Registrar of Labour Relations v Sono N.O and Others (2026/111287) [2026] ZALCJHB 179 (15 June 2026)

THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG
Case no: 2026 – 111287
In the matter between:

REGISTRAR OF LABOUR RELATIONS Applicant

and

SIPHO ERIC SONO N.O.
(Administrator of the Chemical, Energy
Paper, Printing, Wood and Allied Workers’ Union) First Respondent

CHEMICAL, ENERGY, PAPER, PRINTING, WOOD AND
ALLIED WORKERS’ UNION (under administration) Second Respondent

GERHARD VOSLOO Third Respondent

Heard: 8 June 2026

This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the parties and
legal representatives by email and uploading onto CaseLines. The date and
time for hand-down is deemed to be 15 June 2026.

Summary: Superior Courts Act – s 18(3) and (4) considered – concept of next
highest court considered – no further appeal after LAC order competent /
permissible – approach adopted by first respondent contemplates such further
(1) REPORTABLE: YES
(2) OF INTEREST TO
OTHER JUDGES: YES
(3) REVISED: YES


15 June 2026

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appeal – further application for leave to appeal to Constitutional Court against
LAC order not competent

Superior Courts Act – s 18(3) considered – constitutes interlocutory order –
further appeal even if competent applies s 18(2) – no suspension of
interlocutory order pending appeal unless exceptional circumstances shown –
first respondent showing no exceptional circumstances – LAC order not
suspended in any event

Superior Court s Act – approach adopted by first respondent undermining
purpose of s 18(3) and (4) – to allow further appeal inconsistent with clear
wording and structure of section – order of LAC cannot be seen to be order
under s 18(1) – interpretation / application by first respondent would render s
18(3) and (4) valueless – presumption against such interpretation

Constitution – s 167(3)(b) considered – Constitutional Court has overall
jurisdiction over all matters – does not mean that application for leave to
appeal to Constitutional Court always competent – Constitutional Court does
not assume jurisdiction on what is essentially factual determinations – fact that
leave to appeal under s 167(3)(b) possible does not render same competent in
face of clear purpose of statute especially where merits of matter not to be
decided

Contempt of Court – principles considered – requires wilful and mala fide non
compliance – first respondent’s conduct does not establish such intent – first
respondent not in contempt – however declaratory relief and coercive order
against first respondent still competent – order made accordingly

JUDGMENT

SNYMAN, AJ
Introduction

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[1] The current application now before me appears to be the epilogue of a long
and drawn-out saga involving a trade union, CEPPWAWU, being placed under
administration in terms of section 103A of the Labour Relations Act (LRA)1. I
first dealt with this matter on 29 November 2022 in the judgment reported as
Chemical Energy Paper Printing Wood and Allied Workers Union and Others v
Mashanda NO and Others2, when the current first respondent was appointed
as administrator of CEPPWAWU. Since then, various issues concerning the
administration of CEPPWAWU ha s turned in this Court a number of times.
Ultimately, the applicant became dissatisfied with the first respondent in
respect of the fulfilment of his duties as administrator of CEPPWAW U, and
sought to replace him with another administrator . But the first respondent was
certainly not doing to fade quietly into the night. He sought to cling to his
position as administrator, and this culminated in an application brought by the
applicant to this Court to remove the first respondent as administrator, and
replace him with the current third respondent as administrator. The application
came before Tlhotlhalemaje J, and in a judgment now reported as Registrar of
Labour Relations v Sono NO and Others
3 and handed down on 28 January
2926, the learned Judge removed the first respondent as administrator and
appointed the third respondent in his stead. Further relief to give effect to this
change in administrator was also granted. This was the catalyst for the
plethora of further litigation that then followed.

[2] Being the back end of this further litigation, which all went against t he first
respondent, the applicant has brought an application for contempt of court
against the first respondent , with the purpose of compelling him to vacate the
position of administrator of CEPPW AWU and allow the third respondent to
take over. But still the first respondent i s not done. He digs in, and now seeks

take over. But still the first respondent i s not done. He digs in, and now seeks
to pursue a further appeal, and contends that all enforcement proceedings
should be stayed pending what is now his latest appeal, being an application
for leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court.

[3] This all makes for quite distressing reading, considering that the very purpose
of placing CEPPWAWU under administration is to save it from going under ,

1 Act 66 of 1995 (as amended).
2 (2023) 44 ILJ 520 (LC).
3 (2026) 47 ILJ 1375 (LC).

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which would leave its entire membership without the benefit of union
representation, which is one of the fundamentals under the LRA. It would
seem that this objective has been lost in the fight for earning fees from the
administration, rather than achieving the nursing of CEPPWAWU back to
health. As a general comment, if the first respondent could not restore
CEPPWAWU to being a healthy trade union in a period of about three years,
then surely, he should step aside and allow someone else to try. I will suffice
by referring to the following findings by Tlhotlhalemaje J:4

‘The position the union finds itself in cannot continue, nor is there justification
for its administration to continue indefinitely, and in circumstances where, such
as in this case, there is an obvious solution to this state of affairs, which Sono
has unreasonably rebuffed for over three years.

The administration of a union is meant to be a temporary measure to restore
proper governance and ultimately facilitate democratic leadership through
congress. The need for extension of the administration is purely based on the
objective of placing the union in a position it ought to be rather than indefinite
and unlimited control by administrators. In this regard, a higher premium is
placed on an administrator’s duty to act in good faith and in the best interests
of a union and its members in achieving the objectives of the administration.

The facts of this case point to an administration process since 2020 that has
failed to achieve its objectives. They point to an unreasonable posture
adopted by Sono in completing the process, and in circumstances where he
completely misunderstood his independence as an administrator and the need
for transparency and accountability to the extent that a solution was premised
on those principles.
’

[4] The above being said in introduction, what I have now before me is a
contempt application by the applicant, and a counter application by the first

contempt application by the applicant, and a counter application by the first
respondent based on an allegation of an irregular step, seeking to set aside
the contempt application. Both applications were opposed by each respective
party, by way of filing answering affidavits. Replying affidavits were also filed.
These applications first came before Allen- Yaman J on 28 May 2026. On that
day, the learned Judge granted an interim order, i nter alia in the following
terms:

4 Id at paras 97 – 99.

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‘1 The Applicant’s contempt application, in the form delivered on 15 May 2026, is
declared to be urgent.

2 A rule nisi is hereby issued, with a return day of Monday, 8 June 2026 at 10h00,
calling upon the First Respondent to appear before the above Honourable Court
on that date and to show cause why he should not:

2.1 be found guilty of contempt of the order of the Labour Appeal Court
dated 6 May 2026, under case number A2026-047704 (the LAC
Order);

2.2 be committed to imprisonment for a period of thirty (30) days,
alternatively be ordered to pay a fine, alternatively be granted such
other relief as the Court may deem appropriate;

2.3 be directed to comply with the LAC Order by vacating the Union
premises and returning all Union property to the Third Respondent,
failing which that the Third Respondent take pos session of the Union
Property as accompanied by security or the South African Police
Service;

2.4 be ordered to pay the costs of this application, including the costs of
two counsel where so employed …
’

[5] It follows from the above order that effectively, the issue of urgency has been
disposed of, and I need not decide it. What remains for consideration in this
judgment is the terms of the rule nisi granted as aforesaid, together with the
declaratory order applied for in the notice of motion.

[6] Pursuant to the aforesaid order, the two applications referred to came before
me for argument on 8 June 2026. After considering argument by the parties,
and considering the pleadings and written submissions filed, I considered it
prudent to reserve judgment in order to give me a proper opportunity t o apply
my mind the parties’ submissions, considering that this matter was rather
novel. I gave an order on 8 June 2026 that judgment be reserved and that
written judgment would be handed down on Friday 12 June 2026. However,
and due to the extent of the issues to be considered, and a particularly

and due to the extent of the issues to be considered, and a particularly
congested urgent roll for the week, I was unable to complete this judgment by

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12 June 2026. The parties were advised that judgment will instead be handed
down on Monday 15 June 2026. This judgment is now handed down
accordingly.

[7] For ease of reference in this judgment, I will refer to the applicant as ‘the
Registrar’, the first respondent as ‘Sono’ and the third respondent as ‘Vosloo’.
I have already indicated earlier that the second respondent is referred to as
‘CEPPWAWU’.

Background facts

[8] The background facts in this case are straight forward, and mostly undisputed.
It speaks of a long and unfortunate process of court orders, extensions, and
litigation in general. All of this is succinctly set out in paragraph of 11 of the
judgment of Tlhotlhalemaje J of 28 January 2026, referred to above, and I do
not intend to repeat it herein.

