THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, CAPE TOWN
Reportable
Case No: 2025-060491
In the matter between:
ROTUNDA PROPRIETARY LIMITED Applicant
and
GANASEN SAM Respondent
Heard: 6 March 2026 with further heads of argument on 13 and 25 March
2026
Delivered: 1 July 2026
This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the parties’ legal
representatives by email, publication on the Labour Court website and release to SAFLII.
The date and time for handing down judgment is deemed to be 10h00 on 1 July 2026.
______________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
DE KOCK, AJ
Introduction
[1] This is an application for an order declaring the respondent, Mr Ganasen Sam, to
be in contempt of an order granted by Acting Justice C ithi on 11 June 2025. That
order, taken by agreement between the parties, embodied a 12-month restraint of
trade in favour of the applicant, Rotunda Proprietary Limited ( “Rotunda”), to
operate within the Western Cape Province from 7 February 2025. The applicant
contends that the respondent breached the order on two occasions: first, in May
2025, by approaching an entity it identified as Future Stationery and Cleaning
Essentials CC; and second, in October 2025, by soliciting business from Access
Office Solutions (Pty) Lt d (AOS) in respect of so -called Q-Matic ticket rolls. Both
entities are listed on Annexure “CO1” to the consent order.
[2] The application was launched on 19 December 2025. It came before La grange J
on 20 January 2026, who on the ex parte papers issued a rule nisi calling on the
respondent to show cause why he should not be declared in contempt. The return
day was 30 January 2026. On that day the respondent appeared, unrepresented.
This court postponed the matter, granted leave for the respondent to obtain legal
representation, ordered the filing of supplementary affidavits, and referred the
wilfulness and mala fides leg to oral evidence.
[3] On 6 March 2026 the matter was argued in part and oral evidence was heard. Mr
Francois Bruyns testified for the respondent, called to support the defence
advanced in respect of the first breach. The respondent himself thereafter took the
stand and was cross -examined. At the conclusion of the evidence this court
reserved judgment with directions for the filing of further heads of argument. The
applicant filed supplementary heads of argument on 13 March 2026, and the
respondent filed heads of argument on 25 March 2026.
[4] There are two features that shape the analysis of this judgment. The first is that
[4] There are two features that shape the analysis of this judgment. The first is that
the underlying restraint of trade has, by effluxion of time, expired. The restraint ran
for 12 months from 7 February 2025 and came to an end on 7 February 2026, i.e.,
before oral evidence was heard on 6 March 2026 and well before this judgment.
The coercive dimension of contempt, i.e., compelling future compliance, had
accordingly fallen away and what remains is the vindication of the authority of this
court. The second is that the applicant seeks, in the alternative, the committal of
the respondent to imprisonment. Because committal is sought, this court
approaches the matter on the criminal standard of proof, which is in any event the
standard most protective of the respondent.
The order and common cause
[5] The consent order of 11 June 2025 restrains the respondent, for a period of 12
months from 7 February 2025 and within the Western Cape Province, from: (i)
being interested, engaged or concerned or employed in any capacity, whether
directly or indirectly, and whether in his personal capacity or through another entity
which sells products or renders services that compete with the products or services
supplied by the applicant to any of the customers contained on the list attached
marked “CO1”; (ii) soliciting the business from any of the applicant’s clients for
products or services supplied by the applicant, selling products sold by the
applicant to any of the applicant’s clients, rendering services rendered by the
applicant to any of the applicant’s clients or inducing any of the applicant’s clients
(identified on annexure “CO1”) to discontinue its relationship with the applicant or
reduce the scope and ext ent of such relationship; (iii) encouraging or enticing or
persuading any employee of the applicant to terminate his or her employment with
the applicant (and whether for himself or any entity in which he is directly or
indirectly interested or engaged in any capacity ); (iv) disclosing, or utilising, the
applicant’s confidential information for his personal benefit or for the benefit of any
entity with which he is directly or indirectly associated or any third party,
whatsoever; (v) and disclosing the contents of annexure “CO1”.
[6] Annexure CO1 lists various customer entities. Among them are Access Office
Solutions, which appear as item 2, and Future Stationery, which appear as item
Solutions, which appear as item 2, and Future Stationery, which appear as item
122. The status of each as a listed customer is not, as such, in dispute.
[7] The first two elements of contempt are admitted. The respondent admits the
existence of the order and admits that he had knowledge of it. The respondent in
fact consented to the order in person. What is disputed between the parties is
whether there was non -compliance with the order, and whether any non -
compliance, if any, was wilful and mala fide. Those are the questions to which the
bulk of this judgment is directed.
