



**IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA  
NORTH WEST DIVISION, MAHIKENG**

**Not Reportable  
CASE NO: 152/2021**

In the matter between:

**ROBERT PETRUS JANSEN KNIPE**

**Applicant/Defendant**

and

**LBG HOLDINGS PROPRIETARY LIMITED**

**Respondent/Plaintiff**

**Coram:** Petersen ADJP

**Date enrolled:** 12 February 2026

**Judgment reserved:** 12 February 2026

**Delivered:** This judgment was handed down electronically, circulated to the parties' representatives via email, uploaded to CaseLines, and released to SAFLII. The date and time for the handing down of the judgment are deemed to be 10h00 on 23 February 2026.

**Summary:** Practice — Judgments and orders — Rescission of default judgment — Rule 42(1)(a) of the Uniform Rules of Court and common law — test for good cause — default judgment granted after striking out of defence — applicant

hospitalized in Intensive Care Unit with severe infection at time of hearing — attorneys withdrew three days prior to hearing — procedural irregularity established where underlying compelling order required discovery “before trial” despite no trial date being set — applicant’s subsequent delay in bringing application negligent but not wilful default — bona fide defence regarding terms of oral agreement and allocation of payments raised — rescission granted — costs to be paid by the applicant on Scale C of Rule 67A.

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## **JUDGMENT**

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**PETERSEN ADJP**

### **Introduction**

[1] This is an application for the rescission of a default judgment granted on 31 August 2023, by order of Dibetso-Bodibe AJ. The judgment was granted in favour of the respondent (plaintiff in the main action) following the striking out of the applicant’s (defendant’s) defence and the dismissal of his counterclaim. The applicant was ordered to pay the respondent the sum of R163 394.00, together with interest *a tempore morae* and costs on an attorney and client scale.

[2] The applicant approaches this Court seeking to rescind the order, relying primarily on the common law, alternatively on Rule 42(1)(a) of the Uniform Rules of Court. He contends that the judgment was granted in his absence and that he has shown good cause for his default, accompanied by a bona fide defence to the respondent’s claims.

[3] The respondent opposes the application, asserting that the applicant has been grossly negligent, in wilful default of his procedural obligations, and that his purported defences lack any bona fide merit.

## **Background**

[4] To appreciate the nature of the dispute between the parties, it is necessary to traverse the history of the litigation. During 2021, the respondent issued summons against the applicant for monies allegedly owed arising from a verbal, alternatively written, agreement concerning the capture, transport, and sale of game.

[5] The applicant entered an appearance to defend and subsequently filed a plea and a counterclaim. In his plea, he disputed the quantum of transport and ‘boma’ costs, alleged the existence of an oral agreement capping helicopter costs at R2 300.00, as opposed to the claimed R10 580.00, and averred that an advance payment of R100 000.00 pertained to an entirely unrelated matter. In his counterclaim, he sought damages relating to animals that were not accounted for.

[6] The litigation proceeded, albeit at a snail’s pace. On 08 June 2023, the respondent obtained an order compelling the applicant to discover in terms of Rule 35(1), (6), (8), and (10) of the Uniform Rules of Court. When the applicant failed to comply with this compelling order, the respondent launched an application to strike out the applicant’s defence and dismiss his counterclaim. This striking out application was set down for hearing on 31 August 2023.

[7] It is common cause, or at least not disputed, that the applicant was admitted to Mediclinic in Bloemfontein between 02 August 2023 and 04 September 2023. He underwent a hip replacement operation and subsequently contracted a severe,

antibiotic-resistant ‘superbug’ infection, which necessitated a prolonged stay in the Intensive Care Unit. He was entirely incapacitated during this period.

[8] The applicant’s medical woes were further compounded when, on 28 August 2023, a mere three days before the hearing of the striking out application, his erstwhile attorney of record, Mr Zietsman, filed a notice of withdrawal. The withdrawal was ostensibly triggered by a fee dispute. The notice of withdrawal was transmitted to an email address which the applicant claims he had ceased using due to its unreliability, and notably, this transmission occurred while he was hospitalised. The applicant asserts that upon his discharge from hospital on 04 September 2023, he required extensive recuperation. He alleges that he laboured under the mistaken belief that his erstwhile attorneys were still managing his affairs, or at least monitoring the court file, despite the fee dispute.