[9] Suffice it to say, after serving six months as interim administrator starting in
2022, Sono was finally appointed as administrator of CEPPWAWU on 7
December 2022. CEPPWAWU has remained under administration since then,
with Sono at the helm as administrator.

[10] Then, and during September 2024, the Registrar brough an application to
remove Sono as the a dministrator of CEPPWAWU, and to appoint V osloo in
his stead. Sono’s current term at that time, as administrator, was due to end
on 30 June 2025. He sought extensions that were granted, pending a decision
on the removal application against him. He opposed the removal application.

[11] As touched on above, Tlhotlhalemaje J on 28 January 2026 found in favour of
the Registrar and granted the removal application. This meant, in substance,
that Sono was accordingly removed as the a dministrator and Vosloo was
appointed in his stead. The parts of the order granted by Tlhotlhalemaje J of
relevance in casu read:

‘… (7) The Applicant’s application to remove the First Respondent as
Administrator of the Second Respondent is upheld.

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(8) The Third Respondent is appointed as the administrator of the Second
Respondent with effect from 1 March 2026 to 30 December 2026, or until he
has
(i) finalised and concluded, all the outstanding audited financial statements of
the 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023 and 2024 as well as the 2025
financial years;
(ii) convened a national congress for the election of the second respondent’s
national leadership; and
(iii) handed over the union to such elected leadership, whichever comes first.

(9) The powers and responsibilities granted in the judgment and order of
Rabkin-Naicker J dated 4 June 2020 are extended to the third respondent.

(10) The first respondent is directed to facilitate an orderly handover of the
administration of the second respondent to the third respondent with effect
from the date of this order to 27 February 2026 … ’

[12] As appears from the order, Sono was actually removed as Administrator on 28
January 2026 even though Vosloo’s term was to only commence on 1 March
2026. The period between 28 January 2026 and 27 February 2026 was
therefore a transitional period ringfenced for the purpose of an orderly
handover of the administration of CEPPWAWU to Vosloo , as also
contemplated by the aforesaid order.

[13] Nonetheless, and despite the order, Sono continued with running the affairs of
CEPPWAWU as administrator. According to the Registrar, and after the order
by Tlhotlhalemaje J on 28 January 2026, Sono continued to make
arrangements to convene a national congress and increase the Union’s
membership subscription fees, which is not consistent with complying with the
order removing him as administrator.

[14] On 10 February 2026, and after coming under pressure from the Registrar and
Vosloo to hand over the administration of CEPPWAWU to Vosloo, Sono
launched an application for leave to appeal the o rder of 28 January 2026. It is
trite that the effect of the application for leave to appeal was to suspend the
operation of order of 28 January 2026.

operation of order of 28 January 2026.

[15] Because the application for leave to appeal suspended the operation of the
order, the Registrar brought an urgent application on 16 February 2026, in

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terms of section 18(3) of the Superior Courts Act 5 for the interim enforcement
of the order of 28 January 2026, pending the application for leave to appeal or
any further appeal process. Sono opposed this application. The application
came Ramji AJ on 26 February 2026 for argument. Ramji AJ handed down
judgment on 27 February 2026, in terms of which the learned Judge granted
the section 18(3) application and made an order for the interim enforcement of
the order of 28 January 2026 pending any appeal. T his now meant that the
order of 28 January 2026 was no longer suspended by the pending application
for leave to appeal, was operative, and had to be complied with by Sono.

[16] On 27 February 2026, the same day as Ramji AJ handed down judgment ,
Sono noted an urgent automatic appeal in terms of section 18(4)(a)(ii) of the
Superior Court s Act to the Labour Appeal Court (LAC), as the next highest
Court from the Labour Court. This appeal then in turn suspended the operation
of Ramji AJ’s interim enforcement order. The Registrar opposed this appeal.

[17] Whilst this section 18(4)(a)(ii) appeal was still pending, Sono’s application for
leave to appeal was dismissed by Tlhotlhalemaje J on 16 March 2026. In
response, Sono filed a petition for leave to appeal to the Judge President of
the LAC. The petition was opposed by the Registrar and is currently still
pending for determination by the LAC. This is the appeal on the merits of the
main case.

[18] The section 18(4)(a)(ii) appeal then came before the LAC on 28 April 2026,
where it was argued by both parties. In a judgment handed down on 6 May
2026, the LAC dismissed Sono’s automatic appeal. The result of this dismissal
is that the order granted by Ramji AJ on 27 February 2026 for the interim
enforcement of the order of 28 January 2026 pending any appeal was no
longer suspended, in in full force and effect, but in this instance pending the
outcome of the petition for leave to appeal by Sono. Again , this meant that full

outcome of the petition for leave to appeal by Sono. Again , this meant that full
compliance with the order of 28 January 2026 by Sono was now required.

[19] On 6 May 2026, the Registrar’s attorneys sent Sono a letter which brought the
LAC Order to his attention. The Registrar’s attorney s further sought
confirmation from Sono regarding when Vosloo should present himself to the

5 Act 10 of 2013.

9

CEPPWAWU offices to take over the administration of CEPPWAWU in terms
of the order of 28 January 2026.

[20] Again, Sono reacted with a legal challenge. O n 7 May 2026, he filed an
application for leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court against the order by
the LAC of 6 May 2026 dismissing the appeal against the interim enforcement
order of 27 February 2026. Sono also responded to the letter sent by the
Registrar’s attorneys on 6 May 2026, in which he stated that since he had filed
an application for leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court, the operation of
the LAC Order was suspended.

[21] The Registrar disagreed with the contention that the order of 27 February
2026 was suspended pending the application for leave to appeal to the
Constitutional Court. The Registrar demanded that Sono vacate the premises
of CEPPWAWU and return the union property by close of business on 11 May
2026. Sono’s attorneys answered on 12 May 2026, indicating that Sono did
not contend for a further automatic appeal under section 18(4) , however his
application for leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court was pursued under
that Court’s rules and jurisdiction, the filing of that application engaged section
18(1) read with section 18(5), of the Superior Courts Act , and thus a
suspension was in order.

[22] The aforesaid then being the impasse reached between the parties, the
current legal proceedings now before me then followed. I will now decide this
lis.

Analysis

[23] I will first dispose of the application by Sono to set aside the contempt
application. The application is based on Rule 58 of the Labour Court Rules,
which prescribes a process to be followed when applying for contempt of
Court. Considering the approach I intend to adopt in deciding this matter, it is
simply not necessary to decide this appli cation. The objections by Sono in this
respect is primary aimed at the relief sought by the Registrar seeking to hold

respect is primary aimed at the relief sought by the Registrar seeking to hold
him in contempt, and for this Court to then dispense sanction accordingly. I
indicated at the start of this matter that having regard to the issues involved, I
would not be inclined to make any findings of contempt against Sono and

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dispense sanction accordingly. I further indicated that even if I found against
Sono, I would first afford him an opportunity to comply with the order of 28
January 2026, without making a finding of contempt. This approach I intend to
adopt also disposes of the other preliminary issues raised by Sono, including
non-joinder. In line with these suggestions I made, counsel for Sono did not
pursue any of these issues further. No decision in this regard therefore needs
to be made.

[24] The aforesaid then leaves the actual and real issue to be decided. It is a
straightforward issue, which I consider to be quite novel. What is important to
appreciate is that this matter does not in any manner concern the merits or
substance of the order made on 28 January 2026. The merits of the main case
is the subject matter of the pending petition for leave to appeal to the LAC.
What makes this case different is the very basis upon which S ono contends
the interim enforcement order of 27 February 2026, followed by the order of
the LAC on 6 May 2026 dismissing his appeal against it , is suspended. Sono
believes the filing of his application for leave to appeal to the Constitutional
Court brings about such suspension, which application for leave to appeal is
not seeking a further appeal under section 18(4) . So, what I must decide, in
simple terms, is whether an application for leave to appeal to the
Constitutional Court against these interim enforcement orders is even
competent in the first place. If not, then that must be the end of the matter for
Sono, and he would be compelled to comply with the order of 28 January
2026, even whilst his application to the Constitutional Court is pending.

[25] At the heart of deciding this matter is the provisions of section 18 of the
Superior Courts Act. It is necessary to quote it in full, as follows:

‘(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), and unless the court under exceptional

‘(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), and unless the court under exceptional
circumstances orders otherwise, the operation and execution of a decision
which is the subject of an application for leave to appeal or of an appeal, is
suspended pending the decision of the application or appeal.

