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**IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA**

CASE NUMBER: 2024/037681

Reportable: **NO**

Circulate to Judges: **NO**

Circulate to Magistrates: **NO**

Circulate to Regional Magistrates **NO**

In the matter between:-

**CITY OF TSHWANE
METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY**

APPLICANT

And

MOKOTEDI MARIA BONTLENG

FIRST RESPONDENT

NEMAVHADWE PHINIAS

SECOND RESPONDENT

NGOPE SARIA

THIRD RESPONDENT

KEKAE JOHANNAH

FOURTH RESPONDENT

NOKO JACK MATHAKGANE

FIFTH RESPONDENT

MATHIBA EPHRAIM

SIXTH RESPONDENT

MAKUA AUBREY	SEVENTH RESPONDENT
MODISE PATRICK	EIGHTH RESPONDENT
TSUKUDU BENNY	NINTH RESPONDENT
TSUKUDU IGNITIUS	TENTH RESPONDENT
GAFANE PRETTY	ELEVENTH RESPONDENT
MASANGO DELIWE	TWELFTH RESPONDENT
MASHAU PHILIMON	THIRTEENTH RESPONDENT
JAFTHA LUCAS	FOURTEENTH RESPONDENT
MOKGALE FRANCE	FIFTEENTH RESPONDENT
MALATJI SIMON	SIXTEENTH RESPONDENT
KGWATHA CONSTANCE	SEVENTEENTH RESPONDENT
MAKGETHA MPHO	EIGHTEENTH RESPONDENT
APHANE STEVE	NINETEENTH RESPONDENT
MODAKU ELISAH	TWENTIETH RESPONDENT
ALL OTHER UNLAWFUL OCCUPIERS OF ERF 5[...], 1[...] M[...] STREET, HENNOPSPARK, CENTURION, 0172	TWENTY -FIRST RESPONDENT

**ALL OTHER UNLAWFUL OCCUPIERS OF
ERF 5[...],1[...] M[...] STREET,
HENNOPSPARK, CENTURION, 0172**

TWENTY-SECOND RESPONDENT

**ALL OTHER UNLAWFUL OCCUPIERS OF
ERF 5[...],1[...] M[...] STREET,
HENNOPSPARK, CENTURION, 0172**

TWENTY-THIRD RESPONDENT

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The date of the judgment is deemed to be 4 September 2026.*

JUDGMENT

TROMP AJ

Introduction

1. This is an opposed eviction application brought by the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality against Mokotedi Maria Bontleng and 22 others (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the Respondents").

2. It is common cause that the applicant, a municipality, is the registered owner or person in charge of the immovable property comprising Erven 5[...], 5[...], and 5[...], situated at 1[...] M[...] Street, Hennopspark, Centurion (hereinafter referred to as "the property").

3. It is also not in dispute that the respondents are currently in occupation of the property.

4. In these proceedings, the applicant seeks an order evicting the respondents from the property on the grounds that they are in unlawful occupation. The application is brought in terms of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act, 19 of 1998 (the PIE Act). The application of the PIE Act in this matter is not in dispute.

5. To mitigate any potential adverse consequences, including the risk of homelessness, that may result from the granting of an eviction order by this Court, the applicant seeks an order that the eviction be suspended for a period of six months from the date of the order being granted.

6. The application is opposed by the respondents, who are all being represented by SM Sibiya Incorporated Attorneys and which representation was also confirmed during the hearing of this matter.

7. As part of their opposition, the respondents raised the following points in limine:

7.1 Non-compliance with Sections 4(2) and 7(2) of the PIE Act,

7.2 Non-compliance with Rule 41A(2)(a) of the Uniform Rules of Court.

Legal framework and principles

8. This eviction application is brought in terms of the PIE Act.

9. In the matter of *Davidan v Polovin NO and Others* [2021] 4 All SA 37 (SCA), para [11] the SCA held that:

"The starting point is to establish whether the appellant is an unlawful occupier under PIE. The key question is whether the appellant enjoyed a right of occupation? PIE applies not only to occupants who occupied land without the initial consent of the owner or person in charge, it also applies to occupants who

had consent to occupy but such consent was subsequently terminated. In both instances the occupants would be unlawful occupiers within the meaning of PIE. Consent in eviction applications is a valid defence."