The legal framework
[8] Civil contempt is the wilful and mala fide refusal to comply with an order of court.
It is brought by notice of motion, in civil form, but the consequences of a finding of
contempt may include imprisonment. Its dual purpose is the vindication of the
court’s authority and, where appropriate, the coercion of compliance.1
[9] The applicant must establish that there was a court order, that the respondent had
service or knowledge of it, that there was non-compliance with it, and that the non-
compliance was wilful and mala fide. Where the applicant proves the first three
elements beyond any reasonable doubt, the evidentiary burden shifts to the
respondent to lead evidence which raises a reasonable doubt as to whether the
non-compliance was wilful and mala fide. If the respondent fails to discharge that
burden, the requisites of contempt are taken to have been established beyond
reasonable doubt. Fakie was unequivocal that the respondent does not bear a
legal burden to disprove wilfulness and mala fides ; he needs only to adduce
evidence sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt.
[10] The standard of proof depends on the relief sought.2 Where the relief sought bears
on the respondent’s freedom and security of the person, whether by committal or
by a fine, the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt applies to all four
elements. Where the relief carries no such consequence, such as a declarator, a
1 Fakie NO v CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd 2006 (4) SA 326 (SCA).
2 Matjhabeng Local Municipality v Eskom Holdings Ltd and Others; Mkhonto and Others v Compensation
Solutions (Pty) Ltd [2017] ZACC 35; 2017 (11) BCLR 1408 (CC); 2018 (1) SA 1 (CC) at para 67. The
standard of proof turns on the remedy; where the relief sought may affect the respondent’s liberty
(committal, or a suspended committal capable of activation, or a fine) the criminal standard applies; civil
remedies short of committal such as a declarator, a mandamus, or a structural interdict that do not have
the consequence of depriving an individual of their right to freedom and security of the person, may be
established on a balance of probabilities.
mandamus or a structural interdict, the civil standard of proof on a balance of
probabilities applies to wilfulness and mala fides. The applicant fixes the standard
by the relief that it seeks. Committal is sought in this matter as part of alternative
relief, and a fine is in any event among the sanctions this court may impose, each
of which attracts the criminal standard. This court accordingly determines the
application on the criminal standard. That is the standard most favourable to the
respondent and the standard which best protects the respondent’s constitutional
interests under section 12 of the Bill of Rights.3
[11] The applicant’s case in motion proceedings is to be evaluated against the
framework articulated in Plascon-Evans Paints (TVL) Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints
(Pty) Ltd.4 Where there is a genuine dispute of facts on the papers, the version of
the respondent ordinarily prevails. But the rule is not absolute. As affirmed in
Wightman t/a JW Construction v Headfour (Pty) Ltd and Another5, the respondent
must seriously and unambiguously address the fact said to be disputed ; a bare
denial, or a version that is far -fetched, untenable or palpably contradicted by
documentary evidence, will not generate a real, genuine and bona fide dispute of
fact. In contempt proceedings the same principle applies with the rider that this
court has heard oral evidence on the disputed leg of wilfulness and mala fides. The
credibility findings made on that evidence are not subject to Plascon-Evans
constraints.
[12] There are two further principles that bear emphasis in this judgment. Mere
disobedience is not enough; the disobedience must be contumacious. As the
Constitutional Court put it in Pheko and Others v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan
Municipality (No 2)6, a finding of contempt depends on a deliberate and intentional
violation made in bad faith. A respondent who genuinely, even if wrongly, believed
3 Fakie at paras 24-25.
4 [1984] 2 All SA 366 (A); 1984 (3) SA 623 (A).
3 Fakie at paras 24-25.
4 [1984] 2 All SA 366 (A); 1984 (3) SA 623 (A).
5 [2008] 2 All SA 512 (SCA); 2008 (3) SA 371 (SCA) at para 13.
6 [2015] ZACC 10; 2015 (5) SA 600 (CC); 2015 (6) BCLR 711 (CC) at paras 32 -37.
his conduct fell outside the order is not in contempt; a respondent who knew his
conduct was prohibited and proceeded anyway plainly is.
[13] This court will first deal with the alleged breach concerning Future Stationery and
Cleaning Essentials, then with the alleged breach concerning AOS, and then with
the question of wilfulness and mala fides. The appropriate sanction is dealt with at
the conclusion of this judgment.