(2) Subject to subsection (3), unless the court under exceptional
circumstances orders otherwise, the operation and execution of a decision
that is an interlocutory order not having the effect of a final judgment, which is

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the subject of an application for leave to appeal or of an appeal, is not
suspended pending the decision of the application or appeal.

(3) A court may only order otherwise as contemplated in subsection (1) or (2),
if the party who applied to the court to order otherwise, in addition proves on a
balance of probabilities that he or she will suffer irreparable harm if the court
does not so order and that the other party will not suffer irreparable harm if the
court so orders.

(4) (a) If a court orders otherwise, as contemplated in subsection (1)—
(i) the court must immediately record its reasons for doing so;
(ii) the aggrieved party has an automatic right of appeal to the next
highest court;
(iii) the court hearing such an appeal must deal with it as a matter of extreme
urgency; and
(iv) such order will be automatically suspended, pending the outcome of such
appeal.

(b) “Next highest court”, for purposes of paragraph (a)(ii), means—
(i) a full court of that Division, if the appeal is against a decision of a single
judge of the Division; or
(ii) the Supreme Court of Appeal, if the appeal is against a decision of
two judges or the full court of the Division.

(5) For the purposes of subsections (1) and (2), a decision becomes the
subject of an application for leave to appeal or of an appeal, as soon as an
application for leave to appeal or a notice of appeal is lodged with the registrar
in terms of the rules.’

[26] Section 18 of the Superior Courts Act heralded in a new and more stringent
basis upon which a departure from the ordinary principle that an appeal
process suspends the operational of an order , could be brought about . In
University of the Free State v Afriforum and Another 6, the Court succinctly
described this as follows:

‘It is further apparent that the requirements introduced by s 18(1) and (3) are
more onerous than those of the common law. Apart from the requirement of
'exceptional circumstances' in s 18(1), s 18(3) requires the applicant 'in

'exceptional circumstances' in s 18(1), s 18(3) requires the applicant 'in

6 2018 (3) SA 428 (SCA) at para 10.

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addition' to prove on a balance of probabilities that he or she 'will' suffer
irreparable harm if the order is not made, and that the other party 'will not'
suffer irreparable harm if the order is made. The application of rule 49(11)
required a weighing-up of the potentiality of irreparable harm or prejudice
being sustained by the respective parties and, where there was a potentiality
of harm or prejudice to both of the parties, a weighing-up of the balance of
hardship or convenience, as the case may be, was required. Section 18(3),
however, has introduced a higher threshold, namely proof on a balance of
probabilities that the applicant will suffer irreparable harm if the order is not
granted, and conversely that the respondent will not if the order is granted.’

[27] The fact remains that granting a successful litigant relief under section 18(3),
despite the opponent having an automatic right to an appeal, is a drastic
remedy. It would compel compliance with the original order, where the merits
thereof are still subject to legitimate challenge on appeal , and these merits are
thus still not finally decided. That is why this relief must be subject to stringent
requirements. But despite this, and because the decision to grant relief under
section 18(3) is granted in the same Court that granted the original order , a
further check and balance is necessary. This check and balance is found in an
evaluation, if the unsuccessful litigant wants it, by the next Court up in the
chain of Courts. This is a check and balance available for the mere asking,
being an automatic appeal . This will ensure that the decision pertaining to the
interim enforcement of the order is properly moderated. Once this moderation
is invoked, and then decided by the Higher Court, it must be the end of it , and
the entire interim enforcement proceedings are concluded. And all this
happens urgently. The Court in Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v
Vresthena (Pty) Ltd and Others

Vresthena (Pty) Ltd and Others
7 described the position as follows:

‘Section 18(4) of the Act serves as a protective measure to prevent irreversible
harm caused by a court granting an execution order inappropriately. The court
is required to immediately document its reasons for such a decision. The party
affected by the order has an automatic right to appeal, unlike the usual
situation where leave to appeal is required. The appeal against the execution
order is an inherent right, and the party who obtained the order cannot object
to it. If they want to uphold the execution order, they must contest the appeal.

7 2023 (6) SA 434 (SCA) at para 1 8. See also Ntlemeza v Helen Suzman Foundation and Another
2017 (5) SA 402 (SCA) at para 24.

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In an instance where they want to avoid the suspension of the execution order
and potential harm, their recourse is to approach the head of the court
overseeing the appeal and take all necessary steps to expedite an urgent
hearing, as provided by this section.’

[28] It is clear from the text of section 18(4)(ii) and (b) that the ‘next highest court ’
means a full court of a division where the appeal is against a decision of a
single judge of the division or the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) if the
appeal is against a decision of two judges or the full court of the d ivision. The
Labour Court has no provision for a full court. As such, the next highest court
must be the LAC, which is in status equal to the SCA. The notice of motion in
Sono’s application for leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court states that
he: ‘… applies for leave to appeal against the whole judgment and order of the
Labour Appeal Court delivered on 6 May 2026 under case number A2026-
047704 … ’. As it reads, it is th us a further appeal against the original
enforcement order of 27 February 2026 to a further higher court above the
LAC. But section 18(4) does not permit an appeal to a further higher court.
This was made clear Vresthena supra8 as follows:

‘Section 18(4)(ii) introduces a provision that grants an automatic right to
appeal to the 'next highest court' against an order issued under s 18(3) of the
Act. This provision is unique because it changes the general appeal
processes, in that such orders, being interlocutory in nature, are generally not
appealable and that leave to appeal must first be obtained before an appeal
can be lodged. Section 18(4) establishes a mechanism for a single appeal that
will be concluded in an expedited process, as evidenced by the absence of
provisions for appealing the decision of the 'next highest court'. In essence,
the decision made by the 'next highest court' in the appeal process is final and
cannot be appealed any further.’

cannot be appealed any further.’

[29] Similarly, with specific reference to the aforesaid dictum in Vresthena, the
Court in Hashtag Movement v Ethiopian Church of South Africa and O thers9
held:


8 Id at para 16.
9 2023 JDR 4649 (SCA) at para 5.

14

‘… In this case too, the order which was made in terms of s 18(1) of the Act
was made by a single judge of the high court. Accordingly, the automatic
appeal lies to the full court of the Eastern Cape Division of the High Court.
Consequently, this Court does not have the jurisdiction to hear the appeal. … ’

[30] And finally in this respect, the Court in Ntlemeza v Helen Suzman Foundation
and Another10 stated as follows:

‘Since a court of three judges was constituted to hear the matter, this court, so
it was submitted, was ‘the next highest court’ envisaged in s 18(4)(ii). It is on
that basis that the present appeal came to be set down on an expedited basis
before this court, because s 18(4)(iii) directed that the appeal had to be dealt
with as a matter of extreme urgency. Understandably, because it is such a
dramatic change, only one appeal to ‘the next highest court’ is permissible. No
further appeal beyond this court appears competent … ’

[31] It is in the face of the aforesaid clear provisions and objectives that Sono
attempts to construct an alternative approach. What he does is to say that the
order made by the LAC at the end of the enforcement chain under section 18,
so to speak, is an order susceptible to seeking leave to appeal to the
Constitutional Court, not as a further step in the interim enforcement
moderation process, but rather as an appeal against a standalone order as
contemplated by section 18(1) itself. And because it is such a standalone
order, it must follow that the application for leave to appeal to the
Constitutional Court suspends it. The case of Sono is that the basis for
seeking leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court is founded on section
167(3)(b) of the Constitution, which affords the Constitutional Court jurisdiction
to decide this application for leave to appeal. Section 167(3)(b) will be
specifically dealt with later in this judgment. All said, according to Sono, there

specifically dealt with later in this judgment. All said, according to Sono, there
is still a proper appeal pending, resulting in a further suspension of the order of
28 January 2026, because the enforcement order under section 18( 4) by the
LAC is similarly suspended pending this latest appeal.

[32] I must confess that I have several difficulties with the case sought to be
advanced by Sono, as summarized above. I believe that it is a construct t hat
undermines the entire purpose of interim enforcement under section 18. No

10 2017 (5) SA 402 (SCA) at para 25.

