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[2020] ZAWCHC 5
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Standard Bank of SA Ltd v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others, In Re: National Director of Public Prosecutions v Mudlauzi and Others (15403/2014) [2020] ZAWCHC 5; 2020 (2) SACR 169 (WCC); 2021 (3) SA 228 (WCC) (4 February 2020)
REPORTABLE
THE REPUBLIC OF
SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT
OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE
DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
Case No: 15403/2014
Before the Hon. Mr
Justice Bozalek
Hearing: 28 November
2019
Delivered: 4
February 2020
In the matter
between:
THE STANDARD
BANK OF SA
LTD
Applicant
(Reg No:
1962/000738/06)
and
THE NATIONAL
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
1
st
Respondent
MATTHEWS
TUWANI
MULAUDZI
2
nd
Respondent
VIOLET
MABONTSI
MULAUDZI
3
rd
Respondent
MULAUDZI &
ASSOCIATES CC [in
liquidation]
4
th
Respondent
(Reg No:
2015/04820/07)
LUVHOMBA LEGAL
EDGE
CC
5
th
Respondent
(Reg No:
2001/018852/23)
LUVHOMBA
FINANCIAL SERVICES
CC
6
th
Respondent
(Reg No:
2003/048903/23)
JURGENS
JOHANNES STEENKAMP
N.O.
7
th
Respondent
OSCAR JABULANI
SITHOLE
N.O.
8
th
Respondent
CHRISTOPHER
PETER VAN ZYL
N.O.
9
th
Respondent
SELBY
MUSAWENKOSI NTSIBANDE
N.O.
10
th
Respondent
OLD MUTUAL
LIFE ASSURANCE CO (SA)
LTD
11
th
Respondent
NEDBANK
LTD
12
th
Respondent
PETRUS JACOBUS
CORNE VAN STADEN N.O.
13
th
Respondent
SOLOMON
STANLEY ISAKA BOIKANYO
N.O.
14
th
Respondent
ST.
ADENS (PTY) LTD t/a ST. ADENS
INTERNATIONAL
15
th
Respondent
In re:
THE NATIONAL
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
Applicant
MATTHEWS
TUWANI
MULAUDZI
Defendant
VIOLET
MABONTSI
MULAUDZI
1
st
Respondent
MULAUDZI &
ASSOCIATES CC [in
liquidation]
2
nd
Respondent
(Reg No:
2015/04820/07)
LUVHOMBA LEGAL
EDGE
CC
3
rd
Respondent
(Reg No:
2001/018852/23)
LUVHOMBA
FINANCIAL SERVICES
CC
4
th
Respondent
(Reg No:
2003/048903/23)
JUDGMENT
BOZALEK J
[1]
The applicant, the Standard Bank of South Africa
Limited, seeks leave to intervene in an application in which the
National Director
of Public Prosecutions (‘the NDPP’)
obtained a restraint order in terms of sec 26 of the Prevention of
Organised Crime
Act, 121 of 1998 (‘POCA’) against the
assets of Mr Matthews Mulaudzi, his wife and three companies under
his control.
[2]
In the event that such leave is granted, the
applicant seeks a variation of the restraint order in order to secure
the release of
three assets amongst the many which are subject to the
restraint order. One such asset is an immovable property which serves
as
security for loans advanced by the applicant to one of Mr
Mulaudzi’s companies, Luvhomba Financial Services CC, the sixth
respondent in this application. The applicant seeks the release of
the other two assets, being two motor vehicles, on the basis
that it
is the owner thereof and has default judgments for their return.
[3]
All the parties in the main application were cited
and served in this application. They include the parties against whom
the restraint
order was made, the
curator
bonis
appointed in terms of POCA, the
co-trustees in the insolvent estate of the Mulaudzi’s, the
NDPP, the joint liquidators of
one of Mr Mulaudzi’s companies
and two major creditors of, or claimants against, Mr Mulaudzi, Old
Mutual LAC (SA) (Pty) Ltd
(‘Old Mutual’) and Nedbank
Limited (‘Nedbank’).
[4]
The NDPP and the Mulaudzi’s trustees abide
by the Court’s decision herein. Mr Mulaudzi’s company and
Mr Mulaudzi,
who filed an opposing affidavit, purport to oppose the
relief sought. None of the remaining parties have participated in the
proceedings.
