THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, DURBAN
Case No: D476/2023
In the matter between:
MANDLA NGCOBO Applicant
and
COMMISSION FOR CONCILIATION,
MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION First Respondent
LEON PILLAY N.O Second Respondent
PRIVATE SECURITY REGULATORY AUTHORITY Third Respondent
Heard: 29 January 2026
Delivered: 19 June 2026
Summary: This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties and / or their legal representatives by email.
JUDGMENT
(1) Reportable: No
(2) Of interest to other Judges: Yes
Signature Date
19/06/2026
GOVENDER AJ
Introduction:
1. This is an application to review and set aside the Arbitration Award (Award),
issued by the Second Respondent (the Arbitrator), under the auspices of the
First Respondent (CCMA), under case number KNDB5555- 21, dated 10 July
2023.
2. The Applicant (Ngcobo) was employed by the Third Respondent (PSRA) on 1
June 2014, as an Inspector in the Compliance Division of the Durban branch.
The Applicant was charged with various allegations pertaining to misconduct.
3. In brief, the Applicant faces the following charges:
3.1. Dereliction of duty - in failing to report non- compliance of Mr Mthethwa, as
a service provider to the Respondent, nor taking the necessary steps
against Mr Mthethwa;
3.2. Bribery - it was alleged that the Applicant solicited a bribe from Mr
Mthethwa in exchange for exonerating Mthethwa from the consequences of
non-compliance;
3.3. Visiting Mthethwa with the SAPS and seizing Mthethwa’s equipment and
subsequently soliciting a bribe from Mthethwa for the release of the
equipment:
3.4. Failing to report the bribe to the Director of the Respondent; and
3.5. Unprofessional conduct whilst on duty in that the Applicant was
unprofessional, rude and/or abusive to Mr Ramdin and Ms Daphne K on 10
October 2019.
4. The Applicant was found guilty as charged and dismissed on 01 June 2021. He
appealed against the dismissal, but his appeal was unsuccessful. Aggrieved
with the outcome, he referred an unfair dismissal to the CCMA.
5. The Arbitrator found that the Applicant’s dismissal was procedurally and
substantively fair. The Applicant launched this review application, seeking to set
aside the Award and substituting the Award with an order , to the effect that he
be reinstated to his position with full backpay.
6. A brief synopsis of the background is that Applicant was accused by Mr
Mthethwa of soliciting a bribe from him in order to overlook the fact that he was
an unregistered security service provider, who was rendering services at the U
Square shopping mall in Umlazi. There were further allegations about the
Applicant’s dereliction of duties as a result thereof.
7. In 2019, the regional manager, Talent Zwane (Zwane) was informed by a Mr
Majola, that PSIRA inspectors were taking bribes from security service
providers. Mr. Majola was a director of the Vukela group. Zwane sent an email
detailing the complaint she received and requested an investigation. Ms. Selina
Mohlala was appointed as investigator and she conducted the investigation into
the allegations levied against the Applicant of soliciting a bribe from Mr
Mthethwa, a retired police officer. Mahlangu and Chima were also appointed
investigators dealing with other allegations.
8. It was alleged he was being paid R20 000-00 per month to render guarding
services at the U-Square Mall (mall). Ms Mohlala interviewed Mr Mthethwa and
his wife and prepared a statement for him to sign, which was done. Mthethwa,
however, did not testify at the disciplinary hearing or the arbitration. He was
subpoenaed but she still did not attend, and no explanation was offered for his
non- attendance, except that he stopped taking calls from Mohala and
appeared not willing to testify. The Third Respondent led the evidence of
Zwane, Ramdin, Mahlangu, Chima and Mohlala. The evidence is well
summarized in the award, and I will not repeat the evidence herein. The
Applicant testified in his defence and denied the allegations against him.
Applicant testified in his defence and denied the allegations against him.
9. The court will focus on the charge pertaining to the Applicant soliciting a bribe
as that was the reason that the Arbitrator found that the dismissal was for fair
reason and is also the basis of these review proceedings
10. The arbitrator found that the probabilities clearly favored the employer’s version
that the applicant had solicited a bribe from Mthethwa to keep him happy. He
found that this also renders the applicant guilty of dereliction of duty in failing to
report Mthethwa as an unregistered security service provider
1.
