

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA,

FREE STATE DIVISION. BLOEMFONTEIN

Reportable: NO

Of interest to other judges: NO

Circulate to Magistrates: NO

Case number: 778/2017

In the matter between:

J. G. V. R.

1st Applicant

E. V. R.

2nd Applicant

and

F. W. C. L.

Respondent

HEARD ON: 4 MAY 2017

JUDGMENT BY: DAFFUE, J

DELIVERED ON: 18 MAY 2017

I INTRODUCTION

[1] This is an application for the setting aside of two *subpoenae duces tecum* issued in divorce proceedings. There is no doubt that emotions are

running high insofar as the plaintiff in the divorce action entered into an extra-marital affair with the first applicant in this application and these two parties eventually married each other the weekend after the divorce proceedings were finalised. The defendant in the divorce action is responsible for the issuing of the *subpoenae duces tecum*. Although the bonds of marriage have been dissolved on 23 August 2016, the hearing in respect of plaintiff's patrimonial claim based on the accrual system was postponed to 21, 22 and 24 February 2017. Those days have come and passed in the meantime.

II. THE PARTIES

[2] The first applicant is J. G. V. R., a major male person. As mentioned *supra*, first applicant is now married to the plaintiff in the divorce matter, M. A. L.. Second applicant is E. V. R., a major female person and the former wife of first applicant. Both applicants are represented by the same firm of attorneys and Adv. AS Sieberhagen appeared before me on their behalf.

[3] Respondent is F. W. C. L., a major male person and the defendant in the divorce action instituted against him by M. A. L. under case no. 637/2013. Adv. SD Wagener SC appeared before me on his behalf.

III THE RELIEF CLAIMED

[4] In terms of the notice of motion issued on 15 February 2017 applicants seek condonation for non-compliance with the rules of court on the basis of urgency and furthermore, that the two *subpoenae duces tecum* issued on 10

January 2017 under case no. 637/2013 in terms whereof they were called upon to appear before the High Court on 24 February 2017 and to submit the documents set out in the annexures to the *subpoenae* be set aside.

Applicants also seek costs on an attorney and client scale.

IV THE FINAL ORDER OF DIVORCE DATED 23 AUGUST 2016.

[5] On 23 August 2016 Mathebula AJ (as he then **was**) granted the following orders:

"1. That the bonds of marriage subsisting between plaintiff and defendant be and are hereby dissolved.

2. 2.1 The patrimonial claim in respect of the provisions of the Antenuptial Contract (accrual) is postponed to 21 February 2017, 22 February 2017 and 24 February 2017.

2.2 Both parties shall be entitled to amend their respective pleadings regarding the claim(s) referred to in paragraph 2.1 supra to further and/or better define the dispute(s) relating to such claim. The defendant's right to raise the issue of forfeiture remains reserved.

3. Each party shall deliver to the other party within 30 day (sic) from date of this order, a statement in terms of Section 7 of Act 88 of 1984 containing the following:

3.1 List of assets;

3.2 List of liabilities;

3.3 Accrual of his/her estate calculated in terms of Chapter 1 of Act 88 of 1984 as on date of divorce;

4. Both parties shall afford each other full access to all financial records and information relating to their respective estates for purposes of verification of the information referred in paragraph 3 supra, including information and/or records in the possession or custody of Du Preez Accountants, including but not limited to:

4.1 Bank Statements in respect of which the parties has (sic) or had signing powers in the past five years.

4.2 Financial records in respect of any company, partnership, close corporation and/or trust in respect of which any party has or had direct and/or indirect interest in the past five years.

5. Costs are reserved for the determination by the trial court."

(emphasis added)

V MATERIAL BACKGROUND AND COMMON CAUSE FACTS

[6] It is not my intention to give a full and detailed background of the history of the litigation, but I am of the view that the following aspects need to be considered when the evidence is evaluated infra.

[7] Respondent and his former wife, A. L., to whom I shall refer herein as A. to avoid confusion, (now married to first applicant), were married to each other

in accordance with the accrual system. As mentioned, their bonds of marriage were dissolved and the only issues to be considered in the further hearing of the matter is the patrimonial claim of A. in accordance with the accrual system and respondent's reliance on forfeiture of the benefits based on the belated amendment of March 2017 to which I shall refer again *infra*.