10. Section 4 of the PIE Act regulates the eviction of unlawful occupiers by an owner or person in charge. The procedural provisions are contained in Sections 4(2), (3), (4), and (5), while the substantive provisions are found in Sections 4(6), (7), and (8).¹

11. The procedural provisions relate to the notice which, in terms of Section 4(2) of the PIE Act, must be given to the unlawful occupier and the municipality with jurisdiction, at least fourteen (14) days before the hearing of the proceedings. An *ex-parte* application is required in order to obtain the court's directions regarding the manner and service of the notice contemplated in Section 4(2) of the PIE Act. Section 4(5) of the PIE Act prescribes the content of the notice.

12. Once the procedural requirements have been satisfied, the applicable substantive provisions depend on the duration of the occupiers' occupation of the property. If the occupiers have been in occupation for less than six months, the provisions of Section 4(6), read with Section 4(8), are applicable. If the occupation exceeds six months, the provisions of Section 4(7), read with Section 4(8), are triggered.

13. I agree with counsel's submission that Sections 4(7) and 4(8) of the PIE Act are applicable to the present application. In the matter of *City of Johannesburg v Changing Tides 74 (Pty) Ltd and Others* 2012 (6) SA 294 (SCA) the SCA offered the following interpretation of these provisions at paragraph 12:

"In terms of s 4(7) of PIE an eviction order may only be granted if it is just and equitable to do so, after the court has had regard to all the relevant circumstances, including the availability of land for the relocation of the occupiers

¹ *Ndlovu v Ngcobo, Bekker and Another v Jika (Jika)* 2003 (1) SA 113 (SCA) paras [11] to [12].

and the rights and needs of the elderly, children, disabled persons and households headed by women. If the requirements of s 4 are satisfied and no valid defence to an eviction order has been raised the court 'must', in terms of s 4(8), grant an eviction order. When granting such an order the court must, in terms of s 4(8)(a) of PIE, determine a just and equitable date on which the unlawful occupier or occupiers must vacate the premises."

14. Therefore, once the procedural requirements set out in section 4 have been met and the unlawful occupiers raise no valid defence to the eviction, a court may grant an eviction order only if it is just and equitable to do so.

15. In determining whether such an order is just and equitable, the court must consider all relevant circumstances, including the risk that the eviction may render the unlawful occupiers homeless.

16. In eviction proceedings, both the applicant and the respondents bear a duty to place all relevant circumstances before the court in order to enable the court to make this determination.

17. In the matter of *Lochner NO v Gardener and Others* (6026/2023) [2024] ZAWCHC 39 (13 February 2024) the court with reference to the *Changing Tides* matter held as follows in this regard at paragraph 18:

"While an applicant seeking an eviction order in terms of PIE bears the onus to place sufficient information before the court to justify the eviction order that it seeks, there is also an obligation on the respondents in such proceedings to place sufficient information before the court to enable the court to discharge its duty to enquire into all the relevant circumstances for the purposes of the enquiry required by PIE. The Supreme Court of Appeal in Changing Tides qualified the onus that rests on an applicant in PIE proceedings by stating that applicants for

evictions are obviously not required to go beyond what they know or what is reasonably ascertainable."

18. In the matter of *FHP Management (Pty) Ltd v Theron NO & Another* 2004 (3) SA 392 (C) at 4041 - 4058 the court held:

"As regards the effect of s 26(3) of the Constitution (as quoted above), read together with s 4(7) of PIE, it would appear from the judgment of Harms JA in Ndlovu v Ngcobo; Bekker and Another v Jika (supra in paras [17] - [19]) that it is not necessary for an applicant, in proceedings to evict an unlawful occupier from such applicant's property, to place more before the Court by way of evidence than the facts that such applicant is the owner of the property in question and that the respondent is in unlawful occupation of such property. It is then up to the occupier to disclose to the Court 'relevant circumstances' to show why the owner should not be granted an order for the eviction of the occupier"

19. Likewise, the SCA in *Bekker and Another v Jika (Jika)* 2003 (1) SA 113 (SCA). held at paragraph 12:

"Another material consideration is that of the evidential onus. Provided the procedural requirements have been met, the owner is entitled to approach the court on the basis of ownership and the respondent's unlawful occupation. Unless the occupier opposes and discloses circumstances relevant to the eviction order, the owner, in principle, will be entitled to an order for eviction. Relevant circumstances are nearly without fail facts within the exclusive knowledge of the occupier and it cannot be expected of an owner to negative in advance facts not known to him and not in issue between the parties. Whether the ultimate onus will be on the owner or the occupier we need not now decide."

