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[2020] ZAWCHC 79
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Sunwest International (Pty) Ltd t/a Grand West Casino and Entertainment World and Another v Western Cape Gambling and Racing Board and Others (2203/2018) [2020] ZAWCHC 79; 2021 (2) SA 607 (WCC) (29 April 2020)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE DIVISION,
CAPE TOWN)
In
the matter between:
CASE
NO: 2203/2018
SUNWEST INTERNATIONAL
(PTY) LTD
First Applicant
T/A
GRANDWEST CASINO AND ENTERTAINMENT WORLD
WORCESTER
CASINO (PTY)
LTD
Second Applicant
T/A
GOLDEN VALLEY CASINO AND LODGE
and
THE WESTERN CAPE GAMBLING
AND
First Respondent
RACING BOARD
THE
PROVINCIAL MINISTER OF FINANCE,
Second Respondent
WESTERN
CAPE
THE
EASTERN CAPE GAMBLING
BOARD
Amicus Curiae
Coram:
Erasmus, Mabindla-Boqwana et Papier JJ
JUDGMENT HANDED DOWN
ELECTRONICALLY ON 29 APRIL 2020
THE
COURT
Introduction
and Background
[1]
The
applicants sought a declaratory order that "Freeplay"
credits, used to bet on slot machines at the applicants' casinos,
do
not constitute part of the "drop"
[1]
for purposes of the computation of adjusted gross revenue ("AGR"),
in terms of section 64 of the Western Cape Gambling
and Racing Act 4
of 1996 ("the Act"), read with Schedule Ill, and thus that
such Freeplay credits do not form part of
the taxable revenue. They
consequently seek an order for the refund of the amounts overpaid by
them, from the Provincial Revenue
Fund; alternatively that the first
respondent off-set the overpayments against the applicants' future
liability to pay gambling
tax in terms of section 64 of the Act read
with Schedule Ill.
[2]
The applicants are subsidiaries of Sun International (South Africa)
Limited ("Sun International"), one of South Africa's
largest operators of casinos. They are holders of casino operator
licences, issued by the first respondent, and pay gambling taxes
and
levies to the first respondent, which is then paid into the
Provincial Revenue Fund in terms of section 64 (3) of the Act.
The
gambling tax is calculated as a percentage of the applicants' taxable
revenue and AGR. The issue before us concerns the treatment
of
Freeplay for the purposes of calculating taxable revenue and whether
it forms part of the AGR.
The Facts
[3]
The facts are largely common cause. Freeplay is non-cashable credit
that is allocated to a casino player's card, by the applicants,
as a
reward for loyalty. The credit is available for the player to use at
slot machines at applicants' casinos. It is denominated
in rand
value. It is, however, not redeemable for cash. Players are able to
appreciate the value proposition associated with Freeplay
and
entertain themselves without it impacting on their own financial
resources.
[4]
During 2014, Sun International introduced a system called "BALLY"
in its casinos across the country. The system is
able to
differentiate between credits paid for by the player from his or her
own funds, and Freeplay credits generated by the casino
crediting its
Most Valued Guests' player accounts as part of its loyalty programme.
Subsequent to the introduction of this system,
Sun International
requested confirmation from various Casino Boards around the country
that it could implement the method of calculating
adjusted gross
revenue by excluding the "non-cashable" play portion which
is funded by Sun International and/or its subsidiaries
(including the
applicants).
[5]
Various exchanges ensued between the applicants, their attorneys and
officials of the first respondents. The views of the treasury
of the
Western Cape, on behalf of the second respondent, were solicited. The
views of both respondents are that Freeplay falls
within the
definition of AGR and is accordingly taxable. A decision to this
effect by the HOD: Compliance for the first respondent
was conveyed
to the applicants' attorneys, who lodged an appeal with the first
respondent's Board. The Board suggested that an
application seeking
declaratory relief should be brought.
[6]
The
applicant also litigated in the Northern Cape, where the full bench,
in the unreported decision of
Teemane
t/a Flamingo Casino v The Chairperson of the Northern Cape Gambling
Board
[2]
,
held
that:
"It is clear from
the common cause facts that Freeplay cannot form part of 'gross
receipts' for the simple reason that the
applicant does not receive
anything when a Freeplay credit is used in its Casino. I believe Mr
Cockrell is correct in his submission
that the purpose of Regulation
2 is to impose
a
levy on the revenue that
a
licensee
receives. It is common cause that no revenue results from the use of
a
Freeplay credit in the applicant's casino. Therefore, I find
that the applicant is correct in its submissions on the plain
language interpretation of Regulation
2."
