About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: Western Cape High Court, Cape Town
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: Western Cape High Court, Cape Town
>>
2020
>>
[2020] ZAWCHC 113
|
|
Procare Outsourcing (Pty) Ltd and Another v PGR Management t/a Palm Garden Retreat Management (Pty) Ltd and Others (10676/2020) [2020] ZAWCHC 113 (20 August 2020)
SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
and
SAFLII
Policy
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN
CAPE DIVISION)
Case
no: 10676/2020
In
the matter between:
PROCARE
OUTSOURCING (PTY) LTD FIRST
APPLICANT
Registration
number: 2018/511745/07
AGRICULTURAL,
FOOD, FISHING AND SECOND
APPLICANT
RETAIL
INDUSTRY WORKERS UNION
and
PGR
MANAGEMENT t/a PALM GARDEN FIRST
RESPONDENT
RETREAT
MANAGEMENT (PTY) LTD
Registration
number: 2005/009332/07
GRAGOOD
DEVELOPMENTS SECOND
RESPONDENT
(PTY)
LTD
Registration
number: 2003/0000/53/07
WILLEM
DANIEL KOEGELENBERG THIRD
RESPONDENT
Identity
number: […]
PANAF TRADING (2014/051834/07)
(PTY)
LTD FOURTH
RESPONDENT
Registration
number: 2014/051834/07
GAIL
FRANCIS BUECHEL FIFTH
RESPONDENT
Identity
number […]
Coram:
Norton AJ
Heard:
13 August 2020
Delivered:
20 August 2020
JUDGMENT
Norton
AJ
[1]
The applicants seek
urgent declaratory and interdictory relief arising from the
termination of two outsourcing agreements which
the first applicant
concluded with the first and second respondents respectively in
August 2019.
[2]
The first applicant,
Procare Outsourcing (Pty) Limited (Procare), is an outsourced
resources provider which supplies the services
of nursing staff and
care workers to the residents of facilities managed by the first
respondent, PGR Management (Pty) Limited
(PGR), and the second
respondent, Gragood Developments (Pty) Limited (Gragood). It does so
in terms of outsourcing agreements concluded
in August 2019 with,
respectively, PGR (the PGR agreement) and Gragood (the Gragood
agreement).
[3]
The PGR agreement and
the Gragood agreement are in identical terms, and I refer to them
collectively as ‘the outsourcing agreements’.
[4]
It is common cause that
prior to the conclusion of the outsourcing agreements, PGR and
Gragood respectively provided the nursing
and care services the
provision of which was subsequently outsourced to Procare.
[5]
The outsourcing
agreements contain detailed provision, under clauses 13.1 to 13.5,
for the application and implementation of s 197
of the Labour
Relations Act 66 of 1995 (the LRA) in respect of the persons then
employed by PGR and Gragood to perform those services.
In terms of
section 197 of the LRA, the contracts of employment of employees of a
business which is transferred as a going concern,
are transferred
from the transferor (as the ‘old employer’) to the
transferee (as the ‘new employer’).
[6]
It was expressly
recorded in clause 13.1 of the outsourcing agreements that the
transfer of the services of PGR or Gragood, as the
case may be, to
Procare would ‘constitute a transfer of the whole or part of a
business, trade, undertaking or service, as
contemplated in section
197 of the LRA, and therefore that the provisions of that section
shall apply to this agreement’.
[7]
Clauses 13.2 to 13.5 of
the outsourcing agreements set out the obligations of PGR and Gragood
(as the ‘old employers’)
and Procare (as the ‘new
employer’) in terms of the provisions of s 197 of the LRA.
[8]
Clause 13.6 of the
outsourcing agreements goes further, providing as follows for the
application of s 197 of the LRA on the termination
of the outsourcing
agreements:
‘
Should this Agreement be
terminated for whatsoever reason and, should the Client [ie PGR or
Gragood, as the case may be] continue
providing nursing and caring
services beyond the termination of this agreement, and in that event,
said termination will attract
the provisions of section 197 of the
LRA’.
[9]
On 7 July 2020 PGR and
Gragood gave Procare two months’ notice of their termination of
the respective outsourcing agreements
in terms of clause 20.4
thereof, which provides that ‘[e]ither party may terminate this
Agreement for convenience upon 2
(two) months’ prior written
notice to the other Party’.
