

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA



IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA

(GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA)

(1) REPORTABLE: NO
 (2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
 (3) REVISED: YES

02/01/2026
 DATE

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SIGNATURE

CASE NO: 2022/030165

In the matter between:

LIBERTY FIGHTERS NETWORK

1st Applicant

(A voluntary association without gain-*Universitas*)

REYNO DAWID DE BEER NO

2nd Applicant

(*Nomine Officio* Official of 1st Applicant)

and

REGISTRAR OF THE HIGH COURT,

GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA

1st Respondent

COURT MANAGER OF THE HIGH COURT

GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA

2nd Respondent

IN RE:

Case Number:2022/30280

In the matter between:

LIBERTY FIGHTERS NETWORK

1st Applicant

REYNO DE BEER

2nd Applicant

and

**SOUTH AFRICAN HEALTH PRODUCTS REGULATORY
AUTHORITY**

Respondent

IN RE:

Case Number: 2022/030165

In the matter between:

LIBERTY FIGHTERS NETWORK

1st Applicant

(Voluntary Association without gain)

REYNO DE BEER

2nd Applicant

NICOLE CANDICE LAWRENCE

3rd Applicant

BROTHERSIT CC

(REG. NO. 2007/133663/23)

4th Applicant

and

SOUTH AFRICAN RESERVE BANK

1st Respondent

MINISTER OF FINANCE

2nd Respondent

NATIONAL TREASURY DEPARTMENT

3rd Respondent

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF

SOUTH AFRICA

4th Respondent

FIRST NATIONAL BANK

5th Respondent

JUDGMENT: OPPOSED MOTION

(The matter was heard in Court 6/B in open court on 28 October 2025. Judgment was reserved after hearing all parties' arguments and the parties were informed that judgment will be delivered when ready by uploading thereof onto the electronic file of the matter on CaseLines. The date of uploading onto CaseLines is deemed to be the date of the judgment.)

BEFORE: HOLLAND-MUTER J:

[1] The matter allocated to this court on the Duty Roster for Judges for the 4th term 2025 as the special motion court (3rd court). The Duty Roster appears at the end of a term for the next term setting out the allocations of judicial work for the judges for the following term. The drafting of the Duty Roster and the allocation of Judge/Judges is the prerogative of the Judge President of the division.

[2] The second respondent, Mr De Beer, objected to the application being heard by this court sitting as a single judge because he apparently requested hearing by a full court from the Deputy Judge President. After deliberation, this issue was resolved. De Beer's next objection was not to address the court in the usual way as "My Lord" because according to his religious belief he addresses only the Almighty in such way. To minimise potential conflict, I invited him to address the court as "Mr Justice". He started off as requested but very soon continued by merely addressing the court as "Judge". To avoid any further objections or other issues with De Beer, he was allowed to continue to address the court as "Judge". The underlying reason for the court's latitude was that during preparation for the application, the court became aware of his continuous contemptuous conduct towards the judiciary with reference to the matter of **Minister of Co-Operative Governance and Traditional Affairs v De Beer and Another (Case no 538/2020)[2021] ZASCA 95 (1 July 2021)**. The admonishment of De Beer by the Supreme Court of Appeal in that matter does not seem to be taken to heart by De Beer.

[3] The application before this court is a culmination of litigation between the applicant(s) and the respondents in two previously determined applications under case numbers 2022/30280 and 2022/030165. I will refer to these matters as the **SARB** and the **SAHPRA**

matters. De Beer further referred to other matters with similar “problems” but elected to continue with the two mentioned matters. The other matters complained about by De Beer was referred to on passing without any particularity thereto. De Beer did not hesitate to inform the court that he was no stranger to court procedures even though appearing in person. This was a further issue being labelled as a “layman”.

[4] The present respondents are the Registrar and Court Manager of the Pretoria High Court. The two officials elected not to oppose the application but the respondents from the two consolidated matters under case numbers 2022/30280 (**SARB**) and 2022/03015 (**SAHPRA**) filed opposing papers. This became a bone of contention by the second applicant (De Beer) as to joinder procedure vs intervention by SARB and SAHPRA. De Beer took issue with the representatives of SARB and SAHPRA procedurally for not formally applying for intervention/joinder to the present application. This argument cannot succeed as the applicants in its prayer 4 of the Notice of Motion moved for an order to consolidate the SARB and SAHPRA matters with the present application. The applicants move for consolidation resulting in SARB and SAHPRA being before this court. The applicants Notice of Motion sets out the perceived consolidation in its heading. This non-joinder argument by De Beer is rejected.