15

matter how Sono seeks to classify the basis of the further appeal , it must be
remembered that decisions taken in any Court are not taken in abstract, but in
the real world and hav ing real world consequences . It must therefore always
be considered what the granting of the order sought would actually lead to. In
this respect, what Sono is propagating is problematic. The pertinent purpose
of relief under section 18(3) is to prevent irreparable harm in exceptional
circumstances. It involves a specific factual determination. If the facts of a
case illustrate that these kinds of adverse consequences will result, it must
always be in the interest of justice to prevent it at this immediate point in time,
despite the fact that the relief is subject to further challenge under law. So, if it
is found to be justified to grant this relief, and the granting of this relief is
moderated by a higher court and upheld, it simply does not make any sense
that the final m oderation by the higher court is considered to be an order in
itself that reverts back to section 18(1) with all its consequences. It will in effect
render the process under section 18(3) and (4) valueless. This would run
counter the trite principle that it is presumed the legislature does not per
incuriam legislate superfluous statutory provisions.
11 It must always be
supposed that a statutory provision must be of use or must fulfil a purpose. 12
As succinctly held in Wellworths Bazaars Ltd v Chandler's Ltd and Another:13

‘… a Court should be slow to come to the conclusion that the words are
tautologous or superfluous. It was said by the Privy Council in Ditcher v
Denison (11 moore P.C. 325, at p. 357): -
'It is a good general rule in jurisprudence that one who reads a legal document
whether public or private, should not be prompt to ascribe - should not, without
necessity or some sound reason, impute - to its language tautology or
superfluity, and should be rather at the outset inclined to suppose every word

superfluity, and should be rather at the outset inclined to suppose every word
intended to have some effect or be of some use.'

[33] Let me explain why I think the aforesaid would be the case if what is
contended for by Sono is applied. Accept, for the purposes of illustration , that

11 See Attorney-General Transvaal v Additional Magistrate for Johannesburg 1924 AD 421 at 436;
Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Golden Dumps (Pty) Ltd 1993 (4) SA 110 (A) at 116F-117B.
12 As said in Rex v Standard Tea and Coffee Co (Pty) Ltd and Another 1951 (4) SA 412 (A) at 416F-G:
‘…It is a cardinal rule of interpretation of legislative enactments that they 'should be so construed that,
if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence or word shall be superfluous, void or insignificant'’. See
also National Union of Metalworkers of SA v Staman Automatic CC and Another (2003) 24 ILJ 2162
(LC) at 2168E -F; Truworths Ltd v Chief Inspector: Occupational Health and Safety, Department of
Employment & Labour and Another (2025) 46 ILJ 1426 (LC) at para 36.
13 1947 (2) SA 37 (A) at para 43.

16

a successful litigant will actually suffer irreparable harm if relief that has been
granted, especially relief granted on an urgent basis which in itself
contemplates that immediate intervention is necessary, is not immediately
implemented. That litigant, whilst needing to satisfy the stringent requirements
under section 18(3), manages to convince a Judge that interim enforcement is
justified, whist the unsuccessful litigant pursues an appeal on the merits. Then
the decision of the Judge is confirmed by a higher court pursuant to the
prescribed process. To then say that the m ere bringing of a further application
for leave to appeal , no matter on what basis it is sought to be brought, would
suspend the confirmation by the higher court and so suspend the interim
enforcement, would completely undo the entire process right back to when the
original interim enforcement order was granted by the first Judge, until this last
appeal is heard in the ordinary course. What is then the point of all that had
gone before.

[34] In effect, the construct propagated by Sono means that all any unsuccessful
litigant that is pursuing an appeal would need to do, despite circumstances
where the facts actually justify immediate interim enforcement confirmed by
two Courts, is to just keep running up the chain of Courts beyond the higher
Court that ultimately confirmed the original enforcement order by way of
section 18(4) , and this will cause a suspension to always result . The entire
section 18(3) and (4) process is designed to determine this issue immediately,
finally, and urgently . So, and practically speaking, all that such an
unsuccessful litigant would need to d o is to oppose the first interim
enforcement process, and if that does against it pursue the automatic appeal
to the next higher Court which suspends the interim enforcement , and if that
automatic appeal also goes against it, file a further application for leave to

automatic appeal also goes against it, file a further application for leave to
appeal to the further higher court beyond that, which appeal is then decided in
the ordinary course, with automatic suspension then results from it. This surely
cannot be. It will, by way of the mere filing of process, simply resurrect the
suspension of the original order that has been enforced, indefinitely until this
last appeal is decided, completely undoing everything that happened before,
despite the enforcement being essential to prevent irremediable harm. If that is
not an injustice undermining the very purpose sections 18(3) and (4) seek to

17

achieve, I do not know what would be. In this context, the Court in
Vresthena supra decided:14

‘Section 18(4) of the Act establishes a distinct provision that establishes a
unique category of appeals, specifically designed to be utilised solely for
orders made under s 18(3) of the Act. This provision carves out a specific and
extraordinary avenue for appeals in exceptional circumstances, especially
when it can be proved that irreparable harm would follow if the operation and
execution of a decision are suspended. The provision enhances access to
court on appeal by guaranteeing one automatic appeal, bypassing the typical
screening process outlined in the general provisions of ss 16 and 17 of the
Act. The purpose is to streamline and facilitate access to courts for these
specific appeals, providing a more efficient and expedited avenue for seeking
redress without infringing the s 34 constitutional right of access to courts
.’

[35] A further illustration confirms the fallacy of the reasoning advanced by Sono.
Assuming it is correct that the order granted by the LAC is then an order as
contemplated by section 18(1), as Sono propagates, then surely that would
again bring sections 18(3) and (4) into play. Section 18(1) is applicable to all
appealable orders, and Sono suggests the order of the LAC on 6 May 2026 is
appealable. The grounds under which it would be appealable is irrelevant in
this context. And further, section 18(1) reads: ‘ … Subject to subsections (2)
and (3) …’. Does this now mean that the Registrar can now apply to the LAC
under section 18(3) for interim enforcement of its order of 6 May 2026 pending
the leave to appeal application to the Constitutional Court, and if the LAC is
then inclined to grant such order, there is then an automatic appeal to the next
highest Court, which in this case is only the Constitutional Court? Surely not.
The point is that Sono cannot say that section 18(1) applies to the order

The point is that Sono cannot say that section 18(1) applies to the order
granted on 6 May 2026, without acknowledging that this means that sections
18(3) and (4) would also apply. He is seeking to apply only the parts of section
18 that suits his case, and that is not acceptable nor permissible.

[36] The issue of interim enforcement under section 18(3) and (4) is a sui generis
process which is to a large extent divorced f rom the merits of the main case
that is subject to the further appeal challenge. Whilst it is true that prospects of

14 Id at para 21.

18

success on appeal may be a factor to consider when deciding if exceptional
circumstances exist in the context of section 18(3) , whether or not there is
merit in the pending appeal is of lesser importance. This is evident from the
fact that interim enforcement could still be granted pending an appeal itself ,
where leave to appeal is granted by the Court a quo, with the decision to grant
leave to appeal being motivated by a finding that there is reasonable
prospects of success on appeal. The point is that nothing decided in the
course of the section 18(3) and (4) proceedings is determinative of what may
happen to the appeal on the merits . The sui generis process under sections
18(3) and (4) has a statutory prescribed beginning and end. The beginning is
where a litigant obtains a Court order and an application for leave to appeal
follows. It ends when the next highest court decided the issue of interim
enforcement pending that appeal. Nothing further is contemplated. That can,
in my view, be the only interpretation that makes sense.

[37] The principles applicable to interpreting written instruments, including statute s,
are now quite settled. More often than not, it is informed by the often quoted
judgment in Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality
15
where the Court held as follows:

‘... The present state of the law can be expressed as follows: Interpretation is
the process of attributing meaning to the words used in a document, be it
legislation, some other statutory instrument, or contract, having regard to the
context provided by reading the particular provision or provisions in the light of
the document as a whole and the circumstances attendant upon its coming
into existence. Whatever the nature of the document, consideration must be
given to the language used in the light of the ordinary rules of grammar and
syntax; the context in which the provision appears; the apparent purpose to

syntax; the context in which the provision appears; the apparent purpose to
which it is directed and the material known to those responsible for its
production. Where more than one meaning is possible each possibility must
be weighed in the light of all these factors. The process is objective, not
subjective. A sensible meaning is to be preferred to one that leads to
insensible or unbusinesslike results or undermines the apparent purpose of
the document. Judges must be alert to, and guard against, the temptation to
substitute what they regard as reasonable, sensible or businesslike for the
words actually used. To do so in regard to a statute or statutory instrument is

15 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA) at para 18.

19

to cross the divide between interpretation and legislation; in a contractual
context it is to make a contract for the parties other than the one they in fact
made. The 'inevitable point of departure is the language of the provision
itself', read in context and having regard to the purpose of the provision and
the background to the preparation and production of the document.’

