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NO
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NO
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE NUMBER: 082438-2026
In the matter between:-
ADAMAX PROPERTY PROJECTS MENLYN (PTY) LTD 1st Applicant
CHRISTAL INVESTMENTS (PTY) LTD 2nd Applicant
TAKOU INVESTMENTS (PTY) LTD 3rd Applicant
PROCPROPS 60 (PTY) LTD 4th Applicant
and
MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES PENSION FUND 1st Respondent
AKANI PENSION FUND ADMINISTRATORS (PTY) LTD 2nd Respondent
METROPROP (PTY) LTD 3rd Respondent
This judgment is handed down by uploading it on CaseLines and sending it to
the representatives of the parties’ email addresses as indicated in the practice
notes. The date of the judgment is deemed to be 23 June 2026.
I I I L_ __ ____j______
Reid J
Introduction
JUDGMENT
Page 2 of 26
[1] The applicants bring this application as a matter of urgency in terms of
Rule 6(12) of the Uniform Rules of Court. The first respondent brings a
counter-application, similarly on an urgent basis. The matter was heard
before me on 5 May 2026. This judgment concerns both the main
application and the counter-application.
[2] The dispute between the parties' that serves before this Court, concern
three shopping centres in Pretoria, namely Parkview Shopping Centre,
Glen Village North, and Glen Village South ("the shopping centres" or
"the three shopping centres").
[3] The applicants collectively own a share of 45% of these properties, while
the first respondent, the Municipal Employees Pension Fund ("MEPF"),
owns the remaining 55% share. The owners cannot come to an
agreement about expenses to be incurred (or to not be incurred) in
relation to the shopping centres.
[4] Amongst other disputes between the parties, it is disputed whether the
expenses sought to be incurred by the first respondent, are necessary
and essential, or cosmetic of nature (for purposes of this application, I
Page 3 of 26
will cluster the expenses as “certain identified expenses”). The nature of
the expenses is a factual dispute that behoves no determination in this
application, as the question before this Court is whether the applicants
are entitled to an amount equal to 45% of the rental income of the
shopping centres to be held on trust, and that the 45% rental income is
not used to incur the identified expenses, pending the outcome of
litigation proceedings between the parties.
[5] The respondents argue that the 45% share is not to be held on trust, and
that the expenses are necessary to be incurred and should proportionally
be paid from the applicants’ 45% share. The respondents argue that the
expenses are essential to uphold safety (amongst other issues) at the
shopping centres.
[6] The question before this Court is thus very much of an interdictory
nature, and not a factual one. The issue of a factual dispute is analysed
from paragraph [43] – [46] of this judgment.
[7] The relationship between the parties is governed by a Co -Ownership
Agreement concluded on 9 November 2011, a Property Management
Agreement concluded on the same date, and a subsequent agreement
appointing the third respondent, Metroprop as the property sub-manager
on 14 February 2019.
Page 4 of 26
Factual background
[8] The history between these parties is long and contentious. Since 2016,
the relationship has been dysfunctional, giving rise to numerous court
applications, court actions, and two significant arbitrations resulting in
arbitration awards . These proceedings are yet another continuing
chapter in this unfortunate damaged business relationship.
[9] To understand the present dispute, it is necessary to set out the relevant
history in some de tail. On 9 November 2011, the Adamax co -owners
and the MEPF concluded a sale agreement in terms of which the
Adamax co-owners sold a 55% undivided share in certain properties to
the MEPF. Simultaneously, Adamax and the MEPF concluded the Co -
Ownership Agreement ("the COA"), which governed the operation of the
letting enterprise conducted from the three shopping centres. On the
same date, the parties concluded a Property Management Agreement,
appointing Akani as the manager, which immediately ceded and
delegated its rights to a sub-manager company.
[10] The COA provided for the distribution of income from the letting
business, the payment of costs, the constitution of a Management
Committee, and the management of the business. Critically, clause 11.9
of the COA p rovided that no resolution regarding the "Prescribed
Matters" set out in Schedule 1 would be valid and binding unless
assented to unanimously by the co-owners.
Page 5 of 26
[11] On 14 February 2019, Metroprop was appointed as the new sub -
manager. Thereafter, Metroprop collected rental income from the tenants
in the three shopping centres and was obliged to pay the net income to
the co-owners on a monthly basis, in the ratio of 55% to the MEPF and
45% to the applicants.