GROUNDS OF REVIEW
11. The Applicant contends that the Award is reviewable for the following reasons:
11.1. The Arbitrator misconceived the nature of the enquiry when he preferred
hearsay evidence over direct evidence that had been given at the
arbitration hearing. The Applicant contends that the witness Mohlala had
stated that she could not vouch for the veracity of the evidence as told to
her by Mthethwa and his wife;
11.2. The Applicant further contends that the Arbitrator’s findings at paragraph
32 of the Award, that it was undisputed that Mthethwa was not a registered
security service provider , demonstrates the Arbitrator’s complete
misdirection in reaching this conclusion as the Applicant maintains that he
had disputed that Mthethwa was running a private security business;
11.3. The Applicant contended that there had been no evidence that Mthethwa
was running an unregistered security business when he and the other
inspectors went to the U -Square Shopping Mall in Umlazi to conduct
inspections;
11.4. The Applicant further raised that he had disputed the veracity of Mohlala’s
evidence and therefore the Arbitrator committed a gross irregularity by
placing more weight on the hearsay evidence of her testimony pertaining to
what was reported to her by Mthethwa;
1 Page 38 Pleadings Index para 41 of the Award
11.5. The Applicant contended that the arbitration’s finding that the Applicant’s
explanation as to how Mthethwa could have obtained his private cellphone
number was improbable. Further that this finding, amounts to a reviewable
irregularity. The applicant submitted that the Arbitrator should have
preferred his evidence over that of Mohlala , and have accepted that since
he had worked in the Community Policing Forum his number was out for
public knowledge , the number was also included on his business card and
therefore Mthethwa could have obtained his number through these
avenues;
11.6. The Applicant contended that the Arbitrator was incorrect to reject his
contention that there had been a bad relationship between him and the
manager of the Durban Branch, Ms. Talent Zwane. He stated that an
external investigation was conducted against Ms. Zwane and after the
external investigation, Ms. Zwane did not return to her position, but she
assumed a senior position in Gauteng. He averted that Ms. Zwane denied
knowledge of the investigation but that he had referred to evidence in the
bundle, which showed that Ms. Zwane was interviewed by a Ms. P Singh.
He maintained that the Arbitrator, instead of finding that Zwane was not
telling the truth, had instead rejected his evidence, which was incorrect.
11.7. The Applicant contended that the Award of the Second Respondent is
therefore one that a reasonable decision- maker could not have made and
should be reviewed and set aside.
11.8. I pause to mention that there was no supplementary affidavit filed and
therefore, the grounds of review, as set out above, are the only grounds of
review raised by the Applicant. The Applicant did not supplement the
grounds of review with any reference to the evidence from the transcribed
record.
12. The Third Respondent (PSIRA) opposed the review. In short, PSIRA contended
that the Award issued by the Commissioner falls within a band of
reasonableness and that the Applicant has failed to make out a case for a
review.
13. Further that the Applicant’s founding affidavit did not mount any challenge to
the Commissioner’s reasoning and analysis of the evidence. It was emphasized
that the Arbitrator made a ruling on the admissibility of hearsay evidence and
his ruling was clear that whilst he excluded the admission of affidavits of
Mthethwa, Majola and Kelly, (unless they testified at the arbitration which they
did not ), he would admit the evidence of the investigators on what was told to
them by Mthethwa, Mohlala and Kelly.
14. PSIRA maintained that the Commissioner had direct evidence from Mohlala
who stated that she went to the Centre (U Square Mall) and found guards
there. The Centre was owned by a Mr Salim, who had enlisted the services of
Mr. Mthethwa to guard the Centre. Further that Mthethwa was not a registered
security service provider.
15. The Third Respondent contended that the Applicant had not disputed that
Mthethwa had had his private cell number and that the Arbitrator was correct in
rejecting the Applicant’s version that the number was obtained because he
was a member of the CPF, or known to the public from his time he was a police
officer , as highly improbable.
16. PSIRA a verred that since Mohlala’s evidence was based on what was
recounted to her by Mthethwa , then together with Mthethwa’s version of what
transpired and the fact that he had the correct cellphone number of Mthethwa ,
then the probabilities clearly favored the Third Respondent’s version in respect
of the bribery allegations. The Third Respondent maintained that there was
indeed satisfactory evidence that was tendered during the arbitration
proceedings, which supported the conclusion that the Applicant had solicited
and took bribes from Mthethwa. Further that since bribes, fraud and dishonesty
are all in the same basket of deceit, it would have served no purpose for the
are all in the same basket of deceit, it would have served no purpose for the
Arbitrator to reinstate the Applicant who had broken the fundamental element of
an employment relationship which is based on trust.