[9] On 31 August 2023, the matter served before Dibetso-Bodibe AJ. In the absence of the applicant and any legal representation on his behalf, an order was granted striking out his defence, and default judgment was entered against him. The applicant asserts he became aware of the default judgment nearly a year later, in August 2024, when the Sheriff attended at his farm to execute a writ of attachment. He subsequently launched this application on 17 September 2024.

### **The applicable legal principles**

[10] An applicant seeking to rescind a judgment may do so under Rule 31(2)(b), Rule 42(1)(a), or the common law. The applicant’s founding affidavit does not specifically make out a case on any of single subrule or the common law. This is echoed in the heads of argument of counsel for the applicant, Adv Scholtz, who submits that the application is founded on the provisions of Rule 31(2)(b), read with Rule 42(1)(a), and alternatively the common law. This obliges this Court to

consider the facts in light of the broader spectrum of rescission jurisprudence, notwithstanding the fact that the applicant relies primarily on relief in terms of the common law.

[11] Under Rule 42(1)(a), a court may, in addition to any other powers it may have, *mero motu* or upon the application of any party affected, rescind or vary an order or judgment ‘erroneously sought or erroneously granted in the absence of any party affected thereby’. As postulated by the Supreme Court of Appeal in *Lodhi 2 Properties Investments CC v Bondev Developments (Pty) Ltd*<sup>1</sup>, a judgment to which a party is procedurally entitled cannot be considered to have been granted erroneously merely because a defence is subsequently disclosed. However, if there was a procedural irregularity or if the judge was unaware of facts which, if known, would have precluded the granting of the order, Rule 42(1)(a) is engaged.<sup>2</sup>

[12] Under the common law, the standard is that of ‘sufficient cause’ or ‘good cause’. The seminal judgment of *Colyn v Tiger Food Industries Ltd t/a Meadow Feed Mills (Cape)*<sup>3</sup> encapsulates the requirements for rescission under the common law; that an applicant must: (a) give a reasonable and acceptable explanation for his default; (b) show that his application is made *bona fide*; and (c) show that, on the merits, he has a *bona fide* defence that *prima facie* carries some prospect of success. It is well established that the requirements of good cause are conjunctive. A weak explanation for default may be cured by a strong

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<sup>1</sup> *Lodhi 2 Properties Investments CC v Bondev Developments (Pty) Ltd* [2007] ZASCA 85; 2007 (6) SA 87 (SCA).

<sup>2</sup> *Zuma v Secretary of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture* [2021] ZACC 28.

<sup>3</sup> *Colyn v Tiger Food Industries Ltd t/a Meadow Feed Mills (Cape)* [2003] ZASCA 36; 2003 (6) SA 1 (SCA).

defence, but a complete absence of an acceptable explanation cannot be saved by the strongest of defences.<sup>4</sup>

[13] In *Grant v Plumbers (Pty) Ltd*<sup>5</sup>, the Court noted that a litigant's default is not wilful if it was due to a mistake, a misunderstanding, or even negligence, provided it was not a deliberate and conscious decision to abandon the litigation.

### **Submissions on behalf of the applicant**

[14] The central premise of the applicant's case is that the onus rests on him to show 'good cause', which entails demonstrating both a reasonable explanation for the default and a bona fide defence.

[15] In articulating the test for rescission, Adv Scholtz places heavy reliance on the Constitutional Court decision in *Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe v Fick and Others*<sup>6</sup>, where the requirements were reaffirmed as follows:

'The requirements for rescission of a default judgment are twofold. First, the Applicant must furnish a reasonable and satisfactory explanation for its default. Second, it must show that on the merits, it has a bona fide defence which prima facie carries some prospect of success. Proof of these requirements is taken as showing that there is sufficient cause for an order to be rescinded. A failure to meet one of them may result in refusal of the request to rescind.'

[16] Adv Scholtz further emphasized the discretionary nature of this Court's powers, referring to *Zuma v Secretary of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into*

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<sup>4</sup> *Chetty v Law Society, Transvaal* 1985 (2) SA 756 (A) at 765D-E.

<sup>5</sup> *Grant v Plumbers (Pty) Ltd* 1949 (2) SA 470 (O) at 476.

