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SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document
in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE NO: 126757/26
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3) REVISED: YES
DATE 15 JUNE 2026
SIGNATURE
In the matter between:
CHRISTOFFEL JACOBUS VERSTER Applicant
and
METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY OF TSHWANE Respondent
__________________________________________________________________
NEUKIRCHER J:
1] This urgent application seeks, as its essence, to stop the respondent’s
imposition of credit control measures pending the resolution of the formal dispute
declared1 (the dispute) by the applicant, and to restore the applicant’s electricity
supply pending the resolution of that dispute.
1 In terms of s95(f) as read with s102(2) of the Municipal Systems Act 28 of 2026 (the Act)
2
2] It is to be noted that the respondent has acknowledged receipt of the dispute
that was lodged but refused to give any undertaking that credit control measures
would not be implemented by it pending the resolution of the dispute. In fact, and to
underscore the respondent’s stance, two days earlier, it had given the applicant a
pre-termination notice in respect of water services which then gave rise to the
present application.
3] The urgent application is opposed ad the respondent has taken several points
in limine which I will deal with in due course.
Background
4] The applicant, his wife, his son, his daughter -in-law and 3 -month-old
grandchild all live at the subdivided property at 2 […] and 2[...] R[...] Street, La
Montagne, Pretoria (the property). Each property has a separately installed pre -paid
electricity meter and to receive electricity supple from the respondent, the applicant
purchases electricity tokens and then inputs the number received in respect of those
tokens into the electricity meter. For the reasons set out below, since 13 March 2026,
the applicant and his family have been without electricity. This is common cause.
5] On 13 March 2026, employees (or someone contracted by) of the respondent
removed the pre-paid meters in respect of the property from the external meter box.
6] According to the single job card left2 by respondent’s technicians:
“Meter found bridged
2 This even though two meters were removed
3
Meter…removed – load tamper fee.”
7] The fine loaded by the respondent was R73 000. WhatsApp discussions
between the applicant and one “Terence” – ostensibly from the respondent – indicate
that if the applicant pays him an amount of R7000, he will delete the fine of R73 000
from the system and install a new meter on the basis that the old meter was faulty (ie
he would remove the tampering allegation). It is noted that the respondent denies
that any “Terence” is an employee.
8] In any event, after receiving no meaningful assistance from the respondent,
and being sent from pillar to post by them, in an effort to resolve the issue the
applicant eventually employed his own electrician who conducted an inspection of
the wiring left behind by the respondent after they had removed the meters. The
expert found no bridge jumper had been installed and the allegations of tampering
therefore appeared to be unfounded. But the applicant still had no explanation from
the respondent for its conduct.
9] In the meantime, the applicant had found out that he was required to pay a
fine in respect of each meter:
a) R30 423-25 – first time tampering charge for a single -phase power
supply;
b) R3 633-50 - punitive consumption charge per month for the period
during which consumption was allegedly not recorded by the metering
device.3
3 Which was allegedly a period of 3 months
4
10] Despite several enquiries made by the applicant and his attorneys, the reason
for the allegations and the fines were never communicated.
11] On 17 March 2026 the applicant’s attorney sent a letter to various of the
respondent’s departments, including the disputes department and the credit control
department. The letter sets out the background to the matter and records the
following requests:
“a. Immediately reconnect the electrical meters to our client’s properties;
b. Provide out client with the following information:
i. Full names of the technician and/or contractor, who removed the
meters;
ii. A detailed report from the technician and/or contractor who signed the
relevant job card(s);4
iii. The reason for the technical inspection…;
iv. Confirmation by the technician whether the crimped locks were intact
upon arrival at the property;
v. Proof from the Municipality’s system indicating that out client’s meters
did not record consumption for a period of three months..;
vi. Reasons for the conclusion of tampering drawn and for the adverse
administrative action taken against our client.” (my emphasis)5
12] Although the applicant received an automated reply from the respondent’s
disputes department, on 17 March 2026 a “not read” receipt was received from the
4 Especially since the respondent denied that Terence was employed by them
5 Ie a S5 PAJA request for reasons
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credit department which clearly states that the email “was deleted without being read
on Tuesday March 17, 2026 at 9:36AM…”
13] Once again, applicants were subsequently sent from pillar to post by the
various departments within the respondent and no response to the request set out in
paragraph 11 supra was provided. In fact, none of the applicant’s requests were
attended to.
