IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION. PRETORIA)
DELETE WHICHEVER IS NOT APPLICABLE
(1 ) REPORTABLE: -¥68/NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: ¥ES/NO
(3} REVISED
DATE: 2 July 2026
SIGNATURE:
Case No. 2026-068596
In the application for joinder by:
SEBOGODI, THATAYAONE N.O
In re:
In the matter between :
BAHURUTSE BOO MANYANA TRADITIONAL
COMMUNITY
And
MARICO CHROME CORPORATION (PTY) LTD
THEODORE WILHELM VAN DEN HEEVER N.O.
(IN HIS PURPORTED CAPACITY AS A
RECEIVER OF MARICO CHROME)
APPLICANT
APPLICANT
FIRST RESPONDENT
SECOND RESPONDENT
KGASHANE CHRISTOPHER MONYELA N.O.
(IN HIS PURPORTED CAPACITY AS A
RECEIVER OF MARICO CHROME)
OLCKERS CHOPOLOGE KOIKANYANG N.O.
(IN HIS PURPORTED CAPACITY AS A
RECEIVER OF MARICO CHROME)
SAMANCOR CHROME LIMIT~D
VEREENIGING REFRACTORIES (PTY) LTD
COMPANIES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
OFFICE
MASTER OF THE HIGH COURT
DIRECTOR-GENERAL: DEPARTMENT OF
MINERAL RESOURCES
Coram: MillarJ
Heard on: 29 June 2026
2
THIRD RESPONDENT
FOURTH RESPONDENT
FIFTH RESPONDENT
SIXTH RESPONDENT
SEVENTH RESPONDENT
EIGHTH RESPONDENT
NINTH RESPONDENT
Delivered: 2 July 2026 - This judgment was handed down electronically by
circulation to the parties' representatives by email, by being uploaded
to the CaseLines system of the GD and by release to SAFLII. The
date and time for hand-down is deemed to be 09H00 on 2 July 2026.
JUDGMENT - APPLICATION FOR INTERVENTION
MILLAR J
3
[1] On 28 May 2026, I delivered judgment in an application brought by the
Bahurutse Boo Manyana Traditional Community (the Community) against the
first (Marica Chrome) and second to fourth respon.dents (the Receivers).
[2] Marica Chrome and the Receivers brought an application for leave to appeal
against that judgment. The application was set down for hearing together with
an application in terms of s 18(3) of the Superior Courts Act1 brought by the
Community on 15 June 2026. When application was called, counsel for the
applicant (in the present application for intervention), Mr. Sebogodi, informed
the Court that his client wished to bring an application to intervene in the
proceedings, albeit at this late stage. Counsel had in hand, an application for
intervention which had apparently only shortly before the Court convened,
been furnished to the other parties. It had not yet made its way onto
Caselines and so the Court did not have sight of it.
[3]. The situation that was created, was one in which it was impossible for any of
the applications to proceed. The parties reached an agreement with regards
to the time periods for the filing of papers. The parties also agreed that the
wasted costs occasioned by the late intervention would be reserved for
determination when the application was heard. It was agreed that all 3
applications would be heard on 29 June 2026.
[4] When this application for intervention was heard, it was opposed by the
Community. Marica Chrome and the Receivers adopted a "agnostic"
approach. They did not file any papers or make any substantive submissions
regarding the intervention other than to associate themselves with the
submissions made on behalf of Mr. Sebogodi regarding the alleged lack of
locus standi of Mr. Mangope to represent the Community.
[5] The order granted on 12 May 2026 was as follows:
1 10of2013 .
"[34.1)
[34.2]
[34.3)
[34.4]
[34.5]
[34.6)
[34.7]
4
The forms and seJVice provided for in the Uniform Rules of Court
(Rules) are dispensed with and the matter is permitted to be heard
as one of urgency in terms of Rule 6(12). The Applicant's non
compliance with the rules is condoned.
The authority of the Second, Third and Fourth Respondents to act
as receivers of the First Respondent has been terminated.
The order of this Court dated 9 June 2020, under case number
23881/2020 has been terminated by virtue of the discharge of the
provisional liquidation order of the First Respondent.
The control and management of the First Respondent has reverted
to its lawful corporate organs subject to and in accordance with the
provisions of the Companies Act 71 of 2008.
The Applicant and the Fifth and Sixth Respondents, as the
shareholders of the First Respondent, forthwith and in accordance
with the shareholders agreement of July 2011, in the First
Respondent, duly nominate and procure the appointment of their
respective directors of the First Respondent and undertake to take
all reasonably necessary steps to restore lawful corporate
governance in respect of the First Respondent.
The Second, Third and Fourth Respondents, within 7 (seven) days
of this order, are to deliver to the shareholders and directors of the
First Respondent all books, records, accounting documents,
contracts, operational information, bank records, keys, access
credentials, statutory records, and assets of the First Respondent
in their possession or under their control.
