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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE NUMBER: 135081/2026
In the matter between:
NADIA WALKER First Applicant
DYLAN WHEATLEY Second Applicant
and
WALDO CROUCAMP First Respondent
THE SHERIFF OF THE HIGH COURT,
HALFWAY HOUSE – ALEXANDRA Second Respondent
______________________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
______________________________________________________________________________
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3) REVISED.
…………..…………............. ……………………
SIGNATURE DATE
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LEECH, AJ:
1 On 9 June 2026, the applicants caused an urgent application to be issued forth out of this
court, setting it down for hearing on the urgent court roll of 17 June 2026, where it served
before me.
2 The relief that the applicants claim is directed principally at the setting aside an
attachment and removal, by the second respondent (Sheriff), of the applicants’ household
goods and home-office equipment ( attached property). The Sheriff purportedly effected
the attachment in the course of executing a warrant of execution for monies owed to the
first respondent, Mr Croucamp. The jurisprudential underpinning of the application is the
mandament van spolie.
3 The applicants, Ms Walker and Mr Wheatley, and the first respondent, Mr Croucamp ,
were all self -represented in the proceedings, having drafted their papers without the
benefit of any legal assist ance. All three presented argument before me: the applicants
first, Mr Croucamp in answer, and the applicants in reply. The Sheriff played no part.
4 Whilst their efforts were admirable and I thank them for the diligence shown, it has taken
some time to piece together a coherent narrative and understanding of the dispute and its
merits as well as the relevant legal principles applicable thereto. Both the papers
presented before me and the written and oral arguments would have benefitted
enormously from the i nput of a qualified legal practitioner. There is much in both that is
legally inadmissible, irrelevant, or legally unsustainable as either a foundation for a claim
or the basis of a defence. The applicants seek relief in their Notice of Motion that is not
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cognisable in motion court proceedings and allegations in the affidavits —including the
answering affidavit and supplementary answering affidavit —that address this relief are
sometimes more detailed than those issues that are legally cognisable and relevant.
5 Within these constraints and conscious of the urgency of the application, these reasons
have been provided as expeditiously as possible. They do not cover every aspect of the
dispute before me and refrain from addressing aspects that are inadmissible or irrelevant.
I also deal summarily with aspects of the Notice of Motion that I do not regard as seeking
competent relief under the auspices of a spoliation application.
6 As is apparent from what follows, there is a single issue that is determinative of the relief
sought. Before addressing that issue, I first sketch relevant aspects of the factual
background.
6.1 The applicants are lessees occupying immoveable property at Unit [ …] P[… ]
P[…] , 6[… ] T[…] Crescent, M[…] Johannesburg (leased premises) that is leased
to them by Mr Croucamp.
6.2 Disputes have arisen between the Parties, with both sides complaining about the
conduct of the other. These include a complaint by Mr Croucamp that the
applicants have fallen into arrears with payment of their rental obliga tions. a
number of these disputes have served or are presently before the courts.
6.3 Disputes were also referred by both Parties to the Gauteng Rental Housing
Tribunal (Tribunal), a statutory body established under the Rental Housing Act,
50 of 1999 ( Rental Housing Act ). T he applicants ’ complaints proceeded under
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referral number RT1706/25 and Mr Croucamp’s under referral number
RT1965/25. Under his referral, Mr Croucamp complained, amongst other things,
of nonpayment of rent by the applicants.
6.4 On 16 March 2024 the Tribunal held a single hearing at which both the
applicants’ referral and Mr Croucamp’s referral were considered. The Tribunal’s
ruling on both referrals is contained in a single document dated 24 March 2026.
6.5 In its ruling the Tribunal made findings in respect of both referrals before it. As
far as concerns Mr Croucamp’s referral, the Tribunal inter alia concluded that his
complaint about non- payment of rental succeeded. It directed the applicants,
jointly and severally, within seven days of the ruli ng to make payment to Mr
Croucamp of the sum of R39 000 (Rental Sum). The ruling provided further that
Upon non- compliance by the Complainants, the local sheriff is authorized to
attach and remove the asserts of the Complainants situated at [the leased
premises] and/or at any address where the Complainants may in future reside
and to sell same on auction to recover the amount owed to the Respondent.1
6.6 For reasons that do not have a bearing on the outcome of this application, the
Rental Sum remained unpaid and Mr Croucamp invoked the remedies available to
him under section 13(13) of the Rental Act read with the Magistrates’ Court Act
1 All quotations are rendered verbatim, except to the extent that square brackets or ellipses are used to indicate an
omission or insertion. Footnotes have been omitted from quotations.