14] As a result, on 19 March 2026, the applicant filed an urgent application. In
this, he sought an order that the respondent was to restore the pre -paid meters and
electricity supply to the property, and to compel the respondent to respond to the
applicant’s request for reasons. On 31 March 2026, Mngqibisa -Thusi J granted an
order6 that the respondent was to re -connect the applicant’s pre -paid electricity
meters within four hours of service of the order.
15] By 15h30 on 1 April 2026, the respondent had failed to comply with this order
and instead filed a notice of set down in terms of Rule 6(12)(c) for the
reconsideration of the order. On 22 April 2026, van der Westhuizen J granted the
following order7:
“The order of justice Mngqibisi -Thusi made on 31 March 2026…is varied and
substituted by this order:
1. …
6 The March 2026 order
7 The April 2026 order
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2. The parties are directed to approach the registrar for the enrolment of the main
application8 on or before 14 May 2026.
3. …
4. …
5. …
6. Pending the determination of the main application on the opposed motion roll the
Municipality of Tshwane is to install a pre -paid electricity meter at 2 […] and 2[...]
R[...] Street, La Montage, Pretoria before 20 April 2026. This reconnection is
subject to what will be determined in the main application.”
16] It is common cause that the respondent re -installed the two pre -paid meter
boxes, albeit after the deadline. It is also common cause that they did not reconnect
the electricity supply and when the applicant attempted to load pre -paid tokens, he
was met with the following message “No token due to utility charges.”
17] From 4 May 2026 until 25 May 2026 the applicant’s attorney wrote
approximately five letters to the respondent. Only on 13 May 2026 was an
acknowledgment sent that the correspondence was received and that the
respondent was “attending” to the issue and would “revert in due course”. It never
did.
18] On 26 May 2026 the respondent proceeded to issue the applicant a 14 -day
pre-termination notice in respect of the remainder of the applicant’s services ie water.
This is even though the respondent knew the main application was still pending.
8 Ie the one of 19 March 2026
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Thus, it was clear that the respondent was intent upon proceeding with credit control
measures despite the pending court proceedings.
19] Having now had the benefit of the respondent’s response in the application
and now having received their accounts which reflected that the charges were in
respect of meter tampering, the applicant lodged a formal dispute in terms of s95(f)
and 102(2) of the Act on 28 May 2026. The respondent acknowledged receipt of the
formal dispute on the same date. It is common cause that the dispute has yet to be
finalised.
20] The respondent’s conduct on 26 May 2026 resulted in a letter from the
applicant’s attorney dated 29 May 2026 in which an undertaking was sought that the
threatened credit control measures would not be implemented failing which this
application would result – none was received. On 2 June 2026 this application was
launched.
21] In the present application the applicant sets out the background to the matter,
details the orders that have been given and the alleged non -compliance with those
orders. He also sets out the facts that arose subsequent to the April 2026 order, and
which gave rise to the present application ie the pre -termination notice and the
lodgement of the dispute in terms of the Act. The applicant then sets out the facts
upon which he bases the interim interdict sought. I will deal with these in due course.
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The respondent
22] The respondent attacks the application on several fronts: it raises three points
in limine and then it attacks the application on its merits.
