



**IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)**

Case No.:2025-141977

In the matter between:

TWIRLWHIRL CC

First Applicant

(Company Registration No.: 2002/073854/23)

PAUL JOHN PHILANDER

Second Applicant

and

BUSINESS PARTNERS LIMITED

First Respondent

(Company Registration No.: 1981/000918/06)

JOCHEN ECKHOFF N.O.

Second Respondent

(Appointed joint liquidator of

True Southerner Properties (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation))

NAMISWI ELLIOT MOGALE N.O.

Third Respondent

(Appointed joint liquidator of

True Southerner Properties (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation))

THE MASTER OF THE HIGH COURT: CAPE TOWN

Fourth Respondent

**THE COMPANIES AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTIES COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA**

Fifth Respondent

In re:

Case no:2025-012914

In the matter between:

BUSINESS PARTNERS LIMITED

Applicant

(Company Registration No.: 1981/000918/06)

and

TRUE SOUTHERNER PROPERTIES (PTY) LTD

Respondent

(Company Registration No.: 2019/259783/07)

(In Liquidation)

Heard: 20 November 2025

Delivered: 16 February 2026

JUDGMENT

Holderness J

[1] This judgment is in respect of two related matters, which the parties agreed, in terms of an order granted on 31 October 2025, would be heard and dealt with at a single hearing.¹

[2] The issue for determination in the first application (the money judgment application) is whether the respondents are indebted to the applicant in the amounts of R1 486 775.97 and R4 064.67 respectively arising from their obligations in terms of a suretyship agreement, the details of which are set out below.

[3] In the second application the court is called upon to determine whether the applicants have made out a case for an order rescinding the provisional liquidation order granted on 13 February 2024, and the final liquidation order granted on 2 September 2024, in terms of which True Southerner was wound up.

[4] I intend to first briefly set out the relief claimed in both applications, thereafter, to provide a summary of the background facts pertinent to both matters and then to deal with each matter on its merits.

Factual matrix

[5] In the first application issued on 31 January 2025, the applicant, Business Partners Limited (Business Partners) seeks a monetary judgment against the first respondent, Paul John Philander (Mr Philander) and the second respondent, Twirlwhirl CC (Twirlwhirl) in the amounts of R1 486 779 and R4 064.67 respectively,

¹ In terms of the order of Ms Justice Ralarala, it was directed that the two applications referred to in this judgment (there appears to be an error on the order regarding the case numbers of the applications), would be heard together on 20 November 2025.

and

interest.

[4] The respondents' alleged indebtedness arises from suretyship agreements which they concluded in favour of Business Partners in June 2019, binding themselves jointly as surety and co-principal debtors *in solidum* with the principal debtor, True Southerner Properties (Pty) Ltd (True Southerner) for the due and punctual payment of all and any monies arising from any instrument of debt or any agreement that may be executed by the principal debtor, in favour of Business Partners (the suretyship agreements).

[6] Business Partners asserts that True Southerner is indebted to it in the amounts claimed and that such indebtedness is admitted by Mr Philander and Twirlwhirl.

[7] In the second application² issued on 19 August 2025, the first applicant, Twirlwhirl, and the second applicant, Mr Philander, apply for the rescission of the provisional liquidation order granted on 13 February 2024 and the final liquidation order granted on 2 September 2024, in terms of which True Southerner was wound up.

[8] In June 2019, Business Partners and True Southerner entered into a written loan agreement, embodied in two separate documents titled 'Loan Agreement' and 'Standard Terms and Conditions' (the loan agreement), in terms of which Business Partners loaned an amount of R1 539 600 to True Southerner (the loan amount).

² In terms of part B thereof. Part A of the rescission application was for the stay of legal proceedings of the liquidators in the winding up of True Southerner.

The loan amount was repayable in monthly instalments of R21 426, commencing from 1 September 2019.

[9] The loan agreement was amended on five occasions in terms of *addenda* thereto, copies of which are annexed to the founding affidavit.