[5]
It is most
doubtful whether Mr Mulaudzi, his wife or any of his companies have
any right to oppose these proceedings. The Mulaudzi’s
are
insolvent and thus only the trustees of their joint insolvent estate
may defend actions affecting it. Similarly, since Mr Mulaudzi’s
interest in his companies falls into his insolvent estate, the right
or authority to represent these entities rests either with
the
trustees of the Mulaudzi’s insolvent estate or the liquidators
of the company in liquidation. Be that as it may, the
Court
entertained Mr Mulaudzi’s submissions and I will deal with
their merits in this judgment.
[6]
The main application was instituted in August 2014
and led, by a long and circuitous path, to the granting of a final
restraint
order on 20 November 2017 by Davis, J which remains in
place. The circumstances which led to the application and the course
of
much of the subsequent litigation is described in the reported
judgment of
Mulaudzi v Old Mutual LAC
(SA) (Pty) Ltd and Others, NDPP v Mulaudzi
2017
(6) SA 690
(SCA) and I will not repeat them.
[7]
The movable assets which the applicant wants
released from the restraint order are two motor vehicles, a 2014 VW
Golf (‘the
Golf’) and a 2012 Toyota Hilux (‘the
Toyota’). The immovable property which the applicant
seeks to have
released from the restraint order is a residential
property situated at 4 Hangklip Heights, Louis Trichardt. The
registered owner
of the property is the sixth respondent, Luvhomba
Financial Services CC. According to a report issued by the
curator
bonis
, the property has a market value
of R1.2mil and a forced sale value of R800 000.00. However, it
is encumbered to the applicant
in an amount of not less than R1.7mil
in terms of a mortgage bond registered over the property.
[8]
In May 2015, in consequence of the sixth
respondent’s failure to make payment of the instalments due to
the applicant under
the home loan agreement underlying the mortgage
bond, the applicant instituted action against the sixth respondent
for payment
of the sum of R1.28mil and an order declaring the
property specially executable. Judgment has not been entered against
the sixth
respondent in that action which remains ongoing. According
to the curator’s report there is no realisable value, as
defined
in POCA, in the property in view of the amount owing to the
applicant (and secured by the mortgage bond) as well as amounts owing
in respect of arrear rates and levies. The curator’s view as
expressed in his report was that the property should therefore
be
released from the restraint order.
[9]
As far as the vehicles are concerned, the
applicant and the sixth respondent concluded an instalment sale
agreement in respect of
the Toyota in October 2012. The principal
debt was an amount of R259 000 to be repaid by the sixth
respondent in monthly instalments
over five years. In terms of the
agreement, the applicant remains owner of the vehicle until all
instalments have been paid. In
November 2015, the applicant obtained
summary judgment against the sixth respondent in an action brought in
consequence of its
failure to make payment of the instalments. The
judgment ordered the return of the vehicle to the applicant. Although
the vehicle
has been placed under judicial attachment by the sheriff
it remains in the possession of Mr Mulaudzi. As at February 2019, the
sixth respondent’s outstanding debt under the Toyota instalment
sale agreement is approximately R220 000. Given that
the vehicle
is now seven years old it is most doubtful that its sale price will
cover even the outstanding debt and thus there
is a negligible
prospect of it yielding a realisable value for the purposes of any
confiscation order which may be made against
Mr Mulaudzi in terms of
POCA.
[10]
In February 2014, the applicant and Mr Mulaudzi
concluded an instalment sale agreement in respect of the Golf with
the principal
debt being the sum of approximately R263 000 to be
repaid by Mr Mulaudzi by way of monthly instalments over a period of
five
years. As with the Toyota the applicant remains the owner of the
Golf until such time as the final instalment is paid by Mr Mulaudzi.
In February 2015, the applicant instituted action against Mr Mulaudzi
in consequence of his failure to make payment of the instalments
under the agreement. In June of that year, the applicant obtained
summary judgment against Mr Mulaudzi,
inter
alia
for return of the vehicle. The
applicant issued a writ of execution in respect of the vehicle but
has not succeeded in attaching
it since Mr Mulaudzi refuses to
disclose its whereabouts. As with the Toyota, it is most unlikely
that the Golf has any realisable
value as defined by POCA since as at
February 2019, Mr Mulaudzi’s outstanding debt under the
instalment sale agreement was
approximately R357 000 whilst the
vehicle is now four years old and any sale is most unlikely to
realise anywhere near that
amount.