[7]
In the
further, unreported, decision of
Sun
International (South Africa) Limited v The Chairperson of the North
West Gambling Review Tribunal and Others
[3]
,
the
North West High Court was also required to determine whether Freeplay
was included in the definition of "revenue"
for purposes of
calculating liability on the part of a casino. Gutta J, in her
judgment, decided that:
"...
Freeplay
credits do not form part of gross gaming revenue as the purpose of
Regulation 73(1) is to impose
a
levy on the
revenue that
a
licensee
receives and [the casino] receives no revenue from the use of
Freeplay credits. Accordingly, on the plain language interpretation,
and within the framework of the Constitution, I
am
of the view
that the decision made by the Board and the Tribunal was materially
influenced by an error of law ..."
[8]
While this court is not bound by any of these judgments, they are
nevertheless persuasive, insofar as they may be relevant to
the facts
of the matter before us.
[9]
The Eastern Cape Board was admitted as
amicus curiae.
The
Eastern Cape Gambling and Betting Act 5 of 1997 ("the EC Act")
has provisions almost identical to those of the Act
which is the
subject of these proceedings. Southern Sun has advanced similar
views, as they have in this matter, to the EC Board.
The EC Board has
not made a final decision with regard to Freeplay, pending the
outcome of this Court's decision on the matter.
They believe,
however, that Freeplay shouId be included in the definition of drop.
Legislative framework
[10]
In terms of section 64 (1) of the Act, "...
there shall be
paid to the Board [the first
respondent] gambling and betting
taxes
and
levies
by the holders of licences as provided
for in Schedules Ill and IV."
[Own emphasis.]
[11]
Section 64 (3) requires the first respondent to pay such taxes into
the Provincial Revenue Fund within the periods stipulated
in
Schedules Ill and IV, or as prescribed.
[12]
In terms of Schedule 111, Part B, the holder of a casino operator
licence shall pay gambling tax on its
"taxable revenue".
"Taxable revenue"
is defined in Schedule 111, Part A as
"adjusted gross revenue less admissible deductions as
determined under this Act".
The relevant portions of the
definition of
" adjusted gross revenue"
are (d) and
(e), which state the following:
"(d)
in
relation to slot machines,
other than those contemplated
in subparagraphs (e) and (f) below operated by
a
licence
holder in the Province,
the drop
, less fills to
the machine
and winnings paid out;
provided that
the initial hopper load shall not constitute
a
fill and shall
not affect the calculation of adjusted gross revenue;
(e) in relation to
slot machines operated by
a
licence holder in the Province
which are linked via
a
wide-area progressive system,
the
drop,
less fills to the machine, less any contributions
made by the licence holder which are payable in consequence of such
wide-area
progressive system in respect of such slot machines during
the tax period, and less any winnings paid out which are not
recoverable
from the central fund in terms of the wide-area
progressive system; provided that the initial hopper load shall not
constitute
a
fill and shall not affect the calculation of
adjusted gross revenue; provided further that where any surplus
amount is distributed
from the central fund to a licence holder or
where any licence holder withdraws from a wide-area progressive
system and in consequence
of such distribution or withdrawal recovers
or recoups during any tax period any contribution previously deducted
under this subparagraph,
such contribution so recovered or recouped
shall be included in the licence holder's adjusted gross revenue in
the tax period in
which the contribution is recovered or recouped,
..."
[Own emphasis .]
[13]
"Drop "
means-
"(a) in relation
to table games, other than those referred to in subparagraph (b) of
the definition of "adjusted gross
revenue", the total
amount of money, chips and tokens contained in the drop boxes, and
(b)
in relation to
slot machines, the total amount of money and tokens removed from the
drop box, or for cash-less slot machines, the
amount deducted from
players' slot accounts as a result of slot machine play."
[Own emphasis.]
[14]
The applicants have slot machines that accord with paragraphs (d) and
(e) of the definition of AGR. Certain machines are linked
to a
wide-area progressive system (paragraph (e) of the definition), while
others are stand-alone or are linked to the applicants'
progressive
systems.