20. When a municipality seeks an eviction order, it bears a constitutional obligation to engage meaningfully with the affected occupiers of the property. In the matter of

Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg and Others 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC), para [15] - [18], the court held as follows:

"[15] Engagement has the potential to contribute towards the resolution of disputes and to increase understanding and sympathetic care if both sides are willing to participate in the process. People about to be evicted may be so vulnerable that they may not be able to understand the importance of engagement and may refuse to take part in the process. If this happens, a municipality cannot walk away without more. It must make reasonable efforts to engage and it is only if these reasonable efforts fail that a municipality may proceed without appropriate engagement. It is precisely to ensure that a city is able to engage meaningfully with poor, vulnerable or illiterate people that the engagement process should preferably be managed by careful and sensitive people on its side."

21. In the matter of *Setsoto Local Municipality v Various Individual Unlawful Occupiers and Intended Unlawful Occupiers of the Remaining Extent of Ficksburg Dorp Grande 75, (Commonly Known as Peach Farm & Imperani Mountain in Ficksburg) and Others* (5154/2023) [2024] ZAFSHC 299 (19 September 2024) it was highlighted that engagement with affected occupiers by a municipality's legal representatives is permissible and acceptable for purposes of fulfilling the municipality's obligations.

22. Another obligation resting on a municipality in the context of eviction proceedings is the duty to provide temporary emergency accommodation in circumstances where the eviction is likely to result in homelessness. in *Dladla and Another v City of Johannesburg and Others* 2018 (2) SA 327 (CC), the Constitutional Court made it clear that such accommodation is not intended to be permanent but rather serves as temporary housing to address the immediate need.

Application of the facts relevant to this eviction application

The respondents are unlawful occupiers.

23. It is common cause that the applicant in this matter is the registered owner of the property or the person in charge of the property. It is further not denied that the respondents are in occupation of the property.

24. In paragraph 27 of the founding affidavit, the applicant alleged that at all material times, the respondents neither had nor currently have the requisite consent to occupy or remain in occupation of the property. The applicant further alleges that the respondents are in unlawful occupation of the property.

25. In response to this allegation, the respondents merely allege:

"The contents of these paragraphs are denied. The applicant is put to the proof thereof."

26. It is trite that bare denials, such as those advanced by the respondents, do not give rise to real or genuine disputes of fact and are therefore to be rejected on the papers. Accordingly, the respondents' bare denial of the allegation that they do not have the applicant's consent to occupy the property, and that their occupation is lawful, is rejected.

27. Further and in their answering affidavit, the respondents do not allege that they ever received consent from the applicant to occupy the property. They merely allege, without any proof that during the 80's they were informed that a certain Mr Boswel would be vacating the farm and that the municipality would be taking over the farm and would undertake a process of building adequate housing for the people who were residents of the farm after Mr Boswel's departure from the property and that the municipality bestowed upon the residents of the farm the authority to manage the farm after Mr Boswel's departure.

28. The applicant, as is common cause, was not the owner of the property at that stage. Ownership of the property only vested in the applicant's predecessor, the Town Council of Centurion, from 1994 onwards. It is not the respondents' case on the papers that they had consent of the applicant to occupy the property.

29. In view of the averments made in the affidavits filed in this matter, there is no evidence on the papers indicating that the respondents ever obtained consent from the applicant to occupy the property. Accordingly, it is found that the respondents are unlawful occupiers within the meaning of the PIE Act.

Compliance with the procedural requirements

30. In this matter, the applicant obtained an *ex parte* order on 05 July 2024 directing that the notice contemplated in Section 4(2) of PIE be served in accordance with Rule 4(1) of the Uniform Rules of Court.