[10]
Procare responded on 10
July 2020 by referring PGR and Gragood to clause 13.6 of the
outsourcing agreements and stating as follows:
‘
We are going to proceed with
this from our side, but in terms of the LRA, we, you and the staff
must engage in a triparty agreement.
A complete list of all the
current permanent staff will be sent to you shortly and we suggest
that you start communicating this
decision of yours to the staff
without delay to avoid the same misunderstandings that we created
when we took over the staff’.
[11]
Procare’s letter
elicited an immediate response from PGR in the following terms:
‘
We wish to categorically state
that Palm Gardens Retreat Management (Pty) Ltd will not be providing
nursing and caring services
and consequently Procare would be well
advised to take whatever steps necessary arising from the termination
of contract’.
[12]
In a letter dated 14
July 2020, Procare’s attorneys advised PGR and Gragood that
Procare disputed the cancellation as well
as their right to cancel
the outsourcing agreements until they complied with their obligations
under clause 13.6 of the outsourcing
agreements.
[13]
In a letter dated 16
July 2020, Gragood gave Procare notice of its ‘summary
termination’ of the Gragood agreement on
the ground that
Procare had been dishonest in respect of ‘the agreement between
the parties to provide services for Home
Based Care and to share the
profits thereof’ by ‘using permanent staff paid for by
Gragood and deducting salaries from
the reconciliation as an expense
and retaining it.’
[14]
In a letter dated 22
July 2020 Procare’s attorneys claimed the payment by PGR of a
total amount of R165 946.68 and the
payment by Gragood of a
total amount of R328 315.89 in accordance with a reconciliation
of accounts which was annexed to the
letter.
[15]
On 28 July 2020 PGR
gave Procare notice of its ‘summary termination’ of the
PGR agreement on the ground that Procare
had breached the agreement
by, among other things, failing to supply nine senior staff members
over the previous six days.
[16]
In a reply to Procare’s
claim of 22 July 2020, the respondents on 31 July 2020 advised that
they disputed the Procare accounts
and required time to work through
the spreadsheet ‘as it appears to be confusing and rife with
inconsistencies’.
[17]
On 3 August 2020
Procare’s attorneys notified PGR and Gragood that (a) they were
mandated to launch an urgent application
compelling PGR and Gragood
to take transfer of the relevant employees in accordance with the
provisions of the outsourcing agreements
in terms of s 197 of the
LRA; and (b) Procare was forced to proceed with the provisions of s
189 of the LRA by giving notice to
all the relevant employees of
their positions potentially becoming redundant.
[18]
It appears from the
papers that Procare commenced a process in terms of s 189 of the LRA
shortly thereafter.
The
application
[19]
This application was
instituted on 7 August 2020 and heard on 13 August 2020.
[20]
Procare is the first
applicant in the application and the second applicant is the
Agricultural, Food, Fishing and Retail Industry
Workers Union
(AFRIWU), a trade union which is duly registered in terms of the LRA
and purports to represent ‘at least 24
[e]mployees who are
members of the 2nd Applicant and employees of the 1
st
Applicant’.
[1]
[21]
The employees of
Procare who are affected by the termination of the outsourcing
agreements (the affected employees) are neither
named nor cited as
parties in the application.
[22]
I
n addition to PGR and
Gragood, three further persons are cited as the third to fifth
respondents, but no relief is sought against
them (save for an order
of costs in the event that they oppose the application, which is not
the case). I therefore refer to PGR
and Gragood collectively as ‘the
respondents’.
The
issues
[23]
The substantive relief
sought in the Notice of Motion is as follows:
‘
2. A declaratory order that
the outsourcing agreement entered into between the First Applicant
and the Second Respondent dated 16
August 2019 have been validly
cancelled on the 6
th
of July 2020 subject to two months’ notice, and terminating on
31 August 2020.
[2]
3. A declaratory order that the early
termination of the outsourcing agreements attracted the provisions of
Section 197
of the
Labour Relations Act, 66 of 1995
.
4. An order that the First and Second
Respondents and any party acting as its agent of representative must
immediately comply with
the provisions of
Section 197
of the
Labour
Relations Act, 66 of 1995
.
5. An order that the First and Second
Respondents and any party acting as its agent or representative of
the First and/or Second
Respondents must comply with clause 14 of the
outsourcing agreements in that the parties will both enter into the
Section 197
negotiations as provided for in paragraph [4] above in
good faith and will in good faith take all necessary steps to ensure
that
such negotiations and compliance with Section 197 of the Act is
completed by the 30
th
of August 2020.