[8] I have not been provided with copies of the pleadings in the divorce action, but informed from the bar that respondent did not initially claim forfeiture of benefits in accordance with s 9 of the Matrimonial Property Act, 88 of 1984. However, it is apparent that respondent had this in mind at the stage when the parties agreed to postpone the adjudication of the patrimonial claim to February 2017.

[9] No amendment was sought by respondent prior to the launching of this application as anticipated *ex facie* the order of 23 August 2016. In fact, the respondent's counterclaim was amended during March 2017 and after Mathebula J heard argument and evidence during the week of 21 February 2017. I shall return to the amendment *infra*.

[10] On 10 August 2016 two *subpoenae duces tecum* were issued by respondent against applicants who were called upon to appear in court on 26 August 2016, one of the trial dates allocated for the divorce matter. Applicants brought an urgent application under case no. 3861/2016 seeking *inter alia* setting aside of the *subpoenae*. That application is not before me, but I gather from the papers that although it was opposed by respondent, he did not file

an opposing affidavit. That application was postponed *sine die* and has not been finalised yet.

[11] On 10 January 2017 respondent issued the two *subpoenae duces tecum* relevant to this application which were served sometime thereafter. These *subpoenae* are identical to the previous *subpoenae*. On 31 January 2017 applicants' attorney informed respondent's attorney in a letter annexed as annexure 11J4" to the founding affidavit, *inter alia* as follows:

1. that the documentation required were totally irrelevant to the adjudication of the accrual dispute in the divorce matter;
2. his clients were not parties to the divorce matter;
3. respondent's action is *ma/a fide* and an abuse of process;
4. respondent knew from August 2016 that second applicant was not a director of E Van Rooyen en Seuns (Pty) Ltd anymore.

[12] Respondent's attorney was requested to respond by 6 February 2017, failing which the first application referred to *supra* might be enrolled for finalization, alternatively a further application might be brought to set aside the further *subpoenae* with punitive costs.

[13] No response was received from respondent's attorney and consequently, the present application was issued on 15 February 2017 as mentioned *supra*. The application was opposed, as was the case with the first application, and *in casu* an opposing affidavit was filed on 9 March 2017, some two weeks

after the first day of the adjourned trial proceedings. Applicants replied and the matter was set down for hearing on Thursday, 4 May 2017. This was done, well-knowing that the part-heard trial between A. and respondent was postponed to be heard by Mathebula J the next week, to wit from Monday 8 to Friday 12 May 2017.

[14] It is clear that the matter, as is the case with the first application of August 2016, has become moot insofar as the trial dates have come and gone. This caused the parties to reconsider their respective positions whereupon certain communication followed. The various letters written to each other were presented to me for consideration notwithstanding the fact that these would otherwise be regarded as privileged, being settlement negotiations. I deal briefly with the contents of the letters in the next paragraphs.

[15] On 25 April 2017 Honey Attorneys wrote a letter on behalf of A. to respondent's attorneys, Prinsloo Inc of Pretoria. Attached thereto were certain bank statements. It was also stated that for purposes of adjudication of the accrual claim, A. would no longer rely on the loan obtained from first applicant and the claim of her attorneys pertaining to her legal costs. These amounts were reflected as liabilities in the amounts of R266 196,38 and R332 385A8 respectively in A.'s statement of assets and liabilities prepared in terms of s 7 of Act 88 of 1984.

[16] In response to the aforesaid letter Prinsloo Inc wrote a letter to applicants' Kimberley attorneys, Duncan and Rothman, on 25 April 2017 and

mentioned the following relating to A.'s alleged abandoning of her loan from first applicant:

"As a result thereof, we are of the respectful opinion that your clients' application set down for 4 May 2017 should not proceed. Given these new facts, we are prepared to withdraw the subpoenas brought against your clients. Kindly advise whether, in the circumstance, your clients are amendable to withdraw their application, each party to pay their own costs. In the event that your clients wish to proceed with the application, kindly note that we will ask the Court to grant a special costs order against your clients, in that the application is now moot and unnecessary."

