SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document in
compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
KWAZULU-NATAL DIVISION, PIETERMARITZBURG
CASE NO: 10995/2024P
In the matter between:
THE PRUDENTIAL AUTHORITY APPLICANT
and
VALUKUFA JANE NDULI FIRST RESPONDENT
(Identity Number: 6[...])
(Married in community of property to Sibusiso
Christopher Nduli)
(Identity Number: 6[...])
SIBUSISO CHRISTOPHER NDULI SECOND RESPONDENT
(Identity Number: 6[...])
(Married in community of property to Valukufa Jane
Nduli)
(Identity Number: 6[...])
_____________________________________________________________________
ORDER
_____________________________________________________________________
The following order is granted:
2
1. The rule nisi which was issued on 7 August 2025 is confirmed a nd the estate of
the respondents is placed under final sequestration.
2. The costs of the application are costs in the sequestration.
_____________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
_____________________________________________________________________
Pietersen AJ:
Introduction
[1] This is an application for an order placing the respondents’ joint estate under final
sequestration. On 7 August 2025, Marion AJ granted an order placing the respondents’
estate under provisional sequestration. In terms of the provisional sequestration order ,
the respondents and any interested persons were directed to show cause why the
estate of the respondents should not be finally sequestrated and why the costs of the
application for sequestration should not be costs in the sequestration of the first and
second respondents’ joint estate.
[2] The first respondent subsequently delivered a supplementary answering affidavit
together with a notice of motion seeking leave for this affidavit to be delivered. This
application was not oppos ed by the applicant. No other affidavits were delivered in the
matter after the provisional sequestration order was granted.
[3] The respondents do not require leave for the delivery of a supplementary
answering affidavit, as the rule nisi directed the respondents and all interested persons
to show cause why a final sequestration should not be granted . The delivery of a
supplementary answering affidavit is therefore appropriate for purposes of complying
with the court order.
[4] The applicant is the Prudential Authority, a juristic person established in terms of
3
s 32 of the Financial Sector Regulation Act 9 of 2017 (FSRA) , which operates within the
administration of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB). Since 1 April 2018 , when s 5
of the FSRA came into effect, the Prudential Authority has been responsible for
exercising the powers and duties set out in the Banks Act 94 of 1990 (the Banks Act)
and the FSRA. Those powers and duties previously reposed in the office of the
Registrar of Banks (the registrar). When the FSRA took effect, the Prudential Authority
was:
(a) Empowered to continue with pending inspections or investigations commenced
by the registrar;1 and
(b) Substituted in place of the registrar in pending proceedings.2
[5] The respondents, Mrs Valukufa Jane Nduli and Mr Sibusiso Christopher Nduli
(the Ndulis), are married to each other in community of property.
[6] It is not disputed that pursuant to inspection s conducted in terms of the Banks
Act, read with the South African Reserve Bank Act 90 of 1989 (the SARB Act), the
registrar was satisfied that Mrs Nduli obtained money by conducting the business of a
bank without being registered or authorised to do so. The registrar proceeded to direct
Mrs Nduli to repay all monies she obtained from depositors while conducting the
business of a bank . Mr Johannes George Kruger (Mr Kruger) was appointed to
ascertain the true amount that Mrs Nduli obtained through her unlawful conduct and to
manage and control the repayment process. The registrar subsequently directed Mrs
Nduli to repay the sum of R179 100 , which was the sum Mr Kruger determined she
obtained by conducting the business of a bank , in contravention of the Banks Act. Mrs
Nduli failed to repay this amount in accordance with this directive.
[7] In its founding affidavit , the applicant relie d on Mrs Nduli’s undisputed
indebtedness and argue d that she has committed an act of insolvency by failing to
honour the repayment directive , as s 83(3)(b) of the Banks Act deems the failure to
1 Section 296 of the FSRA.
1 Section 296 of the FSRA.
2 Section 300(2) of the FSRA.
4
repay the amount in the directive to be an act of insolvency. The applicant also
submitted that, in terms of s 84(1A)(a) of the Banks Act, the Ndulis were factually
insolvent as, on their own version, their liabilities exceeded their assets.