The Second, Third and Fourth Respondents are interdicted and
restrained from holding themselves out as authorised to act on
[34.8]
[34.9]
[34.10]
[34.11]
5
behalf of the First Respondent, save insofar as may be strictly
necessary to give effect to this order.
The Second, Third and Fourth Respondents will render a full written
account, within 14 (fourteen) days of this order, of all actions taken
by them in relation to the business, assets, affairs and finances of
the First Respondent from 22 September 2023 to date.
It is declared that any person acting through or under the authority
of the Second, Third and Fourth Respondents in purported
continuation of the receivership of the First Respondent after 22
September 2023 being the discharge of the winding up of the First
Respondent, has acted without lawful authority.
The Seventh Respondent, only to the extent necessary, gives effect
to this order, to correct and/or update the public records relating to
the First Respondent to reflect the legal consequences of the relief
granted by this Court.
The Second, Third and Fourth Respondents will pay the costs of
this application, jointiy and severally, one paying the others to be
absolved on the scale as between attorney and client which costs
are to include the costs consequent upon the engagement of two
counsel, one of whom is senior counsel (where so engaged) on
scale C".
[6] The case brought by the Community and the order granted, was in broad
terms, to restore proper corporate governance in terms of the Companies Act2
to Marico Chrome. The Community, through its Tribal Council, of which both
Mr. Mangope and Mr. Sebogodi are members, are shareholders of Marico
Chrome and have, in terms of a shareholders agreement entered in 2011, the
right to nominate directors to the board of directors. The circumstances under
2 71 of 2008.
6
which the application was brought are set out in the main judgment. What is
noteworthy in this regard, is that it was never placed in issue that after the
Receivers had sought their discharge as provisional liquidators, they had not
informed the Traditional Council of this fact.
[7] Mr. Mangope, who deposed to the founding papers on behalf of the
Community, relied for his authority to do so, upon a resolution of the
Traditional Council granted on 24 May 2022. The resolution inter alia
specifically provided that:
"Kgosi Kwena Mangope be and is hereby authorised to sign the mandate and
fee agreement for the appointment of Thompson Wilkes Incorporated
(Registration Number: 2004/000428/21) to render professional legal services
to me, which shall include the right to prosecute or defend proceedings in any
competent court and on my behalf to take all necessary steps in connection
with enforcement of title over the property off (sic) and recovery of monies
owned (sic) to Bahurutshe Boo Mar.yana Tribal Authority by Marico Chrome
Corporation Proprietary Limited (Reg no. 1978/005144/07) (in Liquidation) ."
[8] The resolution is clear and unequivocal in its terms. Mr. Mangope was
authorised to conduct the litigation in terms of the resolution. In its terms, it is
limited only to being in respect of the enforcement "of title over the property" of
the Tribal Authority. It is not in issue that the Tribal Authority represents the
Community which is the beneficial owner of any property registered in the
name of the Tribal Authority. It also cannot be disputed that the shareholding
in Marica Chrome is part of that property.
[9] The basis for the intervention by Mr. Sebogodi, is litany of complaints about
the way Mr. Mangope conducts his affairs arid ads on behalf of the Tribal
Authority. It is not necessary to deal with any of these complaints. If there are
indeed meritorious complaints, then these can legitimately be pursued in
separate proceedings. The satisfaction or otherwise with Mr. Mangope's
separate proceedings. The satisfaction or otherwise with Mr. Mangope's
conduct was not and cannot be an issue in the main case. The main case
7
dealt with a discreet legal issue arising out of common cause facts. The
application for intervention is silent on this issue.
[1 0] While Mr. Sebogodi admits the resolution of 24 May 2022, he seeks an
interpretation of it which would ·require a reading in of limitations on the
authority of Mr. Mangope in terms of that resolution, which are simply not
there. For example, he asserts:
"What the resolution did not do was grant Rre Mangope to institute litigation on
behalf of the traditional council without involving it. It is not a blanket resolution
that entitled him to decide when and for what case to involve the traditional
council lawyers."
[11] Mr. Sebogodi also goes on to assert that:
"The administration of the mineral resources is concentrated in Rre Mangope,
which is an anomaly that has to be addressed. Counsel is present and should
lead the administration of the resources and other affairs of the traditional
community. It is not surprising that he instituted the urgent application,
purporting to represent the interests of the traditional community, but without
involving the council."
[12] The plain wording of the resolution is at odds with these assertions. The
resolution in its terms was for a specific purpose and that is the purpose for
which the litigation was instituted and judgment granted. Perhaps tellingly,
regarding the second of the assertions, that Mr. Mangope is somehow acting
in his own interest, Mr. Sebogodi makes no submission regarding the order
granted as set out in paragraph [5] above. The order confers no right upon
Mr. Mangope - it in fact does the opposite. It directs compliance with the
shareholders agreement of July 2011 - since the Tribal Council is the
shareholder, the order is entirely in its favour.