The first alleged breach: Future Stationery / Future Products
[14] The applicant’s case is set out in the founding affidavit of Ms Michelle Robson, its
Chief Executive Officer. It says that, on or about 23 May 2025, the respondent
approached Future Stationery and Cleaning Essentials with a view to soliciting
business in d irect competition with Rotunda. As stated above, Future Stationery
and Cleaning Essentials appear on Annexure CO1 attached to the court order of
11 June 2025. The applicant says it became aware of the conduct from email
correspondence inadvertently sent to the respondent’s old Rotunda email address
by Mr Francois Bruyns, who appears in Rotunda’s database as the longstanding
contact for Future Stationery. The applicant’s attorneys, in a letter of 24 June 2025,
placed the respondent on terms. The respondent replied to the letter and the
applicant did not at that stage proceed with a contempt application, as it took the
view that the respondent had been warned.
[15] In its replying affidavit the applicant amplifies its case in two respects. First, it relies
on a tax invoice dated 3 July 2025 issued by “Future Stationery and Cleaning
Essentials” in respect of goods purchased by Rotunda, with a billing email address
and website that match those used by what the respondent calls Future Products.
Second, it relies on a company search showing that Mr Bruyns resigned as a
director of Future Products and Cleaning Essentials (Pty) Ltd on 17 March 2025,
some two months before the alleged May 2025 dealings on which the respondent
some two months before the alleged May 2025 dealings on which the respondent
relies. The applicant’s submission is that the names “Future Stationery” and
“Future Products” are, on the evidence, used interchangeably for one and the
same commercial activity, with the same contact d etails, email address and
website; that what Annexure CO1 protected was the customer relationship, not a
particular juristic person.
[16] The respondent denies the breach. He says that the entity he dealt with was Future
Products and Cleaning Essentials (Pty) Ltd, a different juristic person not listed on
CO1. He attached to his answering affidavit a confirmatory affidavit of Mr Bruyns
to that effect.
[17] Mr Bruyns testified. His evidence under cross examination did not establish a clear
division between Future Stationery (a close corporation listed on CO1) and Future
Products (a private company that is not listed on CO1). On the contrary, the same
email address, the same website and the same telephone number were used for
both. The close corporation was a deceased estate in the course of being wound
up following the death of Mr Bruyn’s father and the business of the close
corporation had b een taken over and operated under the Future Products name
from around March 2025. Mr Bruyn’s difficulty was that he could not say, in any
clear or articulate way, where the one entity ended and where the other entity
began. His evidence established that, in May 2025, there was for all practical
purposes a single business operating under two names.
The threshold difficulty that the conduct predates the court order
[18] There is a difficulty with the applicant’s reliance on the alleged breach in relation
to Future Stationery and / or Future Products that this court must address before
dealing with the merits of the alleged breach. The difficulty is this: contempt of court
is the wilful and mala fide disobedience of an existing order of court. It presupposes
an order capable of being disobeyed at the time of the conduct complained of. The
order said to have been disobeyed is the consent order of 11 June 2025. The
conduct relied upon under this leg, i.e., the approach to Future Stationery, occurred
on or about 23 May 2025 . The conduct in question therefore predates the court
order by some weeks.7
[19] The fact that the restraint is expressed to run from 7 February 2025 does not assist
the applicant here. The restraint and the order are not the same thing. The restraint
is a consensual obligation ; the order is the court’s command. A respondent may
breach the underlying restraint without being in contempt, because contempt
attaches to disobedience of the court’s command, not to the breach of the parties’
agreement in the contract of employment. Con duct preceding the command can
never be disobedience of a court order. Contempt is measured only by what the
respondent did after the order was granted and had come to the respondent’s
notice. Whatever the May 2025 approach may have been, and this court is of the
view that it was indeed a breach of the restraint, it cannot constitute contempt of
an order that did not yet exist.
[20] The only communication under this alleged breach that postdates the order is Mr
Bruyns’ email of 17 June 2025. But that was a communication from Mr Bruyns to
the respondent, enquiring about prices and invoices. It was not a solicitation by the
respondent of a listed customer based on the evidence placed before this court.
The communication from Mr Bruyns does not convert the pre-order conduct into a
post-order breach of the court order.