The statutory context
[8] In terms of s 11(1) of the Banks Act , persons are prohibited from conducting the
business of a bank unless they are a public company and registered or authorised to
conduct the business of a bank. Section 1 of the Banks Act defines ‘the business of a
bank’ to include the acceptance of deposits from members of the general public as a
regular feature of business and inter alia:
‘(e) Any other activity which the Authority has , after consultation with the Governor of the
Reserve Bank, by notice in the Gazette declared to be the business of a bank…’
[9] On 27 March 1997 , the r egistrar (who was then the ‘authority’ contemplated
above) published a notice in the Government Gazette titled ‘Designation of Activities
that are the Business of a Bank’ (the Notice).3
[10] The Notice applies to activities that are a regular feature of ‘a business practice’
rather than a regular feature of ‘a business’. The Notice define s a business practice as
(a) an agreement or understanding regardless of its enforceability, or ( b) a scheme,
practice, or method of trading, including a method of marketing or distribution.
[11] The Notice declare s the following activities as ‘the business of a bank ’ for the
purposes of the Banks Act:
(a) First, accepting or obtaining money from members of the public with the prospect
of those persons (called ‘participating members ’) receiving payment or other money -
related benefits, directly or indirectly –
(i) On or after introducing new members of the public ( called ‘new
participating members ’) to the business practice, from whom money is
accepted or obtained;
3 Designation of Activities that are the Business of a Bank, GN 498, GG 17895, 27 March 1997.
5
(ii) On or after promotion, transfer, or a change in status of participating
members or new participating members within the business practice, or
(iii) From funds obtained from participating members or new members in the
business practice.
(b) Second, the solicitation of, or advertisement for, money and/or persons for their
introduction into, or participation in, the business practice described above.
[12] The Notice is directed at pyramid schemes , which the Notice now designated as
‘the business of a bank ’. The Notice effectively pr oscribes participation in pyramid
schemes by targeting activities which typically occur in such schemes. Persons cannot
engage in the identified activities unless they are registered with the registrar in terms of
s 17 of the Banks Act.
[13] In terms of s 12 of the SARB Act, the Governor or the Deputy Governor of the
SARB is empowered, if they have reason to suspect that a person is unlawfully
conducting the business of a bank, to establish whether this is so. The Gove rnor or
Deputy Governor may direct the registrar to launch an investigation into that person ’s
affairs, which investigation is conducted by an inspector appointed under s 11(1) of the
SARB Act.
[14] If, as a result of the investigation, the registrar is satisfied that ‘any person ’
obtained money by unlawfully conducting the business of a bank, then:
(a) The registrar issues a directive to that person to repay all the money so obtained,
including interest and other amounts owed in respect of that money (the repayment
directive).4
(b) The registrar simultaneously appoints a repayment administrator to manage and
control the repayment of monies pursuant to the repayment directive.5 The repayment
4 Section 83(1) of the Banks Act.
5 Section 84(1) of the Banks Act.
6
administrator is empowered to take possession of the person’s assets ;6 and is required
to investigate that person’s affairs to, inter alia:7
(i) Establish the true amount of money unlawfully obtained by the person subject to
the repayment directive;
(ii) Establish the identities of persons from whom the subject of the investigation
obtained that money; and
(iii) Trace the unlawfully obtained funds and the assets into which those funds were
converted, as the case may be.
[15] Apart from constituting an offence, the failure to comply with the repayment
directive is deemed to be an act of insolvency and the Prudential Authority may apply
for the sequestration of the person’s estate . This is set out in s 83(3)(b) of the Banks
Act, which provides that:
‘(3) Any person who refuses or fails to comply with a direction under subsection (1)—
…
(b) shall for the purposes of any law relating to the winding -up of juristic persons or to the
sequestration of insolvent estates, be deemed not to be able to pay the debts owed by
such person or to have committed an act of insolvency, as the case may be, and the
Authority shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law, be
competent to apply for the winding-up of such a juristic person or for the sequestration of
the estate of such a person, as the case may be, to any court having jurisdiction.’