[17] On 26 April 2017 Duncan and Rothman requested clarification as to whether all *subpoenae duces tecum* against their clients, i.e. those of 10 August 2016, 10 January 2017 (relevant in *casu*) as well as further *subpoenae* dated 10 April 2017 in respect of the forthcoming part-heard trial starting on Monday, 8 May 2017, would be withdrawn. It was suggested that in the event of withdrawal of the three sets of *subpoenae*, the applications against respondent would be withdrawn on the basis that applicants' party and party costs in respect of both applications be paid by respondent.

[18] Prinsloo Inc responded the same day, indicating that respondent would be prepared to withdraw all *subpoenae* issued against applicants, "given the new facts contained in Honey Attorneys letter dated 25 April 2017."

However, respondent was not prepared to tender any costs as requested and the following was stated:

"Furthermore, we reiterate due to the new facts contained in the letter from Honey

Attorneys dated 25 April 2017, the matter should not proceed, and proceeding with the application will incur unnecessary legal costs."

Duncan and Rothman noted the contents of the letter, but informed respondent's attorney of the instructions to proceed with the application.

[19] Hereafter heads of argument were prepared and filed by applicants' and respondent's counsel on 26 and 27 April respectively.

VI THE DISPUTES

[20] The matter has become moot insofar as the *subpoenae* that applicants wanted to set aside cannot be enforced anymore. They were called upon to appear on 24 February 2017 and that day has come and gone. The only issue to be considered at this stage is, in essence, who should pay costs. In order to consider that, I have to apply my mind to the merits and in this regard counsel presented arguments on the merits as well.

[21] Applicants rely on the following factors for the contention that the application should have succeeded on the merits:

1. the documentation required are totally irrelevant for adjudication of the accrual dispute between A. and respondent;
2. identical *subpoenae* were issued in August 2016 which caused applicants to issue application proceedings which have not been finalised yet and bearing in mind the particular circumstances, respondent acted *ma/a fide* and in abuse of process when he caused the new *subpoenae* to be issued;

3. respondent **was aware**, since August 2016, that second applicant was no longer a director of E Van Rooyen en Seuns (Pty) Ltd;
4. the request to supply the documentation set out in the *subpoenae* infringes on applicants' right of privacy.

Applicants made two points clear: firstly, that the only dispute to be adjudicated in the action between A. and respondent (based on the pleadings as in February 2017) was the calculation of the accrual in the respective estates of the parties and that respondent's pleadings had not been amended in order to seek forfeiture of the benefits that might have accrued to A.; and secondly, the documentation required from second applicant belonged to E Van Rooyen and Seuns (Pty) Ltd whilst she was to the knowledge of respondent no longer a director of the company.

[22] In his answering affidavit of 9 March 2017 respondent elected to deal with A.'s claim that she was indebted to first applicant in an amount of R266 196,38 and that the *subpoenae* were necessary to obtain documentation to investigate this claim. Nothing is said of the liability pertaining to legal costs.

[23] Insofar as respondent is of the view that A. should forfeit the benefits of the accrual system, he in no uncertain terms relies on the fact that an *interim* maintenance order was granted in A.'s favour in June 2013 and that she received these *interim* payments until finalization of the divorce action notwithstanding the fact that she and first applicant have been living together from January 2013 and that he supported her financially during that time.

This, he says, amounted to fraudulent action and the trial court may eventually find it to be material misconduct in accordance with the provisions of s 9 of the Matrimonial Property Act, 88 of 1984.

[24] Furthermore it is respondent's case that during October 2009 to November 2015 A. misappropriated funds in the amount of R1 266 310,00 belonging to Kirfjohl CC, a close corporation in which both of them were members and it is necessary to obtain the documents requested in the *subpoenae* to establish whether the funds were channelled to first applicant's bank accounts.

[25] It is not explained when respondent became aware of A.'s alleged unlawful behaviour and why respondent did not utilise Rule 43(6) procedure in order to have the *interim* maintenance order terminated or decreased. Also, it is not explained why Kirfjohl CC could not claim the amount allegedly misappropriated from A.. I accept, however, that misappropriation of the close corporation's funds will affect the value of the membership of the close corporation's members.

[26] Notwithstanding the facts apparent from the papers and submissions by counsel, one aspect that cannot be disregarded is that respondent was quite prepared to withdraw the *subpoenae* on receipt of information that A. would not rely on the loan allegedly made to her by first applicant as a liability in her estate. *Ex facie* the correspondence referred to *supra* respondent did not regard the documentation required in the *subpoenae* relevant anymore.