[5] The **SARB** matter involved the South African Reserve Bank while the **SAHPRA** matter involved the South African Health Products Regulatory Authority. The applicant elected to have the two matters joined with the present application.

[6] The issue with the **SARB** matter was that the typed order presented after the hearing incorrectly cited SARB (Reserve Bank) as . The second complaint was that not all the parties’ names were reflected in the heading of the typed order. The typed order was corrected by the clerk of Van der Westhuizen J when approached by one of the parties. The approach of Van der Westhuizen’s J clerk by the opponents was a further issue for De Beer. De Beer’s objection was that the correction must be done on formal application and not “informally” via mail to the clerk. De Beer levelled critique on this procedure by claiming that legal representatives have far easier approach of Judges to the detriment of non-presented parties. The underlying inuendo is that Judges are more open for approach by legal parties if compared with non-legal parties. This is void of any truth and amounts to another unjustified attack on the judiciary.

[7] The complaint with the **SAHPRA** matter is threefold namely (i) that reference is made to “The Applicant” and not to the First and Second Applicants separately; (ii) a spelling

mistake in the full names of the Respondent SAHPRA and (iii) the capacity of persons representing the parties were faulty because it indicated that De Beer as counsel while he was in person. It is important to note that these errors did not affect the material terms of the judgment by Lenyai J. De Beer's objection was that this amounts to the clerk/registrar to alter court orders which may be devastating later. The misdirection in this argument is that it is non-material typographic mistakes corrected and what De Beer is unaware of that clerks will not make such amendments without the particular judge's knowledge.

[8] The position in the SARB matter reflects similar typo errors having no effect on the material contents of the order granted by Van der Westhuizen J.

NOTICE OF MOTION:

[9] Prayer 1 of the Notice of Motion moves for condonation of non-compliance with the Rules of Court, particular Rule 6(12) regarding urgency. The matter was enrolled on the urgent court role for 13 May 2025 but was removed from the urgent roll and Deputy Judge President Ledwaba was approached for a special allocation. The issues of urgency and resulting costs were not addressed in the urgent court or at the meeting with DJP Ledwaba (as he then was). De Beer now accused DJP Ledwaba of dragging heels for not attending timeously to the matter allegedly forcing De Beer to approach the then Judge President Mlambo to request DJP Ledwaba to attend to the request. This outcry by De Beer is evident from one of the Emails he addressed to the Judge President. There is no substance in this allegation by De Beer. This aspect needs no further attention but to state that this is indicative of the attitude of De Beer to cross swords with the judiciary. This is but one example of De Beer insulting the judiciary and practitioners.

[10] I started by requesting De Beer to reply to certain questions posed regarding the issue of **urgency** and costs. De Beer was referred to the Practice Directive in Urgent matters exceeding the page limits of 500 pages and the request for a hearing exceeding one day. There are direct prescripts that in such a matter the parties must approach the DJP for a special allocation before enrolling the matter on the urgent roll. This did not happen and was the reason why the matter was removed from the urgent roll.

[11] I repeatedly asked De Beer to explain why the applicants (as represented by himself) dragged on since 15 October 2024 when Lenyai J granted leave to appeal in the SAHPRA

matter until the end of April 2025 before issuing the urgent application. Six months went by before the urgent application was lodged. The urgency, if any, was self-created and no explanation was given why the applicants would not be afforded substantial redress at a hearing in due course. See **Erasmus, Superior Court Practice 2nd Ed D1 Rule 6-60**. He did not answer but kept on arguing around in circles than to address the rather strait forward question posed by the court at least five times. I waited in vain for an acceptable explanation why this conduct was not self-created urgency. The reason for debating the issue of urgency was to decide on the outstanding cost issue for the urgent application. De Beer failed to give any acceptable explanation and no acceptable explanation on urgency was forthcoming from him. He tried to hide behind the **Plascon-Evans Rule** arguing that because of the non-joinder by SARB and SAHPRA resulted in inadmissible opposing papers and that the applicants were unopposed before court and that the court had to accept its version. This is a futile attempt by De Beer to circumvent his predicament and the argument has no merit. The only reasonable finding on urgency is that it was self-created and had no substance to jump the queue.

