REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA

Case Number: **141493-2024**

(1) REPORTABLE: YES / NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES/NO
(3) REVISED: YES/NO

18 May 2026 [redacted]
DATE SIGNATURE

In the matter between:

BETHESDA CHRISTIAN CENTER NPC AND NPO	Applicant
and	
WORLD OUTREACH PTY LTD	First Respondent
BETHESDA DREAM CENTER	Second Respondent
BETHESDA BUSINESS FOUNDATION TRUST	Third Respondent
FORTUNE IBE	Fourth Respondent
CLEMENT IKECHUKWU IBE	Fifth Respondent
ELVIN IBE	Sixth Respondent
SAMSON MASEKO N.O.	Seventh Respondent
JOHNSON OLUMUIWA DEHINBO	Eighth Respondent

MARIA SEBATE	Ninth Respondent
DAVID MOLEFE	Tenth Respondent
TEBOHO LETUKA	Eleventh Respondent
SADIA HANSLO	Twelfth Respondent
ALICE MUTHONI KITHEKA	Thirteenth Respondent
MAMUYOVWI KOKA	Fourteenth Respondent
MPOVA MPONGO KOKA	Fifteenth Respondent
GAPE FREDDY MOSWEU	Sixteenth Respondent
OKEY ANTHONY NWAFOR	Seventeenth Respondent
REKENORTH	Eighteenth Respondent
CITY PROPERTY	Nineteenth Respondent
MORENA PROPERTIES	Twentieth Respondent
CITY OF TSHWANE LOCAL MUNICIPALITY	Twenty First Respondent
DEEDS REGISTRY OFFICE	Twenty Second Respondent
MASTER OF THE HIGH COURT	Twenty Third Respondent
NPO DIRECTORATE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT	Twenty Fourth Respondent

***Delivered**: This judgment was prepared and authored by the Acting Judge whose name is reflected and is handed down electronically by circulation to the Parties / their legal representatives by email and by uploading it to the electronic file of this matter on CaseLines. The date of the judgment is deemed to be 18 May 2026*

JUDGMENT

RAUBENHEIMER, AJ

Introduction

[1] This matter is before Court in the context of ongoing litigation between the applicant, Bethesda Christian Center NPC & NPO (BCC) and the respondents, World Outreach (Pty) Ltd (WO) and others. The matter has reached this stage following a

series of procedural disputes that have culminated in the interlocutory applications before Court.

[2] There are three interlocutory applications before Court arising from the main application; the first being a Rule 30 application brought by WO and other respondents against the seventh respondent (Maseko) seeking to set aside his explanatory affidavit, which was later renamed as an answering affidavit, as an irregular step.

[3] In the second application, brought by BCC, a formal challenge was raised under Uniform Rule 7 in which the authority of the fourth respondent (Ibe) and the legal representatives (Mashishi Attorneys) acting on behalf of the first, second and third respondents was challenged. The applicant contends that the lawyers for the respondents have failed to demonstrate that they are duly authorized to act on behalf of the respondents.

[4] Concurrently, BCC launched an application to strike out specific averments contained within the respondents' answering affidavit, asserting that these allegations are scandalous, vexatious, and irrelevant, and that their inclusion is designed to disparage BCC rather than to address the factual or legal issues properly before the court.

[5] The third interlocutory application is against the applicants in the second interlocutory application on the basis that that application amounted to an irregular step.

[6] The applications are procedurally intertwined and will, therefore, be adjudicated together.

Factual background of the Main Application

[7] BCC is a long-established church organisation. WO is a property holding entity historically associated with BCC. The Bethesda Business Foundation Trust (the Trust) was registered in 2005 and is the owner of the Trust. BCC, in turn, is the sole beneficiary of the Trust.

[8] The disputes concern the legitimacy of competing Boards, the validity of a proxy allegedly providing the fifth respondent with a sole mandate, the lawfulness of the formation of the Trust, the transfer of all the shares of WO to the Trust, the legitimacy of the intervention of the Directorate of Social Development, the appointment of an administrator and the ownership and control of church property.

[9] The seventh respondent denies authorising the trust or the transfer of shares, while the fourth respondent claims that the proxy empowered the fifth respondent to act alone. BCC, in turn, claims the proxy to be invalid as it is contrary to the provisions of the Companies Act.