However, it needs to be emphasised that Prinsloo Inc were adamant that the matter should not proceed on 4 May 2017 as unnecessary costs would be incurred, but Duncan and Rothman insisted that the moot matter be argued for the court to determine costs.

VII EVALUATION OF THE EVIDENCE AND SUBMISSIONS BY THE PARTIES IN THE LIGHT OF THE AUTHORITIES AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

[27] I agree with Mr Wagener's submission that I should consider whether respondent was entitled to issue the two *subpoenae duces tecum* at the stage when they were issued. I underlined the particular phrase to emphasise the importance of the submission pertaining to timing. These *subpoenae* were issued on 10 January 2017. At that time respondent's pleadings had not been amended as anticipated in the court order of 23 August 2016 and therefore A.'s patrimonial claim relating to the accrual system was the only live issue. Much has been said about the fact that the parties to the divorce matter were obliged to provide financial records over a period of five years to indicate their interest in other entities. It is clear that financial records had to be provided by the parties in the divorce matter, i.e. A. and respondent, pertaining to entities in which they had a direct or indirect interest over the past five years. Nothing was said of third parties and in any event, those third parties such as the applicants in casu, were not part of any agreement that might have been entered into and which was made an order of court.

[28] While appreciating that applicants would probably bring a similar application to have the *subpoenae* set aside, as they did in 2016, respondent waited to the last moment to have the *subpoenae* issued and served. Consequently, the dispute could not be adjudicated prior to the hearing of the first date of trial, to wit 21 February 2017, which date was already agreed upon in August 2016. I would have expected respondent in the circumstances to have issued the *subpoenae* soon after August 2016 to ensure that any dispute in that regard was properly adjudicated long in advance of the new trial dates.

[29] As mentioned, I haven't read the pleadings in the divorce matter, but bearing in mind the allegations made by respondent in the papers before me, there can be no doubt that the relationship between him and A. (and probably first applicant) has become quite toxic. This apparently has an effect on the attorneys as well which prevented them from finding some common ground in order to ensure that this application was not argued on an opposed basis. Unnecessary costs have been incurred - in fact wasted - and it is now my duty to decide who should pay these costs.

[30] Sections 35 and 36(5) of the Superior Court Act, 10 of 2013 are applicable. Section 35 deals with the manner of securing attendance of witnesses or production of any documents in proceedings while section 36(5) reads as follows:

"(5) When a subpoena is issued to procure the attendance of any person

as a witness or to produce any book, paper or document in any proceedings, and it appears that -

(a) he or she is unable to give any evidence or to produce any book, paper or document which would be relevant to any issue in such proceedings; or

(b) such book, paper or document could properly be produced by some other person; or

(c) to compel him or her to attend would be an abuse of the process of the court, any judge of the court concerned may, notwithstanding anything contained in this section, after reasonable notice by the Registrar to the party who sued out the subpoena and after hearing that party in chambers if he or she appears, make an order cancelling such subpoena."

Rule 38(1) of the Uniform Rules of Court stipulates that a *subpoena duces tecum* shall specify the document or thing required by the witness to be produced to the court at the trial.

[31] Before I consider the issue of relevance raised by applicants, it is necessary to make the following comments. Facts and material facts only, should be pleaded in pleadings, and not evidence. A distinction must be made between the facts that have to be proved, the *facta probanda* and the facts (the evidence or *facta probantia*) that would prove those facts. (See *Moaki v Reckitt and Colman (Africa) Ltd* 1968 (3) SA 98 (A) at 102A and *Makgae v*

Sentraboer (Koooperatief) Bpk 1981 (4) SA 239 (T) at 244F-H).

[32] Bearing in mind the applicable principles, it would have been required of respondent to not only rely specifically on the fact that A. should forfeit the benefits arising from the accrual system, but to state the material facts on which his claim is based. Respondent has failed to do this, although in the amendment to the counterclaim which was filed belatedly as indicated *supra*, he does now rely on section 9 of the Matrimonial Property Act, 88 of 1984 for forfeiture of A.'s right to accrual. The only allegations pertaining to the circumstances giving rise to the breakdown of the marriage and any substantial misconduct on the part of A. are the following:

1. she improperly obtained a maintenance order *pendente lite* when she did not have a need for maintenance;
2. she proceeded to enforce the maintenance order whilst there was no need for maintenance, and
3. she delayed finalization of the divorce action unreasonably in order to obtain the advantages of the maintenance order.

