceedings;
(b) the person
upon whose credibility the probative value of such evidence
depends,
himself testifies at such proceedings; or
(c) the court,
having regard to-
(i) the nature of
the proceedings;
(ii) the nature
of evidence;
(iii) the purpose
for which the evidence is tendered;
(iv) the
probative value of the evidence;
(v) the reason
why the evidence is not given by the person upon whose credibility
the
probative value of such evidence depends;
(vi) any
prejudice to a party which the admission of such evidence might
entail; and
(vii) any other
factor which would in the opinion of the court should be taken into
account, is of the opinion that such evidence
should be admitted in
the interests of justice.
[34]
In consideration of section 3(1)(c), the overarching principle in the
admission of hearsay evidence
should be the interests of justice (see
Parkins v S
[8]
). In S v
Ndlovu
[9]
, Cameron JA observed
that in the absence of an agreement, section 3 prohibits the
admission of hearsay evidence unless the interest
of justice requires
it
[10]
. That the act was
designed to create a general framework to regulate the admission of
hearsay evidence that would supersede excessive
rigidity and
inflexibility - and the occasional absurdity of the common law
position. The LEAA retained the common law cautions
about
receiving hearsay evidence, but attained the rules governing when it
is to be received and when not. He furthermore
agreed with the
view that the statutory preconditions for the reception of hearsay
evidence are now designed to ensure that it
is received only if the
interests of justice dictate its reception.
[35]
The court should also in considering the hearsay evidence have regard
to the factors as set out
in this section before concluding that it
would be in the interest of justice to admit such evidence. These
are;
The
nature of proceedings in this particular case, it is a criminal trial
where a finding needs to be made beyond reasonable doubt,
and where
such evidence may play a pivotal part in the conviction of an accused
person.
The
nature of the evidence, which is the direct evidence of a dying
declaration made by the deceased to three independent people,
two of
whom are police officers. The declaration implicates the appellant as
the sole person who shot the deceased more than once.
It is
direct evidence of the deceased who was a witness to his own
killing. A further and the most important considerations
is the
probative value of the evidence. This implies that the evidence
must be considered with caution as the probative value
depends on the
credibility of the person who made the declaration, and it must be
honest and reliable. There is no cogent reason
why the deceased would
specifically implicate the appellant as his assailant and state this
to three people.
[36]
The probative value of the evidence depends not only on the
credibility and reliability of the
statement made by the deceased but
also the credibility and reliability of the neighbour Fortuin and the
police officers to whom
the declaration was made, and their evidence
is without a doubt reliable and acceptable. They arrived on the scene
at different
occasions, and wholly independent of each other (the
incident happened in a relatively small community where the deceased,
Nana
and the appellant were known).
In
addition, the deceased did not deny that he was called “Kaiser”,
nor that he worked at the municipality nor that
he was in a
relationship at the time with Nana. And as I said earlier, it
would be absurd not to have regard to this evidence
that consists of
utterances made by the deceased, that was made spontaneously and
unsolicited. None of the witnesses mentioned,
asked the
deceased what happened and more importantly, who the person was who
shot him. Based on these utterances, not only
the police but
also Fortuin were provided with a clear and unambiguous picture of
who the culprit was. This in our
view, is overwhelming
evidence that strengthens the reliability of the hearsay evidence,
which is also strong evidence in respect
of the identity of the
appellant, and his direct involvement in the shooting of the
deceased.
[37]
The direct evidence of deceased that it was the appellant that shot
him was strengthened by the
strong surrounding evidence. The other
reliable evidence was that of Nana who testified that the appellant
had called her on the
Sunday after the shooting to tell her that if
the police came to look for him at her place that she must tell them
that she knows
nothing about the incident. This is strong evidence
about the involvement of the appellant which corroborates the hearsay
statements
made by the deceased, that it was the appellant that shot
him.
[38]
A further factor to be considered is whether it would be prejudicial
to the appellant. This would
be obvious in a criminal trial but the
overriding consideration would be whether the admission of such
evidence would be in the
interest of justice. And once the court
reaches this conclusion, notwithstanding the fact that it might be
prejudicial to an accused
person, the court must admit such
evidence. In
S v
Ndhlovu and Others,
the
court held at page 328 at [50]:
“
The
suggestion that the prejudice in question might include the
disadvantage ensuing from the hearsay being accorded its just
evidential
weight once admitted must however be discountenanced.
A
just verdict, based on evidence admitted because the interests
of justice require it, cannot constitute 'prejudice'. In the
present
case, Goldstein J found it unnecessary to take a final view, but
accepted that 'the strengthening of the State case does
constitute
prejudice'
.
That concession to the proposition in question, in my view, was
misplaced.
Where
the interests of justice require the admission of hearsay,
the resultant strengthening of the opposing case cannot count
as
prejudice for statutory purposes, since in weighing the
interests of justice the court must already have concluded that
the
reliability of the evidence is such that its admission is necessary
and justified. If these requisites are fulfilled; the very
fact that
the hearsay justifiably strengthens the proponent's case warrants its
admission, since its omission would run counter
to the interests
of justice
.”
(our
emphasis)
In
this particular case, the regional magistrate correctly approached
the evaluation of the hearsay evidence with caution.
The
admission of the hearsay evidence given the fact and circumstances of
this case, does not pose a risk to the appellant’s
right to a
fair trial as contemplated under section 35 of the Constitution.
One of the main reasons being that the appellant
conceded to the
admission of such evidence and did not challenge it.
[39]
In summary therefore, the admissibility of the hearsay evidence was
based on the consent of the
appellant, who was legally represented.
Our view is that it is not necessary to consider section 3(1)(c), but
even if the
section is applied, a consideration of the factors
therein would support the view that the admission of the hearsay
evidence, objectively
considered and approached with caution, was in
the interests of justice.
[40]
In conclusion, we state that even though the regional magistrate did
not specifically refer to
the provisions of the LEAA, and given the
fact that there was no objection to the admission of such evidence,
it cannot be said
that it was not in the interest of justice to admit
such evidence. The weight and probative value of the evidence was so
overwhelming
that it cannot be ignored.
[41]
In our view therefore, the regional magistrate did not misdirect
herself when she convicted the
appellant on the strength of this
evidence. The appeal against the conviction therefore falls to
be dismissed.
[42]
We therefore make the following order:
“
That the
appeal against conviction is dismissed
.”
R.C.A. Henney
Judge of the High
Court
M. Pangarker
Acting Judge of
the High Court
[1]
loosely translated “That Kaizer that works for municipality
shot him.”
[2]
loosely translated “Kaizer of Nana”
[3]
loosely translated “… Kaizer is employed by the
municipality you should know him.”
[4]
Pg 150 record.
[5]
1998 (1) SACR 561
at 567 I-J and 568 A-B.
[6]
1990 1 SA 650 (C).
[7]
1928 AD 265
[8]
2017 (1) SACRS 235 (WCC) para [52]
[9]
[2002] 3 ALL SA 760 (SCA)
[10]
Para [12] …; [14]; and [15]