[10] The Trust deed contains automatic termination clauses in respect of trustees who cease to be members of the church.

[11] The decisions of the directors were upheld in previous litigation.

[12] The mentioned factual disputes form the backdrop to the interlocutory applications.

Procedural chronology

[13] BCC issued the main application on 3 December 2024 to which the fourth, fifth, sixth, eighth, nineth, twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth and the fifteenth respondents entered an opposition on 31 January 2025. At that stage, the mentioned respondents were represented by the same firm of attorneys, Mashishi Attorneys. The said respondents filed their answering affidavit on 25 February 2025. On the same day, Mashishi Attorneys filed a notice of withdrawal in respect of the thirteenth respondent, as well as a notice to oppose on behalf of the first, second and third respondents.

[14] BCC filed its replying affidavit together with a Rule 7(1) notice in which the authority of Mashishi Attorneys to represent the respondents was requested on 20 March 2025. BCC also filed a notice in terms of Rule 6(15) to have certain paragraphs struck out from the respondents' answering affidavit.

[15] Shortly thereafter, on 4 April 2025, the respondents filed a Rule 30 Notice containing three causes of complaint, firstly that the applicant's Rule 7(1) Notice was filed out of time and was not accompanied by an application for condonation, secondly, that the Rule 6(15) Notice was incorrectly worded and thirdly, that there were new averments in the applicant's replying affidavit, which must be struck out. BCC subsequently withdrew the Notice in terms of Rule 6(15) and replaced it with an interlocutory application in terms of Rule 6(15), which application also included an application in terms of Rule 7(1) to the effect that Mashishi Attorneys lacked the requisite authority to act on behalf of the first three respondents. It also sought condonation for the possible late filing of the Rule 7(1) Notice.

[16] Prior to the application, BCC filed a reply to the complaint that there were new averments in the replying affidavit. The respondents replied with a letter in which they alleged that their cause of complaint was not cured. The respondents contended further that the applications in terms of Rule 6(15) and Rule 7 were further irregular steps. The respondents proposed to address the Rule 7 objection and 6(15) by filing the resolutions, which they had, in any case, attached to their answering affidavit.

[17] On 26 May 2025, the respondents sent a letter, accompanied by their resolutions in reply to the Rule 7(1) Notice, together with their Notice of intention to oppose BCC's application in terms of Rule 6(15) and 7(1).

[18] BCC was not satisfied with the resolutions as it did not prove that Mashishi Attorneys had been authorised to act on behalf of the third respondent.

[19] On 30 June 2025, the respondents filed their answering affidavit to BCC's application in terms of Rule 6(15) and Rule 7(1) (second Interlocutory application).

[20] On 14 July 2025, BCC filed their replying affidavit to the respondents' answering affidavit.

[21] On 25 June 2025, the respondents filed their application in terms of Rule 30, pursuant to the filling of their Rule 30 notice of 4 April 2025. The application also prayed for condonation for the late filling of the same application. BCC responded to the respondents' application in terms of Rule 30 by raising an irregular step in terms

of Rule 30 since the application itself constituted an irregular step as the respondents could not bring such an application after having taken several further steps.

[22] On 15 July 2025, the respondents filed a reply thereto stating that they could not file the application in terms of Rule 30 timeously since there were correspondences exchanged which aimed at attending to the raised issues to avoid interlocutory applications.

[23] Dissatisfied with the reply to the Rule 30 Notice on 4 August 2025, BCC filled the application in terms of Rule 30.

[24] The respondents filed their notice to oppose and answering affidavit. Determination of the second interlocutory application disposes of the third interlocutory application. The only issue which shall remain alive is the aspect of costs and the scale thereof.

The chronology of the first interlocutory application

[25] The chronology commenced on 9 January 2025 when the seventh respondent filed a notice of intention to oppose the main application and filed an explanatory affidavit on 17 April 2025 after the other respondents had filed their answering affidavits and BCC had filed its replying affidavit. The seventh respondent indicated that he did not wish to oppose the relief sought but found it necessary to file the explanatory affidavit to clarify certain aspects and to assist the court in the adjudication of the main application.