[15]
The issue in essence is whether Freeplay forms part of the "drop".
Interpretation of the
Act
[16]
The
approach to be followed in interpreting a document (including
legislation) is by now established. It is as summarised in the
often-quoted case of
Natal
Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality
[4]
:
"[C]onsideration must be given to the language used in the light
of the ordinary rules of grammar and syntax; the context
in which the
provision appears; the apparent purpose to which it is directed and
the material known to those responsible for its
production. Where
more than one meaning is possible each possibility must be weighed in
the light of all these factors. The process
is objective, not
subjective. A sensible meaning is to be preferred to one that leads
to insensible or unbusinesslike results or
undermines the apparent
purpose of the document. Judges must be alert to, and guard against,
the temptation to substitute what
they regard as reasonable, sensible
or businesslike for words actually used. To do so in regard to a
statute or statutory instrument
is to cross the divide between
interpretation and legislation; in a contractual context it is to
make a contract for the parties
other than the one they in fact made.
The 'inevitable point of departure is the language of the provision
itself, read in context
and having regard to the purpose of the
provision and the background to the preparation and production of the
document."
[Footnotes
omitted.]
[17]
The statute
must accordingly be given its grammatical meaning (except where it
would lead to absurdity), and be properly contextualised.
It must
also be interpreted purposively and be construed consistently with
the Constitution.
[5]
[18]
The Supreme
Court of Appeal has reiterated the importance of the language of a
document recently in
City
of Tshwane Metropolitan v Blair Athol/ Homeowners Association
[6]
.
It
stated:
"
This Court has
consistently stated that in the interpretation exercise the point of
departure is the language of the document in
question. Without the
written text there would be no interpretive exercise."
[19]
The first
respondent refers to the English case of
Cape
Brandy Syndicate v Inland Revenue Commissioners
[7]
w he re
the
Court said that
"
[1]n a Taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said.
There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity
about a tax.
There is no presumption as to
a
tax.
Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied."
Although
the judgment was quoted with approval by cases thereafter, Botha JA,
in
Glen
Anil Development Corporation Ltd v SIR
[8]
,
rejected
the notion that fiscal legislation should be interpreted differently
to other legislation. He stated (at 727 F-G) that
the decisive and
overriding principle to be used when interpreting fiscal legislation
is no different from that applicable in the
interpretation of all
legislation. In all cases of interpretation, the true intention of
the Legislature is of paramount importance.
It therefore remains open
to the Legislature to attend to the Act to achieve their objectives.
[20]
From the
principles set down by our courts, applying the ordinary grammatical
and literal meaning to words is the primary rule of
interpretation.
However, it may be deviated from if the ordinary grammatical language
gives rise to a glaring absurdity. In such
a case, the court may
depart from the ordinary effect of the words to the extent necessary
to remove the absurdity and to give
effect to the true "intention
of the legislature"
[9]
.
[21]
If the words used are clear and unambiguous and in harmony with the
intention of the Legislature, the objective and the scheme
of the
Act, then the ordinary and grammatical meaning of the words is used.
If the words used are obscure or ambiguous, then the
meaning that
best accords with the intention of the Legislature, the object and
the scheme of the Act, and one that the words are
reasonably capable
of bearing, is to be given to them.
[22]
It is obvious that the word "Freeplay" is not expressed in
the provisions dealing with gambling taxes that are mentioned
above.
The Act defines drop as...
"the
amount
deducted from players' slot accounts
as a
result of slot
machine play".
[23]
While the
definition does not distinguish between the sources of the amount
deducted, the question is what the word "amount''
refers to or
represents. The amount must represent revenue in the hands of the
casino, because it is the "adjusted gross
revenue"
less admissible deductions that the operator of the casino is taxed
on. Revenue is not defined in the Act. In simple terms
"
revenue is the total amount of
income
generated by the sale of goods or services related to the company's
primary operations
."
[10]
[24]
Whilst all parties may hold, from different perspectives, that the
definition of "drop" is clear and unambiguous,
the very
fact that the definition can be given different meanings calls for
more than a literal reading of the words. What is called
for is an
objective interpretation of the word
"amount'.