6. An order that pending the
completion of the Section 197 negotiations, the First Applicant’s
services are restored and that
the First Applicant and its employees
are allowed to render its services as provided for in the outsourcing
agreements between
the parties.
6.1 An order as consequence of
paragraph [6] above, that the placement of the First Applicant’s
Employees on paid/unpaid
leave be lifted and that the First
Applicant’s Employee’s is allowed to return to work and
is allowed on the site;
and
6.2 An order as consequence of
paragraph [6] above, that all services rendered by the First
Applicant will be paid by the
First and Second Respondents as
provided for in the outsourcing agreements in 7 days after the
reconciliation is received.
7. An order that the First and Second
Respondents pay an amount of R216 029.57 (TWO HUNDRED AND
SIXTEEN THOUSAND AND TWENTY
NINE RAND AND FIFTY SEVEN CENTS), being
the sales order in respect of the permanent staff for the month of
July 2020, within 7
(seven) days of this order being granted for the
First Applicant’s Employees’ salaries to be paid.’
[24]
The relief sought in
the Notice of Motion falls into four categories:
(a)
A declaration that the
outsourcing agreements were validly cancelled on 6 July 2020, subject
to two months’ notice, and will
terminate on 31 August 2020
(the declaratory relief in respect of termination);
(b)
A declaration that the
termination of the outsourcing agreements triggers the application of
s 197 of the LRA (the declaratory relief
in respect of the
application of s 197);
(c)
An interdict compelling
the respondents to take specific steps to implement s 197 of the LRA
(the interdictory relief in respect
of the implementation of s 197);
and
(d)
An order directing the
respondents to pay an amount of R216 029.57 in respect of
services rendered by Procare in July 2029
(the payment relief).
[25]
I am satisfied that the
matter is urgent.
[26]
It is apparent that s
197 of the LRA is at the core of almost all the relief sought by the
applicants. Indeed the founding affidavit
describes the nature and
purpose of the application as follows:
‘
3.1 This is an urgent
application brought as a result of the early termination of two
outsourcing agreements by the First Respondent
and Second Respondent.
3.2 The application is brought
in
terms of Section 197 of the Act
where a portion of the business of the First and the Second
Respondents were transferred to the First Applicant on 30 September
2019. Thereafter the First Applicant took over all the First and
Second Respondents employees as per the agreements between them.
3.3 The main reason for this
application and what also further substantiates the urgency in this
matter, as discussed more infra,
is to compel the First and Second
Respondents to comply with their contractual obligations and
retake
employment of the employees in accordance with the provisions of
Section 197 of the Act
.’
(Emphasis added.)
[27]
Unsurprisingly, then,
the grounds upon which the respondents opposed the application
include the preliminary ground that this court
lacks jurisdiction to
determine the application, on the basis that it falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Labour Court.
[28]
I therefore deal with
the pertinent legal provisions and principles governing the
respective jurisdiction of this court and the
Labour Court before
considering each of the categories of relief sought by the applicants
in the light of the point in limine based
on jurisdiction and the
other grounds of opposition.
[29]
I point out as a
starting point that it does not avail the applicants to rely on the
parties’ ‘irrevocable’ agreement,
in clause 29.2 of
the outsourcing agreements, that ‘the High Court of South
Africa has exclusive jurisdiction to settle any
dispute or claim that
arises out of or in connection with this Agreement or its subject
matter or formation (including non-contractual
disputes or claims).’
This court’s jurisdiction must be determined in accordance with
the applicable law, and not on
the basis of the parties’
agreement.
Jurisdiction
[30]
This court lacks
jurisdiction to determine any issue which falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Labour Court in terms
of s 157 of the LRA.
[31]
Section 157 of the
LRA provides as follows:
‘
(1)
Subject to the Constitution and section 173, and except where this
Act provides otherwise, the Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction
in respect of all matters that elsewhere in terms of this Act or in
terms of any other law are to be determined by the Labour Court.
(2) The Labour Court has
concurrent jurisdiction with the High Court in respect of any alleged
or threatened violation of any fundamental
right entrenched in
Chapter 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996,
and arising from—
(a) employment and from labour
relations;
(b) any dispute over the
constitutionality of any executive or administrative act or conduct,
or any threatened executive or administrative
act or conduct, by the
State in its capacity as an employer; and
(c) the
application of any law for the administration of which the Minister
is responsible.’