[16] The repayment administrator is also required to report on whether the person
subject to the repayment directive is solvent, and if not, to opine on whether the person
is technically or legally insolvent. 8 If the repayment administrator concludes that the
person is insolvent, then s 84(1A)(c), allows the Prudential Authority to:
‘…notwithstanding anything contrary contained in any law relating to liquidation or insolvency
apply to a competent court for… sequestration in terms of the Insolvency Act…’
6 Section 84(1A)(b)(i) of the Banks Act.
7 Section 84(4)(a)(i), (ii) and (iii) of the Banks Act.
7 Section 84(4)(a)(i), (ii) and (iii) of the Banks Act.
8 Section 84(1A)(a) of the Banks Act.
7
The material facts
[17] It is common cause that Mrs Nduli was involved in the Travel Ventures
International (TVI) Scheme (the TVI Scheme) , which commenced operation in South
Africa in 2009. The Ndulis did not dispute that the TVI Scheme fell within the business
of a bank in terms of the Banks Act , but say that at the time , Mrs Nduli was unaware of
it. Mrs Nduli also state d that she was at the time unaware that the TVI Scheme was a
pyramid scheme and that she ‘was a victim of TVI and duped into purchasing
vouchers…’.
[18] Briefly, as a matter of background, it is common cause that in terms of a
presentation by TVI, it described itself as an international direct selling company, which
promised opportunit ies to travel and to earn additional income. The presentation
indicated that upon becoming a distributor, one would be entitled to travel discounts and
access to resorts and hotels which partnered with TVI. TVI referred to this as a business
opportunity:
‘For those of you who are interested in supplementing your income by telling others about TVI’s
products and services, please continue with the PowerPoint Prese ntation, to learn more about
the TVI Express Business Opportunity.’
[19] The TVI Scheme then offered four income streams which were all dependent
upon the participant introducing new participants. According to the evidence of Mr
Kruger, these income structures ultimately mean that a participant could earn money
merely by introducing new participants and the scheme did not require retailing of
products or anything to be sold. Persons earned money by introducing members on the
promise of them, in turn, earning money by introducing more members. Therefore, TVI
fell within the expanded definition of the business of a bank and essentially operated as
a pyramid scheme.
The Ndulis’ defences
[20] In argument before me, the Ndulis submitted that there is no proof or acceptable
evidence of the fact that the repayment directive was received by Mrs Nduli , and if Mrs
8
Nduli did not receive the repayment directive, it means that the applicant has failed to
prove that she has committed an act of insolvency (or deemed to have committed an
act of insolvency) , because she did not know that she had to repay the money. It was
further argued that there was an undue delay by the applicant to institute the
sequestration proceedings against the Nduli s and that this is a factor to be taken into
account by the court in exercising its discretion in the dismissal of the application. The
Ndulis further argued that the repayment administrator failed to comply with the
provisions of s 84 of the Banks Act by failing to establish the true amount of money
unlawfully obtained by Mrs Nduli , as it refers in its report to ‘probable investor deposits’
and ‘possible investor deposits’. Lastly, the Nduli s argued that the sequestration of the
joint estate will not be to the advantage of their creditors as, according to the evidence
of Mr Kru ger, the net value of the Nduli s’ immovable proper ty is R390 000 and the
Ndulis’ movable assets are limited to a Mercedez -Benz E -Class vehicle , which is at
least 15 years old. The Ndulis , therefore, conclude that their assets are of insufficient
value for the payment of the costs of sequestration and the administration of the
insolvent estate.
Hearsay and lack of proof of receipt of the repayment directive
[21] The Nduli s’ arguments about hearsay evidence and the lack of proof that the
repayment directive was received by Mrs Nduli can be swiftly disposed of. The
arguments hinge on the premise that there is no confirmatory affidavit by Mr Kruger who
investigated the matter and on whose information the deponent to the applicant’s
affidavit relies. The Nduli s thus argue that the deponent ’s evidence constitutes hearsay
evidence and the report of Mr Kruger thus constitutes inadmissible evidence. However,
it is simply incorrect to say that Mr Kruger has not deposed to a confirmatory affidavit.
it is simply incorrect to say that Mr Kruger has not deposed to a confirmatory affidavit.
Mr Kruger’s confirmatory affidavit was duly annexed to the applicant’s replying affidavit
and in this confirmatory affidavit , Mr Kruger confirmed that he has read the answering
affidavit (which can only be a reference to the applicant’s founding affidavit deposed to
by Nomfundo Tshazibana). As a result, there is no merit in the Nduli s’ arguments about
hearsay evidence and the lack of proof that the repayment directive was received by
Mrs Nduli.