[12] In 2020, the MEPF embarked upon a redevelopment of the Glen Village
shopping centres. The applicants declared a dispute to the effect that
this redevelopment was done unlawfully and unilaterally, and the dispute
was referred to arbitration before Advocate Ginsburg SC. On 14 July
2022, Advocate Ginsburg SC issued his award ("the Ginsburg Award").
He found that the decision to embark upon the redevelopment was a
Prescribed Matter under Schedule 1 of the COA and that the applicants
had not consented to it. He further held that the MEPF had acted without
the unanimous consent required by clause 11.9 of the COA. It was thus
found that the redevelopment was done unlawfully and unilaterally.
[13] Despite the Ginsburg Award, the MEPF continued to direct Metroprop to
deduct the redevelopment costs from the applicants' share of the net
income. On 5 August 2022, the applicants' attorneys, Malatji & Co,
demanded payment of R6,609,145.40 from the MEPF, being the amount
unlawfully deducted from the applicants' rental in come to fund the
unauthorised redevelopment. On 5 September 2022, Malatji & Co
Page 6 of 26
addressed a further letter to the MEPF, giving notice that if the MEPF
failed to remedy its breach within 21 days, the applicants would cancel
the COA.
[14] The MEPF did not comply with the demand. Subsequently, o n 18
October 2022, Adamax terminated the COA. The MEPF disputed the
validity of the termination, and the dispute of whether the COA was
cancelled validly or not, was referred to arbitration before Advocate
Gerald Farber SC.
[15] On 15 January 2024, Advocate Farber SC issued his award ("the Farber
Award"). He declared that the MEPF had materially breached the COA
and that Adamax had validly terminated it on 18 October 2022. He also
found that the MEPF's conduct in instructing Metroprop to deduct the
redevelopment costs from the applicants' net income was unlawful.
[16] The MEPF refused to accept the Farber Award and sought to review it.
The review applications were brought under case numbers 2023 -
089092, 2023-113014, and 2024-022755 in the Gauteng Local Division,
Johannesburg.
[17] On a n uncertain date, Wepener J in the Gauteng Local Division,
Johannesburg, dismissed all three review applications and made the
Farber Award an order of court. The MEPF sought leave to appeal, which
Page 7 of 26
was re fused by Wepener J. The MEPF then applied to the Supreme
Court of Appeal (“SCA”) for leave to appeal, which was also refused. The
MEPF thereafter applied to the President of the SCA for reconsideration,
which was similarly dismissed.
[18] On 25 September 2025, the MEPF applied to the Constitutional Court for
leave to appeal the decisions dismissing its review applications. That
application is still pending.
[19] On 24 June 2024, Adamax gave notice to Akani and Metroprop that it
was terminating the Property Manageme nt Agreement and the
Metroprop contract, respectively, with effect from 25 December 2024.
The MEPF, Akani, and Metroprop disputed this termination.
[20] On 29 February 2024, Adamax instituted action proceedings against
Metroprop under case number 2024 -022567, claiming R10,699,306.43
of unlawfully deducted redevelopment expenses. On 15 September
2025, the applicants instituted further action proceedings under case
number 2025 -162076 against the respondents, claiming 45% of the
rental income that had been retained in the Metroprop trust account.
[21] On 24 March 2026, Mr Serf Joubert, the chief executive officer of
Metroprop, filed an answering affidavit in the summary judgment
application in the 2025 action. In his affidavit, he disclosed for the first
Page 8 of 26
time that Metroprop had deducted R5,954,066.12 from the trust account
and had retained R20,412,229.96 in respect of facilities management
and general maintenance.
[22] Also on 24 March 2026, Mr Joubert sent a "board pack" to the applicants,
which purported to detail a series of proposed development actions at
the shopping centres.
[23] The board pack documents revealed that the MEPF and Metroprop
intended to embark upon a large -scale redevelopment of the Parkview
Shopping Centre, similar to the unlawful redevelopment of the Glen
Village shopping centres. The proposed actions (which are the identified
expenses) included replacing elevators and escalators at a cost of
R22,885,000, replacing the HVAC infrastructure at a cost of
R20,846,908.48, installing compliant fire doors at a cost of R742,082.35,
various electrical works, and retiling of the shopping centre. The board
pack also indicated that the MEPF intended to conclude a long -term
lease agreement with the City of Tshwane for a sky bridge and to rezone
the Glen Village North property.