[32]
Since no violation of
any fundamental constitutional right is alleged in this application,
the question whether this court has jurisdiction
to determine the
application turns on whether the application concerns one or more
matters that ‘in terms of [the LRA] or
any other law must be
determined by the Labour Court’.
[33]
The pertinent question
is ‘
whether
Parliament has conferred the jurisdiction to determine this dispute
upon the Labour Court, in such a manner that it either
expressly or
by necessary implication has excluded the jurisdiction of the High
Court’ (
Fredericks
and Others v MEC for Education and Training Eastern Cape and Others
2002 (2) BLLR 119
(CC) para 35).
[34]
The Constitutional
Court has held that s 157(1) of the LRA must be given a wide scope in
order to promote the determination of labour
matters by the
specialist courts established to deal with matters concerning the
employment relationship. In
Gcaba
v Minister for Safety and Security and Others
[2009]
12 BLLR 1145
(CC) the Court stated that s 157(1) ‘should be
given expansive content to protect the special status of the Labour
Court’,
[3]
which it described as follows: –
‘
[T]he Constitution recognises
the need for specificity and specialisation in a modern and complex
society under the rule of law…Once
a set of carefully-crafted
rules and structures has been created for the effective and speedy
resolution of disputes and protection
of rights in a particular area
of law, it is preferable to use that particular system.
[4]
[35]
The point was
reinforced by the Supreme Court of Appeal in
Motor
Industry Staff Association v Macun NO & Others
2016 37 ILJ 625 (SCA):
‘
The Labour Court and Labour
Appeal Court were designed as specialist courts that would be steeped
in workplace issues and be best
able to deal with complaints relating
to labour practices and collective bargaining. Put differently, the
Labour and Labour Appeal
Courts are best placed to deal with matters
arising out of the LRA. Forum shopping is to be discouraged.’
[5]
[36]
In a statement that
applies equally to the construction of s 157(1) of the LRA, the
Constitutional Court in
Chirwa
v Transnet Limited and Others
(2008) 29 ILJ 73 (CC), having described it as an objective of the LRA
to establish a ‘one-stop court for labour and employment
relations’,
[6]
said the following:
‘
While s 157(2) remains on the
statute book it must be construed in the light of the primary
objectives of the LRA. The first is
to establish a comprehensive
framework of law governing the labour and employment relations
between employers and employees in
all sectors. The other is the
objective to establish the Labour Court and Labour Appeal court as
superior courts, with exclusive
jurisdiction to decide matters
arising from the LRA.’
[7]
[37]
This Court in
O
Thorpe Construction
and Others v Minister of Labour and Others
(2015) 36 ILJ 935 found that it follows from the approach in
Gcaba
that if a cause of action concerns an alleged breach of a provision
of the LRA, it is a matter which falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Labour Court.
[8]
[38]
It has been recognised
that while the labour courts have exclusive power to enforce rights
under the LRA, the high courts and the
labour courts both have the
power to enforce common law contractual rights.
[9]
Section
197 of the LRA
[39]
Section 197 of the LRA
makes detailed provision for the protection of the rights of
employees when a business is transferred as
a going concern, by
imposing specific obligations on the transferor (the old employer)
and the transferee (the new employer) and
stipulating the terms and
conditions which govern the employment relationship between the new
employer and the relevant employees.
[40]
The issues which are
regulated by s 197 (which include the terms and conditions of
contracts of employment; the impact of collective
agreements and
arbitration awards; leave pay and severance pay; and dismissals based
on operational requirements) are part of the
fabric of the employment
relationship as governed by the LRA and the
Basic Conditions of
Employment Act 75 of 1997
.
[41]
In my view the
interpretation, application and implementation of
s 197
of the LRA
are matters which lie within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labour
Court as the specialist court created to deal
with the employment
relationship and its consequences.
[42]
In terms of
s 158(1)
of
the LRA the Labour Court may, in relation to disputes arising from
s
197
, exercise a wide range of powers which include ordering
compliance with the provisions of
s 197
(s
158
(1)(b)); granting an
interdict
(s 158(1)(a)(ii))
; or granting a declaratory order
(s
158(1)(a)(iv)).