[21] This conclusion accords with the applicant’s own position as finally argued. In its
supplementary heads of argument, the applicant records that the order, though
granted on 11 June 2025, operates “retrospectively and with effect from 7 February
2025”. It then accepts, in terms, that “for the purposes of contempt” the May 2025
7 Contempt is the “deliberate, intentional (i.e. wilful) disobedience of an order granted by a court”:
Consolidated Fish Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Zive and Others 1968 (2) SA 517 (C) at 522B, a definition
adopted in Secretary of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture, Corruption
and Fraud in the Public Sector including Organs of State v Zuma and Others [2021] ZACC 18; 2021 (5)
SA 327 (CC). The requirement that the impugned conduct postdate the order is therefore a necessary
incident of the definition of contempt: disobedience presupposes an external command. It is reinforced by
the requisites identified in Fakie (above) at para 42(c); the order; service or notice; and non-compliance;
and wilfulness and mala fides, none of which can be satisfied by conduct preceding the order.
conduct “occurred prior to the order”. The applicant does not press the Future
Stationery episode as a free -standing contempt. It relies on it only as a matter
going to the respondent’s credibility and state of mind, submitting that the episode
“bears the mark of the man”. This court approaches the episode on the same
footing. The May 2025 conduct cannot f ound a contempt of the order for the
reasons set out above and its relevance, if any , is to the assessment of the
respondent’s conduct on the second alleged breach.
[22] For this reason alone, the rule falls to be discharged on the Future Stationery
breach. This court therefore declines to decide this breach on the merits given that
the court order post-dates the breach. This court does, however, observe that even
if the breach was to be assessed on the merits, the rule in respect of Future
Stationery would still be discharged given the reasonable doubt generated by the
existence of two separate juristic bodies although practically intertwined as per Mr
Bruyns’ evidence.
The second alleged breach: AOS and the Q-Matic rolls
[23] This court now turns to the second alleged breach, which concerns the
respondent’s dealings with AOS, the customer listed as item 2 on Annexure CO1.
Its status as a listed customer is not in dispute. The applicant’s case, developed
with the benefit of oral evidence, is that in September and October 2025 the
respondent approached AOS and offered to supply it with a bespoke thermal paper
solution, a Q -Matic ticket roll, and that in doing so he solicited a listed customer
and offered both a product and a service that compete with those of the applicant.
[24] The competition is made out on two footings, products and services, and the
distinctions on which the respondent relied to escape both did not survive his own
evidence. As to products, he accepted that his business sells thermal paper; that
he, like the applicant, imports the base paper in jumbo reels, there being no local
he, like the applicant, imports the base paper in jumbo reels, there being no local
manufacturer of thermal paper; and that what he called “locally manufactured” is
in truth “locally converted”, whi ch is what the applicant does. His attempt to
distinguish his rolls by their core material and their availability in colour did not
survive either, the applicant supplying both plastic and recyclable cores and
coloured rolls, and the sample the respondent himself delivered to AOS having a
plastic core. His evidence that he supplies generic thermal rolls for restaurants,
bars and events is difficult to reconcile with his account, in his affidavit, of a
business confined to unique, bespoke products that very few can produce. As to
services, the applicant’s business includes the rendering of a bespoke conversion
service, the design and production of a thermal roll to a customer’s specifications,
which on the applicant’s evidence made up the bulk of its 2024 sales. That is the
very service the respondent offered AOS.
[25] The respondent’s position in relation to AOS cannot be considered apart from his
history with that customer. He accepted that, as the applicant’s Production
Director, he had personally led the applicant’s research and development of an
AOS Q-Ticket solution for Capitec on two occasions, in 2021 and again in 2023.
He led the sourcing and testing of the paper, attended at Capitec to inspect the
device, and led the development of the tear format, the contemporaneous
correspondence recording that both a straight perforation and a crescent die cut
would work, and by August 2023 had produced sample rolls on the applicant’s
equipment. He accepted that the applicant had, in the past, t wice taken up the
opportunity to develop and offer this solution for AOS and Capitec.
[26] The sample the respondent delivered to AOS in 2025 is telling. It matched the
applicant’s sample, and the Capitec specification, in the width of the roll, which he
admitted was critical for compatibility with the device and which he knew only
because he had led the development work. It carried the crescent tear edge, a tear
format he had developed while employed by the applicant. It bore the black sensor
marks and no logo, exactly as Capitec had stipulated. The correspondence
marks and no logo, exactly as Capitec had stipulated. The correspondence
between the respondent’s 2025 sample and a specification known to him only by
virtue of his employment with the applicant is the clear footprint of confidenti al
information applied for his own benefit, and it engages the confidential information
terms of the order directly.