9
Undue delay
[22] Counsel for the Nduli s, Mr Snyman SC, appearing with M s Ngcobo, submitted
that this court should no te the inordinate delay by the a pplicant to institute the
sequestration application against the Nduli s and that this undue delay should be taken
into account as a factor in the exercise of the court’s residual discretion. In this regard,
counsel provided the following helpful timeline:
(a) 18 March 2011: Mr Kruger was appointed to investigate this matter;
(b) 4 June 2013: Mr Kruger executed a search warrant of Mrs Nduli’s residential
premises;
(c) 5 July 2013: Mr Kruger served a notice on Mrs Nduli summoning her to appear at
the offices of Bowman Gillfilan;
(d) 20 November 2013: Mr Kruger presented his final inspection report to the
registrar and issued a repayment directive to Mrs Nduli;
(e) 2 December 2014: Mrs Nduli became aware that the applicant may bri ng a
sequestration application when the repayment directive was issued;
(f) 13 March 2015: Mr Kruger obtained a rule nisi confirming his statutory duty and
power to take possession of Mrs Nduli’s assets;
(g) 27 July 2015: Mr Kruger’s offices served the rule nisi and repayment directive on
Mrs Nduli.
(h) September 2015: Mr Kruger issued a report in which he recom mended that the
joint estate be sequestrated;
(i) 1 October 2015: Mr Kruger submitted a draft solvency report to the registrar; and
(j) 16 July 2024: The present application papers were issued.
[21] It was properly conceded by Mr Snyman that an undue delay on its own is
insufficient to constitute a reason for the dismissal of an application for sequestration.9
[22] Whilst the above timeline clearly shows an inordinate delay of almost nine years
9 Prudential Authority v Dlamini and Another [2024] ZASCA 133; 2025 (1) SA 365 (SCA) ( Dlamini) para
80.
10
between when Mr Kruger submitted a draft solvency report to the registrar and when the
application papers were issued, I am not satisfied that this delay prejudiced the Ndulis.
The Nduli s failed to present any evidence in support of any finding of prejudice. The
undue delay relied on by the Nduli s, therefore, is an insufficient reason for dismissal of
the application.
Section 84 of the Banks Act
[23] The Ndulis submitted that the applicant has failed to comply with the jurisdictional
requirements of s 84 of the B anks Act in that the draft report by the repayment
administrator, Mr Kruger, did not specify the identities of the persons who deposited the
funds and did not mention the true amount s paid into Mrs Nduli ’s account. This is
denied by the applicant.
[24] As indicated above, s ections 83 and 84 of the Banks Act include two expres s
provisions conferring on the a pplicant the competence to apply for the sequestration of
a person’s estate who is subject to a repayment directive. First, s 83(3)(b) provides that
a person who fails to comply with a repayment directive
‘shall for the purposes of any law relating to the winding -up of juristic persons or to the
sequestration of insolvent estates, be deemed not to be able to pay the debts owed by such
person or to have committed an act of insolvency, as the case may be, and the Authority shall,
notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law, be competent to apply for… [his
or her] sequestration’.
Second, under s 84(1A)(c), if the report filed by the administ rator concludes that the
person concerned is insolvent, the Prudential Authority may, notwithstanding anything
contrary contained in any law relating to liquidation or insolvency, apply to a competent
court for the sequestration of the person’s estate.
[25] In the instant case, the applicant sought the provisional sequestration order on
two grounds, first, on the basis of the deemed act of insolvency in terms of s 83(3)(b).
two grounds, first, on the basis of the deemed act of insolvency in terms of s 83(3)(b).
The second was in terms of s 84(1A)(c), on the ground that Mr Kruger concluded that
the Ndulis are insolvent. In this regard, the applicant relied on the solvency report
issued by Mr Kruger on its behalf in terms of s 84(1A)(a), which established their
11
indebtedness.
[26] The court held as follows in Dlamini regarding ss 83 and 84:
‘[25] The high court erred in dismissing the application. It is common cause that the
Authority’s application was founded on ss 83 and 84 of the Banks Act. The Dlaminis failed to
repay the amount within the period stipulated in the repayment directive. They also did not
challenge the directive by way of review despite being entitled to do so. Therefore, the Dlaminis
were, in terms of s 83, deemed to have committed an act of insolvency.
