



**IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
MPUMALANGA DIVISION, MBOMBELA**

CASE NO: 2107/2025

(1)	REPORTABLE: YES/NO
(2)	OF INTEREST TO THE JUDGES: YES/NO
(3)	REVISED
<u>02 October 2025</u> DATE	 SIGNATURE

In the matter between:

DN SIBANYONI

APPLICANT

And

THE SPEAKER OF THE CITY OF MBOMBELA

FIRST RESPONDENT

THE MAYOR OF THE CITY OF MBOMBELA

SECOND RESPONDENT

THE CITY MANAGER OF THE CITY OF MBOMBELA

THIRD RESPONDENT

THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF MBOMBELA

FOURTH RESPONDENT

THE MEC FOR COOPERATIVE GOVERNANCE

FIFTH RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT

Mangena AJ

[1] Ms Delight Ntombifuthi Sibanyoni (the applicant) was employed by the City of Mbombela as a Chief Financial Officer (CFO) with effect from 1 February 2023. The contract was to endure for a period of 5 years until 31 January 2028. The appointment has not been without difficulty, as the facts below will demonstrate. Those with power instigated the termination of her appointment, and the Municipal Council of the City of Mbombela succumbed to the pressure on 30 April 2025 and summarily terminated her contract. She approached this court for urgent relief, challenging the lawfulness of the decisions of the Council and its instigators.

Background

[2] The background facts are as follows: The City of Mbombela advertised a post of a CFO. At the time of the advertisement, the applicant was acting in the position of the CFO. The minimum requirements listed in the advertisements were the following: Bachelor's degree in the fields of accounting, financial management, economics or chartered accountant, a valid driving licence and no criminal record, and 5 years of management experience at the middle management level.

[3] She applied for the post and went through all the recruitment processes until the Council confirmed her appointment in its sitting on 31 January 2023, in accordance with the applicable legislative prescription.

[4] In compliance with the provisions of section 56(5) of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 (“the Systems Act”), the Municipal Council informed the then MEC for local government, Mr Mandla Msibi (Msibi), of the appointment process and its outcome within the prescribed time limit of 14 days. At this point, the applicant had already assumed her position.

[5] On 12 April 2023, Msibi dispatched a letter to the Mayor informing him that the Department of Co-Operative Governance and Traditional Affairs had received allegations of misrepresentation on the Curriculum Vitae (CV) of the CFO. He requested the municipality to conduct an investigation regarding the CV of the CFO and submit a report to his office by 18 April 2023, a mere period of 5 days.

[6] Acting on the dictates of the MEC, the Executive Mayor conducted the investigation and submitted a report to the MEC for noting. The report is dated 12 May 2023, and it is not clear from the papers when the same was received by Msibi.

[7] On 12 July 2023, Msibi, having received the report from the Executive Mayor, notified the municipality that he does not concur with the appointment of Ms Sibanyoni (the applicant) as the CFO of the City of Mbombela Local Municipality based on misrepresentation. He then directed the Municipal Council to rescind its decision on the appointment of the CFO and inform his office regarding the implementation within 30 days. This did not happen as the Speaker of the Council did not agree, as according to him, the MEC had 14 days within which to indicate if there was any contravention of the law in the appointment of the CFO. When the MEC did not indicate any issues, the Council proceeded with the appointment, and the MEC was free to approach the court for any relief he desired.

[8] Msibi took the guidance of the Speaker and instituted legal proceedings against the municipality, the Executive Mayor, the Municipal Manager, the Municipal Council, the Speaker and Ms Sibanyoni, in which he sought the following orders:

8.1 Condonation of any delay, if any, occasioned by his failure to timeously launch this application as envisaged in section 56(5) of the Systems Act.

8.2 A declaration that the appointment of Ms Sibanyoni to the position of CFO by the first Respondent is null and void in terms of sub-sections 2(a) and (b) of the Systems Act.

8.3 Alternatively, directing the Speaker of the Council of the Municipality to convene a Special Municipal Council meeting in terms of section 37 of the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998, to consider the validity of the appointment of Ms Sibanyoni to the position of CFO.