[38] As I have said, t he approach established in Endumeni supra has been
consistently applied since. 16 I will suffice with two particular references to how
the Constitutional Court applied Endumeni . In University of Johannesburg v
Auckland Park Theological Seminary and Another 17, that Court decided: ‘…
The approach in Endumeni 'updated' the previous position, which was that
context could be resorted to if there was ambiguity or lack of clarity in the
text. The Supreme Court of Appeal has explicitly pointed out in cases
subsequent to Endumeni that context and purpose must be taken into account
as a matter of course, whether or not the words used in the contract are
ambiguous. …’. And in Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union
and Others v Chamber of Mines of SA and Others
18, the Court decided as
follows:

‘All interpretations of law are themselves in a sense ‘factual’: certain textual
and other sources (for example, statutes, common and customary law) are
excavated and marked out as factually ‘law’, in contradiction to non-law. But
this process itself involves a contextual analysis of those sources. See in this
regard Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality [2012]
ZASCA 13; 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA) at para 18. Indeed, interpretation and
application are simultaneous and intricated. The most imaginative exponent of
this insight is Ronald Dworkin. See Dworkin Law’s Empire (Harvard University
Press Cambridge 1986) at vii: ‘legal reasoning is an exercise in constructive
interpretation’, in which we advance ‘the best justification of our legal practices
as a whole’.

as a whole’.


16 See Bothma-Batho Transport (Edms) Bpk v S Bothma & Seun Transport (Edms) Bpk 2014 (2) SA
494 (SCA) at para 12; Unica Iron and Steel (Pty) Ltd and Another v Mirchandani 2016 (2) SA 307
(SCA) at para 21 and all the authorities cited there; Nel v De Beer and Another 2023 (2) SA 170 (SCA)
at paras 22 – 23; Capitec Bank Holdings Ltd and Another v Coral Lagoon Investments 194 (Pty) Ltd
and Others 2022 (1) SA 100 (SCA) at para 50- 51; Sugar Berry CC t/a Horison Staff Solutions v Motor
Industry Bargaining Council and Others (2026) 47 ILJ 188 (LAC) at para 13.
17 2021 (6) SA 1 (CC) at para 66.
18 (2017) 38 ILJ 831 (CC) at fn 28.

20

[39] With particular reference to the interpretation of statutes, the Constitutional
Court in Independent Institute of Education (Pty) Ltd v KwaZulu- Natal Law
Society and Others19 said: ‘… It is a well -established canon of statutory
construction that “every part of a statute should be construed so as to be
consistent, so far as possible, with every other part of that statute, and with
every other unrepealed statute enacted by the Legislature …’. That same
Court in National Credit Regulator v Opperman and Others
20 described the
exercise of interpreting statutes in the following manner:

‘A longstanding precept of interpretation is that every word must be given a
meaning. Words in an enactment should not be treated as tautologous or
superfluous. This is for good reason. Interpretation is a cooperative venture
between legislature and judge, bounded by mutually understood rules, in
which the latter seeks to give meaning to the text enacted by the former. The
mutual suppositions, and the constraints of principle and constitutional precept
on the judge's role, enable the joint process to reach a coherent and practical
outcome. For this, it has to be assumed that the legislature's enacted text
includes only words that matter. For to enact words that do not would violate
the most basic supposition of the shared enterprise. Hence none can be
ignored.’

And finally, and in specifically interpreting section 18 of the Superior Courts
Act itself, the Court in Vresthena supra held:21

‘A general principle of statutory interpretation is that the words used in a
statute should be understood in their normal grammatical sense unless this
would lead to an absurd result. In Cool Ideas 1186 CC v Hubbard and
Another (Cool Ideas) the Constitutional Court added three additional principles
to this general rule. Firstly, statutes should be interpreted purposively.
Secondly, the relevant statutory provision must be properly contextualised;

Secondly, the relevant statutory provision must be properly contextualised;
and, lastly, all statutes must be construed consistently with the Constitution.
These three principles serve to guide the interpretation of statutes and ensure
that the law is applied in a manner that aligns with the intended purpose and
constitutional principles’.22

19 2020 (2) SA 325 (CC) at para 38.
20 2013 (2) SA 1 (CC) at para 99.
21 Id at para 20. See also South African Human Rights Commission v Agro Data CC and Another
2024 (6) SA 443 (SCA) at para 42.
22 The Court was referring to Cool Ideas 1186 CC v Hubbard and Another 2014 (4) SA 474 (CC).

21


[40] Applying the aforesaid, and in particular a purposive interpretation of section
18, I believe the interpretation of section 18 I have discussed above is the only
interpretation that makes sense and achieves the purpose of section 18 as a
whole. In particular, the ordinary and clear text of sections 18(3) and (4)
contemplate that only one appeal to the next highest court is permitted, and no
appeal of any kind beyond that is competent. In fact, and to permit a further
appeal considering the very purpose of section 18(3) and the materially
prejudicial consequences to a deserving litigant if such relief is not afforded,
would entirely undermine the basic core of the provision. Read as a whole, an
order granted under sections 18(3) and (4) is granted under a sui generis
process and cannot be seen to be an order granted under section 18(1). In
short, the construct of section 18 itself prohibits any further appeal of any kind
and on whatever basis, of the order made by the moderating appeal court (the
next highest court) where it comes to interim enforcement under section 18(3).

[41] Sono further pins his case on the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction under
section 167(3)(b) of the Constitution.23 The argument in essence goes that
because the Constitutional Court has jurisdiction to decide the kind of appeal
Sono seeks to pursue, challenging the confirming of the interim enforcement
by the LAC, then that appeal must stay the order because only the
Constitutional Court can decide that issue. In short, his case is that because
he was entitled to invoke the Constitutional Court’s leave to appeal jurisdiction
under section 167(3) (b) of the Constitution, the filing of his application for
leave to appeal had the consequences under section 18(1), as read with
section 18(5) . However, believe that whilst this argument on face value
appears to be appealing, there is an inherent misconception, which I will deal
with next.

appears to be appealing, there is an inherent misconception, which I will deal
with next.

[42] In my view, and if one considers section 167(3)(b), the Constitutional Court
pretty much has jurisdiction over anything feasible to be decided by any Court.
This is evident from the fact that the Constitutional Court may assume
jurisdiction over ‘any matter ’ it may decide to consider . So, and always,

23 Section 167(3)(b) reads: ‘The Constitutional Court … (b) may decide: (i) constitutional matters; and
(ii) any other matter, if the Constitutional Court grants leave to appeal on the grounds that the matter
raises an arguable point of law of general public importance which ought to be considered by that
Court …’

22

anyone can notionally appeal to the Constitutional Court about anything. But
that does not mean that those appeals are competent, even if, at a general
level, the Constitutional Court is bestowed with jurisdiction to decide this. It is
for this reason, I believe, that the Const itutional Court assumes jurisd iction to
decide matters in a quite particular manner. This is evident from the fact that
no matter what the case is that comes before it, the Constitutional Court
inevitably first conducts an enquiry to decide whether the case actually
engages its jurisdiction. This is evident from virtually every Constitutional Court
judgment. That Court thus assumes jurisdiction based on a particular factual
enquiry with due reference to the issue raised that is required to be decided.
Surely, the consequences of this approach to jurisdiction are that it cannot be
said that just because the Constitutional Court could feasibly decide Sono’s
appeal, section 18 must be applied in a manner that is i ncompatible with the
way it specifically reads and what its purpose would be. This is therefore still
something that must be decided by this Court in discharging the duties
expected of it. As explained in TWK Agriculture Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Hoogveld
Boerderybeleggings (Pty) Ltd and Others
24:

‘… the Constitution gives specific treatment to principles that govern
appealability to the Constitutional Court. Those principles frame what the
Constitutional Court may do, and it is for that court to decide how these
principles are to be applied. The Constitutional Court has developed a
sizeable jurisprudence to that end. The interests of justice, as the touchstone
of the Constitutional Court's doctrine of appealability, has an institutional
justification. The Constitutional Court, as the apex court, needs a highly
selective, but flexible, criterion to decide which matters warrant its attention.
To discharge its functions as an apex court, the Constitutional Court depends

To discharge its functions as an apex court, the Constitutional Court depends
upon this court carrying out its functions in an orderly fashion. This means
that, in general, finality should be brought to decisions that ascend the court
hierarchy, so that the Constitutional Court can be highly selective in deciding
upon the matters that should be heard by it. …
’

[43] Sono relies on Road Traffic Management Corporation v Tasima (Pty) Ltd;
Tasima (Pty) Ltd v Road Traffic Management Corporation 25 in support of his
argument, although he does concede that Tasima does not finally decide the

24 2023 (5) SA 163 (SCA) at para 26.
25 (2020) 41 ILJ 2349 (CC).