<sup>6</sup> *Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe v Fick and Others* (CCT 101/12) [2013] ZACC 22; 2013 (5) SA 325 (CC); 2013 (10) BCLR 1103 (CC) (27 June 2013).

*Allegations of State Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the Public Sector Including Organs of State and Others*<sup>7</sup>, which notes that even when requirements are met, the Court is ‘*merely endowed with a discretion to rescind its order*’, a discretion that must be ‘*exercised judicially*’.

[17] On the issue of default, Adv Scholtz argued that the applicant was not in wilful default. On the contrary, it was submitted that the applicant acted swiftly and prudently once he became aware of the order. The default was precipitated by an unfortunate confluence of the applicant’s hospitalisation and his attorney’s withdrawal at the eleventh hour.

[18] Adv Scholtz particularly took issue with the procedural fairness of the 31 August 2023 proceedings. He submitted that the withdrawal of the applicant’s attorneys a mere seventy two (72) hours prior to the hearing created an immediate prejudice. He maintains that it is standard practice and that judicial precedent dictates that, when an attorney withdraws on the eve of a hearing, the unrepresented litigant must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to secure alternative counsel or to prepare to act in person.

[19] Central to this argument is the principle of audi alteram partem. He submitted that due to circumstances beyond the control of the applicant, specifically his hospitalization in ICU, the applicant had been deprived of the right to be heard. This, he contends, is tantamount to punishing a litigant for failing to appear or instruct counsel while physically incapacitated, which infringes upon the constitutional right of access to courts guaranteed by s 34 of the Constitution.

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<sup>7</sup> *Zuma v Secretary of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the Public Sector Including Organs of State and Others* (CCT 52/21) [2021] ZACC 28; 2021 (11) BCLR 1263 (CC) (17 September 2021) at para [53].

[20] Regarding the delay of twelve (12) months post discharge, Adv Scholtz conceded that the applicant was perhaps negligent in failing to actively enquire about his case. However, relying on *De Witts Auto Body Repairs (Pty) Ltd v Fedgen Insurance Co Ltd*<sup>8</sup>, he argues that negligence, even gross negligence, does not necessarily amount to wilful default.

[21] As to the question of a bona fide defence, Adv Scholtz submitted that, if the pleadings are considered holistically, the applicant has made out a bona fide defence to the respondent's action. This defence surmises Adv Scholtz is found in the fact that the amount claimed is denied, with a specific dispute regarding the helicopter charges; that there is a significant dispute regarding the animals delivered, with the applicant contending that more animals were delivered to the respondent than were sold, resulting in a shortfall of R196 000.00. This shortfall forms the basis of the applicant's counterclaim. Adv Scholtz maintains that if the applicant succeeds in proving this counterclaim, it would 'wipe out' the respondent's claim.

[22] In support of the contention that a strong defence can bridge the gap of a weak explanation for default, Adv Scholtz cited *Flacador 109 CC t/a Bell Foods v AFGRI Poultry (Pty) Ltd t/a Day Break Farms*<sup>9</sup>, with reference to the principle that:

'The grounds of the applicant's defence to the claim are also a factor that the Court must consider. A good defence may compensate for a poor explanation.'

[23] Finally, Adv Scholtz pointed out what is a purported legal defect in the underlying compelling order of 08 June 2023. He contends that the order

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<sup>8</sup> *De Witts Auto Body Repairs (Pty) Ltd v Fedgen Insurance Co Ltd* 1994 (4) SA 705 (E).

<sup>9</sup> *Flacador 109 CC t/a Bell Foods v AFGRI Poultry (Pty) Ltd t/a Day Break Farms* (5099/2016) [2018] ZAFSHC 136 (14 September 2018).

compelled compliance with Rules 35(8) and 35(10), rules that mandate compliance ‘15 days before trial’; and since no trial date had been allocated, it the applicant was compelled to perform an impossible act, and the subsequent striking out based on this order was fundamentally flawed.

[24] Consequently, Adv Scholtz submits that the applicant has raised a bona fide defence and a valid counterclaim which justifies the rescission of the default judgment to allow the merits to be properly ventilated at trial.