[24] A purported board meeting was scheduled for 2 April 2026 to approve
these actions. On 31 March 2026, the applicants' attorneys addressed
correspondence to the respondents’, seeking undertakings that they
would not proceed with the development actions. No such undertakings
Page 9 of 26
were given. The absence of such undertakings brought about this
application.
The present proceedings
[25] On 10 April 2026, the applicants launched the present urgent application.
In summary, the relief sought is as follows:
25.1. An order dispensing with the rules and hearing the matter on an
urgent basis.
25.2. An order directing Metroprop to refrain from making payment from
its trust account of R13,834,157.66 to itself (or, if it has already paid
it, to repay that amount into the trust account), and to refrain from
paying any part of 45% of the rental income retained in the trust
account to the MEPF.
25.3. An order directing the respondents to refrain from concluding any
contracts or taking any steps to implement the proposed
development actions listed in the board pack (the elevator and
escalator refurbishment, HVAC replacement, fire door installation,
electrical works, retiling, the sky bridge lease, and the rezoning
application).
25.4. An order that this relief operate as an interim order pending the final
Page 10 of 26
judgment in the 2025 action and the dismissal by the Constitutional
Court of the MEPF's pending leave to appeal application.
[26] On 22 April 2026, the MEPF delivered a notice of counter -application.
The MEPF seeks orders to the following effect:
26.1. Compelling the parties to give effect to the proposed development
actions (which the MEPF calls "the necessary actions" but which I
refer to in this judgment as “certain identified expenses”).
26.2. Directing that the expenses associated with these actions be paid
by the co-owners in their respective 55% and 45% shares.
26.3. Authorising Metroprop to apply the rental income towards these
expenses and to withdraw funds from the trust account if
necessary.
26.4. Imposing an interim dispute resolution process for future disputes
concerning necessary maintenance and upkeep.
[27] The above constitutes the nature of opposing the application as well as
the relief sought in the counter-application.
Page 11 of 26
The Legal Principles Governing Interim Interdicts
[28] The applicants seek an interim interdict. The requirements for an
interim interdict are well established. In Setlogelo v Setlogelo 1914 AD
221, the court held that an applicant must establish the following
factors.
28.1. A prima facie right, though open to some doubt;
28.2. A reasonable apprehension of irreparable harm if the interdict is not
granted;
28.3. That the balance of convenience favours the granting of the
interdict; and
28.4. That there is no other satisfactory remedy available.
[29] These requirements have been confirmed as follows by the
Supreme Court of Appeal in Tau v Mashaba and Others 2020 (5) SA
135 (SCA):
“[21] Had the High Court determined the dispute before it as
defined by the parties, it ought to have decided whether the
respondent had met the requirements for the grant of an interim
interdict. These are: a prima facie right; a well -grounded
apprehension of irreparable harm if the relief is not granted; that
the balance of convenience favours the granting of an interim
interdict; and the absence of another satisfactory remedy. An
Page 12 of 26
interim interdict pending an action is an extraordinary remedy
within the discretion of the court.” (footnotes omitted)
[30] These requirements must be applied with the understanding that the
court's role at the interim stage is not to make final determinations of the
parties' rights, but to preserve the status quo pending the final
adjudication of those rights. As was stated in National Gambling Board
v Premier, KwaZulu -Natal, and Others 2002 (2) SA 715 (CC) at
paragraph [49]:
“[49] An interim interdict is by definition
'a court order preserving or restoring the status
quo pending the final determination of the rights of the
parties. It does not involve a final determination of these
rights and does not affect their final determination.'
The dispute in an application for an interim interdict is therefore
not the same as that in the main application to which the interim
interdict relates. In an application for an interim interdict the
dispute is whether, applying the relevant legal requirements,
the status quo should be preserved or restored pending the
decision of the main dispute. At common law, a court's jurisdiction
to entertain an application for an interim interdict depends on
whether it has jurisdiction to preserve or restore the status quo. It
does not depend on whether it has the jurisdiction to decide t he
main dispute.”
(footnotes omitted)
[31] In Pikoli v President of Republic of South Africa and Others 2010 (1) SA
400 (GNP) the applicant sought to interdict the President from appointing
a new National Director of Public Prosecutions pending his review
application against the President’s decision to remove him from office. It
Page 13 of 26
was held that , since the requirements for the grant of
an interim interdict had been satisfied, it followed that the applicant was
entitled to an interim interdict.