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and Magistrates’ Court Rules. 2 In short, Mr Croucamp obtained a writ of
execution from the Magistrates’ Court and instructed the Sheriff to execute it.
6.7 On 9 April 2026 the Sheriff attended at the leased premises where he is said to
have effected an attachment of the attached property, in furtherance of the writ.
He returned first on 21 and again on 22 May 2026—on the first occas ion
unsuccessfully, because he was denied entry by Mr Wheatley —whereupon he
gained access to the leased premised with the assistance of a locksmith and
proceeded to remove the attached property.
6.8 As at the date of the hearing of the urgent application before me, the attached
property remained in the custody of the Sheriff.
6.9 The applicants initially sought recourse from the Magistrates’ Court, but their
application in this regard was unsuccessful with the Presiding Magistrate
concluding that that Court lacked jurisdiction— it was the High Court that enjoyed
jurisdiction. Thus, the applicants came to proceed with their urgent before me.
7 It is the Sheriff’s actions in executing the writ that resulted in the applicants’
dispossession and which forms the cornerstone of their challenge before me. They
complain about both the validity and manner of execution of the Sheriff’s conduct in
gaining access to the leased premises and executing the writ.
2 Respectively the Magistrates' Courts Act, Act 32 of 1944 and the Rules Regulating the Conduct of the Proceedings
of the Magistrates' Courts of South Africa – GN R740 of 2010.
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8 Their Notice of Motion and affidavits range far and wide be yond this issue, however.
They claim prayers for urgency, a declaratory order of unlawful dispossession on 22 May
2026 and a claim to restoration of possession. They also claim replacement of the locks
damaged by the locksmith and orders against Mr Croucamp prohibiting him from
accessing the leased premises, having keys to the leased premises, or communicating
with the locksmith; an urgent data interdict, preventing Mr Croucamp from accessing or
copying any of the digital information stored on computers that were seized; obliging him
to provide them with digital recordings made during the execution of the writ and
preventing him from disseminating or publishing them; a reservation of the right to claim
damages; that another Sheriff (not joined) be authorised to intervene should the
respondents not adhere to the terms of an order granted by me; and a punitive costs order.
9 I look at the balance of the relief more closely in what follows, but the starting point—
and the central issue in this application—is the relief based on the mandament van spolie ,
which in turn entails a consideration of the lawfulness of the Sheriff’s actions on 22 May
2026 and in the days and weeks leading up to the 22
ND.
10 At the outset I note that Mr Croucamp challenged urgency. In this regard, a spoliation
action is ordinarily by its nature urgent. The specific allegations contained in the
founding affidavit and addressed in argument before me reinforce this general position:
the attached property includes computer equipment required by the applicants for them to
continue with their income-earning activities; the attached property includes refrigerators
and other household appliances that they reasonably require from day to day. The
applicants sought and achieved an appropriate balance between curtailing the ordinary
time periods applicable under the Uniform Rules of Court and giving the respondents
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enough time to respond, without thereby squandering their claim to urgency. In the
circumstances, I am satisfied that the application is urgent and should be treated as such.
11 I also note that an attachment and dispossession of property in the course of executing a
writ is ordinarily or prima facie lawful. This protection is, however, forfeited where the
writ upon which the Sheriff purports to execute is invalid or the process is otherwise
unlawful ( Ritch v Orthopaedic Buildings (Pty) Ltd 1979 (4) SA 19 (T) ). In those
circumstances, the dispossession in purported execution of a writ will be unlawful and the
aggrieved party can claim relief under the mandament.
12 Section 13(13) of the Rental Act provides that
A ruling by the Tribunal is deemed to be an order of a magistrate's court in terms of the
Magistrates' Courts Act . . . and is enforced in terms of that Act.
13 It follows that, in order for the execution of the writ to have been lawful, the Sheriff —
and, insofar as is necessarily required before the Sheriff can act, Mr Croucamp before
him—must have executed a valid writ in the manner stipulated in the Magistrates’ Court
Rules. The applicants deny this is the c ase and have challenged both the validity of the
writ, the entitlement of the Sheriff in law to execute it, and the manner of execution,
including conduct that exceeded the bounds of reasonable execution. If any one of these
complaints is good, there is no need for me to consider the others.
14 The process of execution of writs under the Magistrates’ Court is dealt with in Rules 46
and following of that Court’s Rules. The starting point, for purposes of this case, is to be
found in Rules 36(1) and (2), which read with the heading are as follows:
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Process in execution
(1) The process for the execution of any judgment for the payment of money, for the
delivery of property whether movable or immovable, or for ejectment shall be by warrant
issued and signed by the registrar or clerk of the court and addressed to the sheriff.