It is also bound, in terms of
s 182
of the LRA, by
judgments of the Labour Appeal Court, the specialist appeal court
established to deal with labour matters, ensuring
the development of
a cohesive body of jurisprudence on the interpretation, application
and implementation of
s 197
of the LRA.
[43]
I turn now to consider
whether the relief sought by the applicants is within the
jurisdiction of this court, and if so, whether
a case has been made
out for it to be granted.
[44]
I consider each of the
categories of relief sought by the applicants in turn, as
jurisdiction must be determined on the basis of
the cause of action,
as pleaded (see
Chirwa
,
above, para 169) which underlies each category of relief.
[10]
The
declaratory relief in respect of the application of
s 197
and the
interdictory relief in respect of the implementation of
s 197
[45]
The applicants seek a
declaration that the termination of the outsourcing agreements
‘attracts the provisions’ of
s 197
of the LRA as the
parties agreed in clause 13.6 of the outsourcing agreements, and an
interdict compelling the respondents to take
a range of specific
steps to implement the provisions of
s 197.
[46]
In determining this
relief, this Court would be interpreting, applying, and implementing
s 197
of the LRA, matters which in my view, as I have indicated
above, fall squarely within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labour
Court.
[47]
The declaration sought
by the applicants cannot be granted on the basis of the parties’
agreement, in clause 13.6 of the outsourcing
agreements, that
‘[s]hould this Agreement be terminated for any whatsoever
reason and, should the Client continue providing
nursing and caring
services beyond the termination of this agreement, then, and in that
event, said termination will attract the
provisions of
Section 197
of
the LRA’.
[48]
The question whether or
not the provisions of
s 197
of the LRA are triggered by the
termination of the outsourcing agreements depends on whether, in
terms of
s 197(1)
of the LRA, the termination of the outsourcing
agreements will give rise to the transfer of a business by one
employer to another
employer as a going concern.
[49]
The Constitutional
Court and the Labour Appeal Court have made it clear that this is a
matter to be determined objectively on all
the facts, and not on the
basis of the intention of the transferor and transferee.
[50]
In
South
African Municipal Workers Union & Others v Rand Airport
Management Co (Pty) Ltd & Others
(2005) 26 ILJ 67 (LAC) (
SAMWU
)
the Labour Appeal Court observed that it is clear from the minority
judgment of Zondo JP in the Labour Appeal Court and the judgment
of
the Constitutional Court in
National
Education Health & Allied Workers Union v University of Cape Town
and Others (NEHAWU)
[11]
that ‘the intention of the transferor and the transferee does
not play a critical role, let alone a decisive role’
in the
determination whether there has been a transfer of a business as a
going concern.
[12]
[51]
Zondo JP stated in his
minority judgment in
NEHAWU
that ‘there will be cases where the transferor and the
transferee agree that the workforce will be taken over by the
transferee but the transaction cannot be described as transfer of the
business as a going concern if many of the other factors
that are
relevant to a transfer being one of a going concern are absent’.
[13]
[52]
In the Constitutional
Court, Ngcobo J said, on behalf of a unanimous court,
‘
The phrase “going
concern” is not defined in the LRA. It must therefore be given
its ordinary meaning unless the context
indicates otherwise. What
must be transferred must be a business in operation “so that
the business remains the same but
in different hands”. Whether
that has occurred is a matter of fact which must be determined
objectively in the light of the
circumstances of each transaction. In
deciding whether a business has been transferred as a going concern,
regard must be had to
the substance and not the form of the
transaction. A number of factors will be relevant to the question
whether a transfer of business
as a going concern has occurred, such
as the transfer or otherwise of assets, both tangible and intangible,
whether or not workers
are taken over by the new employer, whether
customers are transferred and whether or not the same business has
been carried on
by the new employer.’
[14]
[53]
This is a determination
to be made by the Labour Court, in the light of all the facts placed
before it, and on the basis of the
extensive jurisprudence developed
in the labour courts on the application and implementation of
s 197
of the LRA.
[54]
I find that the matters
raised by the declarator and the interdict sought in respect of the
application and implementation of
s 197
are matters which fall within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labour Court and therefore outside
this court’s jurisdiction.
The declaratory relief in respect
of termination
[55]
The applicants seek a
declaration that the outsourcing agreements were validly cancelled,
on two months’ notice, on 6 July
2020, and will terminate on 31
August 2020.