[27] Whether the applicant would itself have supplied AOS again in 2025 was a matter
the respondent denied, maintaining that Capitec had by then moved away from the
Q-Matic device. This court’s finding does not turn on any concession by the
respondent, for he made none. It rests on the objective record. The applicant had
twice developed and offered this very solution at the instance of AOS and Capitec;
the respondent had led that work; and a bespoke thermal roll of this kind is the
staple of the applicant’s business. On t hat record there was, at the least, a
reasonable possibility that the applicant would have responded to a fresh
approach, and the evidence establishes that in September and October 2025 the
respondent and the applicant were both in conversation with AOS about a bespoke
solution. They were competitors for that business.
[28] The respondent placed weight on an email of 29 September 2025 in which, on his
reading, the applicant recorded that, he having by then left its employ, it no longer
held the test samples and would have to begin the work afresh and produce new
samples for testing. That email does not assist the respondent. It was written in
the course of the applicant’s own renewed engagement with AOS about this very
solution, and it records a readiness to restart the work rather than an abandonment
of the AOS business. Whether the applicant was in a position to supply at that
moment is not the test. The order forbids the soliciting of a listed customer and the
rendering of a competing service, and a competitor obliged to remake its samples
before delivery is a competitor still. The email confirms, rather than displaces, that
in September and October 2025 both the applicant and the respondent were
pursuing the same AOS business. The respondent’s contention that he offered
AOS a product the applicant would not supply is not made out.
[29] The respondent’s remaining answers do not raise a reasonable doubt. His
[29] The respondent’s remaining answers do not raise a reasonable doubt. His
contention that the samples were not destined for Capitec, and that Capitec had
by then abandoned the Q-Matic device, is contradicted by the messaging between
the respondent and AOS, in which AOS records that the sample was dropped off
with Capitec. That is difficult to reconcile with an assertion that Capitec had no
further interest in the device. The respondent did not disengage from AOS even
after the applicant’s attorneys had placed him on notice of the breach in November
2025; he continued to message AOS, and his message that he had “been set up”
reads as the protest of a person aware that he had been caught, rather than the
answer of someone who believed himself to be acting within the order. Nor does
the respondent’s disclosure to AOS raise a reasonable doubt as to his good faith.
He opened his approach with the message “It's Sam here ex Rotunda ”, and his
case is that he went on to disclose his restrained status at the outset of the
meeting. Taken at its highest, that account does not establish an honest belief that
the conduct was permitted. On his own version the disclosure was coupled with a
request that AOS treat the approach with discretion, and, as the messaging shows,
he continued to press AOS even after the applicant’s attorneys had placed him on
terms. A person who discloses that he is a former employee and subject to a
restraint, yet in the same dealing asks the customer for discretion and persists after
being warned, shows an awareness that his conduct was open to challenge rather
than a genuine belief in its propriety. The disclosure does not, against the balance
of his conduct, generate a reasonable doubt.
[30] Nor does it avail the respondent that no sale was concluded. The order does not
prohibit only the conclusion of a sale. It prohibits the respondent from being
concerned in a competing business, from soliciting the applicant’s listed
customers, and from ren dering to them a service that the applicant renders. The
respondent admitted that he approached AOS and offered it a bespoke solution,
and that the meeting was at his instance and not at the request of AOS. The offer
and the solicitation are themselves the conduct that the order forbids.
[31] The order and the respondent’s knowledge of it are common cause, and non -
compliance is established for the reasons stated above. The respondent
compliance is established for the reasons stated above. The respondent
appreciated, on his own evidence, that the purpose of the order was to keep him
from competing for the applicant’s listed customers. The evidential burden to raise
a reasonable doubt as to wilfulness and mala fides therefore fell to the respondent,
and he did not discharge it. His explanations were strained; they shifted between
his answer to the demand and his evidence at the hearing; and they were
contradicted at the decisive points by his own contemporaneous record. Having
been placed on terms by the applicant’s attorneys in June 2025, the respondent
could have been in no doubt about the scope of his obligations when he
approached AOS some months later. His conduct was deliberate and in bad faith.
On the criminal standard, this court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the
respondent breached the order in respect of AOS, and that he did so wilfully and
mala fide. This court therefore finds the respondent in contempt of the court order
in respect of the AOS breach.