Urgency
23] The respondent argues that the applicant has created his own urgency: it
alleges that he has been without electricity since 13 March 2026 and yet only
launches this application on 2 June 2026. It alleges that any urgency has been self -
created. It also alleges that the application is disingenuous as the applicant in fact
has electricity – he has the benefit of a solar system and a generator. The inference
is that the applicant therefore does not require electricity from the respondent and
thus the application is not urgent.
Lis pendens
24] The respondent then alleges that the applicant has already brought an
application based on the present facts and has sought substantially the same relief
in the April 2026 application. It argues that that application is still pending and
therefore the applicant is precluded from seeking similar relief before this court. It
argues that where the applicant alleges that the respondent did not comply with the
April 2026 order, it should have brought contempt proceedings – which it alleges
would have failed as the respondent complied with the April 2026 order when the
meters were re-installed.
Internal remedy
25] The respondent argues that the essence of this application is whether the
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meters were tampered with; whether tampering charges were lawfully imposed and
whether the respondent’s officials correctly applied the applicable tariff. It argues that
where a customer disputes the imposition of a tampering charge, they must lodge a
formal dispute with the Municipality in terms of the prescribed dispute resolution
mechanism. Only after these remedies have been exhausted can the applicant
launch review proceedings. Until then, the applicant is precluded from approaching a
court as any relief sought would be an attempt to bypass the statutory framework
and would be an impermissible encroachment by the court on the separation of
powers principle.
The April 2026 order
26] The respondent further argues that the April 2026 did not order it to restore
the applicant’s electricity supply – it simply ordered it to re -install the pre -paid
meters, which it has done.
27] But if this argument were to succeed, there would be absolutely no purpose
whatsoever to order the re -installation of the meters if the reconnection was not a
concomitant intention. It would effectively render the order a brutum fulmen.
28] In Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 9, Wallis JA
stated:
“[18] … The present state of the law can be expressed as follows. Interpretation is
the process of attributing meaning to the words used in a document, be it legislation,
some other statutory instrument, or contract, having regard to the context provided by
reading the particular provision or provisions in the light of the document as a whole
9 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA)
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and the circumstances attendant upon its coming into existence. Whatever the nature
of the document, consideration must be given to the language used in the light of the
ordinary rules of grammar and syntax; the context in which the provision appears; the
apparent purpose to which it is directed and the material known to those responsible
for its production. Where more than one meaning is possible each possibility must be
weighed in the light of all these factors. The process is objective not subjective. A
sensible meaning is to be preferred to one that leads to insensible or unbusinesslike
results or undermines the apparent purpose of the document. Judges must be alert
to, and guard against, the temptation to substitute what they regard as reasonable,
sensible or businesslike for the words actually used. To do so in regard to a statute
or statutory instrument is to cross the divide between interpretation and legislation. In
a contractual context it is to make a contract for the parties other than the one they in
fact made. The ‘inevitable point of departure is the language of the provision itself’,
read in context and having regard to the purpose of the provision and the background
to the preparation and production of the document.
[19] All this is consistent with the ‘emerging trend in statutory construction’. It
clearly adopts as the proper approach to the interpretation of documents the second
of the two possible approaches mentioned by Schreiner JA in Jaga v Dönges NO and
another, namely that from the outset one considers the context and the language
together, with neither predominating over the other…”10
29] In Electoral Commission v Mhlope and Others 11 it was confirmed that these
principles equally apply to the interpretation of court orders.
30] In my view, the April 2026 order envisages the reconnection of the electricity
supply pending the outcome of the main proceedings. The last sentence of
10 Case references excluded
11 2016 (5) SA 1 (CC) para 23
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paragraph 6 of the order reads that “ This reconnection12 is subject to what will be
determined in the main application.” In other words, there is to be a reconnection.
Had the order read “the reconnection” of “any reconnection” I would have had to
agree with the respondent that reconnection was not envisaged by van der
Westhuizen J at the time and that it would be dependent on the outcome of the main
application. But then, as I have said, what would be point in re -installing the
electricity meters?