[10] Notably, it appears from the affidavits that it is common cause that True Southerner breached the loan agreement, and that as at 29 November 2024 it was indebted to Business Partners in the amounts of R1 486 775.97 (in terms of account number 4[...]) and R4 064.67 (in terms of account number 6[...]), together with agreed interest.³

[11] In terms of the suretyship agreements, Twirlwhirl and Mr. Philander bound themselves jointly as sureties and co-principal debtors *in solidum* with Business Partners for the 'due and punctual payment of all and monies arising from any instrument of debt or any agreement that may be executed by True Southerner in favour of Business Partners'.

[12] The admitted indebtedness of True Southerner to Business Partners and the provisions of the suretyship agreements is the basis of the relief sought in the monetary judgment application.

³ As reflected in the statement relied upon by Business Partners.

The liquidation proceedings

[13] According to Mr. Philander and Twirlwhirl, True Southerner, represented by Mr. Philander, attended the court proceedings on 2 September 2024 when the final liquidation order was granted.

[14] It appears from the court file in the liquidation proceedings⁴ that the attorney for True Southerner withdrew on 30 August 2024, and that Mr. Philander appeared in person, in his capacity as director of True Southerner.

[15] Mr. Philander applied for a postponement of the matter. Justice Slingers who presided in the matter, after hearing oral submissions from the parties, refused the application for a postponement.

[16] It further appears from the order granted by Justice Salie on 28 March 2024 that Mr. Philander, on behalf of True Southerner, was present at court when an order was granted rescinding the final order of liquidation granted earlier that day, incorporating a timetable for the filing of further affidavits and heads of argument, postponing the application and extending the rule *nisi* for hearing on the semi-urgent roll on 2 September 2024.

[17] It is apparent that Mr. Philander and/or True Southerner had ample time to prepare and deliver an answering affidavit in the winding up proceedings. Their failure to do so remains unexplained. Most importantly for the purposes of the

⁴ Under case number 1055/24.

rescission application, which I shall revert to below, True Southerner represented by Mr. Philander was present in court when the final liquidation order was granted and actively participated in the proceedings. I shall revert to this aspect when addressing the merits of the rescission application below.

The monetary judgment application

[18] In the founding affidavit, Business Partners alleged, *inter alia*, that the principal debtor, True Southerner, breached the terms of the loan agreements (including the *addenda*) by failing to pay the monetary amounts when they fell due.⁵ These allegations are admitted by the respondents in their answering affidavit.

[19] The suretyship agreements, in terms of which the respondents bound themselves jointly as surety and co-principal debtors *in solidum* with True Southerner for the due and punctual payment of monies due in terms of the loan agreement, were signed by them on 12 June 2019.

[20] As sureties of True Southerner, it is therefore undisputed that the respondents are indebted to Business Partners for the monetary amounts.

[21] The respondents disputed the accuracy of the monetary amounts reflected in the certificate of balance. In the face of their admission, under oath, that the monetary amounts are due and owing, there appears to be no factual basis set forth for this ground of opposition.

⁵ An amount of R1 490 840 was due and payable under account number 4048405, and a further amount of R4 064 is due and payable under account number 607764.

[22] The high-water mark of the respondents' defence regarding the quantum of the indebtedness appears at paragraph 5.1.2 of their answering affidavit, where they allege as follows:

'5.1.2 The said amount that the Applicant now claims is disputed. The principal debtor has paid substantial sums over the period of the said loan amount. The respondents did not have the opportunity to audit the said payments against the statements of the applicant and will request leave from this Honourable Court to duly supplement these papers on me obtaining all the statements, invoices, and payments on this account. I could not provide accurate figures to my legal representatives during the drafting of this answering statement of facts. It is the Respondents fair estimation that R427,000 was paid towards the capital amount and R687,000 towards the interest payments.'

[23] In terms of clause 25 of the terms and conditions to the loan agreement, a statement purporting to be signed by any manager or the accountant of Business Partners shall, for all purposes, be deemed to be *prima facie* proof of all amounts owing by the principal debtor, True Southerner to Business Partners, and the rate of interest applicable to the loan amount from time to time (the certificate of balance).

[24] A certificate of balance dated 4 December 2024, reflecting the monetary amounts due, is annexed to the applicant's founding affidavit.

[25] When the respondents deposed to the answering affidavit, they had been aware for several months of the details of the applicants' claim and the amount of the alleged indebtedness of True Southerner.

