CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA


Case CCT 154/25

In the matter between:


MINISTER OF POLICE Applicant

and

CYNTHIA NOBUHLE KHEDAMA Respondent



Neutral citation: Minister of Police v Khedama [2026] ZACC 27

Coram: Mlambo DCJ, Dambuza J, Kollapen J, Majiedt J, Mathopo J,
Mhlantla J, Nuku AJ, Opperman AJ, Rogers J, Savage J and
Tshiqi J


Judgment: Mathopo J (unanimous)

Decided on: 29 June 2026

Summary: Prescribed Rate of Interest Act 55 of 1975 — unliquidated debt
— general damages— monetary unliquidated damages




ORDER



On appeal from the Supreme Court of Appeal (hearing an appeal from the High Court
(Full Court) of South Africa, KwaZulu-Natal Division, Pietermaritzburg):

MATHOPO J
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1. Leave to appeal is granted.
2. The appeal is upheld.
3. Paragraph 1 of the order of the Supreme Court of Appeal dated
2 May 2025 is set aside.
4. Paragraph 2(b)(2) of the order of the Supreme Court of Appeal dated
2 May 2025 is set aside and replaced with the following:
“The applicant is ordered to pay interest on the aforesaid amount at the
prescribed rate per annum from the date of the trial court’s judgment to
date of payment.”
5. Each party is to bear its own costs in the Supreme Court of Appeal.
6. The respondent is ordered to pay the costs of the applicant, including
costs of two counsel where applicable, in this Court.



JUDGMENT




MATHOPO J (Mlambo DCJ, Dambuza J, Kollapen J, Majiedt J, Mhlantla J, Nuku AJ,
Opperman AJ, Rogers J, Savage J and Tshiqi J concurring):


Introduction
[1] This is an application for leave to appeal against part of the judgment and order
of the Supreme Court of Appeal , which ordered the applicant, the Minister of Police ,
to pay interest on damages for an unlawful arrest and detention of the respondent at
the prescribed rate from date of service of summons to date of payment. At issue in
this mat ter is the proper interpretation and application of the Prescribed Rate of
Interest Act1 (PRI Act), which provides for: interest on a debt, at a prescribed rate, in
certain circumstances; for the payment of interest on certain judgment debts ; and for
matters connected therewith. In particular , the question is whether interest on general

1 55 of 1975.

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damages for unlawful arrest and detention runs from date of service of summons ,
alternatively from date of judgment to date of payment . This Court issued dir ections
for the parties to file written submissions and subsequently decided to adjudicate this
matter without an oral hearing.

Parties
[2] The applicant is the Minister of Police. The respondent is Ms Cynthia Nobuhle
Khedama, the recipient of a general damages award which will be explained in detail
below.

Legislative framework
[3] It is prudent to start by setting out the relevant legislative framework. The
common law prior to the promulgation of the PRI Act was that—
(a) a debtor was liable for interest on a debt only if they were in mora
(default);
(b) if a debtor had no knowledge of their liability, they could not be in
mora; and
(c) interest was not payable on unliquidated claims.2

[4] The PRI Act (prior to its amendment in 1997) made provision for—
(a) the rate of interest in respect of interest -bearing debts, where such rate
was not governed by any other law, agreement or trade custom;3
(b) interest in respect of debts which did not ordinarily bear interest;4 and
(c) interest on judgment debts contemplated by section 2(1)—

2 See generally Victoria Falls and Transvaal Power Co Ltd v Consolidated Langlaagte Mines L td 1915 AD 1
(Victoria Falls) and SA Eagle Insurance Co Ltd v Hartley [1990] ZASCA 106; [1990] 2 All SA 616 (A); 1990
(4) SA 833 (A) (Hartley).
3 Section 1(1) read with section 1(2)(a).
4 Section 2(1).

MATHOPO J
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(i) from the date when such judgment debt is payable unless the
judgment or order provides otherwise; and
(ii) the rate set out in section 1(2)(a) unless the judgment provides
otherwise.