31. In the matter of *Unlawful Occupiers, School Site v City of Johannesburg* 2005 (4) SA 199 at par 22 to par 24, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that not every deviation from the literal prescription is fatal. The question remains whether, in spite of the defects in the section 4(2) notice, the object of the statutory provision had been achieved. In the present instance there were no defects in the section 4(2) notice in terms of the PIE Act as it complied with the requirements of section 4(5) of the PIE Act. The court further held that the purpose of s 4(2) is to afford the respondents in an application under PIE an additional opportunity, apart from the opportunity they have already had under the rules of court, to put all the circumstances they allege to be relevant before the court. When a respondent receives the s 4(2) notice they therefore already know what case they have to meet.

32. Pursuant to the order of 5 July 2024, the notice, together with the main application, was served on all the respondents except the tenth respondent, as

evidenced by the returns of service annexed to the replying affidavit. Nonetheless, all of the respondents, through their attorney of record, opposed this eviction application. All the respondents are aware of the application, have opposed the application, know what case they have to meet and have had the opportunity to put all relevant facts before court. Consequently, it is found that the purpose of section 4(2) has been served and complied with.

Duty to place the relevant circumstances before the court by both the applicant and respondents:

33. It is common cause that, on 21 June 2022, the applicant's attorneys of record transmitted a letter to the respondents' attorneys. The purpose of the letter was to confirm whether the respondents continued to be represented by SM Sibiya Attorneys. In the event that they were, the letter extended an invitation to SM Sibiya Attorneys to attend a roundtable meeting for the purpose of engaging on the issue of alternative accommodation and to obtain information regarding each respondent's personal circumstances.

34. On 18 August 2022, the respondents' attorneys replied and confirmed that they continued to represent the respondents. They also accepted the applicant's invitation to the roundtable discussion and proposed dates on which they would be available to attend. Pursuant to the above, a meeting was convened on 21 September 2022 at the offices of the applicant's attorneys. The meeting was attended by the applicant's legal representatives, the respondents' attorney, Mr Matthew Sibiya, and certain of the respondents.

35. At the meeting, both the respondents and their legal representative, Mr Sibiya, offered the following information:

35.1. There were two permanent structures on Erf 5[...]2 together with 35 houses consisting of permanent structures and non-permanent structures.

35.2. There are approximately 118 people occupying these houses. These people make up 23 houses consisting of occupiers who have known the farm to be their home for more than 30 years in some cases. On average, it was around 3 people per shack/dwelling and about 6 to 11 people in the permanent structures.

35.3 These two permanent structures supply electricity and other amenities to the non-permanent temporary structures. That is to say, the entire community of illegal occupants receive their water and electricity from two permanent structures.

35.4 Further, the school which the children attend is 5 km away, additionally each household has an average of 1 breadwinner, most of whom are low income earners (±R4 000.00 per month) in the informal sector.

35.5 Some of the respondents have occupied the property since early 1980. The first generation of occupiers arrived on the property as farmworkers working for one Mr Boswell, who according to the occupiers and Mr Sibiya owned and managed the property as Rainbow Chicken and Livestock Farm.

35.6 Mr Boswell vacated the farm and the City and its predecessor took over the farm. The first respondent and her husband (a former employee of the applicant and/or its predecessor) were informed to look after the farm. According to them, they were verbally promised by the City and/or its predecessor that if they were vacated, the City would build houses for them.

35.7 As far as alternative housing is concerned Mr Sibiya, maintained that:

35.7.1. First: Formalisation of the occupation and systems by the City with building structures that comply with municipal bylaws;

35.7.2. Second: Consider supplying the occupiers with housing under the City's Housing Policy with some grants/loan of some sort;

35.7.3. Third: Permanent accommodation within the boundaries of Centurion.

36. It is also not in dispute that, on 25 January 2023, the applicant's legal representative, together with Mr Charles Marumo and Mr Khazamola Baloyi of the

applicant, visited the property to conduct an inspection. The purpose of the visit was to verify the accuracy of the information provided by the respondents' attorneys and certain respondents during the meeting held on 21 September 2022, and, where necessary, to gather additional information.

37. The inspection revealed that the area was not overpopulated. This is borne out by an inspection report by Mr Marumo. It is not disputed that when some of the respondents were asked to provide details regarding their personal circumstances, they informed the applicant's officials and legal representatives that they should not engage with them directly but rather communicate through their legal representatives, confirming legal representation again.