[26] The respondents (one to five) filed a Rule 30 notice on 6 May 2025 challenging the filing of the explanatory affidavit as such affidavit could only be filed with the leave of the court in their submission. The seventh respondent responded on 14 May 2025 by withdrawing the explanatory affidavit and filing it as an answering affidavit instead on the same day.

[27] The respondents were not satisfied with this attempt at curing the irregular step and filed an application in terms of Rule 30 on 4 June 2025, which the seventh

respondent opposed on 10 June 2025 and filed an answering affidavit on 27 June 2025.

[28] The respondents filed their replying affidavit on 10 July 2025.

Discussion

First Interlocutory application

[29] The basis for the irregular step application is firstly that the filing of an "explanatory affidavit" is not provided for in the Uniform Rules of Court and secondly, that the affidavit substantially traversed not only the substance of BCC's founding affidavit, but also the answering affidavit of the other respondents and BCC's replying affidavit. Even when re-labelled as an "answering affidavit", it was filed well out of time and after the replying affidavit had already been delivered, and without any application for condonation in terms of Rule 27.

[30] The general rule in motion proceedings is that there are only three sets of affidavits.[1]

[31] The court retains a discretion in terms of Rule 6(5)(e), which provides that the court may, in its discretion, permit the filing of further affidavits and the party seeking such an indulgence must provide a satisfactory explanation as to why the information was not produced earlier, and show that the admission of the affidavit will not cause irremediable prejudice to the other parties.[2]

[32] Apart from seeking permission,[3] the respondent must apply for condonation in terms of Rule 27 by showing "good cause," which includes a reasonable explanation for the delay and a bona fide defence.[4]

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[1] *Hano Trading CC v JR 209 Investments (Pty) Ltd and Another* 2013 (1) SA 161 (SCA) at para 12 quoting from *James Brown & Hamer (Pty) Ltd (Previously named Gilbert Hamer & Co Ltd) v Simmons NO* 1963 (4) SA 656 (A) at 660D – H.
[2] *James Brown & Hamer (Pty) Ltd v Simmons, NO* id at 660D-H.
[3] *Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Sewpersadh and Another* 2005 (4) SA 148 (C) at para 13.
[4] *Smith, NO v Brummer, NO and Another Smith, NO v Brummer* 1954 (3) SA 352 (O) at 357H-358A. See also *Melane v Santam Insurance Co Ltd* 1962 (4) SA 531 (A) at 532B-E and *Grootboom v National Prosecuting Authority and Another* 2014 (2) SA 68 (CC) at para 22-23 & 50-51.

[33] That the matter involves multiple parties complicates matters somewhat and is a respondent generally entitled to respond to the version of a co-respondent if that version is adverse to their interests or introduces new facts not contained in the founding affidavit.[5] The court further emphasized that the interests of justice require that a party should be allowed to deal with allegations made against them by any other party to the proceedings, provided such party seek the necessary leave from the court.

[34] Dealing with the applicant's replying affidavit in an answering affidavit is however totally different as the reply is regarded as the last word, however, if the applicant introduced a new matter in the replying affidavit, the respondent has a right to answer that new matter.[6]

[35] A respondent who has not previously filed an answering affidavit may do so after the applicant has already replied only with the leave of the court and by applying for condonation.[7]

[36] The seventh respondent withdrew the explanatory affidavit and therewith also the condonation application which accompanied the explanatory affidavit.

[37] When the seventh respondent filed the explanatory affidavit as an answering affidavit, he did not apply for condonation for the late filing thereof, which was now more than two months after the withdrawal of the explanatory affidavit, which had, in any case, been filed late and had been withdrawn. The reason why he did not seek condonation was that he had obtained consent from the applicants.

[38] This approach to condonation is misdirected as it is only the court that can grant condonation. Consent by the applicant does not replace condonation.[8]

[39] What makes the explanation even more untenable is that no permission from the court to file the affidavit after the pleadings had closed was sought, and no full and reasonable explanation was given for the initial silence.[9]

[5] *Bafokeng Tribe v Impala Platinum Ltd and Others* 1999 (3) SA 517 (BH)
[6] *Mostert and Others v First Rand Bank t/a RMB Private Bank* 2018 (4) SA 443 (SCA) at para 13.
[7] *Rens v Gutman NO and Others* [2002] 4 All SA 30 (C) at 36. See also *Hano Trading CC v JR 209 Investments (Pty) Ltd and Another* 2013 (1) SA 161 (SCA) at para 12, quoting from *James Brown & Hamer (Pty) Ltd (previously named Gilbert Hamer & Co Ltd) v Simmons NO* 1963 (4) SA 656 (A) at 660D-H.
[8] *Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Sewpersadh and Another* above n 3 at para 10.
[9] *Melane v Santam Insurance Co Ltd* above n 4 at 532B-E.