…
[30] … The Authority did not have to rely on the s 84 report to establish a case based on s
83. Section 83(3) (b) is a self -contained provision that allows the Authority to bring the
sequestration application in an instance where a person, who is subject to a directive, has failed
to repay the amount unlawfully obtained and does not challenge the directive. The Dlaminis
were, by virtue of their failure to comply with the directive, deemed to have committed an act of
insolvency. This is a separate ground upon which a sequestration order may be granted, and
the Authority was entitled to proceed on that ground alone, without, in addition, having to
establish actual insolvency under s 84.
…
[38] In this case, the evidence established that the Dlaminis obtained money through their
participation in the TVI scheme which entailed carrying on the business of a bank without being
authorised to do so. The amount which they were directed to repay was disclosed in the
directive that was issued and they failed to repay it as directed. In terms of s 83, the y were
deemed to have committed an act of insolvency. In terms of s 84(1A) (f), the Authority is
regarded as a creditor and he or she has the same rights of a creditor in terms of the law
relating to liquidation and insolvency. Whilst it is correct that the list containing the amounts
collected by the Dlaminis does not specify the creditors, in my view, the lack of such information
is not fatal to the Authority’s case because, as already stated, the Authority is regarded as a
creditor, and it must collect all money unlawfully obtained and distribute same to the investors
once their identity is established.’
[27] Therefore, any non-compliance with s 84 is similarly not fatal to the a pplicant’s
case herein.
12
Advantage to creditors
[28] Before the court can grant a final order of sequestration, it must be satisfied that
there is reason to believe that it will be to the advantage of creditors if the debtor’s
estate is sequestrated. This is in terms of s 12(1)(c) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936
(the Insolvency Act).
[29] The applicant alleged that Mrs Nduli is indebted in the sum of R179 100, which is
the amount that she received through the TVI Scheme, conducting the business of a
bank. The sum of R179 100 attracts interest at the rate of 9% per annum , calculated
from the date of delivery of the repayment directive, which was on 2 December 2014 .
The Ndulis submitted that 9% interest on R179 100 equals R16 119 per annum and
over 11 years, equals R177 309. This amount is then added to the capital of R179 100 ,
which gives a total of R356 409, according to the Ndulis.
[30] The Ndulis further submitted that, according to the evidence of Mr Kruger, the net
value of the Ndulis’ immovable property is R390 000.
[31] As far as movable assets are concerned, the Ndulis submitted that these are
limited to a Mercedes -Benz E -Class vehicle , which w as seized by the applicant. The
vehicle is apparently at least 15 years old and was obtained by the Ndulis during 2010.
According to the Ndulis, they do not own any other vehicles.
[32] It was submitted that t he personal debts of Mrs Nduli amount to R1 649 551.84.
Therefore, so the Ndulis argue, their liabilities total R2 005 069.84 ( R1 649 551.84
(personal liabilities) plus R356 409 (which must be paid to the applicant)).
[33] Therefore, compared to the net value of the Ndulis’ estate, being the value of the
immovable property, it was submitted on behalf of the Ndulis that the costs of
sequestration would result in the benefit to creditors being negligible.
[34] It is so that t he onus of establishing an advantage to creditors remains on the
13
sequestrating creditor throughout, even when it is clear that the debtor has committed
an act of insolvency.
[35] The applicant submitted that t here can be no doubt that there is a reasonable
prospect that some pecuniary benefit will be derived through the sequestration of the
estate.
[36] In Stratford and Others v Investec Bank L td and Others ,10 the Constitutional
Court stated as follows:
‘The meaning of the term “advantage” is broad and should not be rigidified. This includes the
nebulous “not-negligible” pecuniary benefit on which the appellants rely. To my mind, specifying
the cents in the rand or “not-negligible” benefit in the context of a hostile sequestration where
there could be many creditors is unhelpful.’ (Footnote omitted.)
[37] The court in Firstrand Bank Limited v Nel11 held that
‘I do not agree with the contention by the respondent that because of what he avers regarding
the alleged lack of advantage to creditors as “he is hopelessly insolvent”, the Court should not
favourably consider the application. The contention losses sight of the fact that the applicant has
no statutory authority to conduct an inquiry envisaged in the Act.’