[26] In the liquidation proceedings, the applicant annexed a detailed transaction history to its founding affidavit, deposed to on 5 January 2024, which reflected how the amount due and payable, reflected at that stage as R1 440 127, had been calculated.

[27] Arising from the foregoing, the respondents had approximately 16 months to 'audit their payments' and to provide evidence of payments made which served to reduce the indebtedness of True Southerner. They failed to do so.

[28] In *ABSA Bank Ltd v Le Roux and Others*⁶ Binns-Ward J observed as follows:

'The purpose of the certificate is to create an evidential onus on the surety to negate the bank's allegations as to the quantum and the cause of any debt in any proceedings in which it seeks to make a recovery against the surety. The certificate stands as *prima facie* proof of the substance of its contents in any litigation to exact payment under the deeds of suretyship...It has that effect not as an incident of any law of general application, but only because the parties have agreed in their contract that it should do.'

[29] The respondents did not even attempt to discharge this onus. There is not an iota of evidence presented by them, such as documentary proof of alleged payments made by True Southerner which they claim Business Partners has failed to consider in determining the outstanding balance as set forth in the certificate of balance.

⁶ (5842/13) [2013] ZAWCHC 148 (7 October 2013); 2014 (1) SA 475 (WCC) para 16 and the authorities there cited.

[30] In their heads of argument, the respondents do not appear to pursue the defence that the amount claimed in the certificate is incorrect, perhaps alive as they were to their woeful failure to discharge the onus that rested upon them.

[31] The respondents baldly assert that this so-called dispute is material and was foreseeable by the applicants. This contention does not bear scrutiny. The respondents have failed to seriously and unambiguously address the facts which they seek to dispute. The respondents' version in this regard, such as it is, is rejected.⁷

[32] The further string to the respondents' bow is that the liquidation of True Southerner stands to be rescinded.

[33] The respondents rely for the aforesaid contention on clauses 24.1 and 24.2 of the shareholders' agreement, which provides for 14 days written notice to be given for either party to remedy a breach of any material provision thereof. They appear to suggest that as Business Partners failed to give the respondents such notice, the liquidation application was premature.

[34] Mr Steyn, who appeared on behalf of Business Partners, submitted, correctly in my view, that this defence cannot succeed as Business Partners relied on the provisions of the loan agreement and the *addenda* thereto, and not the shareholders' agreement, as its cause of action in the liquidation.

⁷ See *Wightman v Headfour (Pty) Ltd* 2008 (3) SA 371 (SCA) paras 12 and 13.

[35] Moreover, even if there was a valid basis upon which the liquidation order could be rescinded, it would not detract from the respondents' liability for payment of the amount as sureties of True Southerner.

[36] By binding themselves as sureties and co-principal debtors with True Southerner, the respondents tacitly renounced the benefits of excussion and division available to them and became liable with True Southerner as the principal debtor, jointly and severally.⁸

[37] The last-ditch attempt by the respondents to avoid liability was a contention that clause 4.3 of the suretyship agreement, a standard clause which stipulates that the surety renounces the benefits of excussion, division and cession of actions, is '*oppressive, unfair, against public policy and an abuse of the Applicant's contracting powers in standard contract of this nature.*'

[38] In *Beadica 231 CC And Others v Trustees, Oregon Trust and Others*⁹ (*Beadica*), the Constitutional Court held that *Barkhuizen v Napier*¹⁰ (*Barkhuizen*) remains the leading authority in our law on the role of equity in contract, as part of public policy considerations.

[39] In *Barkhuizen*, the majority decision penned by Ngcobo J¹¹ rejected the High Court's direct application of the Bill of Rights to contractual terms and opted for 'an indirect application through the vehicle of public policy. It stated:

⁸ *Neon and Cold Cathode Illuminations (Pty) Ltd v Ephron* 1978 (1) SA 463 (A) at 472B-D; *Liberty Group Ltd v Illman* 2020 (5) SA 397 (SCA) para 14.

⁹ *Beadica 231 CC And Others v Trustees, Oregon Trust and Others*⁹ (*Beadica*) 2020 (5) SA 247 (CC) para 58.

¹⁰ *Barkhuizen v Napier* 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) (2007 (7) BCLR 691; [2007] ZACC 5.

¹¹ *Ibid* para 30.

'(T)he proper approach to the constitutional challenges to contractual terms is to determine whether the term challenged is contrary to public policy as evidenced by the constitutional values, in particular, those found in the Bill of Rights.'

[40] The majority decision in *Barkhuizen*¹² further explained that public policy, as informed by the Constitution, *imports 'notions of fairness, justice and reasonableness', takes account of the need to do 'simple justice between individuals'* and is informed by the concept of ubuntu.

[41] In *Beadica*,¹³ the majority decision of the Constitutional Court cited *Barkhuizen* in which *'the majority recognised that public policy, in general, requires parties to honour contractual obligations that have been freely and voluntarily undertaken. This is because the principle of pacta sunt servanda is a "profoundly moral principle, on which the coherence of any society relies". The majority further stated that this principle — "gives effect to the central constitutional values of freedom and dignity. Self-autonomy, or the ability to regulate one's own affairs, even to one's own detriment, is the very essence of freedom and a vital part of dignity."*

[42] The majority decision in *Barkhuizen*¹⁴ held that determining fairness in this context involves a two-stage enquiry:

'The first is whether the clause itself is unreasonable. Secondly, if the clause is reasonable, whether it should be enforced in the light of the circumstances which prevented compliance with the time limitation clause.'

¹² Op cit fn 10 para 57.

¹³ Op cit fn 9 paras 35 – 37 and the authorities there cited.

¹⁴ Op cit fn 10 para 56.

[43] The respondents have not filed a counterapplication seeking a declaration that the impugned term is 'oppressive, unfair and against public policy' nor have they filed a notice in terms of Uniform Rule 16A to raise an ostensible constitutional issue.

[44] Mr Steyn emphasised that the respondents have failed to allege that they objected to the inclusion of clause 4.3 nor that they were forced to sign the suretyship agreements against their will, notwithstanding their objection to the inclusion of the said clause. It is accordingly clear that their obligations in terms thereof were freely and voluntarily taken.

[45] The respondents have dismally failed to discharge the onus of showing that judicial interference is required and the contractual term should not be enforced. In the circumstances, there is no basis on which this Court should not give effect to the principle of *pacta sunt servanda*. The contractual terms of the suretyship agreement do not violate our constitutional values nor are they so unreasonable as to be inconsistent with public policy.

[46] In all the circumstances, the respondents' purported defences to the monetary judgments are in my view without merit and I am satisfied that Business Partners is entitled to the relief it seeks. An order shall follow for judgment in the monetary amount sought.

Costs in the monetary judgment application

[47] Turning now to costs, Mr Steyn sought an order that, based on the 'opportunistic, vexatious and mala fide' grounds of opposition relied upon by the respondents, an attorney and client costs order is appropriate.

[48] It is well-established in our jurisprudence that a case or defence which is devoid of merit may warrant a punitive costs order as a mark of the courts' displeasure and to more fully indemnify the successful party.

[49] I agree that the grounds of opposition raised by the respondents, which are manifestly without merit, have led to the incurrence of unnecessary costs and wasting of the court's time. An attorney and client cost order is warranted and is expressly provided for in paragraph 18 of the suretyship agreement. The respondents are jointly and severally liable for such costs, the one paying the other to be absolved.

The rescission application

[50] Twirlwhirl CC and Mr. Philander, the applicants in the rescission application, seek¹⁵ an order that the provisional liquidation order granted on 13 February 2024 (the provisional order) and the final liquidation order granted on 1 September 2024 (the final order) winding up True Southerner, be rescinded. The provisional order and final order will be collectively referred to as 'the orders.'

[51] The relief sought is in terms of the common law, alternatively with reference to the provisions of Uniform Rules 42(1)(a) and 42(1)(c).

¹⁵ In terms of Part B thereof.

Locus standi

[52] The applicants rely on section 354 of the old Companies Act 61 of 1973 (“the Companies Act”), which provides as follows:

‘The Court may at any time after the commencement of winding up, on the application of any liquidator, creditor or member,¹⁶ and on the proof to the satisfaction of the court that all proceedings in relation to the winding up ought to be stayed or set aside, make an order staying or set aside the proceedings or for such continuance of any voluntary winding up on such terms and conditions as the court may deem fit.’

[53] Twirlwhirl CC, in para 5.1 of its founding affidavit, describes itself ‘as *an entity that has a direct and substantial interest*’ in True Southerner’s liquidation, and is cited in its capacity as a surety ‘*whose rights are / have been directly affected*’ thereby. Mr. Philander alleges that as a 60% shareholder in and a surety to the loan agreement between True Southerner and Business Partners he too is a ‘*person with a direct and substantial interest.*’

[54] As dealt with above, both applicants bound themselves as sureties and co-principal debtors *in solidum* with True Southerner. The indebtedness of True Southerner to Business Partners is not disputed. Business Partners was thus entitled to act against them as soon as there was default by True Southerner.

[55] More fundamentally, Business Partners contends, correctly in my view, that the applicants lack *locus standi* in terms of section 354 of the Companies Act as neither of them seeks the setting aside of the liquidation orders as ‘liquidator, creditor

¹⁶ Emphasis added.

or member' of True Southerner. They seek to set aside orders in proceedings in which they were not cited as respondents.

[56] In the recent Supreme Court of Appeal decision of *Dr WAA Gouws (Johannesburg) (Pty) Ltd v HR Computek (Pty) Ltd and Others*,¹⁷ the court held that:

'...neither the common law nor Rule 42 requires that the company or directors be assisted by the liquidator or any other person. In establishing the requirements of a sufficient cause in a rescission application, the court emphasised that only two elements have to be satisfied: "(1) the party seeking relief must present a reasonable and acceptable explanation for his default, and (2) on the merits, such a party must have a *bona fide* defence which, *prima facie*, carries some prospect of success."¹⁸

[57] Seemingly alive to the conundrum of the absence of legal standing in terms of section 354, the applicants further rely for their rescission application on the common law, and/or alternatively on Rule 42 of the Uniform Rules.

[58] The Supreme Court of Appeal in *Colyn v Tiger Food Industries Ltd t/a Meadow Feed Mills (Cape) (Colyn)*¹⁹ held that an applicant for rescission of a judgment taken against him by default must show good cause (a) by giving a reasonable explanation of his default; (b) by showing that his application is made *bona fide*; and (c) by showing that he has a *bona fide* defence to the plaintiff's claim which *prima facie* has some prospect of success.²⁰

¹⁷ *Dr WAA Gouws (Johannesburg) (Pty) Ltd v HR Computek (Pty) Ltd and Others* (909/2023) [2025] ZASCA 103; 2025 (6) SA 89 (SCA) (15 July 2025).

¹⁸ *Ibid* para 22, and the authorities there cited.

¹⁹ *Colyn v Tiger Food Industries Ltd t/a Meadow Feed Mills (Cape)* 2003 (6) SA 1 (SCA).

²⁰ *Ibid* para 11.

[59] The general requirements that an applicant for rescission of a judgment must satisfy in a case of this sort were considered in the case of *Colyn*. An applicant is required to show good cause for such an order, which lies within the court's discretionary power to grant or refuse.

[60] The court, when exercising its discretion whether to grant or refuse such an application, must consider these elements as a whole. In *Colyn*, the court found that a weak explanation by the applicant on the reasons for its default may, in the assessment of the court, be counter-balanced by it showing a *bona fide* defence with good prospects of success if permitted to pursue its defence(s).²¹

[61] In terms of Uniform Rule 42(1)(a), the court, in addition to any other powers it may have, *mero motu* or upon the application of any party affected, has the power to rescind or vary an order or judgment erroneously sought or granted in the absence of any party affected thereby.

[62] To successfully apply for rescission of an order in terms of the common law or Rule 42(1)(a), the order must be shown to have been granted in the absence of the party seeking to set such order aside. The order must have been granted by default.

[63] The 'absence' requirement is to protect litigants who are precluded from participating in the proceedings. A party must be absent, and an error must have been committed by the court. In *Zuma v Secretary of the Judicial Commission of*

²¹ *Colyn* supra, para 12, relying on *Melane v Santam Insurance Co Ltd* 1962 (4) SA 531 (A) at 532B-E; and *Chetty v Law Society, Transvaal* 1985 (2) SA 756 (A) at 767J-769D. *Kgoste v 4 Seasons Logistics CC* (9657/2022) [2022] ZAWCHC 229 (9 November 2022) para 8.

Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the Public Sector including Organs of State and Others (Zuma),²² the Constitutional Court observed that:

‘At times the party’s absence may be what leads to the error being committed. Naturally, this might occur because the absent party will not be able to provide certain relevant information which would have an essential bearing on the court’s decision and, without which, a court may reach a conclusion that it would not have made but for the absence of the information. This, however, is not to conflate the two grounds which must be understood as two separate requirements, even though one may give rise to the other in certain circumstances. The case law considered below will demonstrate this possibility.’²³

[64] There can be no question that True Southerner had notice of the proceedings when the court granted the final order. At the hearing before Slingers J, Mr. Philander, representing True Southerner, sought a further postponement of the matter. The court refused the postponement. True Southerner was accordingly not precluded from attending the liquidation proceedings.

[65] If aggrieved by the outcome, True Southerner should have proceeded by way of appeal, not a rescission application.

Further reliance on Rule 42

[66] The applicants have also failed to show that the final order was erroneously granted. A requirement in terms of Rule 42(1)(a).

²² *Zuma v Secretary of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the Public Sector including Organs of State and Others* (CCT 52/21) [2021] ZACC 28; 2021 (11) BCLR 1263 (CC) (17 September 2021) (*Zuma*).

²³ *Ibid* para 57.

[67] The applicants rely, in paragraphs 6.14, 6.15 and 6.16 of the founding affidavit, on Rule 42(1)(c), contending that the orders were granted due to a common mistake as the liquidation of True Southerner was granted in conflict with or in breach of the provisions of Clause 24.1 of the shareholders agreement between True Southerner and Business Partners.

[68] This argument cannot be sustained. The indebtedness relied upon in the liquidation orders was in terms of the loan agreement and its *addenda* concluded between Business Partners and True Southerner. This is admitted by the applicants, who further admit, as referenced above, that True Southerner was in default thereof.

[69] It is therefore common cause that True Southerner was in arrears at the time of the institution of the liquidation proceedings and the granting of the winding up order.

[70] Clause 24.1 of the shareholders' agreement excludes winding up as a remedy where there was a breach of any of the material provisions of '*...this Agreement*'. Business Partners relied on a breach of the loan agreement, not the shareholders' agreement.

[71] The applicants have therefore failed to show that there was a common mistake or error. To the contrary, the orders were granted in circumstances where it is undisputed that True Southers was indebted to Business Partners in terms of the loan agreement and *addenda*.

[72] Even if the applicants had met the jurisdictional requirements for the granting of the rescission, they have failed to show good cause for the granting of such an order, including that they have good (or indeed any) prospects of successfully opposing the winding up of True Southerner if the orders were to be set aside.

[71] It follows that the application for the rescission of the order, and the further relief sought by the applicants must fail. There is no reason why costs should not follow the result. In my view, Scale B is the appropriate scale on which the costs of counsel should be taxed, considering the complexity of the matter and value of the relief sought.

ORDER

[1] In the result, the following order is made:

Under case number 2025-012914

1. Judgment is granted against the first and second respondents, Paul John Philander and Twirlwhirl CC, jointly and severally, the one paying the other to be absolved, for:
 - (a) Payment of the amount of R1 486 775.97.
 - (b) Interest on the amount in paragraph (a) above at a rate of prime plus 1% compounded monthly in arrears from 26 March 2024 to date of payment.
 - (c) Payment of the sum of R4 064.67.

- (d) Interest on the amount in paragraph (c) above at a rate of prime plus 1% compounded monthly in arrears from 26 March 2024 to date of payment.
- (e) Costs of suit on the scale as between attorney and client.

Under case number 2025-012914

- (i) The relief sought in Part A of the Notice of Motion (the stay application) is refused.
- (ii) The rescission application in Part B of the Notice of Motion is dismissed.
- (iii) The applicants, Twirlwhirl CC and Paul John Philander are to pay the costs of the respondent, Business Partners Ltd, the costs of counsel to be taxed on Scale B.

HOLDERNESS J
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN

Appearances

For Business Partners (Pty) Ltd:

Adv R Steyn

Instructed by:

BDP Attorneys

For Twirlwhirl CC & Mr P J Philander:

Adv Petersen

Brink and Thomas Attorneys