23

exact point now being raised before this Court. He however contends that the
judgment nonetheless confirms that, in a Labour Court and LAC context, a
Constitutional Court application for leave to appeal may engage section 18(1).
He further contends that in Tasima the Constitutional Court accepted that the
interpretation and application of the LRA engages constitutional jurisdiction,
because the LRA gives effect to section 23 of the Constitution.

[44] In my view, Tasima does not assist Sono, for the reasons to follow . It is true
that in Tasima part of what was before the Constitutional Court was an
application for leave to appeal against a decision of the LAC under section
18(4) that the requirements of section 18(3) had not been met. The application
for leave to appeal further concerned a finding of the LAC that the Labour
Court hearing proceedings in terms of s 18(3) of the Superior Courts Act does
not have the power to grant relief that goes beyond that granted in the order
which forms the subject of those proceedings , and that a court’s power is, in
effect, limited to reversing the suspension of the relief granted. However, in
deciding whether leave to appeal to that Court should be granted, the
Constitutional Court then consolidated the applications for leave to appeal on
this issue with the application for leave to appeal on the main merits of the
matter, and because of deciding the main matter the Court held it: ‘…
rendered the s 18(3) appeal moot as between the parties. This matter no
longer presents any live controversy, since there is no longer any interim
period during which the Labour Appeal Court’s s 197 order could be enforced
…’.
26 It was then argued that the Court should nonetheless consider the
section 18(3) appeal because it raised important legal questions and the issue
was of public importance and in the public interest for the Constitutional C ourt
to provide certainty on this issue. However, the Court ultimately decided as
follows:27

to provide certainty on this issue. However, the Court ultimately decided as
follows:27

‘In my view, it is not in the interests of justice to grant leave to appeal, despite
the fact that the s 18(3) appeal is moot. As a starting point, an order by this
court will have no practical effect. This is because the issue concerning who is
responsible for the employees has now been finally determined in the s 197

26 Id at para 126
27 Id at para 129

24

appeal. No party will receive any benefit or advantage as a result of an order
on the merits of the s 18(3) appeal by this court. … ’

[45] It is clear that the Court in Tasima never assumed jurisdiction in the
application for leave to appeal in respect of the section 18(3) order . It only
decided the merits of the main matter , and assumed jurisdiction in respect of
that issue. It did this despite being urged that the section 18(3) proceedings
should qualify for le ave to appea l being granted under section 167(3)(b).
Tasima therefore cannot be used as authority for the proposition that an
appeal to that Court for an order under section 18(3) that was also dealt with
under section 18(4) engages the jurisdiction of that Court. The Court never
considered any issue relating to that appeal, and certainly never decided if it
was competent in the first place. It effectively refused leave to appeal in that
regard.

[46] Perhaps a more apposite example is the judgment of the Constitutional Court
in Cloete and Another v S and a Similar Application
28. The Court in that case
considered section 17(2)(f) of the Superior Courts Act, which provides that in
the instance of an application for leave to appeal under section 17(2)(b) being
refused by the SCA, the President of the SCA may on application decide to
refer such decision refusing leave to appeal for reconsideration if exceptional
circumstances exist to do so. 29 The Court held that the section
17(2)(f) procedure is part of the appeal process as a whole which involves
making a judicial determination on a defined legal issue between the litigating
parties, and pertinently decided: ‘ …The President's decision under s
17(2)(f) of the Act thus falls comfortably within the judicial function and
purpose of the Supreme Court of Appeal leave- to-appeal process, in this
instance, to be exercised by one judge of that court, its President …’
30. This
being the case, the Court concluded:31


28 2019 (4) SA 268 (CC).

30. This
being the case, the Court concluded:31


28 2019 (4) SA 268 (CC).
29 The section reads: ‘The decision of the majority of the judges considering an application referred to
in paragraph (b), or the decision of the court, as the case may be, to grant or refuse the application
shall be final: Provided that the President of the Supreme Court of Appeal may, in circumstances
where a grave failure of justice would otherwise result or the administration of justice may be brought
into disrepute, whether of his or her own accord or on application filed within one month of the
decision, refer the decision to the court for reconsideration and, if necessary, variation’.
30 Id at para 33.
31 Id at para 36 – 37.

25

‘It would follow that, if an appeal lies against the decision of the President, it
would essentially amount to an appeal against the factual findings of the
President on whether exceptional circumstances exist. An appeal against
purely factual findings does not ordinarily raise a constitutional matter, nor
does it usually give rise to an arguable point of law, sufficient to bring the
matter within this court's jurisdiction in terms of s 167(3)(b) of the
Constitution. This means that ordinarily, even if a s 17(2)(f) decision is final
because the merits of the court a quo's judgment cannot be appealed to this
court, an appeal against such a decision will not engage the jurisdiction of this
court.

The appeal in this matter is a case in point. Its grounds are purely factual in
nature as they target the President's decision regarding the existence of
exceptional circumstances. An appeal of this nature does not engage the
jurisdiction of this court. … ’

[47] The comparisons to the case in casu are in my view clear. At the heart of the
determination under section 18(3) is that of exceptional circumstances. That is
certainly a fact specific determination. In casu, Ramji AJ found exceptional
circumstances to exist, on the facts, and thus granted the interim enforcement
order under section 18(3) . The LAC moderated that decision on automatic
appeal, as provided for in section 18(4), and upheld it . Deciding that appeal
also clearly involved a determination on the facts that exceptional
circumstances existed. Based on the discussion earlier in this judgment, it is
undeniable that under section 18, that decision is final and there is no further
appeal. This is quite similar in effect and consequence to section 17(2)(f), and
in my view it must follow, applying the reasoning in Cloete , that a further
appeal in this case to the decision by the LAC under section 18(4) would
simply not engage the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court.

simply not engage the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court.

[48] The judgment in Cloete supra points to a further consideration that would be at
stake in this case. As the Constitutional Court said in TM v Member of the
Executive Council for Health and Social Development Gauteng
32: ‘… this
Court has and will refuse “to entertain appeals that seek to challenge only
factual findings or [the] incorrect application of the law by the lower courts. A

32 2023 JDR 2371 (CC) at para 46. See also Mankayi v Anglogold Ashanti Ltd 2011 (3) SA 237 (CC) ;
at para 12; Burger NO. v Bester NO 2022 JDR 0820 (CC) at para 34; NVM obo VKM v Tembisa
Hospital 2022 JDR 0608 (CC) at para 89.

26

challenge to a decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal on the sole basis that
it is wrong on the facts is not a constitutional matter. …’. A decision under
sections 18(3) and (4) is quintessentially a factual determination. The grounds
for Sono seeking leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court shows that it is
primarily aimed at the factual determination of exceptional circumstances and
prejudice made by the LAC. That would not engage the jurisdiction of the
Constitutional Court.

[49] As far a s I am concerned, the issue of jurisdiction raised by Sono is a red
herring, designed to give substantiation to a construct that runs counter to the
very purpose of section 18. This is evident from the fact that Sono’s counsel
conceded that if section 18(3) and (4) was applied as it read, and an appeal
was based on that, then Sono’s case would have no substance. Sono has
also conceded that he does not seek a further appeal by virtue of section
18(4). But w hat Sono says he seeks to do, I believe effectively undoes the
import and purpose of sections 18(3) and (4), as I discussed earlier. To
undermine this based on the existence of the ultimate complete oversight by
the Constitutional Court over all things legal is in my view not competent. The
fact is that one cannot ignore the real -world practical effect of what Sono’s
approach does. No matter how Sono constructs his approach, the
consequence is a further appeal of an order under sections 18(3) and (4)
which cannot be allowed. The Constitutional Court is not asked to consider the
merits of the main case. It is only requested to consider the interim
enforcement order. What Sono is doing, no matter how one cuts it, is seeking
a further appeal of an interim enforcement order under sections 18(3) and (4) ,
which as I said is not permissible. I believe the following dictum in Adams v
National Bargaining Council for the Road Freight and Logistics Industry and
Others

National Bargaining Council for the Road Freight and Logistics Industry and
Others
33, albeit given in the context of litigation rules, is quite apposite:

‘Although it is highly desirable for good order that rules be complied with on
their own terms, the function of the rule is the paramount consideration and,
where it can be safely found that the purpose of the rule is achieved, it is
highly undesirable to approach the matter in a literalist way. Mechanical
thinking is anathema to our law: cessante ratione legis cessat et ipsa lex. … ’


33 (2020) 41 ILJ 2051 (LAC) at para 16.