[33] On respondent's own version A. and first applicant started to cohabit from January 2013 although this is denied by first applicant who states under oath that the correct date is July 2013. Fact of the matter is that the two have been staying together for a long period since obtaining of the *interim* maintenance order. It is not respondent's case that he was unaware of this

until recently and I find it strange that he did not apply for rescission of the order or decrease of the maintenance amount in accordance with the provisions of Rule 43(6) of the Uniform Rules Court.

[34] It is clear that the marriage relationship has broken down prior to January 2013. It is debateable whether, and even whilst accepting that the right to accrual must be adjudicated on date of divorce, substantial misconduct by any of the parties after an irreversible breakdown has taken place could be taken into consideration in adjudicating forfeiture of benefits. It is unnecessary to decide the issue, especially insofar as Mr Wagener is of the view that the application should be adjudicated based on the prevailing facts at the date when the *subpoenae* were issued. Bearing in mind the dispute between the parties in the divorce action, I cannot find that any of the documents mentioned in the *subpoena* of second applicant are relevant to the dispute. Even if I'm wrong, all these documents could properly be produced by anyone of the present directors of E Van Rooyen and Seuns (Pty) Ltd. These documents are the property of and supposedly under control of the company and not second applicant in her personal capacity. As mentioned, she is not a director of the company anymore and could not be directed to bring documents to court that belong to or are in the possession of a separate entity.

[35] **As is** the case with the documents required from E Van Rooyen and Seuns (Pty) Ltd, I fail to see any relevance in the documents that respondent

requires from first applicant, save for those mentioned *infra*. I am not persuaded by respondent's contention that it was necessary to inspect these documents to establish whether first applicant was in a financial position to make loans to A.. I fail to understand what documents such as first applicant's tax returns, to mention one example, have to do with the dispute between the respondent and A.. The same applies to the request that first applicant has to provide a full description of all assets owned by him, including a certain motorcycle. I have reason to believe that respondent was on a witch-hunt due to his emotional condition after having lost his erstwhile wife to a person whom he believed participated in defrauding him and/or his close corporation. Respondent probably had in mind to establish that the funds allegedly misappropriated by A. from Kirfjohl CC were channelled to first applicant. This is absolutely irrelevant pertaining to the aforesaid matrimonial dispute. The only possible item in the schedule to the *subpoena* that might be regarded as relevant is item 1.7, to wit documents such as bank statements, receipts and invoices to investigate A.'s alleged indebtedness to first applicant. I will deal with this issue *infra*.

[36] First applicant's passport and cellphone records of three telephone numbers are *inter alia* required. There can be no doubt that these are irrelevant in respect of the accrual dispute. It is not respondent's case in the amended counterclaim that A. entered into an extra-marital affair and that such affair either caused the breakdown in the marriage or that it should be

considered as material misconduct in order to substantiate the forfeiture claim. Although the judgment can be distinguished on the facts, I'm of the view that the *dicta* of Griesel J in *Meyers v Marcus and Another* 2004 (5) SA 315 (CPD) at paras [26] – [33] should be applied in *casu* as well. First applicant's personal financial position is irrelevant to the disputes between A. and respondent. It is also irrelevant whether he travelled abroad with A. in the absence of an allegation of adultery.

[37] I was tempted to make a finding that respondent's issuing of the *subpoenae duces tecum* constituted an abuse of process. No doubt a *subpoena duces tecum* must have a legitimate purpose and save for the documents required in item 1.7 of the annexure to the *subpoena duces tecum* against first applicant, the other documents required are really irrelevant for purposes of adjudication of the disputes as the pleadings stood in January 2017. I am mindful of the fact that abuse of process should only be found in exceptional circumstances and the court should be cautious to come to such a conclusion. This issue was dealt with for the first time to my knowledge about ninety years ago in *Hudson v Hudson and Another* 1927 AD 259 at 268 and more recently the Supreme Court of Appeal stated the following and I quote from *Beinash v Wixley* 1997 (3) SA 721 (SCA) at 734G - 735A:

"Ordinarily, a litigant is of course entitled to obtain the production of any document relevant to his or her case in the pursuit of the truth, unless the disclosure of the document is protected by law. The process of a subpoena is designed precisely to protect that right.