[40] BCC and the other respondents were consequently placed in an untenable position and could only respond to the answering affidavit with leave of the court.

[41] The answering affidavit of the seventh respondent amounts to an irregular step and is hereby set aside.

The second interlocutory application

[42] As the second and third interlocutory applications deal essentially with the same questions of fact and law, the parties are *ad idem* that determination of the second interlocutory application also disposes of the third interlocutory application.

[43] The second interlocutory application dealt with the Rule 7(1) and 6(15) Notices by BCC to the respondents. In response to the Notice, the respondents brought a Rule 30 application on the basis that the Rule 7 Notice was out of time and was not accompanied by a condonation application.

[44] On receipt of the Rule 30 Notice, the BCC simply withdrew the Rule 7(1) notice and the Rule 6(15) Notice and issued an application in respect of both, which was opposed by the respondents.

Discussion

[45] Rule 30 deals with an irregular step, defined as a procedural step conflicting with the rules or in disregard of the rules, having the effect of advancing the litigation process and thereby causing unfairness or inefficiency, and ultimately, prejudice to the innocent party's rights in the litigation process.[10]

[46] The adjudication of a Rule 30 application entails a two a step process,[11] of which the first step is to ascertain whether the step taken by the respondent amounts to an irregular step. Once that has been determined, the court has wide remedial

[10] *BMW Financial Services South Africa v Doola* [2025] 2 All SA 107 (GP) at para 18.
[11] *Afrocentric Projects and Services (Pty) Ltd t/a Innovative Distribution v State Information Technology Agency (SITA) SOC Ltd and Others* 2023 (4) BCLR 361 (CC) at para 26.

powers, ranging from setting aside, granting leave to amend or any other order it deems fit in the circumstances.

[47] The time period for the filing of the Rule 7(1) Notice was within 10 days after BCC became aware that Mashishi is acting on behalf of the third respondent. Mashishi came on record for the third respondent on 25 February 2025.

[48] A power of attorney has been defined as a declaration in writing, in which the client authorises an attorney to institute or defend legal proceedings and to do all necessary steps in connection therewith as the client's representative.[12]

[49] The purpose of the rule is to eliminate unnecessary speculation about the existence of authority.[13]

[50] In *Johannesburg City Council v Elesander Investments (Pty) Ltd & Others,*[14] the court held with reference to the similar rule in the Magistrates Court Rules:[15]

> "The Rule is concerned with the representation of parties, and with nothing else. It was designed to dispense with the necessity of an attorney obtaining a power of attorney to act, and to provide for a procedure whereby an attorney can be challenged to satisfy the court that he is authorised to act for a party. The Rule contemplates that a challenge of authority can be met by proof of such authority (which need not be in the form of a power of attorney), and all that is required is that the court must be satisfied that authority exists at the time when proof of it is proffered. We can find nothing in the Rule to suggest that a magistrate is obliged, or even entitled, to investigate the validity of past acts in the context of the authority to act. When an attorney's authority is challenged, he may not act further until he satisfies the court that he is authorised to do so, but the effect of the Rule does not go beyond that; the Rule does not require him, either expressly or by implication, to satisfy the court that he had authority at any particular point of time in the past. The concept of representation as dealt with in the Rules involves no more than an investigation into the state of affairs relating to authority as at the time when the challenged attorney seeks to satisfy the court on that score."

[12] Cilliers, *Loots and Nel Herbstein and Van Winsen: Civil Practice of the High Courts and the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa* 5 ed (Juta e- publications 2009) at 267.
[13] *Unlawful Occupiers, School Site v City of Johannesburg* 2005 (4) SA 199 (SCA).
[14] 1979 (3) SA 1273 (T) at 1279H-1280C.
[15] Rule 52(2) Magistrates Court Rules.

[51] BCC filed its Rule 7(1) notice on 20 March 2025, which was out of time by some margin.