8
[13] Does Mr. Sebogodi, whether acting personally or on behalf of the Tribal
Council have a direct and substantial interest in the order? The law in this
regard is clear as set out in Lebea v Menye and Another, 3 in which the
Constitutional Court held that:
"The word "interest" in rule 28(1) has been interpreted to mean a direct and
substantial interest which a person is required to have in the subject matter
before he or she can be said to have locus standi in such a matter or before
such a person may be jointed or be allowed to be joined in proceedings. Direct
and substantial interest is a direct and substantial interest in the order that a
courl is asked to make in a matter. It is not enough if a person has an interest
in a finding or in cerlain reasons for an order. The interest must be in the order
or the outcome of the litigation."
(14] In Gordon v Department of Health, KwaZulu Natal,4 it was held that:
"The test is whether a parly that is alleged to be a necessary parly, has a legal
interest in the subject matter, which may be affected prejudicially by the
judgment of the courl in the proceedings concerned."
[15] An interest in the Court's reasoning or findings, as opposed to the order itself,
is insufficient for intervention. The only interest that Mr. Sebogodi has, is in
the restoration of lawful corporate governance in respect of Marica Chrome.
His concerns regarding Mr. Mangope have no place in the present litigation
and would add nothing to the determination of the legal question. Put simply,
the order of the Court is not prejudicial to any member of the Community or
Mr. Sebogodi or the Tribal Council. For this reason, the application for
intervention is to be refused.
3 2023 (3) BCLR 257 (CC) (CC} at para [30].
4 2008 (6) SA 522 (SCA) at para [9] referring to Bowring v Vrededorp Property CC 2007 (5) SA 391
(SCA) at para [21].
9
[16] It is somewhat surprising, given the fact that the Community and Tribal
Council, have been excluded from the management of Marica Chrome in
circumstances where they are entitled to be included, that an application to
intervene in support of the parties who have subverted the Community's and
Tribal Council's rights is brought by Mr. Sebogodi. It is inexplicable that Mr.
Sebogodi, acting either as a member of the Tribal Council or in his own
capacity, would take any steps to subvert the Community's interests and the
assertion of its legal rights in Marica Chrome.
[17] Turning now to the question of costs. The application for intervention was
stillborn. Mr. Sebogodi, while asserting that he acts on behalf of the Tribal
Council, placed nothing before the Court establishing this. No resolution or
even a single confirmatory affidavit. Simply asserting that you act on behalf
of a party does not make it so and it cannot be that a party such as the
Community or the Tribal Council for that matter, can be mulcted with costs
simply because a third party alleges to be acting on their behalf.
[18] I intend to order Mr. Sebogodi to pay the costs of the intervention application.
The timing of the bringing of the application was the direct cause for the
postponement on 15 June 2026. The wasted costs for that day could easily
have been avoided had the other parties been given timeous notice of the
application. Mr. Sebogodi must pay those costs also.
[19] It bears mentioning ttiat the Receivers indicated that they were not seeking a
costs order against Mr. Sebogodi for the wasted costs of 15 June 2026. Since
they took no part in the intervention application, no costs order is made in
respect of them for this application either.
[20] Accordingly, the costs to be paid by Mr. Sebogodi are to be paid in respect of
the applicants for both the wasted costs of 15 June 2026 as well as for the
opposed intervention application. The Community sought an order for costs
10
on the scale as between attorney and client. ·Considering the matter as a
whole, I am of the view that Mr. Sebogodi, should pay costs on the attorney
and client scale. All parties were represented by more than one counsel.
Given the nature and importance of the matter, scale C is the scale upon which
counsels costs are awarded.
[21] In the circumstances, it is ordered:
[21.1] The application for intervention is dismissed.
[21.2] The applicant for intervention. Mr. Sebogodi, is ordered to pay
the costs of the application on the scale as betwee n attorney and
client which costs are to include the costs consequent upon the
engagement of two counsel, one of whom is senior counsel
(where so engaged) on scale C. Such costs are to include the
wasted costs of the first respondent, the Bahurutse Boo
Manyana Traditional Community of 15 June 2026.
HEARD ON:
JUDGMENT DELIVERED ON:
APPLICANT FOR INTERVENTION
COUNSEL:
A MILLAR
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
29 JUNE 2026
02 JULY 2026
ADV. M MAKOTI
ADV. J MABUZA
INSTRUCTED BY:
REFERENCE:
PARTIES IN THE MAIN APPL/CATION
FOR THE APPLICANT:
COUNSEL:
INSTRUCTED BY:
REFERENCE:
TCM ATTORNEYS INC
MR. CT MAREDI
ADV. G ROME SC
ADV. R MAKOANYANA
THOMSON WILKS INC
MR. T KGAOBOESELE
FOR THE FIRST TO FOURTH RESPONDENTS:
COUNSEL:
RESPONDENTS:
INSTR UCTED BY:
REFERENCE:
ADV. E THERON SC
DE VRIES INCORPORATE D
MR. A BONNET
11