Evaluation
17. The test to review an Award is now well established. The court’s powers of
intervention in review proceedings are narrowly circumscribed. A court may
only review and set aside an arbitration award, if it can shown to contain a
defect as contemplated by section 145 of the Labour Relations Act 66,1995
(LRA), renders the award so unreasonable that no reasonable decision maker
could have reached on the same evidence.
18. The test as well-known to be set out in Sidumo and Another v Rustenburg
Platinum Mines Ltd & Others2 [Sidumo], is whether the decision reached by the
Commissioner is one that a reasonable decision- maker could not reach. This
standard of reasonableness, established in Sidumo , thus places a high
threshold on applicants seeking to challenge an arbitration outcome or a ruling.
In Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd 3 , the Supreme Court of Appeal held that the test is
a stringent one that will ensure that awards are not lightly interfered with.
19. In short, a reviewing court must ascertain whether the Arbitrator considered the
issues before him or her; evaluated the facts presented at the hearing and
came to a conclusion that is reasonable. It is trite that the review court is not
required to take into account every factor individually, consider how the
Arbitrator treated and dealt with each of those factors, and determine whether a
failure by the Arbitrator to deal with it , is sufficient to set the Award aside.
Hence it is trite that a piecemeal approach to dealing with the Award is
improper , and a reviewing court must consider the totality of the evidence and
decide whether the decision made by the Arbitrator is one that a reasonable
decision-maker could make, based on the evidence adduced before him.
2 2007 (28) ILJ 2405 (CC) at para 1110
3 [2013] 11 BLLR 1074 (SCA)
20. The court is mindful that a determination of any reviewable irregularity on the
part of the decision maker includes a determin ation of whether or not, the
decision of the arbitrator falls within a band of decisions , to which a reasonable
decision maker could reach on the available material. If so, the award must be
upheld regardless of any lapses in the decision maker’s reasoning or conduct.
The test is outcome based. If the outcome can be sustained on the evidence
led at the arbitration, regardless of the reasons advanced for the finding, it must
be sustained.
21. The grounds of review appear in paragraphs 15 to 19 of the founding affidavit.
The Pleadings Index contains all pleadings. There has been no supplementary
affidavit filed. I pause to mention, that the Transcribed Record was in total
disarray and the court had to spend many hours trying to make sense of the
Record, given the manner in which it was presented. Be that as it may,
eventually the court was able to follow the dates and the evidence as presented
as the arbitration hearing.
Hearsay evidence versus Direct evidence
22. The Applicant contended that the Arbitrator misconceived the nature of the
enquiry when he preferred hearsay evidence over direct evidence.
23. Although, it is trite that arbitration proceedings are less formal than criminal or
civil proceedings, this does not infer that the correct legal principles on the law
of evidence and or the admissibility of hearsay evidence in particular, are not
applied. A right to fair hearing embraces a concept of substantiative fairness to
all parties to the hearing and includes a right to challenge the evidence.
24. Hearsay evidence is inadmissible, unless permitted in the interests of justice
after due consideration of the factors, as set out in S3(1)(c) of the Law of
Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1998 (the Act ) . S 3(1)( c) of the Act provides
that the evidence may be permitted after the court carefully weighs the
following factors:
i) the nature of the proceedings;
ii) the nature and purpose of the evidence;
iii) the probative value of the evidence;
iv) the reason the original person is not giving the evidence themselves;
v) any prejudice the admission of the hearsay might cause;
vi) and other factor the court finds relevant.
25. From the reasons in the award, it is clear that the Arbitrator assessed the
evidence of what was reported to Mohala against the version of the Applicant.
26. Mohlala testified that she had conducted an investigation, and during her
investigations she interviewed Mthethwa. She testified that Mthethwa had told
her that he had been rendering services at U -Square Shopping Mall, as an
unregistered service provider. That the Applicant and him had exchanged
cellphone numbers and thereafter he had met the Applicant on two occasions
and paid him monies so that he was not reported, as the Applicant as duty
bound to do as an inspector. The arbitrator accepted all the evidence of what
was reported to Mohlala during her investigation, even though Mohlala was
very clear that she was not present to witness any incident and further that she
could not confirm if anything told to her by Mthethwa was correct or not .