[52] The removal of a cause of complaint is an act of bringing the proceeding back into alignment with the Rules.[16]

[53] After receipt of the Rule 30 notice, BCC could have cured the irregularity by filing a condonation application. Instead, it withdrew the notice and filed an application to obtain leave of the court to challenge the authority of the lawyers to act on behalf of the respondents.

[54] The respondents, in opposition to this challenge, contend that the production of resolutions, allegedly authorizing their participation in these proceedings, renders the applicant's challenge moot. They argue that the mere provision of a document purporting to grant authority satisfies the requirements of the Rule. This interpretation is fundamentally flawed.

[55] The principle established in *Unlawful Occupiers, School Site v City of Johannesburg*[17] is that Rule 7(1) is not merely a mechanism for the formal production of a document but to verify that the person or entity before the court has the actual, legal authority to act. The court cannot simply accept a document at face value if the veracity and legal validity of the authority contained therein are in dispute. Where the challenge goes to the substantive validity of the resolution itself, the production of that document does not cure the defect if the signatories of that document lacked the legal standing to pass it.

[56] The essence of the challenge concerns the interpretation of Clause 5.8 of the Trust Deed. The applicant contends that the signatories purportedly authorising the attorneys for the respondents had, by virtue of the provisions of the Trust Deed, vacated their office as trustees prior to the passing of the resolutions. This clause provides that any trustee who ceases to be a member of the BCC immediately forfeits their position as a trustee of the Foundation.

[16] *Bloem v NWK Ltd* [2024] ZANWHC 83 at para 9.
[17] Above n 11.

[57] In support of this assertion, the applicant relies on documentation procured from the Master of the High Court providing contemporaneous records in substantiation of the cessation of the particular individuals as members of the BCC. The evidence presented in these annexures is compelling as it demonstrates that the status of the signatories as trustees had terminated by the date the resolutions were purportedly signed.

[58] The respondents have failed to provide a cogent rebuttal to the effect of Clause 5.8. Reliance on the formal existence of a resolution is misplaced when the substance of that resolution is derived from unauthorised individuals.[18] Because the individuals who signed the resolutions were no longer legally empowered to act for the Trust at the time of signing, the resolutions are fatally defective. Therefore, the legal representatives of the respondents lack the mandate required to represent the Trust, and the Rule 7(1) challenge must consequently succeed.

The Rule 6(15) Striking out application

[59] The focus of this application pertains to a multiple page narrative detailing the history of the parties' relationship, which the applicant contends is entirely extraneous and constitute scandalous, vexatious, and irrelevant matter, the inclusion of which serves no purpose other than to prejudice the applicant and burden the court record with unnecessary and inflammatory detail.

[60] The legal framework governing the striking out of matter from an affidavit is set out in Rule 6(15) of the Uniform Rules of Court and entails a twofold threshold. Firstly, whether the matter is indeed scandalous, vexatious, or irrelevant, and secondly, whether the applicant will be prejudiced if the offending material remains in the record.[19] It is prejudicial where the inclusion of such subject matter obliges the applicant to traverse irrelevant factual disputes, and in so doing, unnecessarily

[18] *Mall (Cape) (Pty) Ltd v Merino Ko-Operasie Bpk* 1957 (2) SA 347 (C). See also *Tattersal and Another v Nedcor Bank Ltd* 1995 (3) SA 222 (A) at 228G-229D.
[19] *Vaatz v Law Society of Namibia* 1990 NR 332 (HC) at 335F.

increasing the costs of litigation or causing reputational harm without a legitimate legal basis.[20]

[61] From a scrutiny of the passages identified in the notice to strike out, it is evident that the respondents have included various averments delving into historical disputes and personal character assessments, having no bearing on issues presented in this application. Litigation should be confined to the real issues between the parties; the inclusion of material designed to annoy, embarrass, or harass constitutes an abuse of the court's process.[21]

[62] The Court finds that the allegations identified by the applicant satisfy the criteria for striking out under Rule 6(15) for the following reasons:

[63] Irrelevance: The targeted paragraphs introduce historical grievances regarding the parties' relationship that predate the current cause of action and do not assist the Court in determining the merits of the present dispute.