### **The Respondent’s Submissions**

[25] Adv Maritz, raised several valid arguments in his heads of argument. The opposition is premised on the contention that the applicant has failed to meet the requirements for rescission under the common law or Rule 31(2)(b), specifically regarding the requirement of ‘good cause’.

[26] As a point of departure, Adv Maritz on a point in limine pointed out that Adv Scholtz failed to address the lateness of the applicant’s replying affidavit, which was served some ten (10) months late on 27 August 2025. This, after the respondent’s answering affidavit was delivered on 17 October 2024. Adv Maritz referred this Court to Rule 27(1), noting that no application for condonation accompanied this significant delay. Relying on *National Union of Mineworkers v Council for Mineral Technology*<sup>10</sup>, he argued that ‘without a reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay, the prospects of success are immaterial’. Consequently, he submitted that the replying affidavit should be disregarded in toto.

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<sup>10</sup> *National Union of Mineworkers v Council for Mineral Technology* (JA94/97) [1998] ZALAC 22; [1999] 3 BLLR 209 (LAC) (17 August 1998).

[27] On the merits, Adv Maritz argued that the applicant was in wilful default. Citing the locus classicus *Silber v Ozen Wholesalers (Pty) Ltd*<sup>11</sup>, he emphasized that the applicant bears the onus of proving, not merely alleging, good cause. He contended that the applicant's reliance on the withdrawal of his attorneys constitutes an insufficient explanation and ignores his own gross negligence. He further pointed to the applicant's own admission that he had a 'strained relationship' with his attorney as early as 2021 and 'did not make definite means to contact Mr Zietsman', his attorney, for a prolonged period. Citing *Satin Rock (Pty) Ltd and Another v Teichman*<sup>12</sup>, Adv Maritz submits that it is imperative for a litigant to be involved in the proceedings and not simply leave matters to their attorney.

[28] Further reliance was placed on *Olympic Flame (Pty) Ltd v Connectpro (Pty) Ltd t/a Nashua Welkom*<sup>13</sup> where the court held that litigants cannot 'turn their backs on the justice system... and then return when the shoe pinches'. Adv Maritz argues that the applicant's failure to enquire about his case for nearly two years constitutes gross remissness. On a contrary argument that, even if the fault lay with the attorney, Adv Scholtz relies on *Minister of Police v Murray, Murray v Minister of Police*<sup>14</sup>, that '*the law reports are replete with examples of courts visiting the negligence of legal representatives on their clients*'.

[29] On the issue of the withdrawal of the applicant's attorney days before the hearing, Adv Maritz submission is that this did not excuse the default. Referring to Rule 16(4)(b), he submitted that service of the set-down had already been properly served on the attorneys prior to their withdrawal. Citing *Take and Save*

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<sup>11</sup> *Silber v Ozen Wholesalers (Pty) Ltd* 1954 (2) SA 345 (A).

<sup>12</sup> *Satin Rock (Pty) Ltd and Another v Teichman* (2022-049732) [2024] ZAGPJHC 541 (5 June 2024).

<sup>13</sup> *Olympic Flame (Pty) Ltd v Connectpro (Pty) Ltd t/a Nashua Welkom* (5790/2021) [2024] ZAFSHC 17 (24 January 2024).

<sup>14</sup> *Minister of Police v Murray, Murray v Minister of Police* (A81/2016) [2016] ZAWCHC 152 (2 November 2016).

*Trading CC v Standard Bank of SA Ltd*<sup>15</sup>, Adv Maritz characterized the withdrawal as a potential strategic ploy, noting that ‘*mere withdrawal by a practitioner... does not entitle a party to a postponement as of right*’.

[30] On the requirement of a bona fide defence, Adv Maritz relied on *Fakie N.O. v CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd*<sup>16</sup>. He asserts that the applicant’s founding affidavit merely regurgitates the plea and constitutes a ‘bare denial’ which creates a fictitious dispute of fact.

## Discussion

[31] I deal first with the delay of ten (10) months in filing the replying affidavit, without a substantive application for condonation. It is indeed deplorable. As noted in *National Union of Mineworkers*, the Rules of Court are not mere suggestions. However, the Court possesses a discretion to regulate its own process in the interests of justice. While the applicant’s procedural tardiness is evident, to disregard the affidavit entirely in a matter involving such severe medical incapacity would be overly formalistic and potentially unjust.