27

[50] I would add to the consideration of this case the fact that an order under
sections 18(3) and (4) is an interlocutory order.34 This is because, at the core,
it is not an order that in any manner disposes of the merits of the main
matter.35 In fact, it is an order district and separate from it, seeking to achieve
a different purpose. It is clearly an interim measure designed to only operate
until the merits of the main case is decided. It automatically ends along with a
decision in respect of the case on the merits. Further, it is not an impediment
to the conduct of the appeal on the main merits and will have no impact on it.
In short, there is no doubt that the order Sono seeks to appeal against is an
interlocutory / interim order. In Naledi Local Municipality and Others v
Appolus and Others 36 the Court dealt with the interaction between an appeal
on the merits and proceedings under section 18(3) and (4), and said the
following:

‘Although these litany of applications are not part of the current appeal, the
respondents raised the status of the s 18 appeal stream in their oral
arguments, to the extent that it had a bearing on the regular appeal against
the main judgment and order of Reid J. The conundrum is created by the fact
that it remains pending in the office of the Judge President of that Division. I
will thus divert to briefly refer to the status of the s 18 appeal and thereafter
return to deal with the appeal before us.

Section 18(4)(a)(ii) is a distinct provision establishing a unique category of
appeals, designed explicitly for orders made under s 18(3). Moreover, the
application in terms of s 18(3) serves, by its nature, to regulate the interim
position between litigants from the time that an order is issued until the final
judgment on appeal is handed down. In addition, the s 18(4) appeal
specifically allows for a single right of appeal, indicating that multiple appeals
are not permitted under the section.
[5] In my view, once the judgment of this

are not permitted under the section.
[5] In my view, once the judgment of this
Court on the main appeal is handed down, irrespective of the outcome thereof,
the s 18(3) order and the automatic appeal in terms of s 18(4) (a)(ii) will
automatically fall away
.’

34 This is specifically confirmed in Vresthena supra and Ntlemeza supra.
35 See Zweni v Minister of Law and Order 1993 (1) SA 523 (A) at 532I-533B; Tshwane City v
Vresthena (Pty) Ltd and Others 2024 (6) SA 159 (SCA) at para 8 ; MV Smart: Minmetals Logistics
Zhejiang Co Ltd v Owners and Underwriters of MV Smart and Another 2025 (1) SA 392 (SCA) at para
29; Knoop and Others v Tegeta Exploration and Resources (Pty) Ltd and Others 2025 (6) SA 424
(SCA) at para 6.
36 2025 JDR 4844 (SCA) at para 13 – 14.

28


[51] Although some debate went into whether the order of the LAC of 6 May 2026
is appealable because it is an interlocutory order, it must be rem embered that
what is at stake in this case is not whether the order is appealable. It is about
whether the application for leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court ,
assuming it is competent and that the order at stake is appealable, suspends
the said order. This enquiry has nothing to do with appealability and the case
in casu can be decided on the basis that it is assumed that the order, despite
being an interlocutory order, would be appealable because it may be in the
interest of justice to do so.37

[52] So, and even being an appealable interlocutory order, there is an obvious
reality that stares Sono in the face, once he contends that section 18(1)
applies. Because the order by the LAC, as is clear from the above principles
and as the SCA has specifically said, would be an inter locutory order , the
provisions of section 18(2) must equally come into play. Under section 18(2),
an interlocutory order is not suspended and continues to operate, unless a
court under exceptional circumstances orders otherwise. So, and applying
Sono’s own contention of an order that is appeala ble under section 18(1), he
would need to illustrate exceptional circu mstances why the order is not
suspended, and not vice versa. The default position with an interlocutory order
is therefore that it is not suspended by an appeal, unless exceptional
circumstances dictate otherwise. This has nothing to do with the appealability
of the order. Sono has made out no case in this regard. His contention is that
the application for leave to appeal to the Constit utional Court, per se,
suspends the order. The proper position was succinctly articulated in TWK
Agriculture supra
38 as follows:

‘The defendant referenced s 18(2) of the Superior Courts Act. It does
contemplate that an interlocutory order not having the effect of a final

contemplate that an interlocutory order not having the effect of a final
judgment may be the subject of an appeal. Section 18 regulates the
suspension of decisions pending an appeal. The scheme of s 18 is simply to
allow for different suspension regimes of application to decisions and
interlocutory orders. The provision has nothing to say about when

37 See Tshwane City v Afriforum and Another 2016 (6) SA 279 (CC) at para 40; MV Smart (supra) at
para 32.
38 Id at para 24.

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an interlocutory order might be appealable. Only that if such an order is sought
to be appealed or leave has been given (rightly or wrongly), s 18(2) is the
regime of application to the suspension of the order. Section 18 does not
overturn this court's jurisprudence as to when a decision is appealable. Nor
does it enthrone the interests of justice as the overarching principle to decide
when a matter is appealable.’

[53] But even if exceptional circumstances are considered, the concept of the
interest of justice as part of such consideration would work squarely against
Sono. It has been decided by no less then three Courts that he must vacate
his position as administrator, a nd if he does not do so, there would be
irremediable prejudice to very victim of all of this, being CEPPWAWU. Sono’s
right to challenge his removal as admi nistrator on the merits is in the first
instance fully protected by his pending appeal to the LAC, which must still be
decided. But in the meantime, there can be no reason why the dispensation as
contemplated by the Court order of 28 January 2026 should not find
immediate application, as found to be the case by this Court, and the LAC.
The fate of the interim enforcement order should be tied to the fate of the
appeal on the merits . There can be no cause or reason to continue to further
separate this, by conducting two different determinations in two different
courts. I find guidance in the following dictum in MV Smart: Minmetals
Logistics Zhejiang Co Ltd v Owners and Underwriters of MV Smart and
Another
39:

‘… it is undesirable to fragment a case by bringing appeals on individual
aspects of the case prior to the proper resolution of the matter in the court of
first instance, and an appellate court will only interfere in pending proceedings
in the lower courts in cases of great rarity — where grave injustice threatens,
and, intervention is necessary to attain justice.’

and, intervention is necessary to attain justice.’

[54] In summary, based on the aforesaid discussion, I decide that the Registrar is
entitled to the declaratory order sought in the notice of motion. The order of 28
January 2026 remains operative and Sono remains obliged to comply with the
same and give effect thereto , despite his pending application for leave to
appeal to the Constitutional Court. This is because there exists no competent

39 2025 (1) SA 392 (SCA) at para 33.

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appeal to any final determination made by the applicable appeal Court under
section 18(4) . And even if such an appeal can be brought, an order under
section 18(3) is an interlocutory order that does not in any manner determine
the main appeal on the merits, and thus under section 18(2) the operation of
such order is not suspended, unless exceptional circumstances are shown
that it should be suspended, however Sono made out no such case . Lastly,
even if it can be argued that an application for leave to appeal to the
Constitutional Court under section 167(3)(b) per se, is competent, I do not
think it engages the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court because of the clear
consequence, effect and purpose of sections 18(3) and (4) and the fact that it
would be an appeal to the Constitutional Court concerning purely factual
determinations. In the end, all must finish once the LAC pronounced on the
issue under section 18(4).

[55] Since Sono remains obliged to comply with the order of 28 January 2026,
what next? He was clearly aware of the order, knew what he had to do to
comply therewith, and deliberately and purposefully decided not to comply.
Prima facie, this satisfies the requirements of establishing that he would be in
contempt of court. As held in National Union of Metalworkers of SA and Others
v Vulcania Reinforcing Co (Pty) Ltd and Another40:

‘It is well established that in order to succeed in the application for committal
for civil contempt, the applicant must prove the requisites of contempt beyond
a reasonable doubt. The applicant must allege and prove that: (a) there was a
court order against the alleged contemnor; (b) such court order was served or
brought to the notice of the alleged contemnor; and (c) the alleged contemnor
has not complied with the order.’

[56] However, it is not as simple as that. N o matter how one may look at it, Sono’s
adopted position was at least bona fide, reasonably arguable, openly

adopted position was at least bona fide, reasonably arguable, openly
advanced at the out set when this issue arose, and was arrived at based on
legal advice. As such, it cannot be said that the conduct of Sono was in wilful
and mala fide non-compliance with the order granted under sections 18(3) and
(4). These facts relate to the second component of the contempt enquiry, so to
speak, which is that the respondent, in this case Sono, must show that he is

40 (2022) 43 ILJ 1307 (LAC) at para 16. See also SA Municipal Workers Union and O thers v Thaba
Chweu Local Municipality and Another [2015] JOL 32840 (LC) at para 27.