[5] Section 2 of the PRI Act regulates the calculation of interest on judgment debts
and it states:
“(1) Every judgment debt which, but for the provisions of this subsection, would
not bear any interest after the date of the judgment or order by virtue of
which it is due, shall bear interest from the day on which such judgment debt
is payable, unless that judgment or order provides otherwise.
. . .
(3) In this section ‘judgment debt ’ means a sum of money due in terms of a
judgment or an order, including an order as to c osts, of a court of law, and
includes any part of such a sum of money, but does not include any interest
not forming part of the principal sum of a judgment debt.”

[6] Section 2A of the PRI Act, inserted by amendment in 1997 5 and further
amended in 2005, regulates the calculation of interest o n unliquidated debts , thus
making provision for interest on debts that did not at common law attract interest. It
provides:

“(1) Subject to the provisions of this section the amount of every unliquidated debt
as determined by a court of law, or an arbitrator or an arbitration tribunal or
by agreement between the creditor and the debtor, shall bear interest as
contemplated in section 1.
(2) (a) Subject to any other agreement between the parties and the
provisions o f the National Credit Act, 2005 (Act 34 of 2005) the
interest contemplated in subsection (1) shall run from the date on
which payment of the debt is claimed by the service on the debtor of
a demand or summons, whichever date is the earlier.

5 Prescribed Rate of Interest Amendment Act 7 of 1997.

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. . .
(5) Notwithstanding the provisions of this Act but subject to any other law or an
agreement between the parties, a court of law, or an arbitrator or an
arbitration tribunal may make such order as appears just in respect of the
payment of interest on an unliquidate d debt, the rate at which interest shall
accrue and the date from which interest shall run.”

Background facts
[7] The factual matrix upon which th is judgment is premised is largely taken from
the judgments of the courts a quo and the helpful written submissio ns of both parties.
On 3 December 2011, the respondent was arrested by members of the South African
Police Service (SAPS) at the King Shaka International Airport , Kwa-Zulu Natal after
they had questioned her about fraud -related cases pending against her. At the time of
the arrest, the respondent was en route to Türkiye with her employer to purchase
merchandise. Members of the SAPS searched her suitcase, opened it in full view of
the public and her belongings were scattered on the floor. Nothing untoward was
found in her suitcase , but the SAPS members detained her on suspicion of fraud
arising from the loss of her identity document which was allegedly used by unnamed
people to commit fraud.

[8] The respondent was then transported and detained in a small cell at Tongaat
Police Station. In the trial court, the respondent testified that the conditions at
Tongaat Police Station were appalling and uninhabitable, in that the cell had a very
dirty toilet with faeces and smelt terribly. There was also a filthy grey blanket in the
cell which she placed onto the cement bed and sat on. The respondent had no blanket
to cover herself and was also not offered any food that evening. As a consequence of
this ordeal, the respondent was treated for blisters on her face and chest, anxiety,
hypervigilance and sleep deprivation . The respondent was released on bail on
12 December 2011 after spending time in custody. The charges were withdrawn

12 December 2011 after spending time in custody. The charges were withdrawn
against her in March 2012 after the fingerprint verification process proved that the
respondent was not the person sought.

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[9] According to the respondent’s testimony at the High Court , it took time for her
employer to trust her again and travel with h er overseas to purchase stock for the shop
in which the respondent worked . Regrettably for the respondent , her unpleasant
experience with members of the SAPS continued for a second time . This time, and
again in the company of her employer, the same two members of the SAPS stopped
and detained her for questioning , only for the respondent to be t old that they were
joking and had only wanted to establish what happened after her first arrest. She
feared that she would suffer the same fate ; nevertheless, the respondent was released
after being questioned for less than an hour. As her employer witne ssed both her
encounters with members of the SAPS, the respondent was demoted.