Sanction
[32] Before turning to the form of sanction, this court notes, as stated above, that the
hearing of oral evidence and this judgment postdated the expiry of the restraint .
There is accordingly no longer any conduct to be coerced; the respondent cannot
breach a restraint that has ended and an order compelling his future compliance
would be directed at nothing. Counsel for the applicant fairly accepted that the
coercive element of the relief has fallen away and that what remains is the punitive
element, to be established beyond reasonable doubt.
[33] Committal, therefore, of the kind sought by the applicant in its notice of motion, is
no longer competent. The date of suspension, as sought, has passed and the
condition can no longer be performed or breached. The court’s remaining task is
therefore not t o coerce but to vindicate, i.e., to mark the seriousness of wilful
disobedience of the court order and to deter its repetition. The sanction must
therefore be punitive in character and proportionate to that purpose.
[34] Contempt of court is a public wrong. A fine that may follow a finding of contempt is
a punitive measure, payable to the State and not to the applicant. The fine
vindicates the authority of the court, and it is not compensation. As the
Constitutional Court emphasised in Pheko, the public interest in obedience to court
orders is what the sanction exists to vindicate.
[35] It follows therefore that an applicant in contempt proceedings cannot, as part of
the contempt order, recover damages from the respondent. Damages for the
breach of a restraint of trade are a separate cause of action, proceeding on
different pleadings and requiring the applicant to allege and prove actual loss.
None of that is before this court.
[36] The relief sought in respect of this sum is pleaded inconsistently. The founding
affidavit seeks payment of R384 165.00 as “damages”, calculated at three times
the respondent’s former monthly cost to company, while the notice of motion casts
the same amount as a fine. On neither footing can it be granted. As stated already,
a fine is payable to the State and not to the applicant and damages are not
competent to be granted in a contempt application. Insofar as the sum is pressed
as a fine, the applicant’s reliance on three months’ salary has no rational
connection with the gravity of the contempt or with any tariff for fines. In any event,
R384 165.00 is, on any view a substantial sum, inappropriate for a respondent
against whom a single breach is established, where no transaction occurred and
no concrete loss has been demonstrated. The prayer accordingly must fail.
The appropriate sanction
[37] The respondent deliberately approached a key listed customer in the face of an
order to which he had personally consented; he did so by offering a product that
he himself developed while at the applicant; and he had been warned only months
earlier. These facts weigh against the respondent. Weighing in favour of the
respondent is that no transaction was concluded; no actual loss has been proven;
this is a first finding of contempt against the respondent; and the restraint has now
expired so that no continuing harm flows from any further breach. It is this court’s
finding that the appropriate sanction for the respondent’s contempt is a fine of
R50,000.00, payable to the State, alternatively imprisonment in the event that the
R50,000.00, payable to the State, alternatively imprisonment in the event that the
respondent fails to pay the fine in accordance with this judgment.
[38] A fine of R50,000.00 properly marks the seriousness of a deliberate and previously
warned breach of an order taken by consent. This court does not deem it proper
to suspend any part of the fine, or the alternative imprisonment, as suspension is
directed at securing future compliance. There is no longer any obligation with
which the respondent can be required to comply, the restraint having come to an
end. Nor does this court impose an immediate and unconditional term of
imprisonment as the primary sanction for a single proven breach, as that would be
disproportionate to the contempt committed. The period of imprisonment recorded
in the order operates only in default of payment, as the conventional consequence
of non-payment of a punitive fine, and not as a measure directed at the now spent
restraint.
Costs
[39] Costs in this court do not follow the result. Section 162 of the Labour Relations Act
confers a discretion to be exercised according to the requirements of the law and
fairness, having regard to the conduct of the parties.8 The respondent wilfully and
in bad faith breached an order to which he had personally consented, and met the
contempt application with a defence that shifted and was contradicted by his own
contemporaneous record. In law and fairness, that conduct justifi es an order that
he pays the applicant’s costs. The seriousness of a deliberate contempt, and the
manner of the respondent ’s opposition, further justify those costs, including the
costs of counsel.
Order
[40] In the premises, the following order is made:
1. The rule nisi issued on 20 January 2026 is confirmed in respect of the AOS
/ Q-Matic rolls breach, and is discharged in respect of the Future Stationery
/ Future Products breach.
8 Zungu v Premier of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal and Others [2018] ZACC 1; (2018)
39 ILJ 523 (CC).