The prima facie right
[32] The applicants contend that they have a prima facie right to the relief
sought on two alternative bases: first, under the common law (if the COA
has been terminated); and second, under the contractual regime (if the
COA is still extant).
[33] Under the common law, it is well established that no single co -owner is
entitled to make changes or improvements to common property without
the consent of the other co-owners.
[34] The applicants argue that the proposed development actions are not
necessary m aintenance but rather constitute improvements and
redevelopments that require their consent. They point to the board pack
documents, which describe the projects as "Refurbishment Program,"
"Infrastructure Replacement," and "Modernization Project." They arg ue
that these are not the kind of day -to-day maintenance that a co -owner
may undertake unilaterally.
[35] The MEPF argues that the proposed actions are essential maintenance
and preservation measures that fall within the ordinary course of
Page 14 of 26
business and do not require unanimous consent. The MEPF relies on
the provisions of the COA, which provide that "Prescribed Matters"
requiring unanimous consent are limited to specific matters set out in
Schedule 1, including "the incurring of liability or obligation which is not
in the ordinary course of business" and the entering into of contracts
involving capital expenditure exceeding R1 million.
[36] On a proper analysis, the applicants have established a prima facie right
to the relief they seek. The proposed actions are sig nificant capital
projects, not routine maintenance. The replacement of entire elevator
and escalator fleets, the replacement of major HVAC infrastructure, and
the complete retiling of a shopping centre are substantial capital projects.
They go beyond ordin ary upkeep and maintenance. The fact that the
actions may be necessary does not mean that they do not require the
consent of both co -owners. The necessity of the actions does not
determine whether they are prescribed matters; the nature and scale of
the actions do.
[37] Moreover, even if the COA has been terminated, as the applicants
contend, the common law requires the consent of all co-owners for major
changes to common property. The MEPF cannot unilaterally decide to
embark on substantial capital projects without the applicants' consent.
Page 15 of 26
[38] Furthermore, the applicants have a prima facie right to the protection of
the trust money held by Metroprop. Section 54(3) of the Property
Practitioners Act 22 of 2019 provides that a property practitioner must
retain all trust money until it is lawfully entitled to such money or receives
written instructions to make payment.
[39] The applicants have not given Metroprop any written instructions to pay
out their 45% share of the rental income. Metroprop has no lawful
entitlement to the applicants' share. The applicants are therefore entitled
to the protection of their trust money.
The doctrine of fictional fulfilment
[40] The MEPF argues that the doctrine of fictional fulfilment should be
applied because the applicants frustrated the process by refusing to
attend the meeting on 2 April 2026. The doctrine of fictional fulfilment
holds that a party cannot rely on the non-fulfilment of a condition if it has
deliberately prevented the condition from being fulfilled.
[41] This argument must be rejected. The applicants did not attend the
meeting because they took the position that the COA had been
terminated and they were no longer bound by its terms. Whether this
position is correct is the very dispute that must be resolved. The
applicants cann ot be said to have "frustrated" the process when they
were exercising their right to challenge the validity of the COA.
Page 16 of 26
[42] Moreover, the applicants' refusal to attend the meeting was not an
attempt to prevent the fulfilment of a condition precedent; it was an
assertion of their legal rights. The doctrine of fictional fulfilment is
therefore not applicable in this instance.
The existence of disputes of fact
[43] The MEPF argues that there are material disputes of fact that cannot be
resolved on the papers, and t hat this militates against the granting of
interim relief. The applicants have raised a striking out application in
respect of certain portions of the MEPF's answering affidavit.
[44] The applicants seek to strike out the evidence concerning the necessity
of t he proposed actions on the basis that it is hearsay and lacks
supporting documentation. The applicants point out that Mr Zamani
Letjane, who deposed to the answering affidavit on behalf of the MEPF,
does not have personal knowledge of the technical details of the
proposed projects. The evidence of necessity is based on information
provided by Metroprop and is not supported by expert reports or
technical assessments.
[45] While it is true that much of the evidence concerning necessity is
hearsay, it is not necessary at this stage to determine the admissibility of
this evidence. The applicants have established a prima facie right to the
Page 17 of 26
relief sought by them, on other grounds.
[46] The question of whether the proposed actions are "necessary" or
"essential" is ultimately a question of fact that will have to be determined
in the main proceedings. For present purposes, it is sufficient that the
applicants have shown that they have a prima facie right to prevent the
MEPF from unilaterally embarking on significant capital projects without
their consent.