31] In my view, one cannot break the order up into parts to suit a particular
interpretation. In any event, the end of the day, the interpretation has become a side
issue: the applicant has argued that the whole purpose of the main application was
to get reasons from the respondent in terms of s5 of PAJA. As that has now been
provided, the main application serves no further purpose.
32] I must also consider the issue of whether the applicant has made out a case
for an interim interdict on the new facts that have transpired since early May 2026.
Consideration of whether the interim interdict should be granted and the
respondent’s points in limine
Ad: Urgency
33] This is the third in a series of applications in which the applicant has already
been granted two orders from two judges in the urgent court. It is common cause
that the respondent has yet to reconnect the electricity supply. The fact that the
applicant has been without electricity since 13 March 2026 does not assist the
12 My emphasis
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respondent as it is the cause of the conundrum in which the applicant and his family
find themselves at present. The fact that they have other means of electricity
production also does not assist the respondent. It is bound to provide the applicant
with electricity: where it alleges that the applicant tampered with the meters, and a
dispute has been lodged, its own dispute resolution mechanism provides that it must
continue to provide services, and the applicant must pay for present consumption
until the dispute has been adjudicated. In my view, two previous courts have already
found that, on similar background facts, the applications warranted an urgent
hearing. Where the applicant and his family are now faced with the termination of
water based on credit control mechanisms in the face of a pending declared dispute,
the urgency has been compounded by the actions of the respondent. The application
is urgent.
Ad: lis pendens
34] This argument must similarly fail . I h ave already set out the facts that led to
this application and upon which this application is based. That relief is not lis
pendens as it arose after the April 2026 order. In this application, the applicant
essentially seeks to interdict the credit control measures imposed by the respondent
on 26 May 2026 and restore the electricity supply until his dispute is adjudicated in
terms of the Act.
35] In my view, the applicant does not need to bring contempt proceedings in
these circumstances - given the change in circumstances since the April 2026 order,
the point of lis pendens must fail.
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Ad: Dispute mechanism
36] This argument similarly has no merit. The applicant has indeed lodged a
formal dispute in terms of the Act – this was conceded by the respondent. It is
common cause that the dispute has yet to be resolved. It therefore means that the
applicant is following the internal remedy provided to him in terms of the Act. There is
no attempt by the applicant to bypass a statutory framework: he simply seeks the
restoration of his services pending resolution of that dispute. To argue that he is not
entitled to an i nterdict or that the court would be overstepping its bounds to grant
one, fundamentally misunderstands the proceedings. It also begs the question of
how a court, in any matter, can grant interim interdicts pending resolution of the final
disputes between the parties which it regularly does if the requirements for interim
relief are met.
37] The purpose of any interdict against the respondent would be to restore the
status quo ante pending the outcome of the dispute procedure lodged under the Act.
That would be all. The applicant has, in any event, tendered to pay all current
consumption charges and there can therefore be no prejudice whatsoever to the
respondent. The only issue that remains between the parties is the resolution of the
disputed R73 000 tampering charge.
38] I therefore disagree with the respondent’s argument that the essence of this
application is whether the meters were tampered with; whether tampering charges
were lawfully imposed and whether the respondent’s officials correctly applied the
applicable tariff. The essence of this application is whether the applicant has made
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out a case for the interim interdict he seeks. This court cannot pre -determine the
outcome of the dispute lodged. That must take its course. It is for this reason that the
supplementary affidavit of the respondent’s expert that deals with the tampering
issue – and which was only filed after the replying affidavit was filed which meant the
applicant had no chance to deal with it – is not of overriding consideration. That
evidence, together with the evidence of the applicant’s expert, can be put before the
body that considers the dispute lodged and must be considered as part of the
conspectus of evidence placed before it to determine the outcome of the applicant’s
dispute.