[38] The court in Nel12 referred to Mercantile Bank Limited A division of Capitec Bank
Limited v Ross and Another,13 where Twala J, in the case where the respondent raised
the defence that it would not be to the advantage of creditors to sequestrate his estate,
held as follows on the purposive interpretation of the Insolvency Act:
‘Even if I am wrong in finding that the respondent’s estate should be sequestrated on the basis
of the reasons stated above, it should also be borne in mind that the purpose of the Insolvency
Act is not only for securing the pecuniary benefit to the creditors, but to protect the general body
of the public from people who behave in this manner. It would be an absurdity to interpret s
10 Stratford and Others v Investec Bank L td and Others [2014] ZACC 38; 2015 (3) SA 1 (CC) ( Stratford)
para 44.
11 Firstrand Bank Limited v Nel [2025] ZAGPJHC 617 (Nel) para 15.
12 Nel para 20.
13 Mercantile Bank Limited A division of Capitec Bank Limited v Ross and Another [2023] ZAGPJHC 435
(Ross) para 25.
14
12(2) of the act in a way that, even if the creditor has established and met the requirements of s
12(a) and (b), but the debtor does not have any assets which when reali sed may yield a
dividend to the benefit of the body of creditors, an order sequestrating the estate of the debtor
should not be granted because the sequestration of the estate will not be to the advantage of
the creditors. I say so because that would be a narrow and rigid interpretation of s 12(2) of the
Act.’
[39] The court in Nel went on to find that there was an advantage to the general body
of creditors , that the respondent ’s estate should be sequestrated and that the inquiry
into his affairs may yield some benefit.
[40] In Trust Wholesalers and Woollens (Pty) Ltd v Mackan 14 it was decided by
Selke J that:
‘…it seems clear that it is for the petitioner to satisfy the Court that there is reason to believe
that creditors will derive advantage from the sequestration, and I venture to think that what the
petitioner has thus to show is that on the facts before the Court there is a reasonable likelihood
that sequestration will yield, at the least, a not negligible dividend.’15
[41] I am satisfied that the sequestration of the Ndulis’ joint estate will constitute an
advantage to creditors. The advantage to creditors, or reason to believe that there will
be an advantage to creditors, is not too remote – being the immovable property and the
likelihood that as a result of an investigation and enquiry, assets may be unearthed that
will benefit creditors.16
[42] The Ndulis’ assets are not so small that they will not be sufficient for the payment
of the cost of sequestration and administration.17
[43] A sequestrating creditor seeking a final sequestration order on the return day of
14 Trust Wholesalers and Woollens (Pty) Ltd v Mackan 1954 (2) SA 109 (N) at 111G-H.
15 See also Stratford para 43.
16 Commissioner, South African Revenue Services v Hawker Air Services (Pty) Ltd; Commissioner, South
African Revenue Services v Hawker Aviation Partnership and Others [2006] ZASCA 51; 2006 (4) SA 292
(SCA) para 29.
17 Trade Discount CO v Steele 1949 (4) SA 121 (O) at 122-123.
15
the rule nisi granted in the provisional order has the onus to show, on a balance of
probabilities, that the order should be made final. There is no onus on the respondent s,
only an evidential burden to establish that the confirmation of the provisional order is
being resisted on bona fide and reasonable grounds. If the respondents succeed in
doing so, the provisional order must be discharged and the application for final
sequestration dismissed.
[44] Furthermore, it is so that e ven if this court is satisfied that the requirements for a
final order of sequestration have been established on a balance of probabilities, it is not
bound to grant a final order of sequestration. In each case , it has an overriding
discretion, to be exercised upon a consideration of all the circumstances. 18 No
exhaustive rule can be laid down as to how the court should exercise the discretion,
each case depends on its own particular facts.19
[45] In the exercise of its discretion, the courts have in the past refused to sequestrate
an estate where the debtor had no assets at all, or very small assets.20
[46] I am satisfied that the requirements for a final sequestration order have been met
by the applicant. I further find no reason to exercise my residual discretion in favour of
the Ndulis.
Order
[47] The following order is made:
1. The rule nisi which was issued on 7 August 2025 is c onfirmed and the estate of
the respondents is placed under final sequestration.
2. The costs of the application are costs in the sequestration.
18 Braithwaite v Gilbert (Volkskas Bpk Intervening) 1984 (4) SA 717 (W) at 718C-D; Julie Whyte Dresses
(Pty) Ltd v Whitehead 1970 (3) SA 218 (D) at 219A.
19 Pelunsky & Co v Beiles and Others 1908 TS 370 at 372.
20 Smith v Smith 1918 CPD 331 at 335.
16
_____________________
PIETERSEN AJ