(2) A process issued under subrule (1) may be sued out by any person in whose favour
any such judgment shall have been given, if such judgment is not then satisfied, stayed
or suspended.
15 Hence, the process is initiated through the issuing of a signed warrant by the registrar or
clerk of the court, addressed to the Sheriff. The purpose behind this is to ensure oversight
of the process, from the outset, by the court or its officials. The Rule 36(1) warrant is a
sine qua non for everything that follows, as the validity of the Sheriff’s conduct is in turn
premised on the warrant authorising him to act.
16 When he acts, the Sheriff is obliged thereafter to act in accordance with the Magistrates’
Court Rules; he has no authority to undertake another process or to depart from the
requirements of those Rules.
17 It is not in dispute before me that the attached property comprises moveables. The Sheriff
was therefore obliged to adhere to the requirements of Rules 41 and 42.
18 Rule 41 stipulates a bifurcated process, in terms of which the Sheriff is required to first
take an inventory of and attach the moveable property and, at a later stage after other
steps have been satisfied, if necessary to remove the attached property.
18.1 The purpose of this bifurcated process is, amongst other things, to afford the
judgment debtors an opportunity to make payment of the amount owed to the
judgment creditor or otherwise to exercise such rights as may be available to
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them. In this way, a balance can be struck between the inroads made on the rights
of the debtors and the need to ensure compliance with the order that is being
executed upon. This ensures adherence to rights under the Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa, 1996 and adherence to the rule of law.
18.2 There are means by which the intervening period between attachment and
removal can be shortened, but none of those are applicable here. Put differently,
Mr Croucamp has not sought refuge in any of them.
18.3 At each of these step s in this bifurcated process, the Sheriff must produce a valid
warrant, which necessarily means a warrant as envisaged by Rule 36(1). To be
abundantly plain, it must at very least on the face of it be a warrant issued and
signed by the registrar or clerk of the court and addressed to the Sheriff. This must
have been done before the Sheriff purports to act on the warrant.
18.4 Because both steps are mandatory and sequential, due compliance with the second
cannot cure non-compliance with or any invalidity attaching to the first.
19 In their founding affidavit the applicants squarely took the point that there had been no
compliance with this dual process, which rendered the execution unlawful. They
described this as the “mandatory two -step process”. It was therefo re incumbent on Mr
Croucamp to place some evidence before the Court to gainsay this case that was made
out. The easiest way in which he could have done so was by putting up documentary
evidence that demonstrated that the bifurcated process had indeed been complied with.
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20 There is only one writ or warrant of execution, issued by the court, that has served in the
papers before me. It was attached to the founding affidavit and is dated 22 May 2026.
Self-evidently, it cannot serve to validate the first step in the bifurcated process, because
the Sheriff attached the property on 9 April 2026, which was more than a month before
the warrant was issued and signed by the clerk of the court.
21 Prima facie, therefore, when the Sheriff attached the property on 9 April 2026, he was
not acting in accordance with a valid warrant as required. There was no evidence
advanced by Mr Croucamp in his answering affidavit or supplementary answering
affidavit to contradict this.
22 When I asked, during the course of argument, what the position was regarding the
applicants’ complaints about the two-step process, Mr Croucamp confirmed the evidence
as it appears in the affidavits: on 21 May 2026 an attempt was made to execute the
second step in the bifurcated process, which was resisted by Mr Wheatley; on the
morning of 22 May 2026, Mrs Croucamp went to the Magistrates’ Court where the
warrant was stamped; it was executed the same day. Hence, it would seem to be common
cause on the papers that prior to the morning of 22 May 2026 the warrant had not been
issued by a clerk of the Magistrates’ Court.
23 The result is that, prior to 22 May 2026, there was no valid warrant upon which the
Sheriff could execute attachment or removal. His first step in the bifurcated process,
taken on 9 April 2026, was therefore taken without a valid warrant and was unlawful.
24 It follows necessarily that if the first step was unlawful the process as a whole does not
comply with the requirements stipulated in the Magistrates’ Court Rules. The second
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step—in the form of t he removal of the attached property on 22 May 2026—was
accordingly also unlawful. The applicants’ dispossession thus constituted an unlawful
spoliation entitling the applicants to redress under the mandament.
25 It follows that the applicants are entitled to relief as prayed for in the first three prayers of
their Notice of Motion. They are also entitled to have the locks restored, as these were
damaged at the instance of the Sheriff in the course of his executing an unlawful warrant
and is akin to a form of spoliation. I am not persuaded that they are entitled to the further
relief preventing Mr Croucamp, the lessor, from having access to the keys as the leased
premises are and remain his—always subject, of course, to his duty not to disturb the
applicants’ peaceful use and enjoyment of the premises.