The prejudice to Metroprop
[47] The applicants argue that Metroprop may be unable to repay the money
if it is paid out of the trust account. The MEPF has not addressed this
argument in its answering affidavit.
[48] The applicants are therefore entitled to the inference that Metroprop may
not be able to repay the money if it is dissipated.
The irreparable harm
[49] The applicants argue that they will suffer irreparable harm if the proposed
development actions proceed. Once the projects are implemented, the
status quo ante cannot be restored. The properties will be permanently
changed, and the applicants will have los t their right to object to the
changes. The applicants will be forced to seek damages, which would
be an inadequate remedy and may be very difficult, if not impossible, to
Page 18 of 26
quantify.
[50] The MEPF argues that the irreparable harm will be suffered by the
properties if the actions are not undertaken. The properties will
deteriorate, tenants will leave, and the value of the letting enterprise will
diminish. The MEPF argues that the balance of convenience favours
allowing the actions to proceed.
[51] In assessing the question of irreparable harm, it is important to
distinguish between necessary maintenance and substantial capital
projects. The proposed actions are not limited to essential maintenance;
they include significant improvements and upgrades.
[52] The appli cants' right to have a say in these projects would be
permanently lost if the projects proceed without their consent. That is
irreparable harm.
[53] Moreover, the applicants will suffer financial harm if their 45% share of
the rental income is used to fund the se projects. The money in the trust
account is trust money that belongs to the applicants. If it is used to fund
the projects, the applicants may not be able to recover it. This is
particularly so given the uncertainty about Metroprop's financial position.
[54] On the other hand, the MEPF has not established that the properties will
suffer irreparable harm if the projects are delayed. The properties have
Page 19 of 26
been operating for years. The harm that tenants may be lost and the
income stream may be affected, is specul ative of nature. A delay of a
few months until the Constitutional Court decides the MEPF's appeal will
not cause irreparable harm.
[55] The COA allows that the MEPF can continue to perform essential
maintenance and repairs while the legal disputes are resolved.
[56] I find that the applicants have proven that they will suffer irreparable
harm should the interim interdict not be granted.
The balance of convenience
[57] The applicants have a clear right to their 45% share of the rental income
and a clear right to prevent the MEPF from unilaterally embarking on
significant capital projects without their consent in terms of the COA. The
MEPF can pursue its claims through proper legal channels. It cannot
resort to self -help by using the applicants' money to fund proje cts to
which the applicants have not consented.
[58] The MEPF argues that the applicants are seeking to "freeze" the
properties and prevent essential maintenance. This argument is
overstated. The applicants are not seeking to prevent essential
maintenance. They are seeking to prevent significant capital projects that
go beyond ordinary maintenance. The applicants have not objected to
Page 20 of 26
day-to-day maintenance and repairs.
[59] Furthermore, the Farber Award is final and binding on the basis that it
was made an order of court, unless it is overturned by the Constitutional
Court. The MEPF's appeal to the Constitutional Court is pending, but the
MEPF has not applied for an order suspending the operation of the
Farber Award.
[60] Pending the outcome of the Constitutional Court appeal, the Farber
Award stands. It declares tha t the COA was validly terminated on 18
October 2022. The applicants are therefore entitled to rely on the
common law, which requires the consent of all co -owners for major
changes to common property.
[61] I subsequently find that the balance of convenience fav ours the
applicants.
The adequacy of an alternative remedy
[62] Should the development actions proceed, the applicants will be left to
claim damages, which would be an inadequate remedy. The damages
would be difficult to quantify, and the applicants may not be able to
recover it.
[63] The applicants are therefore entitled to interim relief to protect their rights
Page 21 of 26
pending the final adjudication of the disputes between the parties.
[64] I find that the applicants have no adequate alternative remedy.
The counter-application
[65] The MEPF seeks to force the applicants to consent to the proposed
development actions and to pay their share of the costs. This relief is
sought on an interim basis, but it is final in effect. The MEPF is asking
this Court to compel the applicants to fund projects to which they have
not consented and to which th ey object. This is not relief that can be
granted on an interim basis as it will have a final effect.
[66] The MEPF's proposed interim dispute resolution process also cannot be
imposed on the applicants. The parties are not in agreement on the
process. This Court cannot impose a contractual regime on the parties
that they have not agreed to. The MEPF's proposed process is an
attempt to circumvent the applicants' rights under the common law and
the COA. As such, it must be rejected.