The
respondents contend that the principles of income tax, where a
taxpayer pays tax on its income, should not be employed in this
case
because the principles are different. We are not sure how different
those are as to the meaning of revenue. The purpose of
paying the
taxes might be different, but does the concept of revenue mean
something other than income in the gambling statute?
If it does, it
must be demonstrated in the statute, not subjectively, but
objectively so. If revenue has a meaning specific to
the context of
gambling, and which differs from that of taxation laws, then such
meaning would be clearly stated in the gambling
legislation,
precisely to avoid confusion.
[25]
In the
applicants' casinos, the player with Freeplay loaded on his or her
card would insert it into the slot machine. He or she
has a choice as
to whether to download Freeplay credits onto the slot machine. If he
or she chooses to do so, such credits are
reflected on the slot
machine as credits to place bets. When a player plays a game using
Freeplay, the applicants do not receive
any revenue from that
game
[11]
. The applicants paint
two possible outcomes to illustrate the point. The first being when a
player bets and loses the game. In
this regard, the applicants '
revenue position does not improve, because the player lost a
'notional' credit that had been credited
by the applicants with no
quid pro
quo
given
by the player. The player is in the same position as he or she was
before he or she used Freeplay to bet. The second possible
outcome is
when a player wins. In this scenario, the applicants' have to pay
cashable winnings to the player, despite the player
having betted
with a Freeplay credit. In this case, the applicants' revenue
decreases. The winnings are paid out of their own financial
resources. To drive the point, the applicants' counsel uses an
example of an operator, Cape Wheel, being taxed on a ride (that
costs
R150), that it offered to a patron for free as if the patron had paid
for the ride.
[26]
In terms of
section 39 (2) of the Constitution,
"
[w]hen interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common
law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum
must promote the
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights."
In
the same injunction, judges must where possible read the statute, so
far as is possible, in conformity with the Constitution.
This means
that an interpretation which falls within the constitutional bounds
should be preferred.
[12]
[27]
The provincial legislature imposes tax as empowered by section 228 of
the Constitution. Such imposition should rationally be
connected to a
legitimate governmental purpose.
[28]
Imposition
of tax should not be arbitrary. It has been held that
"deprivation
of property
is
'arbitrary'
as
meant by
s 25
[of
the Constitution]
when
the 'law' referred to in s 25 (1) does not provide
sufficient
reason
for the particular deprivation in question or is procedurally unfair
."
[13]
[Own
emphasis.] The Court in
[14]
went on to set out factors that would establish such sufficient
reason, which include the evaluation of the relationship between
the
means employed, and the ends sought to be achieved. The responden1s
are vague as to what purpose is sought to be achieved,
other than
contending that the literal grammatical language of section 64 and
Schedule Ill should be applied. The second respondent
suggests that
the focus of the tax is on the gambling activities of a player, i.e.
what actually happens in the slot machines,
as the second respondent
puts it, and that the source of what is inserted into the slot
machine is irrelevant.
[29]
Although the focus may be on the gambling activities of a player, it
seems logical to ask what the meaning is of
"amount deducted
from players' slot accounts as
a
result of slot machine play
'.
Freeplay is a notional amount, although it has a rand value.
Although the second respondent differs. It is notional because no
cash
is loaded for it. It is Freeplay and unredeemable. We do not see
how it can be treated in the same manner as the amount of money
that
the player deposits into his account. Although the distinction
between Freeplay and actual cash coming from the player is
not
expressed in the Act, the amount is taxed in the hands of the
operator, who provided the Freeplay credit. The construction
that the
Freeplay credits do not improve the applicants' financial position,
and accordingly should not be included in the "drop",
does
not impact the income tax position. This, in our view, is simply a
question of rationality. Is it rational to construe Freeplay
as an
amount included in the drop? In our view, and in the absence of a
logical explanation, it is not. We are persuaded by the
argument
therefore that it is irrational to require the operator of a licence
to pay tax on a neutral position, which also amounts
to the
deprivation of property.
[30]
We need not
visit foreign jurisdictions to illustrate the point of irrationality.
We agree with the second respondent and the amicus
that different
jurisdictions may treat the issue of Freeplay differently, depending
on their policy positions on this issue. What
some of the foreign
cases cited by the applicants illuminate, however, is that the
Freeplay concept is a complicated one. While
that is so, the
interpretation advanced by the applicants seems to find support in
the judgments it has referred to, which are
to the effect that
Freeplay is not revenue and should not be included in the calculation
of gambling tax.