[11]
The facts set out above are common cause or at
least have not been disputed by Mr Mulaudzi.
The
Applicant’s case
[12]
The substantive relief sought by the applicant is
a variation of the restraint order in terms of sec 28(2) and (3) of
POCA, namely,
the release of the three assets in question from the
operation of the restraint order. The applicant’s case is that
it has
a direct and substantial interest in the main application in
that the assets in question, namely, the two vehicles which it owns
and the immovable property which serves as security for a debt owing
to it by the sixth respondent, are subject to the restraint
order.
Its case is further that the restraint order falls to be varied by
the release of the three assets from the restraint order
since they
have no realisable value for the purposes of any confiscation order
which may eventually be made. The variation sought
would allow the
applicant to proceed with litigation, in the case of immovable
property, and, in the case of the vehicles, with
execution, all with
a view to recovering the debts owing to it by Mr Mulaudzi, the
company in which he had an interest or the insolvent
estate of the
Mulaudzi’s in which the applicant is a preferred or secured
creditor.
[13]
The applicant also relies on the interim (and
only) report prepared by the
curator
bonis
in July 2017 as offering some
support of the relief claimed in respect of the immovable property.
In the report the
curator bonis
concluded that the only assets subject to the
restraint order with any material realisable value are two Old Mutual
insurance policies
and a Momentum policy. As previously mentioned the
curator bonis
also
concluded that the immovable property, having regard to the mortgage
bond held by the applicant and the underlying debt owing
to it, had
no realisable value as defined in POCA and should be ‘
released
from under the provisional restraint order’
.
Clearly, however, this recommendation was not acted on in November
2017 when the provisional order was made final.
[14]
Regarding the vehicles, the
curator
bonis
noted in his report some months
later merely that the Toyota remained in the possession of the
defendant (Mr Mulaudzi) and that
its realisable value, if any, still
needed to be determined. Reporting on the Golf, the
curator
bonis
noted that its whereabouts were
unknown to him and as such he could make no recommendation.
Mr Mulaudzi’s
case
[15]
Mr Mulaudzi filed a brief opposing affidavit and
made oral submissions. In his affidavit, Mr Mulaudzi claims that the
final restraint
order is the subject of an appeal and that the
applicant has suffered no patrimonial loss; furthermore, that the
assets and related
payments are subjects of dispute. Mr Mulaudzi
appears to also submit that appeals are pending in relation to the
three assets in
question. None of these statements were substantiated
and I am satisfied, are either incorrect or irrelevant for the
purposes of
this application.
[16]
One may well ask what stage has been reached in
the criminal prosecution of Mr Mulaudzi given that five years have
passed since
he allegedly attempted to defraud Old Mutual and the
POCA proceedings commenced. The issue is not addressed in the papers
despite
the fact that the possibility of a confiscation order at the
conclusion of criminal proceedings is the entire rationale for a POCA
restraint order. Upon enquiry Mr Mulaudzi stated from the bar that
the criminal case against him had commenced earlier in 2019
and had
been postponed to February 2020 for the decision of the Regional
Court Magistrate on his application for discharge at the
end of the
State’s case. In argument, the only point of any substance made
by Mr Mulaudzi was that the criminal proceedings
against him would
conclude in a matter of months and the applicant should rather await
their outcome.
[17]
It is against this factual background that the
parties’ cases must be considered.
Discussion
[18]
The effect of a restraint order in terms of POCA
is to place the property of a defendant beyond his or her control and
into the
hands of a
curator bonis
pending the outcome of criminal proceedings. The
lengthy order granted by Davis J was largely a recapitulation of the
provisional
order initially granted but with a number of variations.
It appears to imply that all the restrained property had to be
surrendered
to the
curator bonis
save for such property as the
curator
bonis
was ‘
satisfied
by evidence under oath was not realizable property’
,
property which he certified was in excess of the quantum of the
alleged fraud giving rise to the restraint order and certain
necessary household items.