38. It is further not in dispute that, in light of the respondents' stance, the applicant's attorneys transmitted an email to the respondents' attorneys on 27 January 2023, enclosing a questionnaire aimed at eliciting the personal circumstances of each occupier which questionnaire remains unanswered by the respondents.

39. From the foregoing, it is clear that the applicant made a genuine effort to engage meaningfully with the respondents and to obtain information regarding the personal circumstances of the individual occupiers.

40. However, it seems that these efforts were frustrated by the respondents' refusal to cooperate and their legal representatives' failure to respond to correspondence specifically aimed at eliciting such information.

41. One would have expected the respondents, who have long been legally represented, to set out their personal circumstances in their answering affidavit. Instead, the affidavit contains only general allegations regarding their historical occupation of the property. It fails to provide any meaningful information that would enable the court to assess their individual circumstances, their needs, and, most importantly, whether the eviction would render them homeless.

42. In the matter of *Lochner NO v Gardener and Others* (6026/2023) [2024] ZAWCHC 39 (13 February 2024) the court has outlined how conduct of the kind displayed by the respondents should be treated. At paragraph 20, the court held:

"It is thus not open to respondents in eviction proceedings to fail and/or refuse to place their personal circumstances before the court. Where the answering affidavits in PIE proceedings are silent on matters which the respondents should be able to address with relative ease, a satisfactory explanation should be provided for the omission, and in the absence thereof a court will be justified in drawing the inference that a bald assertion of impecuniosity or homelessness is not genuine or credible"

43. The regrettable consequence of the respondents' failure to provide information regarding their individual circumstances is that it deprives both the court and the applicant of the opportunity to properly consider and reflect on the issue of potential homelessness.

44. A court, when applying the 'just and equitability' requirement in terms of ss 4(7) and 4(8) of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE), must essentially make three determinations: Firstly, whether an eviction order should be granted, secondly, if the order is granted, the date by which the property is to be vacated and thirdly, the date by which the eviction order may be executed if the property has not been voluntarily vacated. All three determinations must be 'just and equitable' (see the *Changing Tides* case at para 12; and *Johannesburg Housing Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Unlawful Occupiers, Newtown Urban Village* 2013 (1) SA 583 (GSJ) at para 33 and 126).

45. Determination of the eviction date and execution of the order are discretionary. When a court is clothed with a discretion, it can be either in a wide or narrow sense. A discretion in the wide sense refers to a discretion being exercised from a range of

permissible options while a discretion in narrow sense leaves little room for variation. The courts essentially support application of the discretion in the narrow sense in evictions. See for instance, *Machete and Others v Mailula and Others* 2010 (2) SA 257 (CC) where Skweyiya J, delivering the unanimous judgment of the Constitutional Court (CC), said: 'The application of PIE is not discretionary' (at para 15). In an earlier decision the SCA, in *Ndlovu v Ngcobo; Bekker and Another v Jika* 2003 (1) SA 113 (SCA) favoured the same view. The discretion in the narrow sense, however, applies only in theory because essentially an eviction does not have one possible justified outcome.

46. Courts frequently decline or delay eviction orders because the order will allegedly render occupiers homeless. Neither the SCA nor the CC have attempted to define the term 'homeless'. In the *Newtown* case Willis J defined 'homeless' as (at para 85):

"Without any reasonable prospect, between the date of the court order which it is proposed be made that the occupier is to vacate the property and the date upon which the eviction order is to be effected (in the event that the occupier does not vacate the property), of the occupier being able to find alternative accommodation that is (a) of a comparable or better standard to and (b) at a similar rental to and (c) within reasonable proximity to that of the property from which the eviction is sought."

The mere fact that a person stands to be evicted does not necessarily mean that he or she will be rendered homeless. To determine this fact, an inquiry into the *bona fides* and detailed personal circumstances of occupiers is imperative.

47. The respondents have not placed any evidence before court to substantiate an allegation that they would be rendered homeless should the eviction order be granted.

48. Nevertheless, in order to safeguard the respondents against potential homelessness that may arise from the granting of an eviction order, the applicant

conceded that it is willing to permit the respondents to remain on the property for a further period of six months from the date of the order.