[64] Vexatious Nature: The language employed in the affidavit is argumentative and accusatory, exceeding the bounds of a legitimate defence and appearing intended primarily to cause vexation to the applicant.

[65] Prejudice: Allowing these allegations to remain would compel the applicant to file a lengthy replying affidavit, addressing collateral issues that do not advance the resolution of the matter, thereby incurring unnecessary costs and delaying the finalisation of the proceedings.

[66] Consequently, the Court finds that the respondents' affidavit includes material that is both irrelevant and vexatious. Further, the applicant has successfully discharged the onus of proving both the objectionable nature of the material and the prejudice that would result from its retention.

[67] In considering the application to strike out, the court must weigh the relevance of the impugned material against the rights of the parties to plead their case. It is a requirement that the material be not only scandalous or irrelevant but also prejudicial

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[20] *Beinash v Wixley* 1997 (3) SA 721 (SCA) at 733C-F.
[21] *Mostert and Others v First Rand Bank t/a RMB Private Bank* above n 6 at para 13.

to the party seeking the strike-out.[22] The Court acknowledges the principle which emphasises that court processes should not be burdened with peripheral and unnecessary narratives.[23]

[68] Furthermore, referencing the constitutional imperative regarding the orderly conduct of litigation in *Afrocentrics Projects and Services (Pty) Ltd t/a Innovative Distribution v State Information Technology Agency (SITA) SOC Ltd and Others*,[24] this Court is obligated to excise matter that obstructs the efficient resolution of the case.

Synthesis and Findings

[69] In conclusion, the Court finds that the respondents have failed to satisfy the onus placed upon them under Rule 7 to prove the requisite authority to oppose the application. Simultaneously, the Court finds that the applicant has met the threshold under Rule 6(15) for the striking out of irrelevant and vexatious matter. The Court's role is to ensure that the litigation is conducted with due regard to the Rules of Court; allowing these defects to remain would undermine the judicial process. Accordingly, the Court grants the orders as requested, finding that the respondents' authority is not established and that the offending material must be excised from the record.

Conclusion

[70] Having considered the papers filed on record and the arguments presented by the respective parties, and for the reasons detailed in the preceding analysis, the Court makes the following order:

1. The Rule 7 Challenge:

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[22] *Swissborough Diamond Mines (Pty) Ltd and Others v Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others* 1999 (2) SA 279 (T) at 337.

[23] *Helen Suzman Foundation v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others; In Re: Glenister v President of South Africa and Others* [2014] 1 All SA 671 (WCC) at para 10-11.

[24] 2023 (4) BCLR 361 (CC) at para 22.

1.1. The applicant's challenge to the authority of the respondents is upheld.

1.2. The respondents are directed to rectify the defect in their representation by filing a valid, formal resolution authorizing the opposition of these proceedings within ten (10) court days of the date of this order.

1.3. Should the respondents fail to comply with the directive in paragraph 1.2, their opposition to the main application shall be deemed to have been withdrawn, and the applicant may, upon notice, enrol the matter for adjudication as an unopposed application.

2. The Application to Strike Out under Rule 6(15):

2.1. The application to strike out is granted.

2.2. The following paragraphs contained in the respondents' answering affidavit are hereby struck out as scandalous, vexatious, and irrelevant: 2.4; 2.6; 2.7; 2.8; 2.11;2.12; 2.13 – 2.17 - 2.21; 2.25; 4.1; 4.2; 4.12; 4.16; 4.21; 4.22; 4.25-4.27; 4.29 and 4.42.

2.3. The respondents are granted leave to file a supplementary affidavit, restricted solely to the merits of the main application and excluding the material struck out by this order, within fifteen (15) court days of the date of this order.

3. Costs:

3.1. The respondents are ordered to pay the costs on scale B of the Rule 7 challenge and the Rule 6(15) application, jointly and severally, the one paying the other to be absolved.

[redacted]

E RAUBENHEIMER

ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT

GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA

Appearances:

For the Applicants (main application):	Adv Muza instructed by Mabapa
For the Seventh Respondent:	Adv Mpya & Maboea instructed by Rambauli Attorneys
For the 1st-6th; 8th; 12th; 14th &15th Respondents:	Adv Lekalakala instructed by Mashishi Attorneys
Date of hearing:	7 November 2025
Date of Judgment:	18 May 2026