31

not in wilful and mala fide contempt of the Court order. As explained in Fakie
NO v CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd41:

‘The test for when disobedience of a civil order constitutes contempt has come
to be stated as whether the breach was committed deliberately and mala fide.
A deliberate disregard is not enough, since the non-complier may genuinely,
albeit mistakenly, believe him or herself entitled to act in the way claimed to
constitute the contempt. In such a case, good faith avoids infraction. Even a
refusal to comply that is objectively unreasonable may be bona fide (though
unreasonableness could evidence lack of good faith).

These requirements - that the refusal to obey should be both wilful and mala
fide, and that unreasonable non-compliance, provided it is bona fide, does not
constitute contempt - accord with the broader definition of the crime, of which
non-compliance with civil orders is a manifestation. … ’

[57] Therefore, it cannot be said that Sono is in contempt of court to the extent that
the relief afforded in terms of paragraphs 2.1, 2.2 and 2.4 of the rule nisi
granted by Allen -Yaman J of 28 May 2026 is justified. Those paragraphs all
relate to sanction, or differently out, punishment for contempt of court. The
facts show that Sono’s conduct is not wilful and mala fide, as contemplated by
the contempt test. The interim order s granted where it comes to these
mentioned paragraphs of the rule nisi thus fall to be discharged.

[58] But does that mean that Sono walks away from the current application without
consequence? I do not think so. In my view, where it comes to applications for
contempt of Court relating to non- compliance with civil Court orders ad factum
praestandum, the primary purpose of such proceedings is not to punish /
sanction the non- compliant party. The primary purpose is to compel
compliance, against a court imposed sanction if there is no compliance. To
simply decide contempt of court applications only from the perspective of

simply decide contempt of court applications only from the perspective of
dispensing punishment for non- compliance does not really assist the party
who remains suffering as a result of non-compliance. As held in Fakie supra
42:

41 2006 (4) SA 326 (SCA) at paras 9 – 10.
42 2006 (4) SA 326 (SCA) at para 42(a). See also para 39 of the judgment, where the Court said: ‘… A
court, in considering committal for contempt, can never disavow the public dimension of its order. This
means that the use of committals for contempt cannot be sundered according to whether they are
punitive or coercive. In each, objective (enforcement) and means (imprisonment) are identical …’. See
further Vulcania Reinforcing (supra) at para 16.

32

‘… The civil contempt procedure is a valuable and important mechanism for
securing compliance with court orders, and survives constitutional scrutiny in
the form of a motion court application adapted to constitutional requirements
…’.

[59] That is why there are several orders available to a Court in contempt
proceedings other than simply committing an errant party to imprisonment or
fining it. The Court in Matjhabeng Local Municipality v Eskom Holdings Ltd and
others43 held that:

‘Not every court order warrants committal for contempt of court in civil
proceedings. The relief in civil contempt proceedings can take a variety of
forms other than criminal sanctions, such as declaratory orders, mandamus ,
and structural interdicts. All of these remedies play an important part in the
enforcement of court orders in civil contempt proceedings. Their objective is
to compel parties to comply with a court order. In some instances, the
disregard of a court order may justify committal, as a sanction for past non-
compliance.’

[60] Therefore, I intend to follow an approach, since Sono’s adopted position to
substantiate his non- compliance has now been found wanting, that would
compel Sono to first comply with the order of 28 January 2026 before being
visiting him with a contempt sanction for non- compliance.44 The order I intend
to make will afford Sono an opportunity to fully comply with the order of 28
January 2026, by a stipulated deadline, and if he does not do so, the Registrar
will be given leave to approach this Court again on the same contempt
pleadings in this case for the purposes of securing a contempt sanction of
imprisonment and / or a fine. This order will also entail a confirmation of
paragraph 2.3 of the rule nisi of 28 May 2026. In short, the order would be
firstly declaratory in nature coupled with coercive relief. In Fakie supra it was
held:45 ‘… A declarator and other appropriate remedies remain available to a

held:45 ‘… A declarator and other appropriate remedies remain available to a
civil applicant on proof on a balance of probabilities …’. And in Pheko and
Others v Ekurhuleni City46 the Court said:

43 2018 (1) SA 1 (CC) at para 54. See also para 67 of the judgment . See further Pheko and Others v
Ekurhuleni City 2015 (5) SA 600 (CC) at para 37.
44 Compare Solidarity v Minister of Employment and Labour and Others (2026) 47 ILJ 214 (LC) at
paras 26 and 29.
45 Id at para 42(e).
46 2015 (5) SA 600 (CC) 31

33


‘Coercive contempt orders call for compliance with the original order that has
been breached, as well as the terms of the subsequent contempt order. A
contemnor may avoid the imposition of a sentence by complying with a
coercive order.’

[61] I wish to make some concluding comments in this case. A pplications for leave
to appeal and / or appeals should not be pursued because it may be tactical or
intended to frustrate and tire out an opponent. 47 This kind of approach was
appositely identified, in Zuma v Downer and Another 48 as being a fight from
‘burning house to burning house’, hoping for a victory due to attrition where the
actual substance of the case is lost or meritless. This approach not only
undermines the rule of law, but it overburdens the limited resources of the
Courts to the detriment of everyone. I venture to say that it would be
appropriate for a Court, when confronted with deciding an application for
interim enforcement and where the above kind of stratagem is involved, to
consider the following dictum in Hudson v Hudson and Anotherr
49:

‘... When therefore the Court finds an attempt made to use for ulterior
purposes machinery devised for the better administration cf. justice, it is the
duty of the Court to prevent such abuse. But it is a power which has to be
exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case. ...’

Surely, it is now time for Sono to let this all go.

Conclusion

[62] In conclusion, the Registrar has made out a proper case for the declaratory
relief he seeks. Accordingly, it is declared that Sono is obliged to comply with
the order of 28 January 2026 and that such order remains operative, pending
Sono’s petition for leave to appeal to the LAC in the main matter, and any
further appeals that may follow thereafter. However, and at this stage, no
finding will be made that Sono is in contempt of court, coupled with punitive
sanction. Instead, coercive relief will be granted in terms of which Sono must

sanction. Instead, coercive relief will be granted in terms of which Sono must

47 Compare Trident South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Another v Taylor and Others 2024 JDR 0423 (GP) at
paras 45 – 46; Sekgala v Body Corporate of Petra Nera 2023 JDR 1126 (GJ) at para 49.
48 2024 (2) SA 356 (SCA) at para 28.
49 1927 AD 259 at 268.

34

give effect to the order of 28 January 2026, and if he fails to do so, then a
contempt of court finding and sanction against him would follow.

Costs

[63] This then only leaves the issue of costs. In this respect, and in terms of section
162(1), I have a wide discretion. As guidance in exercising this discretion, I will
consider how the issue of costs was dealt with in all the preceding litigation
proceedings in this whole saga. Tlhotlhalemaje J did not make a costs order in
his judgment of 28 January 2026 and his leave to appeal judgment of 16
March 2026. Similarly, Ramji AJ made no costs order in her judgment given on
27 February 2026. And lastly, the LAC followed the same approach in the
judgment of 6 May 2026. I see no reason to decide differently and also make
no order to costs in the current proceedings . In any event, I consider, overall,
making no order as to costs would be fair. I also do not believe it is appropriate
to mulch any party with a costs order with all the proceedings obviously still to
follow. And at least Sono had an arguable case. No costs order will therefore
be made.

[64] For all the reasons set out above, I make the following order:
Order

1. Paragraphs 2.1, 2.2 and 2.4 of the rule nisi dated 28 May 2026 is
discharged.

2. The order granted by the Labour Appeal Court on 6 May 2026 under
case number A2026 – 047704 is not suspended pending the final
determination of any appeals being pursued by the first respondent.

3. The first respondent is directed to immediately comply with the order
granted by Tlhotlhalemaje J o n 28 January 2026, and further to
immediately vacat e the CEPPWAWU premises , and return all
CEPPWAWU’s property to the third respondent.

35

4. In the event of the first respondent failing to comply with paragraph 3 of
this order within 7(seven) days of date of this order, the applicant is
given leave to immediately re-enrol, on an urgent basis, the applicant’s
contempt application based on the same pleadings in this matter ,
together with any supplementary affidavit that may be necessary for
establishing further non-compliance, for the purposes of holding the first
respondent to be in contempt of court and implementing an appropriate
sanction.

5. There is no order as to costs.




_____________________
S Snyman
Acting Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa



Appearances:
For the Applicant: Professor T Madima SC together with
Advocate J Chanza
Instructed by: The State Attorney – Pretoria
For the First Respondent: Advocate F Boda SC together with Advocate
S Bismilla
Instructed by: KMNS Inc