[9] In the affidavit filed in support of the prayers, Msibi found his powers in section 56 of the Systems Act as well as section 41 of the Constitution dealing with Co-operative Government and Intergovernmental Relations. He believed that the Systems Act provides for his concurrence in the appointment of the CFO and other section 56 managers directly accountable to the Municipal Manager.

[10] The CFO, who was the sixth respondent, opposed the application and filed an opposing affidavit in which she comprehensively dealt with the allegations regarding her suitability for the post, namely, the alleged misrepresentation in her CV. She insinuates unwarranted interference by Msibi in the affairs of the municipality due to the financial interests he has in the allocation of tenders. She says Msibi agreed to her appointment as he was represented throughout the recruitment process. Lastly, she says Msibi was actuated by malice and vindictiveness due to their love relationship that started in 2016 when he was the Speaker of the Council of the Municipality of Mbombela and ended in 2018. Msibi is accordingly using his official power to settle personal scores and is determined to derail her career progress whenever he can.

[11] Msibi was removed from the portfolio of Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs and was succeeded by Mr Speedy Katisho Mashilo (Mashilo). Almost a year after Msibi's institution of the legal proceedings, Mashilo withdrew the application through his lawyers on 29 October 2024. Ordinarily, this would have been the end of the ordeal for the applicant, but not in the Mbombela Municipality, which has become a feeding trough

for avaricious politicians and business people alike. The withdrawal was a temporary reprieve as Mashilo was to strike again, and this time without notice to the applicant as to what led to the change in position. He owed her no explanation – after all, he is in charge. He is the MEC.

[12] On 4 April 2025, Mashilo addressed a letter to the Executive Mayor in which he stated as follows:

“[2] The municipality was advised through the office of the Executive Mayor that, the office of the MEC was not supporting the appointment of the Chief Financial Officer due to the misrepresentation on the curriculum vitae. The municipality was further advised to take the matter to council so that, a decision can be made to reverse the appointment of the Chief Financial Officer and that within **30 days** the municipality to inform the office of the MEC in this regard.

[3] The Department still maintains that, the advice that was provided through a letter dated **12 July 2023** still stands.”

[13] The Executive Mayor did not disappoint. He cajoled the Speaker to convene a council meeting on 30 April 2025, where he surreptitiously sneaked in the report calling for the rescission of the decision taken in 2023 for the appointment of the CFO. The report was adopted by the Council and brought to an end the appointment of the applicant as CFO of the City of Mbombela, effective from 1 June 2025.

This Application

[14] The applicant brought an urgent application against the Speaker of the Municipality, the Mayor, the City Manager, Council and the MEC for the Department of Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs, in which she sought the following relief:

14.1 Declaring the directive of the fifth respondent to the fourth respondent unlawful and setting it aside.

14.2 Declaring the report of the third respondent unlawful and setting it aside.

14.3 Declaring the resolution of the fourth respondent dated 30 April 2025 unlawful and setting it aside.

[15] The application is opposed by the Mayor, the Council, as well as the MEC. The Speaker filed an explanatory affidavit on the advice of his legal representatives. He aligns himself with the case of the applicant and says that the Council does not have the power to rescind its own decision. Only a court of law can do so. The other Respondents defend the position of the Council and submit that the MECs (Mashilo and Msibi) were entitled to act in the manner they did in order to ensure that there is compliance with legislative prescripts.

Preliminary Points

[16] This matter came before me in the urgent court on 9 September 2025. It was the second time that it was enrolled in the urgent court, and the following paragraphs indicate how it happened.

[17] The applicant first enrolled the matter in the urgent court on 13 May 2025 before Fourie AJ, who struck it from the roll for want of urgency. He ordered the applicant to pay the costs of the opposing respondents on a party and party scale B, which costs shall include the costs of two counsel where employed. The second to fourth respondents were ordered to pay costs to the applicant in respect of the withdrawn application. The parties were directed to approach the Registrar for the allocation of a trial date on the normal motion court roll.

[18] The applicant, through her attorneys, approached the office of the Judge President for a special allocation. The Judge President, writing in response to the request, said: The parties can re-enrol their matter on the urgent court roll should they wish to do so. However, they are directed to comply with the Rules of Court and the Practice Directive.