[12] The next aspect discussed with De Beer was prayer 2 of the Notice of Motion. The respondents requested the court to determine whether De Beer was authorised to litigate on behalf of the first applicant (referred to as LFN). The averment in the prayer is that De Beer was **nominated** by LFN to represent it. I requested De Beer to produce any form of written authorisation/nomination by the executive of LFN in this regard. After a long evasive discussion by De Beer he could not produce any written authorisation at all. He tried to circumvent the issue by stating that he was the president of LFN (also no proof thereof) and that the constitution of LFN authorises him to litigate. There is no supporting proof that De Beer is the president of LFN and that he was authorised to litigate this specific application on behalf of LFN. His attempt to convince the court in this instance fell woefully short of any proof. The fact that he appeared in past matters representing LFN does not authorise him to litigate in this matter. In the **SAHPRA** case there was a document purporting to be authorization by LFN that De Beer may represent it in that matter but it does not authorise De Beer in general. His argument is rejected.

[13] In prayer 3 of the Notice of Motion the court is requested to grant the applicants leave to bring this application in their own capacities as well as in the interest of the members of LFN **and** in the interests of the public in general. The failure to obtain prior written authority from LFN has been dealt with supra. There is no proof of kind for De Beer to represent the members of LFN in this application. No minutes of meetings of members authorising him was forthcoming from De Beer. The next hurdle to cross is authority to **represent** the public in general. This amounts to a disguised class action on behalf of the public in general and granting such relief will open the sluices of unimaginable

litigation in the alleged interest of public in general by opportunists. De Beer's vague unconvincing arguments takes this issue no further. The question of representing the general public was dealt with in the **Minister of Co-Operative Governance and Traditional Affairs** *supra* and De Beer's representation and expertise was rejected.

[14] The gist of the relief sought is to prevent the apparent gross negligent conduct of the court personal (the Court Manager and Registrar of the court and their personal) regarding alleged improper documentation and alleged unilateral correction of final court orders. The gravamen of the De Beer's complaints is that in two separate matters (the SARB and SAHPRA matters) the respondents purported to unilaterally amend or reissue corrected orders without judicial oversight. There is no evidence supporting this argument.

[15] De Beer stated under oath (in the founding affidavit) that the conduct of the respondents was reckless whereby published court orders without being formally declared invalid, unilaterally corrected in a piecemeal fashion. De Beer's tendency to continuously insult judicial personal (judges and clerks) has been the subject of past comment as in **Minister of Co-Operative Governance and Traditional Affairs (supra)** but it seems that this has no effect on his conduct. The court will deal with other similar issues below.

[16] De Beer further argued that there was a misconception to what constitutes a court order. He argued that the mere pronouncement of an order in court by the presiding judge does not in itself render the order enforceable. Such order only becomes binding and enforceable once it has been properly documented, signed by the Registrar and sealed with the official seal of the court. This argument has no merit.

[17] De Beer further argued that the Registrar, who is not a judicial officer, by altering or correcting a typed order without the formal intervention of the court, usurps judicial functions when purporting to correct a typed order encroaching upon judicial functions. This is impermissible because the Registrar is not the court. He however counter argues his own argument by stating that the Registrar is not expected to make any material errors. Again the argument lacks any merit.

[18] The constitutional attack by De Beer against the corrected court orders is so vague and without any substance that it needs little if any discussion. On his own version the

orders granted by Lenyai and Van der Westhuizen JJ in the two matters are not challenged. The challenge is against the later documentation of the respective orders to be invalid and unconstitutional, De Beer argues that an order pronounced by a Judge in court does not render that order enforceable. It is only after the order is properly documented, signed by the Registrar and sealed with the official seal of the court that it becomes enforceable. This is with respect incorrect. The documentation afterwards is only embodiment of the pronounced order.