[56]
They do so in
circumstances in which PGR and Gragood, having given two months’
notice of termination of the agreements in
terms of
s 20.4
of the
outsourcing agreements on 6 July 2020, subsequently (on 16 July 2020
in the case of Gragood and on 28 July 2020 in the case
of PGR)
purported to terminate the agreements summarily.
[57]
The respondents contend
that their subsequent ‘summary termination’ of the
outsourcing agreements was the effective
termination.
[58]
This is not a matter
which requires the interpretation, application or implementation of
s
197
of the LRA. It can be decided on the application of the facts to
the pertinent clauses of the outsourcing agreements. It is
accordingly
not a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
LRA, but within the concurrent jurisdiction of this court and the
Labour
Court.
[59]
However, a valid
termination of the outsourcing agreements would be a necessary
element of the cause of action of any party seeking
a declarator or
interdict in the Labour Court in respect of the application or
implementation of
s 197
of the LRA to the employees of Procare who
have been providing services to the respondents.
[60]
I am mindful that if
this court were to determine the question whether (and if so, on what
date) there has been a valid termination
of the outsourcing
agreements, the prosecution of any proceedings instituted in the
Labour Court in respect of the application
or implementation of
s
197
, might be delayed pending the determination of any appeal against
this court’s decision in a different set of courts, to the
detriment of those seeking relief in the Labour Court, and in
particular the affected employees (in respect of whom retrenchment
proceedings have already commenced).
[61]
The courts have
accepted that where a court has jurisdiction over part of a cause of
action, it may assume jurisdiction over the
whole cause of action,
albeit that the remainder of the cause of action would fall under the
jurisdiction of another court, on
the basis of the common law
doctrine of ‘continentia causae’ (cohesion of a cause of
action) where considerations of
convenience, justice and good sense
justify its exercising jurisdiction over the whole cause.
[62]
The doctrine, first
analysed by the Appellate Division in
Roberts
Construction Co Ltd v Wilcox Bros (Pty) Ltd
1962
(4) SA 326
(A) at 336D-E and further developed by the Supreme Court
of Appeal in
Permanent
Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape Provincial Government
& Another v Ngxuza and Others
2001
(4) SA 1184
(SCA) para 22, has been applied (a) in circumstances
where jurisdiction over one cause of action is ‘split’
between
courts in different geographical divisions; and (b) by a
court with jurisdiction over part of a cause of action which assumes
jurisdiction
over the whole of the cause of action.
[63]
However I do not think
this means that the doctrine cannot be applied where jurisdiction
over a cause of action is split between
the High Court and a
specialist court such as the Labour Court, nor that this court could
not decline to exercise its jurisdiction
over part of a cause of
action in favour of the Labour Court exercising jurisdiction over the
whole of the cause of action. Such
an application of the doctrine
would in any event, in my view, fall within this Court’s
inherent jurisdiction under s 173
of the Constitution to develop the
common law in the interests of justice.
[64]
I find that it is in
the interests of justice, convenience and good sense that
jurisdiction over this issue should be exercised
by the Labour Court
and not this court.
The
payment relief
[65]
Procare seeks the
payment by the respondents of the sum of R216 029.57, the total
sum reflected in pro forma accounts or ‘sales
orders’
sent to the respondents on 15 July 2020 in respect of services
provided to the respondents for the month of July
2020. This relief
is sought urgently so that Procare is in a position to pay the
relevant employees’ salaries.
[66]
Procare’s cause
of action in this instance is based upon the contractual relationship
between the parties, and does not require
any interpretation or
application of s 197 or any other provision of the LRA. It is
accordingly not a matter within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the
Labour Court. Whether or not the Labour Court shares concurrent
jurisdiction with this court is not a matter
which I am required to
decide, as the matter falls within the jurisdiction of this court and
there is in my view no compelling
reason based on convenience or any
other consideration why the issue should not be determined by this
court.
[67]
It is common cause that
the practice followed by the parties in respect of payment for
Procare’s services was as follows:
(a)
Before the 25
th
day of every month, Procare would send pro forma accounts or ‘sales
orders’ to PGR and Gragood in respect of permanent
staff
providing services at the respondents’ various facilities.
(b)
PGR and Gragood would
pay Procare in advance in terms of the pro forma accounts.
(c) Procare would pay its employees’
salaries.