[32] In principle, I align myself with the sentiments expressed in *Pangbourne Properties Ltd v Pulse Moving CC and Another*<sup>17</sup>, albeit in a different context, on the approach to the late filing of a replying affidavit. Wepener J, in an elaborate exposition of the approach to the late filing of affidavits, referred to a plethora of authorities. The following reasoning is apposite in the present matter:

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<sup>15</sup> *Take and Save Trading CC v Standard Bank of SA Ltd* 2004 (4) SA 1 (SCA).

<sup>16</sup> *Fakie N.O. v CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd* 2006 (4) SA 326 (SCA).

<sup>17</sup> *Pangbourne Properties Ltd v Pulse Moving CC and Another* (2009/30282, 2009/37649) [2010] ZAGPJHC 121; 2013 (3) SA 140 (GSJ) (19 November 2010).

[16] There are a large number of matters that come before us in this Division in which parties, for a variety of reasons, agree to file affidavits at times suitable to them. Each case must be decided on its own facts and it cannot be said that when affidavits are filed out of time that is it not, without more, before the court. Without attempting to tabulate all instances where affidavits which are filed out of time may indeed be validly before a court, I refer to two examples only. Affidavits can validly be before the court pursuant to an agreement between the parties – see Rule 27(1) which provides for such an agreement. **It can also be validly before the court if the interests of justice require it.** See the unreported judgment of the National Director of Public Prosecutions In Re: An Application for the Issuing of a Letter of Request, case number 3771/07 which was delivered in the North Gauteng High Court on 14 September 2007 where Van der Merwe J (as he then was) said: “***Though the replying affidavit was well out of time it had to be taken into account in the interests of justice***”. Shongwe J (as he then was) said in the unreported judgment of *Venter v Van Wyk*, case number 30323/04 delivered in the North Gauteng High Court on 27 June 2005:

“The first point in limine is, in my view, highly technical. It is correct that the replying affidavit was filed out of time and that no formal application for condonation was filed by the respondent. However there are a lot of mud-slinging to and fro between the parties which situation I do not prefer to entertain. It is a waste of valuable time. I therefore rule that I will admit all affidavits before me and deal with the important issues presented by the application.” (emphasis added)

[33] If it were to be disregarded in toto, it renders the application itself a mere formality. The affidavit is before Court and affords this Court an opportunity to consider the application on its true merits, giving effect to the dictates of the interests of justice and more importantly, the audi alteram principle.

[34] I turn to the applicability of Rule 42(1)(a). Was the judgment erroneously sought or granted? It is a cardinal principle of procedural fairness that a litigant must have notice of proceedings. When the applicant’s attorneys withdrew on 28 August 2023, the applicant effectively became an unrepresented litigant. While

the notice of set down was served on his erstwhile attorneys prior to their withdrawal, the proximity of the withdrawal to the hearing date, three days, is deeply problematic. Had the presiding judge been alerted to the fact that the attorneys had withdrawn a mere 72 hours earlier, and that the unrepresented applicant had not been personally notified of the imminent hearing, it is highly probable the Court would have postponed the matter to allow for personal service or to afford the applicant time to obtain new counsel.

[35] The granting of the ultimate sanction, striking out a defence, under these specific circumstances leans towards an order erroneously granted. Furthermore, the applicant's argument regarding the defective nature of the June 2023 compelling order carries weight. One cannot be held in contempt of, or struck out for failing to comply with, an order requiring actions '15 days before trial' when no trial date exists. This legal impossibility taints the foundation of the default judgment.

[36] Even if Rule 42(1)(a) were not applicable, the applicant must succeed under the common law. The requirement to show 'good cause' involves an assessment of the explanation for the default. I agree with the respondent that the applicant's conduct between September 2023 and August 2024 was highly negligent. It is incomprehensible that a businessman facing a substantial claim would not make a single inquiry regarding his matter for a year. However, negligence, even gross negligence, is not the sole inquiry.

[37] This Court must determine if there was wilful default. Wilful default implies a deliberate choice not to defend, with full knowledge of the consequences. On the issue of wilful default, the respondent's reliance on *Minister of Police v Murray* and *Satin Rock* is well-founded to a point. It is true that the applicant appears to have been negligent in failing to maintain contact

with his attorney between 2021 and 2023. Under normal circumstances, this ‘turning of the back’ on litigation would be fatal to a rescission application. The applicant’s failure to ensure his attorney was executing his mandate is, indeed, a significant dereliction of duty.