[19] The interpretation of Rule 42 by De Beer leaves much to be desired and he failed to note the contents of Rule 42(1)(b) of the Uniform Rules. This subrule empowers the court to *mero motu* rescind or vary (b) an order or judgment in which there is an ambiguity, patent error or omission. This enables a court to correct a clerical, arithmetical or other error in its judgment or order to give effect to its true intention. This exception is confined to the mere correction of an error in expressing the judgment or order; it does not extend to altering its intended sense or substance. **Erasmus supra D1 Rule 42-29 and S v Wells 1990 (1) SA 816 (A) at 820 C.**

[20] It is further clear from **Erasmus supra** that the High Court has the inherent competence to correct an incorrect typed version of the court order to correspond with the order which was pronounced by the court. A similar approach was followed in **Isaacs v Williams 1983 (2) SA 723 (NC)** and in **Firestone South Africa (Pty) Ltd V Gentiruco AG 1977 (4) SA 298 (A) at 306-307**. The court there dealt with the status of a court after pronouncing an order to be *functus officio* but as an exception thereto held that a court may supplement or alter the order in respect of accessory or consequential matters not altering the material terms of the order. If any error in a court order, whether non-material, has to be formally enrolled on the court rolls to correct non-material errors, the result will be that the already congested court rolls will be burdened with trivial applications using precious court resources and time that other matters will be enrolled on later days resulting in what De Beer tries to prevent and that is to ensure access to court on the earliest possible time. Clogging the roll with these trivial issues is not in the interest of justice and will counter section 34 of the Constitution to ensure timeous access to court for real disputes. De Beer's relief sought is counter productive and clearly without any foundation.

[21] If the above is applied to the SARB and SAHPRA cases the correct finding will be that the correction of the typed versions of the orders after the order s were granted in court is justified and in line with the practice as set out in Rule 42 (1) (b) and the relevant case law. The argument by De Beer is unconvincing and his constitutional challenge cannot

succeed. If what he proposes is granted it would result in an administrative minefield for court personal. The court is further not convinced that the mere typing and subsequent corrections to a typographical error qualifies as an administrative decision. The typing of the order does not amount to an administrative decision subject to a review as envisaged in Rule 53 and the provisions of The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000.

[22] Returning to the Notice of Motion the relief sought in prayers 5 to 9 is still born. The corrected typographical errors do not amount to administrative action of kind and no relief is granted.

[23] The relief sought in prayer 10 of the Notice of Motion is superfluous in that is what the administrative personal in the Office of the Registrar and Court Manager ought to do when issuing typed version of court orders from the different courts. The further attempt to engage with the management of the Equality Court, Tax Court or any other statutory forum regarding the performance of office duties has no merit. This court cannot prescribe to these courts directives concerning those courts functioning. Such proposed directives as to correctly complete orders regarding citations, accurate reflection of the orders and other is another unsuccessful attempt to be prescriptive to officials. The request is refused.

[24] The interdict sought in prayer 11 of the Notice of Motion is refused. To obtain an interdict the applicant has to allege and prove certain requirements for an interdict. There is nothing in the founding papers justifying such relief. De Beer is referred to **Erasmus supra D6-1 and further** on interdicts in general. It would serve the purpose to acquaint himself with the requisites for a final and interlocutory interdict and what needs to be alleged and proved. There is no indication of irreparable harm suffered by De Beer. He is the author of his own demise by stalling the process to correct the non-material errors on the typed court orders. The applicants do not make any case for the granting of an interdict or to prohibit the Registrar and Court Manager to have non-material errors in typed court orders corrected. Rule 42(1)(b) and the relevant case law is clear that what the clerks have been doing is not illegal nor unconstitutional.

[25] The balance of the relief sought in prayers 12 to 15 is superfluous because that it what the administrative court personal is doing all along. As held *supra*, the actions by the court personal do not amount to any administrative action subject to review. It is correct that the matter was enrolled as a special motion but that does not elevate the application in importance. The reason was the non-compliance with the directive on

volume. All applications are important to the individuals involved but this does not elevate this application to be more important than other applications.