27. All the evidence pertaining to interview with Mthethwa falls squarely into the
category of hearsay evidence, as the probative value of such evidence
depended on the credibility of Mthethwa and not Mohlala. The analysis and
probative value attached to this evidence certainly illustrates a misdirection and
irregularity in the proceedings, as there was no ruling that this hearsay
evidence was accepted in the interests of justice and the reasons, therefore.
28. The court notes that there was a previous ruling before another arbitrator that
hearsay evidence would be accepted but then for reasons not clear , there was
hearsay evidence would be accepted but then for reasons not clear , there was
a second ruling before the current arbitrator where he excluded the written
statements from the evidence but stated that he would allow the investigators to
testify on what was told to them . Needless to point out, any version related to
them would be hearsay evidence as well.
29. Having perused the records, the court finds that the ruling excluding the
admission of the written cannot be faulted and accords with the correct legal
principles on the law on hearsay evidence and its admissibility. However, rather
baffling, is that the Arbitrator accepted the very same hearsay evidence,
through the “backdoor”, via testimony of Mohlala. He not only accepted the
evidence of what was allegedly told to her by Mthethwa during her interview
process but also placed considerable probative value on what was allegedly
reported to Mohala and reached his conclusions based on such acceptance,
which is flawed.
30. This was despite the fact, that is common cause from the Transcribed Record
that Mohlala, testified that she could not verify the veracity of what Mthethwa
reported to her, nor confirm the incidents as she was not there. Therefore, there
should have been no probative value attached to such evidence.
31. A further issue with acceptance of such evidence as a version that was
assessed against the testimony of the Applicant and determined on the
probabilities and improbabilities is that the Applicant, did not have an
opportunity to challenge the version that was told to Mohlala by Mthethwa. The
entire report of what was told to Mohlala during her investigation amounted to
hearsay, unless Mthethwa himself had testified to that version. It is irrelevant
whether the evidence was accepted from the written statement, which was
excluded, or whether Mohlala herself testified on what was told to her and
which she in fact recorded in that written statement as that statement was
prepared by her. The oral testimony of Mohlala could carry no greater weight
than the statement, as her testimony was that she had prepared the statement.
than the statement, as her testimony was that she had prepared the statement.
A fact that seems to have eluded the arbitrator.
32. It is also evident from the transcribed record, that the Applicant disputed that
Mthethwa had been guarding at U -Square shopping mall when he conducted a
search. The Arbitrators finding at paragraph 32 of the Award, is at odds with
evidence led before him. It was put to Mohlala under cross - examination that
the Applicant denied that the guards at U Square shopping mall, were non -
complaint 4 and had denied that Mthethwa was found rendering services at the
mall.
33. Hence the Arbitrators finding that it is “undisputed that Mthethwa was not
registered as a security service provider, but he did provide security service at
U-Square shopping mall is not correct at all. It was in fact disputed that at the
material time of the Applicant’s inspection Mthethwa was not rendering
services. Even if it is common cause that Mthethwa is not a registered security
services provider, it was nonetheless disputed that he was rendering services
at the time of the Applicant’s inspection. This was material fact from the
evidence led, which the Arbitrator clearly misunderstood. The court finds that
arbitrator misdirected himself when he found that it was undisputed that
Mthethwa rendered services at U - Square , despite being unregistered with
PSIRA.
Evidence of Applicant’s cellphone number on Mthethwa’s cellphone
34. The Arbitrator correctly found that it was not disputed that Mthethwa had the
Applicant’s private cellphone number and therefore it was incumbent to provide
a reasonable explanation on how Mthethwa would have obtained the
Applicant’s private number. However, again without the evidence of Mthethwa
confirming how he obtained the Applicant’s cellphone number, the Arbitrator
was incorrect to dismiss the Applicant’s version in this regard.
4 Transcribed Record 05 December 2022, Page 26 Lines 25 to page 27…. “but at the time that he
(Applicant) got there with the police, there was no non-complaint guards on site “
35. The Applicants’ version of course was pure speculation . On his version he had
no knowledge of how Mthethwa had the number but speculated on how it could
be possible. In his evidence he denied the employer’s version that he had given
Mthethwa his cell phone number in order to solicit a bribe and further that the
only reason why Mthethwa had his cellphone number was because the
Applicant had given it him. The court is not persuaded that the employers’
version is the only plausible explanation.