Points in limine

49. First point in limine: Non-compliance with Section 4(2) of the PIE Act

It is alleged that the notice contemplated in Section 4(2) of the PIE Act was not served on the respondents is factually incorrect. This point *in limine* has already been addressed above, where it was demonstrated that the notice in terms of Section 4(2) of PIE was duly served. Accordingly, the point *in limine* is dismissed.

50. Second point in limine: Non-compliance with Section 7(2) of the PIE Act

The respondents contend that there has been non-compliance with Section 7(2) of the PIE Act. Section 7(2) provides as follows:

"7. Mediation.-(1) If the municipality in whose area of jurisdiction the land in question is situated is not the owner of the land the municipality may, on the conditions that it may determine, appoint one or more persons with expertise in dispute resolution to facilitate meetings of interested parties and to attempt to mediate and settle any dispute in terms of this Act: Provided that the parties may at any time, by agreement, appoint another person to facilitate meetings or mediate a dispute, on the conditions that the municipality may determine.

(2) If the municipality in whose area of jurisdiction the land in question is situated is the owner of the land in question, the member of the Executive Council designated by the Premier of the province concerned, or his or her nominee, may, on the conditions that he or she may determine, appoint one or more persons with expertise in dispute resolution to facilitate meetings of interested parties and to attempt to mediate and settle any dispute in terms of this Act: Provided that the parties may at any time, by agreement, appoint another person to facilitate meetings or mediate a dispute, on the conditions that the said member of the Executive Council may determine.

(3) *Any party may request the municipality to appoint one or more persons in terms of subsections (1) and (2), for the purposes of those subsections."*

51. Section 7(2) of the PIE Act, is not peremptory as is clear from the use of the word "may" by the legislature.

Third point in limine: Non-compliance with rule 41A(2)(a) of the Uniform Rules of Court

52. The respondents raise a point *in limine* contending that the applicant has not complied with Rule 41A(2)(a) of the Uniform Rules of Court. In the matter of *Firststrand Bank Ltd v De Santos and Another* (13329/2022) [2025] ZAGPPHC 606 (6 June 2025), para [24] with reference to several authorities, confirmed that noncompliance with Rule 41A is not, in itself, fatal to the proceedings. Furthermore, the Court held that a party alleging non-compliance with the Rule is required to file a notice in terms of Rule 30. It is common cause in the present matter that no Rule 30 Notice has been filed. As a result, this point in limine also fails.

Conclusion

53. The applicant, a municipality, is the registered owner or person in charge of Erf 5[...]2, 5[...]3, and 5[...], situated at 1[...] M[...] Street, Hennopspark, Centurion.

54. The Respondents are in unlawful occupation of the property without the applicant's consent.

55. Their occupation is therefore unlawful in terms of the PIE Act.

56. The applicant has complied with all procedural requirements under the PIE Act, including obtaining and serving the notice in terms of section 4(2).

57. The applicant engaged the respondents through their attorneys, held a roundtable meeting, and conducted a site inspection to assess the occupiers' circumstances. Despite repeated efforts, including sending a questionnaire, the respondents failed to provide adequate information to assess their individual personal circumstances including not providing necessary information in the opposing papers.

58. Although the respondents failed to disclose their personal circumstances, the applicant nevertheless seeks a suspension of the eviction order for six months in case an eviction order renders them homeless to afford the respondents the opportunity to find alternative accommodation.

Accordingly, the following order is made:

1. The Respondents and all other persons who through the Respondents occupy the immovable property situated at 1[...] M[...] Street, Hennospark, Centurion, 0172 at Erven 5[...]2, 5[...]3 and 5[...] ("the property") are declared to be in unlawful occupation of the property.
2. The Respondents and all other persons who through the Respondents occupy the property are ordered to vacate the property on or before **1 March 2027** to afford them reasonable opportunity to find alternative accommodation.
3. The Sheriff or his deputy is directed to remove any Respondent or occupier who fail to vacate the property on the date determined by this Honourable Court in terms of paragraph 2 hereof.
4. Each party is to pay their own costs.

TROMP AJ
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA

DATE OF HEARING: 4 FEBRUARY 2026

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 4 SEPTEMBER 2026

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