[19]
Section 26(10) of POCA deals with applications to
vary a restraint order but it provides a Court with only a limited
discretion
to do so, namely, where the order deprives the applicant
of the means to provide for his/her living expenses. This provision
appears
to be directed at the protection of a person against whom a
restraint order is made i.e. a defendant but, whatever the case may
be, it is certainly not a remedy to which the present applicant does
or can lay claim. No doubt it is for this reason that the
applicant
sought to rely on the provisions of sec 28(2) and (3) of POCA. Before
dealing with these provisions some consideration
of our Court’s
approach to variations of restraint orders in terms of sec 26 of POCA
is appropriate.
[20]
In
Phillips and
Others v NDPP
[2005] ZACC 15
;
2006 (1) SA 505
(CC), the
Constitutional Court held that sec 26(10) of POCA was not capable of
a construction that allowed the High Court, in the
exercise of its
inherent power, to set aside a restraint order on common law grounds.
It found that the subsection dealt with standing,
as well as
carefully regulating the substantive circumstances in which the
rescission of a restraint order made under POCA may
be sought. The
Court held further that the approach of the Supreme Court of Appeal
to sec 26(10) of the Act, namely, that the grounds
for the rescission
of such orders constituted a closed list and that the High Court was
not empowered to rescind a restraint order
on grounds other than
those specified in POCA, could not be faulted and given that there
was no constitutional challenge to sec
26(10), the Supreme Court of
Appeal’s interpretation had to stand.
[21]
Section 28 of POCA deals generally with the
appointment of a
curator bonis
in respect of property subject to a restraint
order and insofar as it is material reads as follows:
‘
28.
Appointment
of curator bonis in respect of property subject to restraint order
.
–
(1) Where a High
Court has made a restraint order, that court may at any time –
(a)
appoint a curator bonis to do, subject to the
directions of that court, any one or more of the following on behalf
of the person
against whom the restraint order has been made, namely
–
(i)
to perform any particular act in respect of any
of or all the property to which the restraint order relates;
(ii)
to take care of the said property;
(iii)
to administer the said property; and
(iv)
where the said property is a business or
undertaking, to carry on, with due regard to any law which may be
applicable, the business
or undertaking:
(b)
order the person against whom the restraint
order has been made to surrender forthwith, or within such period as
that court may
determine, any property in respect of which a curator
bonis has been appointed under paragraph (a), into the custody of
that curator
bonis.
(2) Any person
affected by an order contemplated in subsection (1)(b) may at any
time apply –
(a)
for the variation or rescission of the order;
or
(b)
for the variation of the terms of the
appointment of the curator bonis concerned or for the discharge of
that curator bonis
(3) The High
Court which made an order contemplated in subsection (1)(b) –
(a)
may at any time –
(i)
vary or rescind the order; or
(ii)
vary the terms of the appointment of the
curator bonis or discharge that curator bonis;
(b)
shall rescind the order and discharge the
curator bonis concerned if the relevant restraint order is
rescinded.’
[22]
Section (28)(1)(b) thus provides that where a High
Court has made a restraint order, that Court may at any time order
the person
against whom the restraint order has been made to
surrender
any
property in respect of which a
curator
bonis
has been appointed, into the
custody of the
curator bonis
.
For present purposes, I shall term this a surrender order albeit that
it forms part of the overall restraint order. Section 28(2)(a)
provides that any person affected by a surrender order contemplated
by sec 28(1)(b) may at any time apply for,
inter
alia
, the variation or rescission
thereof whilst sec 28(3) empowers that the High Court which made the
order in terms of sec 28(1)(b)
to vary or rescind such order at any
time.
[23]
As the applicant’s counsel noted in her
written heads, sec 28(1)(b) of POCA contemplates an order
additional
to a simple restraint order granted under sec
26(3). Consequently, counsel’s initial argument proceeded, the
power granted
to this Court by sec 28(3) of POCA is limited to the
additional order made under sec 28(1)(b) of POCA, being the order to
surrender
property to the
curator bonis
.
[24]
However, this interpretation of sections 28(1),
(2) and (3), which in my view is correct, wholly undermines the
relief sought by
the applicant, namely, the release of the three
assets from the operation of the restraint order as a whole. The
applicant’s
case is not that it seeks a reversal of a surrender
order affecting the three assets, but rather the complete lifting of
the restraint
order in relation to the three assets so that it may
proceed with legal process and/or execution against such assets.