36. The Applicants evidence is that his cellphone is widely known from his days as
a police office in the community as well as his participation the community
police forum. This version was not disputed by any evidence to contrary but
was dismissed as highly improbable. The Applicant testified that he did not
know but thought it could have been obtained from anyone as his cell phone
number was circulated when he was a police officer and public would
sometimes contact him on his cell phone. His cellphone number was not private
according to his evidence.
37. There could be a variety of possibilities of how someone’s cell number is
circulated. Had the arbitrator properly applied his mind to the evidence , he
would have recognized that the applicant’s version was not unreasonable in
this regard , or an unreasonable evasion , but rather a logical response in the
circumstances based on speculation against his bare denial of having given the
cell phone number himself . The arbitrator mischaracterized the response as
improbable, when the basis of the employer’s version was hearsay evidence.
The applicant did not have an opportunity to challenge Mthethwa on the
cellphone number was obtained. The fact that he had the number was not
conclusive proof that the Applicant had given to him. The court finds that was in
reality a rational statement of fact (that the applicant on his version, did not
know as a matter of fact how Mthethwa had obtained his cellphone), was in
know as a matter of fact how Mthethwa had obtained his cellphone), was in
the court’s view wrongly construed as a failure to provide a reasonable
explanation.
38. The arbitrator placed an unnecessary evidentiary burden on the Applicant to
disprove an unsubstantiated assumption of guilt based on hearsay evidence,
which could not be tested and the veracity of which could not be confirmed by
Mohlala herself, rather than requiring the employer to positively prove the
misconduct complained off. By treating the Applicant’s inability to speculate
about how the cellphone number was obtained as evidence against him, the
Arbitrator reversed the burden of proof, and by so doing acted wholly
inconsistently with the notions of basic fairness which underpins all labour
processes. The arbitrators’ flawed reasoning in this regard has resulted in a
decision that no reasonable arbitrator could have reached on the evidence led
before him.
39. Another important aspect of the evidence, which was not given due
consideration, was the evidence of Mohlala, that there were four other
inspectors who conducted the investigation with Mthethwa at U-Square Mall but
who was not interviewed by her. This is rather perplexing as they would have in
the best position to confirm if Mthethwa or any of the alleged unregistered
guards were found at the mall.
5 This was critical evidence that was ignored.
The fact that they were not interviewed, when they could have been
interviewed, raises suspicion as to why they were not interviewed.
40. The explanation offered by Mohlala was not satisfactory at all and appears to
be rather evasive. The explanation offered by her was that Mthethwa had told
her that no other person was present when the bribe was solicited. But this
explanation seems illogical, as the reason to interview the other four inspectors,
would not have been to verify the alleged bribe, but more importantly for them
to confirm the alleged reason giving rise to a need for a bribe in the first place.
But Mohlala didn’t see a need for such corroboration.
41. There was no cogent explanation before the arbitrator as to why these
witnesses did not come to testify. There was mere speculation of alleged
intimidation because the Applicant was an ex - police officer. Since there was
intimidation because the Applicant was an ex - police officer. Since there was
no satisfactory explanation, the arbitrator ought to have drawn a negative
inference from the non- appearance of critical witnesses, instead of assessing
5 Transcribed Record Page 11 and Page 14 Lines 9 to 11; Page 16 Lines 1 to 6
the evidence of Mohala’s secondhand account of Mthethwa’s narrative against
the evidence of the Applicant. This conduct indeed amounts to a gross
irregularity in the proceedings, compro mising the basic tenets of fairness of the
proceedings.
42. As an aside, the court also must point out that neither Mohlala or the other
inspectors who confirm that Mthethwa was found unlawfully guarding during
their investigations, appear to have taken any action against Mthethwa, and this
appears rather odd to the court. It was a point that was raised in cross
examination with Mohlala as well with reasonable explanations.
43. Further, for all intents and purposes, Mohlala was also a single witness and the
necessary caution should have been applied to her evidence. But instead, the
Arbitrator completely relied on her evidence and on what was allegedly
reported to this single witness, without any corroborating evidence at all , to find
that the Applicant had been justly dismissed, without the accuser being called
to testify. This kind of conduct does not at all inspire a process that was fair to
the employee at all.
44. Further, even the crux of the actual hearsay evidence of Mthethwa’s version
was not corroborated by any witness and even his evidence too falls into
category of a single witness. Even the evidence pertaining to his wife did not
offer any corroboration. The nature of the allegations of soliciting a bribe are
serious and the Applicant ought to have been given an opportunity to face his
accuser. It is re-iterated that there was no valid or cogent reasons advanced at
all as to why the accusers (except for Kelly), did not testify or respond to their
subpoenas. Surely this would have been a factor to consider in deciding
whether to permit hearsay evidence.