[67] I find that the MEPF's counter-application must be dismissed.
Conclusion
[68] This matter concerns the fundamental rights of co-owners to protect their
property and to have a say in how it is managed and developed. The
Page 22 of 26
applicants have established a prima facie right to the relief they seek.
The MEPF's attempts to unilaterally embark on significant capital
projects without the applicants' consent and to use the applicants' money
to fund those projects have already been found to be unlawful in the
Faber Award.
[69] The counter -application is nothing other than an attempt to force the
applicants to accept a regime that would deprive them of their rights. It
is destined to be dismissed.
[70] The orders sought by the applicants to be granted herein are interim in
nature. They preserve the status quo pending the final adjudication of
the disputes between the parties. The parties are urged to resolve their
disputes through the proper legal channels and to avoid further litigation.
Costs
[71] The general principle is that the successful party is entitled to its costs. I
find no reason to deviate from the gene ral principle. The respondents
should therefore pay the applicants costs in this matter.
[72] The complicated factual history and difficulty of the matter justif y a cost
order higher than a regular cost order. A cost order on Scale C of in terms
of Rule 67A is justified.
Page 23 of 26
[73] Both the applicants and respondents have requested that a cost order
include the cost of two counsel. I agree that the complexity of the matter
justifies such an order.
The Order
[74] In the result, the following order is made:
[i] The forms, service and time periods prescribed by the Uniform
Rules of Court is c ondoned and the matter is heard as one of
urgency in terms of the provisions of Uniform Rule 6(12) of the
Uniform Rules of Court.
[ii] The third respondent is ordered to refrain from making payment
from its trust account of the sum of R13,834,157.66 to itself, and to
repay that amount into the trust account if it has already paid it.
[iii] The third respondent is ordered to refrain from making payment
from its trust account of any part of 45% of the rental income
retained in the trust account to the first respondent.
[iv] The respondents are ordered to refrain from concluding any
contracts or taking any steps to implement the following actions:
(a) The elevator and escalator refurbishment program;
(b) The Parkview HVAC infrastructure replacement project;
(c) The rational fire design for Parkview shopping centre;
Page 24 of 26
(d) The emergency procurement an d installation of compliant fire
doors;
(e) The phased replacement of changeover infrastructure and
electrical compliance and asset protection (surge mitigation);
(f) The mandatory electrical compliance;
(g) The Woolworths air -conditioning replacement at G len Village
South;
(h) The parking infrastructure modernisation project at the Parkview
Shopping Centre;
(i) The retiling of the Parkview Shopping Centre;
(j) The conclusion of a long -term lease agreement with the City of
Tshwane in respect of the skybridge between the Glen Village
North and Glen Village South shopping centres; and
(k) The rezoning of the Glen Village North shopping centre
property.
[v] Paragraphs [ii], [iii], and [iv] above shall operate as an interim order
pending:
(a) The final judgment in the action between the current
applicants and respondents under Gauteng Division case
number 2025-162076; and
(b) The finalisation of the pending application for leave to appeal
by the first respondent to the Constitutional Court, alternatively
the finalisation of the first respondent's applications under
Page 25 of 26
Gauteng Local Division case numbers 2023-089092, 2023-
113014, and 2024-022755.
[vi] The counter-application is dismissed.
[vii] The respondents are ordered to pay the costs of the main
application and the counter-application, including the costs of two
counsel, on Scale C, jointly and severally, the one paying the
other to be absolved.
REID U
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION PRETORIA
DATE OF ARGUMENT:
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
APPEARANCES:
FOR APPLICANT:
INSTRUCTED BY:
4 MAY 2026
23 JUNE 2026
ADV MA CHOHAAN SC
WITH ADV VAN ZYL
MALATJI & CO ATTORNEYS
Applicant's attorneys
C/O DITSELA INC
tmalatji@mcinc.africa
Page 26 of 26
FOR 1ST AND 2ND RESPONDENTS: ADV P McNALLY SC
WITH ADV MANENZA
INSTRUCTED BY: WEBBER WENTZEL
First and second respondents' attorneys
C/O HILLS INCORPORATED
Email: audrey@hillsincorporated.co.za
AND TO: JJR INCORPORATED
Attorneys for the third respondent
Email: johann@jjrinc.co.za