(d) At the end of the month, Procare
would draw up a reconciliation of its accounts, now including
Procare’s commission of
15% as well as VAT of 15%, reflecting
the amount still due and payable by PGR and Gragood.
(e) PGR and Gragood would pay, in
terms of the reconciled accounts, any sum still due and payable to
Procare.
[15]
[68]
Procare concedes that
there is a dispute in respect of the full outstanding amount due and
payable to it by the respondents in respect
of the services of
permanent and non-permanent staff for the month of July 2020 as
reflected in the accounts provided to the respondents
at the end of
June 2020. It is expressly stated in the founding affidavit filed on
behalf of Procare:
‘
It is common cause that there
is a dispute in respect of the full outstanding amount due and
payable to the First Applicant. Either
party can institute action
proceedings in relation to this dispute at a later stage’.
[69]
Procare contends that
the amount due and payable in terms of the sales orders is on a
different footing and can be dealt with in
this application.
[70]
The respondents, in
their answering affidavit, do not deny their indebtedness arising
from the sales orders generated on 15 July
2020, but aver that their
indebtedness has been extinguished by set-off against it of Procare’s
indebtedness to them in respect
of a counterclaim which they intend
to bring.
[71]
In response to
Procare’s reliance on the sales orders, the following averments
are made in the respondents’ answering
affidavit:
‘
251. First and Second
Respondents deny liability to pay any of the sums claimed,
owing
to the far larger sum which is owed to it by First Applicant
.
252. The fact that there may be sales
orders does not detract from the fact that
whatever
indebtedness there may otherwise have been
,
has been extinguished through set-off.’ (Emphasis added.)
[72]
What has been placed in
dispute is not the respondents’ indebtedness for the amounts
reflected in the sales orders, but the
respondents’ liability
to pay those amounts. The basis on which the respondents deny
liability is that they have a counterclaim
against the applicants for
an amount which exceeds the amount claimed in terms of the sales
orders.
[73]
However, it is apparent
from the relevant averments in the answering affidavit that the
counterclaim relied upon by the respondents
is an
anticipated
counterclaim based upon the respondents’
suspicion
that Procare has been ‘double billing’ in respect of
certain staff. The counterclaim is still, on the respondents’
own version, in the process of being quantified.
[74]
The key averments in
the answering affidavit are as follows.
·
‘
The First
and Second Respondents
suspect
that the First Applicant has been double billing the First and Second
Respondents for permanent and temporary staff.’
·
‘
To this
end, what is required is for a
full
debatement
of all
accounts in order to
establish
the extent
of the
suspected
double billing, over the full period of the contract term.’
·
‘
The First
and Second Respondents are of the
prima
facie view
, at this
stage, that they
will
have
a collective
counterclaim against the First Applicant for an amount of
approximately R1, 500, 000.00 … as a result of the
suspected
double billing.’
·
‘
First and
Second Respondents contend that the First Applicant owes them in the
region of R1,5 million in respect of overcharging
on the contracts,
charging for personnel that was not supplied and using personnel that
was supposed to have delivered services
under the parties’
contracts for home based care and getting residents to pay First
Applicant directly for this.’
·
‘
The
parties are in the process of doing a
reconciliation
in this regard.’
(Emphasis
added.)
[75]
It is apparent from
these averments that the respondents have not established a
debt which can be set off against their debt
to Procare arising from
the sales orders.
[76]
It is trite that
set-off comes into operation when two parties are mutually indebted
to each other and both debts are liquidated
and due and payable
(
Schierhout v Union
Government (Minister of Justice
)
1926
AD 286).
As explained in
Christie’s
The Law of Contract
in South Africa
:
[16]
‘
For
set-off to operate the defendant must be in a position to say “the
plaintiff owes me a debt”, rather than “I
have a claim
against him”. That is to say the debt must be liquidated…”
[77]
A debt is liquidated
only when it is ‘based on a liquid document or is admitted or
its money value has been ascertained or
in the sense that it is
capable of prompt entertainment’ and the decision as to whether
or not a debt is capable of speedy
ascertainment is a matter left for
determination to the individual determination of the judge (
Lester
Investments (Pty) Ltd v Narshi
1951
(2) SA 464
(C) at 469F and 470D).
[78]
Set-off does not take
place where a claim is based on an account which requires detailed
examination (
Bhima v
Proes Street Properties (Pty) Ltd
1956 (1) SA 458
(T) at 460F) or prolonged investigation (
Whelan
v Oosthuizen
1937
TPD 304
at 311).