[38] The evidence indicates that during the crucial window when the default judgment was actually granted in August 2023, the applicant was in an ICU battling a superbug. He was physically incapable of giving instructions or attending court. This undisputed medical fact mitigates any suggestion that his default at the time the order was granted was wilful. His subsequent negligence, post-discharge, does not retrospectively make his initial default wilful. The inquiry into ‘wilful default’ must, in my view, focus on the specific default that led to the judgment on 31 August 2023. While the applicant was remiss prior to this date, the *causa causans* of his non-appearance on the day in question was an objective impossibility, his hospitalisation for a life-threatening ‘superbug’ infection.

[39] This distinguishes the matter from *Take and Save Trading*. The withdrawal of the attorney here does not appear to be a ‘trick’ to force a postponement, but rather a chaotic breakdown of the mandate coinciding with a genuine medical emergency. The applicant was not merely ‘absent’ due to negligence. He was physically incapacitated. Even if he had been diligent up to July 2023, his hospitalisation in August would likely have prevented his attendance. Thus, while his prior conduct is censurable, it does not render his default on 31 August ‘wilful’ in the legal sense. He cannot be said to have acquiesced to the judgment when he was physically unable to instruct new counsel.

[40] Turning to the requirement of a bona fide defence, the threshold is not overly burdensome. The applicant is not required to prove his case on a balance

of probabilities at this stage, but to establish a prima facie case. He must merely set out averments which, if established at trial, would entitle him to the relief asked for. The applicant has raised specific factual disputes regarding the terms of the oral agreement, specifically the helicopter cost cap and the allocation of the R100 000.00 advance. While the respondent points to Annexure 'B' as contradictory, these are evidentiary issues that require the ventilation of a trial, complete with discovery and cross examination. I am satisfied that the applicant has disclosed a defence that carries prima facie prospects of success.

[41] In weighing the respective prejudice, I am mindful of the delay suffered by the respondent. However, the constitutional imperative that disputes should, wherever possible, be resolved on their merits in a fair public hearing tips the scales in favour of the applicant. A dismissal of the rescission application would result in a final, irreversible judgment against a litigant who was medically incapacitated when the critical order was made.

[42] While the respondent's opposition was entirely reasonable and indeed invited by the applicant's lax handling of his affairs, the 'good cause' requirement is met by the medical evidence.

## **Costs**

[43] An application for rescission is an application for an indulgence. The general rule is that an applicant seeking an indulgence must bear the costs of the application. However, a court has a wide discretion. The respondent prayed for a punitive cost order. While I have found in favour of the applicant on the rescission, I cannot ignore the remissness highlighted by Adv Maritz. The applicant's failure to manage his litigation properly contributed significantly to the procedural conundrum that necessitated this application. The respondent

should, in the circumstances, not be put out of pocket for justifiably challenging the application for rescission. The most equitable order in the circumstances is that the applicant bear the costs of this application. A stern caution is also issued to the applicant regarding future delays occasioned by himself in the conduct of the litigation.

## **Order**

[43] In the result, the following order is made:

1. The default judgment granted against the applicant on 31 August 2023 is hereby rescinded and set aside.
2. The order striking out the applicant's defence and dismissing his counterclaim is set aside, and the applicant's plea and counterclaim are reinstated.
3. The applicant is directed to comply with the respondent's notices in terms of Rule 35(1) and (6) within 15 days of the date of this order.
4. The applicant shall pay the costs of the application, including the costs of Counsel on Scale C of Rule 67A.



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**ACTING DEPUTY JUDGE PRESIDENT OF THE HIGH COURT  
NORTH WEST DIVISION, MAHIKENG**

**Appearances:**

For the Applicant: Adv H J Scholtz  
Instructed by: Kotze Louw & Swanepoel  
c/o Van Rooyen, Tlhapi and Wessels  
Mafikeng

For the Respondent: Adv D Maritz  
Instructed by: Jacobs Roos Fouche Inc.  
c/o Loubser-Ellis & Associates Inc.  
Mmabatho