[15]
In one
case it was held to be a notional value placed on tokens given to the
player by a casino, as part of its promotional or
marketing exercise
which intrinsically has no value and is non -negotiable, or
"at
best have an economic value to the player equivalent to their face
value multiplied by the chances of winning."
[16]
[31]
Finally,
where the language is found to be ambiguous, based on the
contra
fiscum
principle,
the presumption should favour the taxpayer.
[17
[32]
The reasoning that the amount cannot be "revenue" in the
sense similar to income tax because gambling tax is comparable
to sin
taxes and the like, is unsound, because sin taxes excise duties
levied on the actual goods. If the purpose of gambling tax
is to
discourage harmful behaviour, it is not clear how taxing Freeplay
would achieve that purpose. In other words, a player does
not get
dissuaded from playing more.
[33]
Conversely, Freeplay would attract more players into the casinos as
an incentive to use their own financial resources, and
in so doing,
to ensure increased profitability for the casino. This should result
in more gambling tax being collected. It would
not make business
sense to allow customers to only play using Freeplay credits. It is a
reward for loyalty. The Most Valued Guests
are evidently those that
spend more. If the programme was designed to have more players
playing, mainly using Freeplay, with the
applicants simply paying the
winnings, without getting anything back, that would defeat the whole
purpose of running their business.
The applicants allege that since
the inception of Freeplay in July 2014, until May 2017, for every R1
of Freeplay that was bet
the customer's average spend from their own
financial resources was R25. That is however not germane to the legal
question of what
"drop" means.
[34]
It could also not be said that gambling tax is imposed because an
operator must pay a licence to operate and therefore gambling
tax is
not taxed on income. An operator pays a licence fee in terms of other
provisions of the Act, such as section 44. It seems
to us that the
reasoning put forward by the applicants, that the underlying general
principle is that a person whose financial
position has improved
because of money coming in must share a portion of the increase with
the
fiscus,
is sensible. As already mentioned, that reasoning
is not to confuse the principles of gambling tax with that of income
tax, it is
logical. The respondents have not been able to support
their interpretation of the statute other than to say, it must be
read literally
to mean everything that is deducted from the player's
slot account. The word "amount'' requires close scrutiny, as we
have
indicated, and it must be given a more sensible and
business-like interpretation. It is not sensible for it to read to
include
Freeplay. In the final analysis, we are persuaded by the
interpretation advanced by the applicants. In our view the meaning of
"amount'' should be sensibly interpreted to mean the "actual
revenue". As to whether the declaratory relief should
be
granted, there is no reason not to do so. The applicants clearly have
an interest in the rights and obligations leading to the
correct
interpretation of the Act. It was important to have the dispute
resolved so that the kind of tax that the applicants are
liable to
pay as per the statute is clearly defined.
Consequential Relief
[35]
The claim
of repayment is based on unjustified enrichment. It cannot be said
that the overpayments were made in error after the
BALLY system was
introduced by the applicants. They knowingly paid, knowing that they
held a different interpretation. However,
they were instructed by the
first respondent to calculate tax inclusive of Freeplay. It might
possibly be said the payment,
"
although deliberate ..
.was
nevertheless
involuntary because it
was
effected
under pressure and protest."
[18]
The
first respondent controls all gambling activities in the province, as
submitted by the applicant (Section 2(4) of the Act).
It also has the
power to grant, amend, refuse and suspend casino licences and amen d,
suspend or revoke licence conditions (Sections
12 (3) and 12 (4)), it
has the power to administer taxes and levies (Section 12 (13)) and
impose penalties for any contravention
or failure to comply with the
Act (Section 12 (21)).
[36]
There were issues of prescription raised. To the extent that claims
have prescribed the applicants are not entitled to such
amounts. It
seems to us appropriate that the money be off-set against the
applicants' future liability to pay gambling tax, rather
than it be
paid back. As we understand the submissions the parties were to
recalculate the correct amount and the court does not
have to direct
that certain specific amounts be paid.
Costs
[37]
As to costs, it was firstly by agreement that the application be
brought, and it was to the benefit of all parties that the
issue be
determined. We would not consider it just in the circumstances of
this case for a cost order to be awarded against the
respondents.