[10] Aggrieved by the aforementioned, the respondent in December 2013 issued and
served summons against the applicant for damages arising from her unlawful arrest
and detention in December 2011.

Litigation history
High Court
[11] Before the High Court ,6 the respondent sued the applicant for damages for:
embarrassment and humiliation; defamation of character; discomfort and pain and
suffering; deprivation of her freedom of movement and w rongful detention and
incarceration; psychological shock and trauma; and travel and subsistence expenses as
well as disbursements incurred in relation to her movements and sojourn for court
appearances totalling R1 million. The applicant conceded liabilit y on the merits by a
consent order in 2018. 7 The matter then proceeded on the issue of quantum in
November 2021, with the corollary question being the date from which interest should
run, the central issue now before us. The High Court awarded the full amount claimed

6 Khedama v Minister of Police , unreported judgment of the High Court of South Africa, Kwa -Zulu Natal

Division, Durban, Case No D13841/2013 (17 January 2022) (High Court judgment).
7 Id at para 5.

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plus interest at 15.5% per annum calculated from 20 December 2013, being the date of
service of summons, to date of payment.8

[14] The High Court computed the damages suffered by the respondent as follows,
all of these components constituting general (non-patrimonial) damages:
(a) wrongful arrest – R100 000;
(b) wrongful detention, computed at R80 000 per day for 12 days –
R960 000;
(c) defamation, embarrassment and humiliation – R500 000; and
(d) general damages for pain and suffering, psyc hological shock and trauma
– R200 000.

[15] Because the sum of these amounts exceeded the R1 million that the respondent
had claimed, the High Court awarded her R1 million. The High Court did not say
whether it had assessed the general damages as at the date of the delict committed by
the SAPS members (December 2011), the date of issue of summons (December 2013)
or at the date of judgment (January 2022). The natural inference, in the absence of a
contrary statement, is that the Court regarded the amounts awarded as the appropriate
amounts as at the date of judgment. This is, in my experience, the invariable approach
in assessing general damages.9 Interest on R1 million at the then prevailing prescribed
rate of 15.5% per annum from (12 December 2013 (date of summons) to
17 January 2022 (date of judgment)) comes to more than R1.25 million.

[16] In relation to the award of interest , from the date of service of summons to the
date of payment, the High Court provided extensive reasoning for its decision. The
High Court specifically referred to the relevant legislative provision dealing with

8 Id at para 33(b).
9 Where trial courts use previous awards as a rough guideline, they use standard indices (for example, Koch The
Quantum Yearbook 36 ed (2026)) to update those awards to the present time, that is the date of judgment.

MATHOPO J
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interest on unliquidated debts , which is section 2A of the PRI Act.10 The Court
further relied on GFE Blything11 and Drake Flemmer 12 to confirm that section 2A
makes provision for the calculation of interest on an unliquidated debt either from the
date of service of demand or summons, whichever is earlier. 13 The applicant sought
leave to appeal on both the quantum and interest ordered. The High Court refused
leave to appeal and on petition, the S upreme Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal
to the Full Court of the KwaZulu-Natal Division.

Full Court
[17] On appeal, the Full Court 14 reduced the amount awarded by the trial court to
R350 000, holding that the trial court’s award was excessive and overcompensated the
respondent. I t also overturned the trial court’s decision as to interest and held that i t
should run from the date of judgment of the trial court, being 17 January 2022, and not
the date of service of summons for the reasons set out hereunder.15

[18] The Full Court noted that the PRI Act provides that interest on illiquid claims
ordinarily runs from the date of service of a demand or summons. 16 In its discussion,
the Court further held that the PRI Act altered the common law position laid down in
Victoria Falls which stated that “[t]he civil law did not attribute mora to a debtor who
did not know and could not ascertain the amount which he had to pay.”17


10 High Court judgment above n 6 at para 27.
11 GFE Blything v Minister of Safety and Security unreported judgment of the High Court, