



**IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)**

JUDGMENT

Reportable/Not Reportable

Case no: 2026-013973

In the matter between:

**COMMUNITY UPLIFTMENT PROJECTS
APPLICANT**

In re: Purple Blok Projects (Pty) Ltd v Coetzee and Others

and

In re: Purple Blok Projects (Pty) Ltd v Combrink and Others

and

GOODFIND PROPERTIES (PTY) LTD

FIRST RESPONDENT

PURPLE BLOK PROJECTS (PTY) LTD

SECOND RESPONDENT

THE SHERIFF OF THE MAGISTRATE’S COURT: THIRD
RESPONDENT
GOODWOOD
THE REGISTRAR OF DEEDS, CAPE TOWN FOURTH
RESPONDENT
THE MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE, LAND REFORM FIFTH
RESPONDENT
AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT

Neutral citation: Community Upliftment Projects V Goodfind Properties (Pty)
 Ltd And Others (Case No: **2026-013973**) [2026]
 ZAWCH ... (11 February 2026)

Coram: **SALLER AJ**

Heard: 29 January 2026

Delivered: 11 February 2026

**Summary: Urgent application for stay of execution of eviction orders – urgent
application for anti-spoliation order – hearsay – standing – urgency**

ORDER

1. Part A of the application is dismissed.
 2. The applicant is to pay the costs of Part A of this application on Scale A.
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JUDGMENT

Saller AJ:

- [1] Before me is an application brought by the applicant Community Upliftment Projects (‘CUP’) in two stages.
- [2] Part A of the application was brought before me on an *ex parte*, urgent basis in chambers on 26 January 2026. I raised with CUP’s counsel two issues: the *ex parte* nature of the Part A proceedings, and their alleged urgency. I directed CUP to file a supplementary affidavit dealing with those issues. Upon consideration of the supplementary affidavit, I made an interim order which maintained the status quo, pending the determination of Part A later in the week, and provided for expeditious service on the respondents.

The relief sought

- [3] In Part A, with which I am currently seized, CUP seeks what it refers to as interim relief which is primarily aimed at achieving a stay of execution of two eviction orders granted by this Court in favour of the second respondent, Purple Blok Projects (Pty) Ltd (‘Purple Blok’). Purple Blok is the registered owner of the properties to which those eviction orders relate.
- [4] The first eviction order was made on 13 August 2025 in respect of property commonly known as [...] L[...] T[...] Street, Ruyterwacht, Cape Town, against Mr Colin Combrink and other occupiers holding title under him (‘the Combrink family’ and ‘the Louis Trichardt Street property’). The Court ordered the Combrink family to vacate the Louis Trichardt Street property by 31 December 2025, failing which the sheriff was authorised to evict them by 9 January 2026.
- [5] The Combrink family are not applicants in the present application.
- [6] The second eviction order was made on 30 October 2025 in respect of property commonly known as 1[...] H[...] Street, Ruyterwacht, Cape Town, against Mr Christopher Coetzee, Ms Rita Coetzee and other occupiers holding title under them (‘the Coetzee family’ and ‘the Huguenot Street property’). The Court similarly ordered the Coetzee family to vacate the Huguenot Street property by 31 December 2025, failing which the sheriff was authorised to evict them by 7 January 2026.

- [7] The Coetzee family are also not applicants in the present application.
- [8] In Part B of the application, CUP seeks in the main an order declaring the sale and transfer of properties forming Part of Erf 3[...], Epping, Garden Village, Cape Town ('the Garden Village properties') to have been unlawful and invalid, alternatively void *ab initio*, setting them aside, as well as ancillary relief relating to the registration of transfer.
- [9] A deed of transfer is attached to the founding affidavit which further identifies the Garden Village properties – it is common cause they include the Louis Trichardt Street property and the Huguenot Street property. It appears from the deed of transfer that the sale of the Garden Village properties from the first respondent Goodfind Properties (Pty) Ltd ('Goodfind') to Purple Blok took place on 22 November 2023, and transfer was registered on 21 June 2024.
- [10] The grounds on which CUP impugns the sale and transfer of the Garden Village properties to Purple Blok arises from restrictive title deed conditions incorporated from a Crown Grant dated 28 March 1947 ('the Crown Grant') which prohibits bulk sale and transfer of the properties to which it relates.
- [11] In the alternative, CUP asks that the fifth respondents, the Minister of Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Affairs ('the Minister') be directed to determine whether to grant a waiver of restrictive title deed conditions arising from the Crown Grant in respect of the Garden Village properties.
- [12] Part B of the application seeks no relief relating to the eviction orders.

Opposition

- [13] Purple Blok and Goodfind opposed the application and filed answering affidavits.
- [14] They raised multiple complaints, among them lack of genuine urgency, a challenge to CUP's locus standi, and CUP's reliance on hearsay evidence.
- [15] On the merits, Purple Blok denied CUP's allegation (in the supplementary affidavit) of spoliation of the Huguenot Street property on the part of Purple Blok, and denied CUP had made out a case for a stay of execution of the eviction orders.

[16] Goodfind aligned itself with Purple Blok's case and additionally disputed CUP's prospects in Part B. In what follows, I refer to Purple Blok and Goodfind as 'the respondents' unless it is necessary to distinguish them.

[17] CUP did not file a reply. However, at the hearing on 29 January 2026, CUP's counsel provided the Court with a photocopy of an affidavit of Mrs Rita Coetzee, the second respondent, apparently deposed to at the Brackenfell police station that same morning. In the affidavit, Mrs Coetzee elaborates on the alleged spoliation by Purple Blok on 26 January 2026. Counsel for the respondents did not object to it being accepted by way of reply.

[18] Although the issues raised in the application are to some extent interlinked, I will deal with each of them in turn.

Hearsay

[19] I begin with the question of hearsay which is foundational to the application. Save for the affidavit of Mrs Coetzee in reply, CUP's papers are deposed to by Mr Keown.

[20] Mr Keown says he has personal knowledge of the facts deposed to but does not say how. He does not set out his personal involvement with, nor relationship to, the Coetzee and the Combrink families, or even the wider community. There is no mention of consultations with the families in the preparation of the affidavits, nor are there confirmatory affidavits – even Mrs Coetzee's affidavit in reply does not say that she has read the founding and supplementary affidavits, much less confirm their contents.

[21] The high point of CUP's case in this regard is to be found in the supplementary affidavit, where CUP says it was approached by the Coetzee and the Combrink families in March 2025 for advice, at which point it advised the families to approach the Legal Practice Council for assistance. It seems that there was a further instance of engagement in December 2025, when CUP says it began searching for a legal representative willing to take the matter *pro bono*. CUP does not say whether and to what extent Mr Keown was personally involved in engaging with the families.

[22] The Supreme Court of Appeal has cautioned (my emphasis):¹

“... Merely to allege that that information is within the ‘personal knowledge’ of a deponent is of little value without some indication, at least from the context, of how that knowledge was acquired so as to establish that the information is admissible, and if it is hearsay, to enable its weight to be evaluated. In this case there is no indication that the facts to which Mr Chikane purports to attest came to his knowledge directly and no other basis for its admission has been laid. Indeed, the statement of Mr Chikane that I have referred to is not evidence at all: it is no more than bald assertion.

It was submitted by counsel for the appellants that it is probable that Mr Chikane had direct knowledge of the purpose for which the appointment was made by reason of the office that he held at the time. We are not concerned with probability. ...”

[23] It follows that the affidavits on the basis of which I am asked to determine the application largely constitute inadmissible hearsay, and the application is consequently devoid of the necessary foundational facts required to support the relief sought, on the basis of which I might exercise my discretion in CUP’s favour to suspend the eviction orders.

[24] Counsel for CUP submitted that given the urgency of the matter, it was not possible to obtain confirmatory affidavits. But urgency alone cannot explain a failure to place proper evidence before the Court. If the Coetzee and Combrink families were consulted with in the course of drafting the founding papers, it is hard to see why a confirmatory affidavit could not have been obtained, or at least a contemporaneous affidavit setting out only the facts which each of them provided to CUP. Mrs Coetzee’s affidavit of 26 January 2026 shows that there are no insurmountable hurdles to sworn evidence being obtained from the families. On the other hand, if the Coetzee and Combrink families were not consulted with, then there is no basis upon which I might rely on the facts contained in CUP’s papers as they relate to the Coetzee and Combrink families.

¹ The President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v M & G Media Ltd (2011 (2) SA 1 (SCA); [2010] ZASCA 177 paras 38-39.

[25] That must be the end to the relief sought in Part A. There are other reasons, too, why the application must fail and I deal with them below, mindful of the jurisprudence of our appellate courts² that, even if a single issue may dispose of a matter, it is desirable for a court to determine all of the issues before it.

Urgency

[26] CUP's case for urgency is based on the imminency of eviction, coupled with the alleged inability of the Coetzee family and the Combrink family to secure legal representation.

[27] It says that the Coetzee family and the Combrink family unsuccessfully sought *pro bono* legal representation from the Legal Practice Council ('LPC') and were placed on a waiting list in April 2025 and June 2025, respectively. Respective letters of the LPC are attached to the founding affidavit. CUP says that by December 2025, the families had not heard back from the LPC.

[28] There is no supporting evidence of any engagement or follow up by either CUP or the families after April and June 2025, respectively. Nor is there supporting evidence of what CUP says was its attempts to contact "multiple private law firms for pro bono assistance", nor to seek "assistance through civil society and housing advocacy networks". The founding papers merely conclude that "about two weeks ago" CUP secured *pro bono* legal representation, again without any substantiation or detail. This, at least, must be information of which CUP must have specific knowledge but which it did not place on record.

[29] CUP says that it was under the *bona fide* belief that legal representation could be secured before the evictions were executed, and that the families were under the *bona fide* belief that the evictions would not be enforced pending clarification of the ownership dispute. But not every *bona fide* belief in a state of affairs will support a case for urgency. Even accepting for the sake of argument the evidence as it relates to the families' state of mind in the absence of confirmation from them, their belief was quite unreasonable.

² S v Jordan and Others (Sex Workers Education and Advocacy Task Force and Others as Amici Curiae) 2002 (6) SA 642 (CC) para 21; Maharaj and Others v Mandag Centre of Investigative Journalism NPC and Others 2018 (1) SA 471 (SCA) para 26; Minister of Home Affairs and Others v Somali Association of South Africa and Another 2015 (3) SA 545 (SCA) para 18.

- [30] The supplementary affidavit attaches a letter of the Minister of Human Settlements to the Presidency dated 10 May 2024, wherein the Minister refers to community meetings during the course of May 2024 regarding disputes about evictions sought by Communicare, the predecessor in title over the properties and the holding company of Goodfind. My understanding is that this includes the properties in issue in this matter. In the letter, the Minister records that tenants are challenging the transfer of ownership of the properties from Communicare to Goodfind, and demanding that Communicare hold in abeyance all evictions from the affected properties. It is clear from the facts of the present matter that this did not happen.
- [31] The respondents have set out in some detail their efforts to proceed with the eviction proceedings against the Coetzee and Combrink families. They show that Purple Blok firmly resisted the family's efforts to have their respective eviction proceedings postponed, including through personal appearances. In those circumstances, it was not only reasonably foreseeable but likely that Purple Blok would also take steps to enforce the eviction orders granted in its favour, once the period for vacating the properties had run out.
- [32] It is hard to fault the respondents' submission that the remarkable lack of detail in CUP's narrative as to what steps they and the families took in the months after the eviction order were granted, fatally undermines its case that such urgency as has now arisen was not self-created. If one has sympathy for the relative lack of sophistication on the part of the families, CUP as an experienced housing rights advocacy organisation must have known better than to come to court on the vaguest of allegations.

Standing

- [33] CUP claims standing under section 38(b), (c) and (d) of the Constitution, in the public interest and on behalf of persons whose rights to housing and lawful administrative action are affected.
- [34] Somewhat surprisingly, given its stated objects, CUP does not rely on own-interest standing provided for in section 38(a) of the Constitution. It also makes no claim to be an association acting on behalf of its members under section 38(e).

- [35] The starting point when a court considers a litigant's standing is to separate this question from the merits. What this means is that "in determining a litigant's standing, a court must, as a matter of logic, assume that the challenge the litigant seeks to bring is justified."³ Further, a broad approach to standing is appropriate in cases where constitutional rights are implicated,⁴ and even under the common law.⁵
- [36] Nevertheless, the generosity of the Constitution's standing provisions does not mean that standing is there for the taking, or section 38 would be rendered nugatory.⁶ In the present matter, I have considerable difficulty with CUP's standing in respect of Part A of the application (I express no opinion regarding its standing to pursue relief in Part B) on the grounds it asserts.
- [37] Section 38(b) of the Constitution allows a party to litigate on behalf of another who cannot act in their own name. On the papers, there is nothing to suggest the Coetzee family and/or the Combrink family are legally or practically incapacitated, nor disadvantaged in their ability to litigate⁷ – there is no indication on the papers that CUP's current legal representatives might be unwilling to act for the families. Given the relief sought in Part A that would be a curious position to adopt, and require explanation. There is also no evidence of the families having granted authority to CUP to litigate on their behalf, particularly in the absence of affidavits from them, and it is not clear to me on what basis such authority might be granted.
- [38] Section 38(c) provides standing to a litigant acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of persons. CUP makes no attempt to define a group or class whose interests it is pursuing in Part A (nor Part B).⁸ The beneficiaries of relief in Part A are

³ *Giant Concerts CC v Rinaldo Investments (Pty) Ltd and Others* [2012] ZACC 28 para 32, endorsing *Jacobs en 'n Ander v Waks en Andere* 1992 (1) SA 521 (A) at 536A and *Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa* 2 ed (Juta & Co, Cape Town 2012) at 488.

⁴ *Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others* 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) para 165 (Chaskelson J) and para 229 (O'Regan J).

⁵ *Trustees for the time being of Children's Resource Centre Trust and Others v Pioneer Food (Pty) Ltd and Others* 2013 (2) SA 213 (SCA) paras 29-34; *Mukaddam v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd and Others* 2013 (5) SA 89 (CC) para 32.

⁶ *Afriforum and Another v University of the Free State* 2018 (2) SA 185 (CC) para 29.

⁷ Alluded to in *Afriforum and Another v University of the Free State* 2018 (2) SA 185 (CC) para 24.

⁸ *Trustees for the time being of Children's Resource Centre Trust and Others v Pioneer Food (Pty) Ltd and Others* 2013 (2) SA 213 (SCA) paras 29-34 (in the context of common law rules of standing)

the Coetzee and Combrink families. Even on a generous interpretation of section 38(c),⁹ on the facts before me, these two families do not constitute a class.

[39] Lastly, section 38(d) provides for public interest litigation. CUP says it acts in the public interest. But CUP does not explain how the stay of execution of the eviction orders sought in Part A constitutes a public good. In *Ferreira v Levin* O'Regan J said the following in relation to public interest standing provided in equivalent terms under the Interim Constitution:¹⁰

“This Court will be circumspect in affording applicants standing by way of s 7(4)(b)(v) and will require an applicant to show that he or she is genuinely acting in the public interest. Factors relevant to determining whether a person is genuinely acting in the public interest will include considerations such as: whether there is another reasonable and effective manner in which the challenge can be brought; the nature of the relief sought, and the extent to which it is of general and prospective application; and the range of persons or groups who may be directly or indirectly affected by any order made by the Court and the opportunity that those persons or groups have had to present evidence and argument to the Court. These factors will need to be considered in the light of the facts and circumstances of each case.”

[40] It would have been of considerable assistance had CUP engaged in such enquiry. On the limited facts before me, particularly the availability of the Combrink and Coetzee families to be joined as applicants in their own interests in light of the relief sought, I am not satisfied CUP has a public interest standing to seek the relief it does in Part A of the application.

Spoliation

[41] Turning then to the merits, the logically first issue is the question of spoliation. CUP says that on 26 January 2026 Purple Blok ordered the locks changed on the Huguenot

⁹ Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v Ngxuza 2001 (4) SA 1184 (SCA) paras 13-14.

¹⁰ Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) para 234 (O'Regan writing in the minority without disagreement by the majority); endorsed in Lawyers for Human Rights and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2004 (4) SA 125 (CC) para 17

Street property while Mrs Rita Coetzee was visiting her daughter and other family members were absent. Since the eviction order authorised only the sheriff to evict the Coetzee family, CUP says this constitutes an unlawful spoliation of the property over which the Coetzee family was in peaceful and undisturbed possession which must be restored.

[42] Despite raising the issue in the supplementary affidavit, CUP made no effort to amend its notice of motion.

[43] Purple Blok denied spoliation, on the grounds that the Coetzee family voluntarily vacated the Huguenot Street property. In support, they put up an email of Mrs Coetzee dated 24 January 2026 wherein she says the following:

“We vacate property 1[...] H[...] str Ruyterwacht erf 4[...] on the 9 and 10 January 2026. No sheriff of court come or so to be new owners Purple blok phoned to collect key of 1[...] H[...] str Ruyterwacht erf 4[...].

...

So what is happing with property 1[...] H[...] str Ruyterwacht erf 4[...] and the key. We will not be responsible for any damage or vandalism of property.”

[44] Counsel for the respondents submitted that the email provided strong contemporaneous evidence that the Coetzee family had voluntarily vacated the property, and Purple Blok was entitled to cause the locks to be changed in anticipation of another tenant moving into the property. He submitted that the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from Mrs Coetzee’s concern with being held responsible for any damage or vandalism of the property was that she and her family were not, in fact, occupying the property at the time the email was written.

[45] Counsel for CUP, on the other hand, relied on the affidavit of Mrs Coetzee’s in reply. Mrs Coetzee says there that on an unspecified date prior to 26 January 2026 she moved out “some” of her furniture – counsel for CUP urged me to conclude that this meant that the remainder of the Coetzee family furniture remained in the property on the day the locks were changed. Mrs Coetzee further says she still has the original keys, and

that “it was not my intention to move out” but she did so, as she says, “in a state of duress”. She does not mention her email of 24 January 2026.

[46] In my view the email of 24 January 2026 and Mrs Coetzee’s replying affidavit can be read together without difficulty, and without undermining Purple Blok’s version. She may have moved some of the family’s furniture ahead of 9 and 10 January 2026, and the remainder on those days when she says they vacated the property without intervention of the sheriff. The eviction order and its impending execution would undoubtedly have placed Mrs Coetzee in a perceived state of duress, where she might regard any representative of Purple Blok, including security personnel in the area, as a threat. I have no difficulty accepting that in these circumstances, her and her family vacating the property on 9 and 10 January 2026 was accompanied by unhappiness and resentment, and was not experienced as voluntary. But that does not change the fact that, on her own version in the email of 24 January 2026, that is what happened. In the absence of a clear explanation dealing with the content of the email of 24 January 2026, there is nothing in Mrs Coetzee’s affidavit that supports CUP’s allegation of spoliation.

The case for a stay

[47] Rule 45A permits a court, on application, to suspend the operation and execution of any order for such period as it may deem fit. The Rule affords a court a wide discretion, to be exercised judicially.¹¹ The Court is called to consider what real and substantial justice requires in the circumstances, and in appropriate circumstances may be guided by factors usually applicable to interim interdicts.¹²

[48] CUP’s case is that it seeks a stay of the eviction orders so as to allow the legality of the sale of the Garden Village properties and of the evictions to be adjudicated, that it has no alternative remedy, that irreparable harm will befall the Coetzee and Combrink families if the eviction orders are not stayed pending the determination of Part B, and that while Purple Blok’s prejudice is merely financial and procedural, its own prejudice (I assume in CUP’s favour that it refers here to prejudice to the Coetzee and Combrink

¹¹ R.A v F.A [2024] ZAWCHC 35 para 19; and authorities discussed there.

¹² Gois t/a Shakespeare’s Pub v Van Zyl and Others 2011 (1) SA 148 (LC) paras 33-37; Van Rensburg and Another NNO v Naidoo and Others NNO; Naidoo and Others NNO v Van Rensburg NO and Others 2011 (4) SA 149 (SCA); Stoffberg N.O and Another v Capital Harvest (Pty) Ltd (2130/2021) [2021] ZAWCHC 37 para 26

families) is existential and irreversible. It says that if the sale agreements and transfers of the two properties are declared unlawful and invalid, “the judicial foundation for the eviction orders will fall away entirely”,

[49] A number of immediate difficulties present themselves.

[50] The most obvious difficulty is the fact that CUP does not seek any relief relating to the eviction orders in Part B. Even if the sale of the Garden Village properties, including the Louis Trichardt Street property and the Huguenot Street property, were to be invalidated and set aside (not a given, in light of the alternative relief in Part B even if CUP were to succeed), that alone has no bearing on the enforceability of the eviction orders, which remain binding.

[51] CUP does not seek relief setting the eviction orders aside, and has not identified a legal basis upon which they may be set aside.

[52] It is far from clear that Purple Blok’s lack of ownership over the properties in question at the time of the eviction orders is fatal to its claim. Here, a recent case of *Dlamini and Another v Gumede*¹³ in the Gauteng Local Division is of assistance in that it is analogous in some important respects. That matter concerned PIE eviction proceedings which were instituted after the property in question was sold and the residential tenant refused to vacate the property. The tenant challenged the lawfulness of the sale, and sought a stay of the eviction proceedings until such time as its validity could be determined. The Court had no difficulty in refusing to stay the eviction proceedings, on the grounds that, first, that the tenant had no standing to challenge the validity of the sale, and second, that title was not a prerequisite to the conclusion of a lease agreement and its attendant consequences such as the obligation to vacate upon its termination.¹⁴

[53] Such reasoning is by no means unpersuasive, albeit that the Constitutional Court authority the Court relies on¹⁵ dealt with commercial, not residential, leases. In PIE evictions, it is a statutory requirement that the applicant be the owner or person in

¹³ *Dlamini and Another v Gumede and Others* [2024] ZAGPJHC 145.

¹⁴ *Dlamini and Another v Gumede and Others* [2024] ZAGPJHC 145 paras 7-10, with reference to *Mighty Solutions t/a Orlando Service Station v Engen Petroleum Limited and Another* 2006 (1) SA 621 (CC).

¹⁵ *Mighty Solutions t/a Orlando Service Station v Engen Petroleum Limited and Another* 2006 (1) SA 621 (CC) paras 33, 51-52 and 56.

control of the property to which the proceedings relate. But even assuming in CUP's favour that it has better standing to challenge the sale and transfer of the Garden Village properties than Mr Gumede had, and further, that in Part B a court will be persuaded to either declare such sale void or retrospectively invalidate it, Purple Blok's lack of ownership of the property is not an obvious bar to successful eviction proceedings in light of its undisputed control over the property at all relevant times.

[54] Furthermore, the right on which CUP seeks to rely is not the kind of substantive right which founds entitlement to an interdict, nor, in my view, a stay, on the principles articulated in OUTA.¹⁶

[55] CUP says it asserts a *prima facie* right to lawful land administration, constitutionally compliant processes and to have eviction founded on ownership deferred until the lawfulness of that ownership has been judicially determined. Those are rights akin to the right to review unlawful administrative action, which the Constitutional Court in OUTA found insufficient to justify the granting of an interim interdict. They do not found a right, whether *prima facie* or not, to reside in the properties.

[56] Leaving aside all other deficiencies in the application, before I might be persuaded to consider a stay of execution of the eviction orders pending the determination of Part B on the grounds that this is what real and substantial justice demands, I would need to be persuaded that the Coetzee family and the Combrink family have at least a *prima facie* substantive right to reside in their respective properties which they are able, or should have been able, to assert against Purple Blok, and that such a right is in substance pursued in Part B of the application. On the papers before me, they do not.

Conclusion

[57] For all these reasons, Part A of the application must fail, and the interim interim order falls away.

[58] On the question of costs, it was not suggested that there are any reasons why costs should not follow the result, nor that that matter was of the kind of complexity which

¹⁶ National Treasury and Others v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance and Others 2012 (6) SA 223 (CC) para 50

warranted an increased scale of costs. CUP must bear the costs of its unsuccessful application on a scale A.

Order

[59] In the premises, the following order is made:

3. Part A of the application is dismissed.
4. The applicant is to pay the costs of Part A of this application on Scale A.

K SALLER

ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT

Appearances

For applicant: S Peer

Instructed by: Sayeed & Co Attorneys

For respondent: Lawrence

Instructed by: Toefy Attorneys