[19] At the commencement of the hearing, I enquired from the parties if urgency is still an issue in view of the order of Fourie AJ. The respondents took the view that the applicant still has to pass the urgency test since the matter was in the urgent court and the provisions of Rule 6(12) are applicable. The applicant, through his counsel, contended otherwise and submitted that the matter, properly contextualised, is a special allocation by the Judge President who has designated the urgent court to be the forum to hear it. Even if the respondents do not agree with this interpretation, the matter is still urgent in view of the subsequent events, in particular, the pending recruitment process the municipality has embarked on. If the matter were to be heard on the normal roll, there would not be substantial redress in due course. I gave an order that the matter is urgent, and that my reasons will follow with the judgment.

[20] The principles governing urgency are trite, and the requirements thereof have been the subject of many cases. There is a general consensus that the ultimate test, as espoused in *East Rock Trading 7 (Pty) Ltd and Another v Eagle Valley Granite (Pty) Ltd and Others*,¹ is whether the applicant will obtain substantial redress if the matter were to be heard on a normal roll. The determination of whether or not the applicant will obtain substantial redress in due course is made on a case-by-case basis, depending on the facts. As it is often said, substantial redress is not the same as irreparable harm.

[21] On the facts of this case, the respondents argued strenuously that the applicant cannot use financial hardship as a reason to support her contention for urgency and urged me to consider the relief she may possibly get at the CCMA or in the Labour Court. As I listened to the respondents, they did not seriously contest the applicant's submission that she is suffering harm as a result of the impugned decision taken by the respondents. Indeed, it is so that harm alone does not determine urgency but needs to be assessed against the possible redress in future if it is not eradicated instantly.

¹ *East Rock Trading 7 (Pty) Ltd and Another v Eagle Valley Granite (Pty) Ltd and Others* [2011] ZAGPJHC 196.

[22] The applicants countered the respondents on the need for the court to vindicate the rule of law as an incident of the principle of legality. People employed to exercise public power should at all material times observe the limits of their power and exercise it within the bounds of the Constitution. The violation of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights should not be tolerated. With this, I agree. It is for this reason that I ruled that the matter is urgent and deserves to be heard in time in order to eradicate the continuous harm the applicant was being subjected to in violation of her rights by the people employed to exercise public power for lawful purposes and not for self-enrichment, and personal vindictiveness disguised as legislative oversight. As stated in *Apleni v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another*:²

“Where allegations are made relating to abuse of power by a Minister or other public officials, which may impact upon the Rule of Law, and may have a detrimental impact upon the public purse, the relevant relief sought ought normally be urgently considered.”

[23] In *Millennium Waste Management (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson, Tender Board: Limpopo Province and Others*,³ Jafta J urged the High Courts to give priority to review applications. He said the following:

“In conclusion there is one further matter that needs to be mentioned. It appears that in some cases applicants for review approach the High Court promptly for relief but their cases are not expeditiously heard and as a result by the time the matter is finally determined, practical problems militating against the setting-aside of the challenged decision would have arisen. Consequently the scope of granting an effective relief to vindicate the infringed rights becomes drastically reduced. It may help if the High Court, to the extent possible, gives priority to these matters.”

[24] The second preliminary point related to the lack of jurisdiction. The respondents argued that this Court does not have jurisdiction and that the applicant should have instituted proceedings in the Labour Court. There is simply no merit to this tired argument.

² *Apleni v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another* [2018] 1 All SA 728 (GP) para 10.

³ *Millennium Waste Management (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson, Tender Board: Limpopo Province and Others* 2008 (2) SA 481 (SCA).

The Constitutional Court has authoritatively stated in *Baloyi v Public Protector and Others*⁴ that:

“... the mere fact that a dispute is located in the realm of labour and employment does not exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court. As this court held in *Gcaba*:

‘(T)he LRA does not intend to destroy causes of action or remedies and s 157 should not be interpreted to do so. Where a remedy lies in the High Court, s 157(2) cannot be read to mean that it no longer lies there and should not be read to mean as much ... If only the Labour Court could deal with disputes arising out of all employment relations, remedies would be wiped out, because the Labour Court (being a creature of statute with only selected remedies and powers) does not have the power to deal with the common-law or other statutory remedies’.”