[79]
The respondents have
not in my view established a debt owed to them by Procare which is
liquidated, or due and payable.
[80]
They have accordingly
not set up a dispute of fact such as to defeat the grant of the
payment relief on the papers.
Costs
[81]
The applicants have
succeeded in respect of only a small portion of the relief sought in
their Notice of Motion, and have been substantially
unsuccessful. In
the circumstances I am of the view that the applicants should pay 80%
of the respondents’ costs.
Order
[82]
I make an order in the
following terms:
(a)
The applicants’
non-compliance with the Uniform Rules of Court relating to the
service of documents and timeframes is condoned
and the matter is
heard as an urgent application in terms of Rule 6(12)(a) of the
Rules.
(b)
The first respondent
shall pay the first applicant the amount of R150 821.82 in
respect of sales orders SO024 and SO022 dated
15 July 2020, within
seven days of this order being granted.
(c)
The second respondent
shall pay the first applicant the amount of R65 207.75 in
respect of sales order SO023 dated 7 July 2020,
within seven days of
this order being granted.
(d)
The application in
respect of the relief sought in prayers 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the
Notice of Motion is dismissed.
(e)
The applicants jointly
and severally shall be liable for 80% of the respondents’
costs.
___________________
Michelle Norton
Acting Judge of the High Court
Western Cape Division
APPEARANCES
For
Applicants: T Ellerbeck
Instructed
by
Waldick
Jansen Van Rensburg Inc.
Centurion
c/o
Le Roux Attorneys
Cape
Town
For
First and Second
Respondents:
R Stelzner SC
Instructed
by
STBB/Smith
Tabata Buchanan Boyes
Cape
Town
[1]
AFRIWU’s standing to do so was
challenged, but this was not an issue which ultimately needed to be
determined.
[2]
It is evident from the contents of
the founding affidavit that this relief is sought in respect of both
of the outsourcing agreements.
[3]
Gcaba,
para
70
[4]
Gcaba
,
para 56
[5]
Macun
,
para 20
[6]
Chirwa,
para
119
[7]
Chirwa,
para
123
[8]
O
Thorpe
,
para 25
[9]
Makhanya v University of Zululand
2010 (1) SA 62
(SCA) para 18. The Court stated that ‘in
respect of the enforcement of both contractual and constitutional
rights the high
courts retain their original jurisdiction assigned
to them by the Constitution. In both cases equivalent jurisdiction
has been
conferred upon the Labour Court to be exercised
concurrently with the high courts’ (para 26).
[10]
In
Makhanya
the Supreme Court of Appeal recognised that separate causes of
action arising from the same incident may coexist, and noted:
‘Thus
there is the potential … for three separate claims to arise
when an employee’s contract is terminated.
One is for the
infringement of his or her LRA right. Another is for the
infringement of his or her common law right. And where
it occurs in
the public sector, a third is for infringement of his or her
constitutional right’ (para 12). The Court went
on to consider
how different courts might be engaged in determining these different
causes of action: ‘Naturally a claim
that falls within the
concurrent jurisdiction of both the high court and a special court
could not be brought in both courts.
A litigant who did that would
be confronted in one court by either a plea of lis pendens (the
claim is pending in another court)
or by a plea of res judicata (the
claim has been disposed of by the other court). A claimant who has a
claim that is capable
of being considered by either of the two
courts that have concurrent jurisdiction must necessarily choose in
which court to pursue
the claim and, once having made that election,
will not be able to bring the same claim before the other court. But
where a person
has two separate claims, each for enforcement of a
different right, the position is altogether different, because then
both claims
will be capable of being pursued, simultaneously or
sequentially, either both in one court, or each in one of those
courts’
(para 27).
[11]
2003 (3) SA 1
(CC) (
NEHAWU
CC)
and
2002 (4) BLLR 311
(LAC) (
NEHAWU
LAC)
[12]
SAMWU
,
para 32
[13]
NEHAWU
LAC,
para 65
[14]
NEHAWU
CC,
para 56
[15]
The respondents do not deny that this is the
practice which has been followed, although it is averred in
paragraph 236 of the
answering affidavit that ‘[t]he practice
cannot override the terms of the agreement’.
[16]
RH Christie, GB Bradfield, 6
th
edition p495