Conclusion
45. The court finds that the Commissioner had not correctly assessed and
evaluated the evidence wholistically with regard to the available evidence
before him. It is generally accepted that courts will resolve factual disputes by
assessing the credibility of the various witnesses, their reliability and the
probabilities.
46. However, the Arbitrator in causa, considered the probabilities or improbabilities
of each parties’ version based on pure hearsay evidence. He did not correctly
apply the legal principles on the law of evidence and or hearsay evidence and
the admissibility thereof, with regard to Mohlala’s evidence on what was
singularly reported to her by Mthethwa. The court is mindful that there are
instance, when it is in the interests of justice to admit hearsay evidence, but
there are no reasons advanced in the award as to why the arbitrator allowed
the hearsay evidence. In any event, after considering all the evidence, the court
finds no reasons that justify the admission of such evidence at all. As stated, no
evidence of intimidation or any other basis laid for the reluctance of these
witnesses. The evidence of the witnesses who did not testify were critical to the
allegations and in the interests of justice they should have been called to testify.
47. The Arbitrator’s finding that the Applicant had in all probability solicited a bribe
from Mthethwa, based on Mthethwa’s report to Mohlala, and on Mohlala’s own
investigations and confirmation that Mthethwa renders services at U -Square
Shopping Mall, although he is not a registered service provider in terms of
PSIRA’s compliance requirements , is deeply flawed . The reason being is that
the critical aspect, had to be evidence pertaining to the time when the
operations were carried out by the Applicant at the shopping mall , and not the
time when the investigations were carried out by Mohlala. Again, the four
inspectors could have been crucial witnesses, but they were not interviewed.
inspectors could have been crucial witnesses, but they were not interviewed.
48. In the result, the Arbitrator committed gross irregularities in the proceedings,
and he reached a decision that does not fall with a band of reasonableness.
The evidence was poor, lacking and unsatisfactory to establish a finding of guilt
for charge of soliciting a bribe , or a dereliction of duties in failing to report
Mthethwa. The arbitrator made an incorrect finding on law as he overlooked
the fact that all the evidence pertaining to what was told to Mohlala was clearly
hearsay evidence, was not irrefutable, in fact was disputed and cannot be
considered as conclusive evidence of events that actually transpired.
49. The above evaluation of the arbitrators’ findings reveals a failure by him to
rationally and properly assess the evidence. He overlooked material evidence
and attached undue weight to unsubstantiated evidence. The outcome is
disconnected from the evidence led. In the circumstances, the Applicant was
not given a fair hearing, and the Applicant was greatly prejudiced.
50. Therefore, the arbitration award stands to be reviewed and set aside. I am
satisfied that a direct substitution of the Arbitrators award is appropriate, rather
than remitting the matter for a de novo hearing. There are no reasons not to
order a re-instatement and the court in these circumstances is obliged to do so
, once the conclusion is reached that the Applicant was unfairly dismissed.
COSTS
51. In terms of the provisions of section 162(1) of the LRA, the court has a wide
discretion when it comes to the issue of costs. The court is aware of the
reaffirmed principles as set out in Zungu v the Premier of the Province of
KwaZulu-Natal & Others67 , where the court held that when making an adverse
costs order in a legal matter, a presiding officer is required to consider the
principle of fairness and have due regard to the conduct of the parties.
52. I do not find it necessary to make any costs order.
In the premises the following Order is made:
6 Transcribed Record 05 December 2022, page 26
7 (2018) 39 ILJ 523 CC at para 25
i) The arbitration award of the Second Respondent is reviewed and set
aside.
ii) The arbitration award is substituted with the following order:
“1. The dismissal of the Applicant by the Third Respondent was
substantively unfair.
2. The Third Respondent is ordered to re- instate the Applicant
retrospectively from the date of dismissal, on the same terms and
conditions of employment that existed prior to his dismissal, and without
any loss of benefits.
3. The Applicant is ordered to report to work within 07 (seven) days of
receipt of this order.”
iii) There is no order as to costs.
________________________________
Nalini Govender
Acting Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa
APPEARANCES:
APPLICANT: Bulose and Partners
RESPONDENT: Adv Xolani Mofokeng instructed by Moeti Kanyane Attorneys