[25] The applicant challenges the power of the MEC to dictate that the Municipal Council rescind its decision. Aligned to this, whether the MEC is in law required to concur in the appointment of a section 56 manager. These are matters located in the constitution as they implicate an exercise of public power. Absent lawful power, the decision is unlawful and a court of law, including the High Court, has jurisdiction to review and set it aside on the basis of the principle of legality. The point on the lack of jurisdiction is dismissed.

[26] The MEC (Mashilo) raised the point of *res judicata*, and I will assume it was in relation to urgency, as the merits were not argued before Fourie AJ. I have already made an order on urgency, and the reasons are furnished above. The merits are not *res judicata*.

Merits

[27] The applicant approached this court to vindicate the rule of law. She alleges that the two MECs (Msibi and Mashilo) are exercising their powers outside the law, more especially when it comes to the appointment of section 56 managers. The legislation does

⁴ *Baloyi v Public Protector and Others* 2022 (3) SA 321 (CC) para 45.

not provide for their concurrence in the appointment of the incumbent to the section 56 position. She also says the Municipal Council of Mbombela does not have the power to rescind its own decision. Once a decision is taken, it is binding until reviewed and set aside by a court of law.

[28] I propose to consider this matter from the decision of Msibi dated 12 April 2023, when he requested the Executive Mayor to conduct an investigation regarding the CV of the CFO. The letter does not state the source of his power to make the “request”. There is, however, nothing wrong with an MEC responsible for Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs acting on allegations of maladministration and irregular appointments in a municipality falling under his jurisdiction. The law allows him to do so. It is unfortunate that his advisors used the wrong word, “concurrence”. Section 56 does not require an MEC to concur in the appointment of the manager. All that it says is that the Municipal Council must, within 14 days of the date of appointment, inform the MEC for local government of the appointment process and outcome. Nowhere does it use the word “concur”, nor does it give him/her power to play any role in the appointment process.

[29] If it comes to the attention of the MEC that a section 56 post was filled in contravention of this (the Systems Act and not any other Act), the MEC for local government must take steps to enforce compliance. The steps may include an application to the court and must be done within 14 days of becoming aware of the contravention.

[30] When the MEC wrote a letter to the Executive Mayor, he was acting in terms of section 56(6), taking an appropriate step to ensure that the Municipal Council complies with the Act by ensuring that a suitable, qualified person is appointed to the post.

[31] Section 106 of the Systems Act empowers the MEC to request the Municipal Council or Municipal Manager to provide a report in cases where he or she believes that the municipality does not perform a statutory obligation or that there is maladministration or serious malpractice occurring in the municipality. He or she may also designate a person to investigate the matter. The purpose of section 106 was explained in *MEC for*

*Local Government, Western Cape v Matzikama Local Municipality and Others*⁵ as follows:

“It is part of the system for the monitoring, by provincial executive, of local governments so that the performance of local governments may be strengthened and improved, and municipal officials be held accountable for their administration. Section 106 is therefore a mechanism by which an MEC may investigate allegations that serious problems have arisen relating to the administration and governance of a municipality. The purpose of activating the mechanism is to obtain the necessary facts so that the source of the problem can be identified, with a view to remedying the weakness in the system.”

[32] Msibi was correct to request the Council, through the Executive Mayor, to conduct the investigation and furnish him with a report. The timeline given was too short for anyone to conduct a meaningful investigation, and this suggests in the strongest way that the request was more of a compliance than a need to conduct a fair, objective and independent investigation on the allegations he received. The applicant decries this “investigation” and contends that it was malicious and not for a lawful purpose. When one has regard to the fact that Msibi, as the MEC, was represented throughout the recruitment process, it is difficult to dismiss this contention. The applicant has a point.

[33] Upon receipt of the report, Msibi, believing that he has a legal weapon in his hands to reinstate the removal of the CFO, wrote to the Executive Mayor that he does not “concur” with the appointment. As stated above, this was an exercise of power he did not have. He was wrong to think that he was required to concur. All actions following this erroneous belief were consequent upon his exercising an unlawful power. His direction to the Municipal Council to rescind its decision on the appointment of the CFO was based on the wrong reading of the law. He had no power to direct the Municipal Council to rescind its decision. In any event, councillors of the municipality perform constitutional duties and are, in law, not allowed to submit to unlawful instructions of the MEC. They

⁵ *MEC for Local Government, Western Cape v Matzikama Local Municipality and Others* 2023 (3) SA 521 (SCA) para 17.

should, in the performance of their duties, be independent and act in the best interests of the municipality.