Notwithstanding
the inconvenience to the applicant, and other
creditors who find themselves in a similar position to it, there
appears to be no
provision in POCA for a creditor to obtain what is
in effect the partial discharge of a final restraint order in the
circumstances
found in the present matter.
[25]
Nor do I see any basis for granting the relief
sought by the applicant by reason of the fact that the assets in
question are either
not the property of Mr Mulaudzi or those of the
respondent companies in which he held an interest, nor on the basis
that the secured
or preferent claims the applicant has to such assets
exceed their realisable value. In this regard the applicant relies on
the
facts that in terms of the instalment sale agreements it remains
the owner of the two vehicles and as regards the immovable property,
that there is no prospect of its secured claim based on the mortgage
bond being met upon the sale of the property. Allied to this
argument
is the contention that POCA provides in effect that any confiscation
order against a defendant ‘
may not
exceed the value of the benefit that accrued to him from criminal
activities, or the combined value of his property together
with
certain tainted dispositions that he or she might have made,
whichever is the lesser. The value of the defendant’s property
and tainted dispositions is their value after deducting the amount of
certain defined obligations, as well as his secured and preferent
obligations’
. See
Absa
Bank Ltd v Fraser and Another
[2006] 2
All SA 1
(SCA) at para 18.
[26]
I accept these propositions from
Absa
Bank v Fraser
without reservation.
However, it does not follow, in my view, that a portion of a final
restraint order can be varied or discharged
solely on the basis of an
accounting exercise which determines that certain assets subject
thereto have no realisable value for
the purposes of a possible
confiscation order. POCA’s provision do not allow for a
procedure to vary or discharge the order
in such circumstances and
the High Court, as was held in
Phillips
,
has no inherent power to vary a final restraint order. Hence, the
Constitutional Court’s warning in
Phillips
to the following effect: ‘
Given
the limited powers of variation and rescission provided for in
section 26(10) of the Act, courts making restraint orders should
take
care to ensure that their terms are sufficiently flexible to ensure
that the preservation of properties subject to restraint
orders is
not imperilled by the terms of the restraint order. The NDPP, too, in
formulating draft orders should bear these considerations
in mind’.
(para [55] at 523 A – B).
[27]
An unfortunate consequence of the restraint order
in
Phillips
was
that certain businesses conducted on property placed in the
possession of the
curator bonis
were
closed down by him with the result that charges on such properties
could not be paid and they began to deteriorate in value.
This in
turn also jeopardised the potential contribution of these assets to a
possible confiscation order. The Constitutional Court’s
warning
in
Phillips
that
restraint orders must be carefully worded can be equally applied to
restraint orders which place assets which cannot make any
contribution to a possible confiscation order beyond the reach of
creditors during the currency of the order.
[28]
There are several possible ways to forestall the
dilemma which presents itself in the current matter. Restraint orders
can be more
carefully examined and worded before being made to ensure
that assets which cannot contribute to any confiscation order and
against
which creditors should be allowed to proceed, are not frozen.
Furthermore, creditors who find themselves in the position in which
the applicant does need to be astute to assert their rights prior to
any restraint order being made final.
Supplementary
argument
[29]
Since the issue of whether the provisions of POCA
even allow for a variation of the restraint order in the present
circumstances
was not squarely addressed in argument, the parties
were subsequently requested to furnish further written submissions.
Specifically,
submissions were invited on the question of whether the
Court had the power to effect the release of the assets in question
from
the restraint order when its powers to grant a variation in
terms of sec 28(2) and (3) of POCA appear to be limited to a
surrender
order.
[30]
In response, the applicant’s counsel
contended that a necessary consequence of effecting the release of
the property in question
from the control of the
curator
bonis
was its release from the
restraint order, a submission however which takes the matter no
further. Counsel further contended that
interpreting of sec 28(2)(a)
read with sec 28(3)(a) as creating a wide power to amend restraint
orders in appropriate circumstances
was the only sensible
interpretation to give these provisions failing which they served no
other purpose or were rendered meaningless.
It was further submitted
that the legislature must have intended the Courts to have the power
to effect the release of properties
from a restraint order at the
instance of a party having rights to such property particularly where
such property cannot be considered
realisable property for the
purposes of a confiscation order. Finally, reliance was placed on an
order made by Davis J granting
substantially similar relief to a
creditor, Nedbank, at the time that the present restraint order
matter was made final.