Ad: interim interdict
39] By now, the requirements for an interim interdict are trite and I do not intend to
enumerate them. Insofar as the prima facie right if open to some doubt, is
concerned, the applicant has a right to have his dispute adjudicated in terms of the
provisions of the Act. He also has a right that credit control measures are not taken
to pre-empt the outcome of that decision. This is an important part of audi principle.
40] Both the balance of convenience and the irreparable harm elements favour
the applicant’s case: there are 4 adults and a 3 -month-old baby living on the
property. It is not disputed (with any form of proof) that prior to the removal of the
meters, the applicant had not met his obligations towards the respondent – ie he had
paid all invoices rendered and was not in arrears with any accounts. It is also
common cause that the sole cause of the issue is the levying of the R73 000 fine.
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41] The applicants admit that, for a portion of the day, they can make use of the
solar power and generator, but they state that this is not for the entire 24-hour period.
This is an issue, especially with a 3 -month-old baby to care for. The potential
interruption of the water supply would have disastrous consequences – they would
be unable to cook, clean, boil bottles, flush toilets to name a few issues. The harm
would be thus ongoing and irreparable.
42] The balance of convenience similarly favours them, especially in
circumstances where the applicant had tendered to continue paying for present
consumption of all services ie water and electricity. There is thus no prejudice to the
respondent whatsoever.
43] The applicant has no other suitable remedy available – he is following the
internal remedy available to him under the Act. Pending the resolution of that, and
short of the interdict, he is left without recourse.
44] In my view the applicant has made out a proper case for the relief sought.
Costs
45] The applicant argues that the respondent’s conduct has been malicious,
vexatious and mala fide especially in the circumstances where two orders have
already been granted against it and where it has failed to comply in full with the order
of April 2026.
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46] Whilst I am perturbed by the respondent’s conduct, I cannot say that its
conduct is mala fide as it appears to be based on a misinterpretation of the April
2026 order. Whether that is a deliberate misinterpretation or a genuine
misinterpretation is not an issue which can be resolved on these papers. I am
however of the view that costs should follow the result and should be taxable in
accordance with Scale B.
Order
1. The respondent is interdicted and restrained from discontinuing, restricting,
terminating and/or in any manner interfering with all the municipal services
supplied to 2 […] and 2[...] R[...] Street, La Montagne, Pretoria (the property)
held under account numbers 5[...] and 2[...], pending the finalisation of the
dispute lodged in terms of the Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 (the dispute).
2. The applicant is ordered to continue to make payment of all undisputed
amounts due and payable in respect of present and ongoing consumption of
water and electricity to the property, excluding the disputed amounts and any
interest on the disputed amount.
3. The applicant is authorised, in the event that the respondent fails to comply
with the order set out in paragraph 1 supra, to appoint a suitable qualified
contractor or expert to restore the municipal services, and to recover the costs
thereof from the respondent.
4. The respondent is directed to take all necessary steps to forthwith ensure
that, pending the finalisation of the dispute lodged, the applicant’s electricity
supply is fully restored by remove any block, restriction or limitation placed on
the applicant’s pre-paid electricity meters.
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5. The respondent is ordered to enable the applicant’s pre-paid electricity meters
so that they are able to generate and accept electricity tokens purchased by
the applicant in the ordinary course.
6. The respondent is ordered not to appropriate or allocate any purchased
electricity tokens towards payment of the disputed amount.
7. The respondent is ordered to pay the costs of this application, which costs are
to be taxed in accordance with Scale B.
____________________________
B NEUKIRCHER
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
This judgment was prepared and authored by the judge whose name is reflected and
is handed down electronically by circulation to the parties/their legal representatives
by email and by uploading it to the electronic file of this matter on CaseLines. The
date for hand-down is deemed to be 15 June 2026.
For the appellant : Adv Bouwer
Instructed by : Taute, Bouwer & Cilliers Inc
For the first respondent : Adv Kwinda
Instructed by : JL Raphiri Attorneys
Matter heard on : 10 June 2026
Judgment date : 15 June 2026