[34] When the municipality did not act on his dictates, Msibi launched a court application where the issue relating to the appointment of the CFO was placed at the centre stage. At the heart of this application was a challenge to the lawfulness of the Municipal Council's resolution to appoint the applicant as the CFO of the municipality. All relevant parties were invited to participate in these proceedings, including the Mayor, the Municipal Manager, the Speaker, the Council itself, as well as the applicant.

[35] Only the CFO (applicant) joined issue with Msibi. She was supported by the Speaker. In opposing the application, the applicant sets out in detail her qualifications, experience and the process she underwent before being appointed. This application was not pursued until Msibi left office.

[36] The new MEC (Mashilo), in his capacity as the successor in rights and obligations, considered the facts surrounding the application, including the allegations levelled against the applicant and decided to withdraw the application. The withdrawal of the application brought to an end a legal dispute between the applicant and the MEC (Mashilo) insofar as her appointment to the position of the CFO is concerned. This is predicated on the doctrine of finality.

[37] In *Zuma v Secretary of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the Public Sector Including Organs of State and Others*,⁶ the Constitutional Court opens its judgment with the following instructive words:

“[1] Like all things in life, like the best of times and the worst of times, litigation must, at some point, come to an end ... legal certainty and finality of judgments are the oxygen without which the rule of law languishes, suffocates and perishes”.

⁶ *Zuma v Secretary of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the Public Sector Including Organs of State and Others* 2021 (11) BCLR 1263 (CC) para 1.

[38] I am aware that a withdrawal of court proceedings cannot be equated to a judgment of the court. The point I am simply making is that Mashilo made a decision to withdraw the application. The applicant and all other parties participating in the court action acted on the basis of that decision and arranged their lives and operations in line with it. Once an administrator makes a decision, he or she is bound by it.

[39] In *Mncwabe v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others*,⁷ the Constitutional Court dealt extensively with the doctrine of finality and said:

“Functus officio

[42] ... this doctrine entails that once something is done, it cannot be undone, reversed or otherwise altered by the decision-maker. This is because the decision-maker would have exhausted her authority and relinquished her jurisdiction over the matter by taking a final decision. The finality of a decision is central to the doctrine’s operation. The doctrine promotes certainty and stability and it ameliorates prejudice and injustice occasioned to those who would rely on otherwise wavering decisions.

[40] In *Retail Motor Industry Organisation and Another v Minister of Water & Environmental Affairs and Another*,⁸ the Supreme Court of Appeal held the following with regard to the doctrine:

“... first, the principle applies only to final decisions; secondly, it usually applies where rights or benefits have been granted – and thus when it would be unfair to deprive a person of an entitlement that has already vested; thirdly, an administrative decision-maker may vary or revoke even such a decision if the empowering legislation authorises him or her to do so (although such a decision would be subject to procedural fairness having been observed and any other conditions); fourthly, the *functus officio* principle does not apply to the amendment or repeal of subordinate legislation.

⁷ *Mncwabe v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others* 2024 (1) SACR 447 (CC) para 42.

⁸ *Retail Motor Industry Organisation and Another v Minister of Water & Environmental Affairs and Another* 2014 (3) SA 251 (SCA) para 25.

[41] A useful exposition of the doctrine is advanced by Pretorius:⁹

“The *functus officio* doctrine is one of the mechanisms by means of which the law gives expression to the principle of finality. According to this doctrine, a person who is vested with adjudicative or decision-making powers may, as a general rule, exercise those powers only once in relation to the same matter. This rule applies with particular force, but not only, in circumstances where the exercise of such adjudicative or decision-making powers has the effect of determining a person’s legal rights or of conferring rights or benefits of a legally cognizable nature on a person. The result is that once such a decision has been given, it is (subject to any right of appeal to a superior body or functionary) final and conclusive. Such a decision cannot be revoked or varied by the decision-maker.”