The ends of justice would be prejudiced if that right was impeded. For this reason the Court must be cautious in exercising its discretion to set aside a subpoena on the grounds that it constitutes an abuse of process. It is a power which will be exercised in rare cases, but once it is clear that the subpoena in issue in any particular matter constitutes an abuse of the process, the Court will not hesitate to say so and to protect both the Court and the parties affected thereby from such abuse."

Bearing in mind the totality and extent of the documents required - the majority being irrelevant - I was tempted to find that respondent used the rules of court for a purpose extraneous to the objective of facilitating the pursuit of the truth. See Beinash *supra* at 734G. However, I decided against such outcome.

[38] A.'s reply to the notice in terms of rule 35(3), made under oath as required, clearly directed respondent's attention to the financial affairs of first applicant and E Van Rooyen and Seuns (Pty) Ltd. It is also clear from the electronic bank transfers that other entities such as JGVR Vervoer and Van Rooyen Eiendomme were involved in making payment on behalf of first applicant to A.'s attorneys. I am prepared to accept, on this narrow issue, that there was room to obtain documents pertaining to A.'s alleged debt in order to investigate the claim fully. If this was the only issue to be considered, first applicant would have had extreme difficulty to persuade me to grant the application. As stated *supra* no *subpoena* should have been issued against second applicant and it is unnecessary to deal with the position of the particular company any further. No doubt, the application was instituted

primarily at the instance of first applicant who also deposed to the founding affidavit. *Ex facie* the application papers second respondent's involvement in drafting the affidavits and instructing attorneys was limited.

[39] If the parties were on friendly terms, and hereby I include the legal representatives as well, they would have found common ground and come to an agreement at an early stage and at the latest on 25 April 2017.

Respondent was prepared to withdraw all three sets of *subpoenae*, "given these new facts" but applicants' attorneys insisted on the matter being heard on an opposed basis, two court days before the first day of the postponed hearing. The parties now seek punitive costs orders against each other. It is difficult to fathom the logic of proceeding with an opposed application on 4 May 2017 to determine costs only. Respondent's attorneys made a laudable settlement proposal which if accepted, would have prevented the costs in respect of the drawing of heads of argument, travelling to Bloemfontein, accommodation costs and the costs of the opposed hearing. Mr Wagener had to travel back to Pretoria just to return to Bloemfontein over the weekend for the trial that started the following Monday, 8 May 2017.

[40] I have considered the submissions of Mr Wagener as well as the judgment in *Venmop v Cleverlad Projects 2016 (1) SA 78 (GJ) at para [33]*. As mentioned earlier, there is a toxic relationship between the parties which is apparent from the papers before me and to a certain extent both parties can be blamed for being vexatious, putting the other side to unnecessary trouble

and expense which they ought not to bear. Save for the one issue mentioned above, it cannot be said that the application was lacking in merit. However, I am not impressed with applicants' approach as reflected in the correspondence referred to *supra*.

[41] Having considered all aspects, those dealt with herein as well as others that might not have been stated in this judgment, I am satisfied that in the exercise of my discretion none of the parties should be burdened with the costs of the other party. They must blame themselves or call upon their legal representatives to explain why a relatively simple dispute turned into a financial nightmare. The application has become moot for the reasons mentioned *supra* and it is not necessary to make any order in that regard, save to mention that I might not have dismissed the application if it had not become moot. However, the parties are equally to be blamed for the predicament they find themselves in. The application could have been set down for the first day of the postponed divorce matter, or insofar as costs only remained relevant, it could have been reserved and argued at the end of the divorce trial. Each party shall bear their own costs.

VIII ORDERS

[42] The following orders are issued:

1. Insofar as the two *subpoenae duces tecum* issued against first and second applicants respectively have lapsed, no order is made in respect of the application to set them aside.

2. The parties shall bear their own costs in respect of this application, to wit application 778/2017.

J.P DAFFUE, J

On behalf of the applicants: Adv. AS Sieberhagen Instructed

by: Duncan & Rothman Attorneys

c/o Honey Attorneys,

Bloemfontein

On behalf of the respondent: Adv. SD Wagener SC

Instructed by: Prinsloo Attorneys c/o Symington & De Kok

Bloemfontein