26 As indicated above, the applicants have challenged the execution of the warrant of
execution on other grounds.
26.1 These include a number of complaints about the wording of the Tribunal’s ruling
and whether or not i t can be enforced. Among these complaints, by way of
example, is a concern that the word “asserts” is incapable of meaning, when it is a
clear typographical error and should be taken as reading “assets”. Pr ima facie at
least, I am not persuaded by these complaints insofar as they serve before me in
this urgent application,
3 but I need make no finding on this for two reasons.
3 I am enjoined to interpret the ruling sensibly having regard to the ordinary meaning of the language used, read in
context and having regard to the factual circumstances (University of Johannesburg v Auckland Park Theological
Seminary 2021 (6) SA 1 (CC). See also Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA
593 (SCA) and Capitec Bank Holdings Ltd v Coral Lagoon Investments 194 (Pty) Ltd 2022 (1) SA 100 (SCA)).
When I do so, the applicants complaints seem to me to be more contrived than real.
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26.1.1 First, because the Tribunal’s decision constitutes administrative action
which remains valid unless and until set aside by a court of competent
jurisdiction on review. 4 The applicants have not sought to review the
ruling before me , but have pursued those proceedings before another
court. In the result, I am constrained to accept the ruling as a fact.
26.1.2 Secondly and flowing from this , once I have concluded that the spoliation
was unlawful for the reasons set out above, it is not necessary for me to
inquire into the other grounds of challenge based on the applicants’
interpretation. More importantly, it would be inappropriate for me to do so
in circumstances where this issue will serve before another review court.
26.2 For t he same reason as informed the second proposition above, it would be
inappropriate for me to inquire into or express a view on the manner in which the
Sheriff executed the warrant and if he exceeded the bounds of reasonableness. I
have already concluded that the execution of the warrant on 22 May was
unlawful; how it was carried out by the Sheriff cannot change that. The applicants
seek relief recording the reservation of their right to pursue a damages remedy,
but that is not relief that I need consider: whether or not they have a valid cause of
action for damages is something that another court might be called upon to
determine and they do not need my imprimatur to their pursuing such a claim if it
exists. I am not going to prejudge the merits of any such claim, however, by
4 MEC for Health, Eastern Cape v Kirland Investments (Pty) Ltd t/a Eye & Lazer Institute 2014 (3) SA 481 (CC) at
[64] ff approving and endorsing Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2004 (6) SA 222 (SCA).
Page 13
commenting in these urgent court proceedings on matters in respect of which
there are disputes of fact. Those are matters best left to a trial court.
27 As for the other relief that the applicants seek, the attached property is in the possession
of the Sheriff. There is therefore no room for the urgent data interdict, preventing Mr
Croucamp from accessing or copying any of the digital information stored on computers
that were seized. I am also not persuaded that the applicants have made out a case for an
interdict against Mr Croucamp obliging him to provide them with digital recordings made
during the execution of the writ or preventing him from disseminating or publishing
them. I therefore decline to grant that relief.
28 What remains is the question of costs, which the applicants claim on a punitive scale. The
difficulty they face in this regard, however, is that they have been self -represented
throughout and therefore there are no costs that they can tax. I accordingly decline to
make any order for costs in their favour.
29 That said, to the extent that there are any costs that might be incurred arising from the
restoration of the applicants to possession of their property, those costs are to be borne by
the first respondent.
30 I accordingly make the following order:
1 The application is enrolled as one of urgency under Rule 6(12).
2 It is declared that the applicants were unlawfully dispossessed of their
possession of the items purportedly attached on 9 April 2026 and
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removed on 22 May 2026 by the second respondent, at the instance of
the first respondent.
3 The second respondent is directed, forthwith, to release the attached
property from attachment and to restore the appli cants to possession
thereof.
4 Pursuant to the order in sub-paragraph 2 above, the second respondent
is directed forthwith to restor e the applicants’ previous possession of the
premises situate at Unit […] P[…] P[…] , 6[ …] T[…] Crescent, M […]
Johannesburg through the replacement of the locks damaged by the
locksmith on 22 May 2026 during the course of the second respondent’s
purported execution of the warrant on that day.
5 Insofar as there may be any costs arising from the orders in sub-
paragraphs 2 to 4 above, those costs are to be paid by the first
respondent.
6 Save as aforesaid, there is no order as to costs.
______________________________
B.E. LEECH
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
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For the applicants: In person
For the first respondent: In person
Date of hearing: 17 June 2026
Date of judgment: 23 June 2026