COSTS:

[26] The normal rule is that costs follow success. There is no reason why that should not apply in this matter. The argument by De Beer in par [par 35] of his heads of arguments that there was a selective targeting of the applicants' representatives amounting to unconstitutional discrimination and undermines the right to access to court is without any foundation. To further argue in par [44] the representatives try to shield themselves from potential accountability and misconduct is completely void of any truth. The allegation that their conduct is a misuse of public funds in pursuing personal vendettas is as far as the west apart from the east.

[27] These allegations, rounded off in par [46] of the heads of arguments that the attorneys mislead the court regarding their clients' positions and their participation in the es proceedings without formal authority, is indicative of the unacceptable conduct of De Beer. He is the reason for the matters delay by his frivolous conduct contesting the correcting of non-material aspects in the orders.

[28] It was mentioned supra that the conduct of De Beer leaves much to be desired. He was very generous in his insults to all who disagree with him. He constantly accused the Registrar and the Office Manager of gross negligence, reckless approach to the documentation of court orders, their misconception of what constitutes court orders, invalid conduct, etc. his conduct is unbecoming.

[29] I fail to find that the relief sought will enhance the provisions of sections 33 and 34 of the Constitution. There is nothing unlawful or procedurally unfair in the way that typographical and similar errors in court orders are corrected. The present way of correcting orders as provided for in Rule 42(1)(b) is to ensure legal clarity and certainty. De Beer accuses **SARB** and **SAHPRA** of interjecting themselves in these proceedings to obscure their own irregularities and delaying the applicants' progression towards a full court appeal. the facts are clear that the opposite is true.

[30] It was mentioned supra that De Beer accused DJP Ledwaba of dragging heels for not allocating a date for hearing. He bemoaned his position with the previous JP Mlambo in this regard. He levelled accusations against Van der Westhuizen J at the JSC. He will leave no stone unturned to raise his objections. He objected to this court hearing the application in the 3rd court and not by a full court of the division.

[31] it was necessary to request him on several occasions during address not to interrupt the court but to listen to questions posed. He clearly overstepped all boundaries during address to “warn” Advocate Berger appearing obo SAHPRA that he, De Beer, will personally oppose any application by Mr Berger should he appear before the JSC for consideration of appointment to the bench. This was done in open court in the presence of Mr Berger’s junior, Advocate Ncloko, and Advocate Kromhout appearing obo SARB. He was requested to withdraw this allegation, but it is illustrative of De Beer’s disrespect the judiciary and others.

[32] His final complaint was that he is referred to as a “layman”. This was not done during these proceedings but in the SCA in the matter of **Minister of Co-Operative Governance and Traditional Affairs (supra)**. He was taken to task in that judgment that his unjustifiable defamatory scurrilous utterances against judicial officers will not be tolerated. He seems not to take this advice to heart.

[33] De Beer bemoaned the situation that, in view thereof that he was referred to as a “layman”, like all other persons appearing without legal representation, he found it more difficult to engage with the office of a judge and that legal representatives had an almost straight door off access. This is not true. All parties have access to a judge via the judge’s clerk. This is again indicative of De Beers disrespect for the judiciary. In the matter of SARB all communications with the clerk of Vander Westhuizen J’s clerk was via E-mail copying the other party. This is another example of De Beer’s attitude.

[33] Having considered all aspects above the court is of the view that the applicants be ordered to pay the costs of the respondents inclusive of counsels’ fees.

ORDER:

1. The application (dated 1 May 2025) is dismissed.
2. The applicants is to pay the costs of the respondents SARB and SAHPRA on an attorney-and-client-scale on the appropriate scale “B”, including the costs of two counsel where employed.
3. The applicants are to pay the wasted costs of both respondents SARB and SAHPRA of the earlier urgent application on 13 May 2025 on a party-and-party scale on scale “B”, the costs of two counsel included where appointed.

Signed at Pretoria on January 2026.

HOLLAND-MUTER J
Judge of the Pretoria High Court

APPEARANCES:

APPLICANTS: R de Beer (in person)

RESPONDENTS: SARB Advocate E Kromhout

SAHPRA: Advocate J Berger and Advocate Y Ncloko

DATE IN COURT: 28 October 2025 (Judgment reserved)

DATE DELIVERED: 2 January 2026 (On Electronic file on CaseLines)