[31]
For the reasons that follow I find myself unable
to accept these submissions. As previously mentioned they in fact
represent a
volte face
on
the part of the applicant’s counsel who initially emphasised
that sec 28(1)(b) of POCA contemplates a surrender order being
an
element
additional
to
a restraint order granted under sec 26(3). It follows ineluctably
from this reading of these provisions and from the wording
of sec
28(3), that a Court’s power to vary an order in terms thereof
is limited to a surrender order or to the terms of appointment
of the
curator bonis
.
[32]
The release of property from the provisions of a
surrender order does not logically or necessarily entail its release
from the restraint
order as a whole. So, for example, a motor vehicle
possessed by a defendant which is the subject of a restraint order
and surrender
order, and which has been surrendered to the
curator
bonis
, could be restored to the
defendant for his or her use upon the lifting of the surrender order
pursuant to a variation application
in terms of sec 28(2) of POCA.
[33]
Apart from the fact that the interpretation of sec
28(2) and (3) for which the applicant now contends disregards the
plain wording
of these sections, these provisions can indeed be
sensibly interpreted as applying only to a surrender order. Adopting
such an
interpretation does not render the relevant provisions
meaningless nor does it render any words in the relevant provisions
tautologous
or superfluous, as was contended by the applicant’s
counsel. It is so that the absence of a general power to vary or
rescind
a restraint order on good cause shown can lead to inequitable
results and even hardship. But, as was emphasised by the
Constitutional
Court in
Phillips
,
neither a restraint order nor the power to vary or rescind it exists
in common law (para 25). Nor would it be open to a Court
to give the
provisions of section 28(2) and (3) in POCA a strained interpretation
in order to conjure up a general power to vary
or rescind a simple
restraint order.
[34]
Finally, no reliance can be placed on the fact
that, at the time the restraint order was made final, Davis J granted
Nedbank relief
similar to that now being sought by the applicant.
Davis J was dealing with the provisional restraint order and thus had
a much
wider discretion to vary its terms. At that stage Nedbank
found itself in the same position as the present applicant in
relation
to immovable property over which it held mortgage bonds. Its
secured claims over such properties were also such that no realisable
value was left in them which might satisfy any confiscation order
made against Mr Mulaudzi. The
curator
bonis
recommended in his report that
the properties ‘
should be released
from under the provisional restraint order’
and
the Court duly made such an order. It is worth noting that prior to
the restraint order being made final the
curator
bonis
made exactly the same
recommendation in respect of the immovable property which the
applicant now seeks to be released from the
restraint order. For
reasons which are not explained by the applicant, it did not move at
that stage for the release of the immovable
property from the
operation of the restraint order. It only did so some two years
later, long after the provisional order had been
made final, bringing
to mind the maxim that the law protects those who are vigilant and
not those who sleep on their rights.
[35]
Finally, it needs be noted that the applicant did
not make out any case for relief based on the terms of the restraint
order. This
in my view precludes any such relief but in any event a
careful reading of the restraint order indicates that its terms do
not
permit of any procedure by which the applicant can unilaterally
obtain such a result. For one thing although the order does permit
the
curator bonis
in
particular circumstances to exclude certain property from the
restraint order and surrender provisions, he has not purported
to do
so in relation to the three assets in question. Ultimately, it seems,
Mr Mulaudzi is correct when he states that, as matters
presently
stand, the applicant must await the outcome of the criminal
proceedings against him.
[36]
For these reasons, although the applicant’s
application to intervene must succeed, its application for
substantive relief
falls to be dismissed.
[37]
On the questionable assumption that Mr Mulaudzi
has
locus standi
to
oppose these proceedings, I can see no basis for a costs order in his
favour since he appeared in person and was not legally
represented at
any stage.
[38]
In the circumstances, the Court’s order is
that the application for leave to intervene is granted but the
application for
substantive relief is dismissed, in both instances
with no order as to costs.
____________________
BOZALEK J
For the
Applicant: Adv M Adhikari
As Instructed by:
Van Huylsteyns Attorneys
c/o Hayes
Incorporated
For the 2
nd
Respondent: In Person