Order
[38]
Accordingly, we would make an order as follows:
1. It is declared that
1.1 Freeplay used to bet
on slot machines at the applicants' casinos do not constitute part of
the "drop" for purposes
of the computation of adjusted
gross revenue in terms of section 64 of the Western Cape Gambling and
Racing Act4 of 1996 ("the
Act'') read with Schedule Ill;
1.2 Freeplay credits
accordingly do not form part of taxable revenue in terms of section
64 of the Act read with Schedule Ill;
2. The first respondent
is to off-set against the applicants' future liability to pay
gambling tax in terms of section 64 of the
Act read with Schedule Ill
such amount as may be agreed between the parties or proved by the
applicants.
3. Each party is to pay
its own costs.
__________________
N
C Erasmus
Judge
of the High Court
__________________
N
P Mabindla-Boqwana
Judge
of the High Court
__________________
T
D Papier
Judge
of the High Court
APPEARANCES
Counsel
for Applicants
Adv A Cockrell SC
Adv
N Ferreira
Attorneys
for Applicants
Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr Inc
Counsel
for First Respondent
Adv J A Newdigate SC
Adv
R Matsala
Attorneys
for First Respondent
Marais
Muller Hendricks Inc
Counsel
for Second Respondent
Adv RT Williams SC
Adv
H Cassim
Attorneys
for Second Respondent
State Attorney
Counsel
for Amicus Curiae
Adv I Jamie SC
Adv
H J De Waal SC
Attorneys
for Amicus Curiae
Abraham Le Roux Inc
[1]
See para 13 below.
[2]
Teemane (Pty) Ltd TI A Flamingo Casino v The Chairperson of the
Northern Cape Gambling Board, Case No. 2023/2016, in the judgment
of
Lever AJ with Mamosebo J concurring, at para 22.
[3]
Sun lntemational (South Africa) Limited v Chairperson of the North
West Gambling Review Tribunal and Others (M255/2017)
(2018) ZANWHC
62
(25 May 2018), at para 30.
[4]
Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality
2012 (4)
SA 593
(SCA) at para 18.
[5]
Cool Ideas 1186 CC v Hubbard and Another
2014 (4) SA 474
(CC) at
para 28.
[6]
City of Tshwane Metropolitan v Blair Athol/ Homeowners Association
[2019] 1 All SA 291
(SCA) at para 63.
[7]
Cape Brandy Syndicate v Inland Revenue Commissioners (1921) 1KB 64
at 71.
[8]
Glen Anil Development Corporation Ltd v SIR 1975 (4) SA 715 (A).
[9]
Venter v R
1907 TS 910
; M v Commissioner Of Taxes(SR)
21 SATC 16
;
Farrar's Estate v CIR, 1926 TPD 501).
[10]
https://www.in vestopedia.com/ask/answers/122214/what-diff
erence-between-revenue-and-income.asp
[11]
This is on the understanding that the applicant does not write off
the total value of the Freeplay scheme as a nontaxable expense
when
accounting to the South African Revenue Services.
[12]
Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences and Others v
Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others: In re Hyundai
Motor
Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others v Smit NO and Others
[2000] ZACC 12
;
2001 (1) SA
545
(CC) at paras 22 to 23.
[13]
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissione,r South
African Revenue SeNice and Another; First National Bank of SA
Limited t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance
[2002] ZACC 5
;
2002 (4) SA 768
(CC) at
para 100.
[14]
Id fn 13 at para 100.
[15]
See First Gold, Inc. Mineral Palace LP and Four Aces Gaming LLC v
South Dakota Department cl Revenue and Regulation 2014 S.D.91;
Pueblo of lsleta v Michelle Lujan Grisham Civ. No. 17- 654 KGI KK.
[16]
See Revenue and Customs Commissioners (HMRC) v London Clubs
Management Ltd
[2018] EWCA Civ 2210
at para 30.
[17]
Estate Reynolds v CIR
1937 AD 57
at p 70 and Glen An// Development
Corporation Ltd vs JR
1975 (4) SA 715
(A) at 727F.
[18]
CIR v First National Industrial Bank Ltd
[1990] ZASCA 49
;
1990 (3) SA 641
(A) at
647C-D.