[42] The MEC (Mashilo) took a decision that the appointment of the applicant as the CFO is legal, and is put beyond doubt by the explanatory affidavit filed by the Speaker of the municipality. He states as follows:

“Mr Mashilo, the current MEC withdrew the review application and that withdrawal brought finality to the matter... shortly after his appointment as MEC, and after he was appraised of the review application internally the MEC convened a meeting with the Applicant, Mayor, Municipal Manager, Chief Director of the Department and HOD. In that meeting he asked the Applicant to make a representation regarding the alleged misrepresentation so that he could make a decision. The Applicant made the representation in that meeting.

The next meeting, the MEC convened shortly before he withdrew the review application on the same issue was with me, the Mayor, the Chief Whip, the Municipal Manager, and the eight full time Councillors who are appointed MMCs. In that meeting, the MEC was accompanied by the HOD of the Department. He informed us he has considered the matter and the representations that were made to him by the Applicant and as the Department, they have done their own internal investigations and have concluded that there was no merit in the allegation that the Applicant has misrepresented in her CV.”

⁹ D M Pretorius ‘The origins of the *functus officio* doctrine, with specific reference to its application in administrative law’ (2005) 122 SALJ 832 at 832.

[43] The Municipal Manager and the Mayor have not disputed the assertions made by the Speaker. In motion proceedings, affidavits serve as evidence, and what comes from the Speaker is unchallenged evidence. The MEC (Mashilo) himself chose not to say anything on this recording of events and what was said in his name. I therefore find without hesitation that the MEC (Mashilo) has properly applied his mind to the issue regarding the suitability of the applicant to assume the position of the CFO. Council of the municipality, represented by the Speaker, the Executive Mayor, and the Municipal Manager, agreed with the MEC (Mashilo) that the decision by the Council to appoint the applicant was valid and no legal basis existed for its challenge. They, in support of the decision, agreed to the withdrawal of the application, fully aware of its effects on the municipality.

[44] The subsequent decision by MEC (Mashilo) on 4 April 2025 to still require the Council to table the issue for discussion was unlawful. The decision made previously that there was no merit to the allegations against the CFO remained valid until reviewed or set aside.

[45] The decision by the Executive Mayor to table a report without notice to the Speaker and the applicant violated the applicant's right to be heard on an issue where she had a vested right.

[46] Finally, the termination letter by the City Manager written to the applicant records that the Council resolved to terminate the appointment "as a result of MEC for CoGTA not concurring with your appointment". The termination was effected for the wrong reason and unrelated to the allegation of misrepresentation. The Council relied on a non-existent law to terminate the appointment of its employee, acting on the dictates of the MEC, who does not clearly understand his powers and duties, or he simply acted ignorantly to perpetuate an unlawful removal of the CFO.

[47] It is concerning that an MEC with unlimited exposure to legal advice both internally and externally can choose to be so reckless in the execution of his duties and risk

plunging the municipality into financial chaos. The removal of the CFO was, based on the facts before me, actuated by malice, sinister motives and desire to perpetuate illegality. It was not for a lawful purpose.

[48] It follows that the application should succeed, and the resolution of the Municipal Council of the City of Mbombela dated 30 April 2025 is declared unlawful and set aside.

[49] The municipality, more especially the Executive Mayor and the Council, failed in their duties and allowed themselves to be dictated to by the MEC, Mashilo. They should all be liable for the costs on an attorney and client scale, jointly and severally liable, one paying the other to be absolved.

A black rectangular box redacting the signature of the judge.

M.I. MANGENA AJ
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
MPUMALANGA DIVISION, MBOMBELA

Appearances

For the Applicant: Adv. T.S Ngwenya

Instructed by: Nthabiseng Madoa Attorneys INC.

For the First Respondent: Gerhard Lourens INC.

For the Second - Fourth Respondents: Adv. Zwane

Instructed by: WS Nkosi Attorneys INC.

For the Fifth Respondent: Adv. M.W Dlamini

Instructed by: Office of the State Attorney Mbombela

Heard On: 09 September 2025

Delivered On: 02 October 2025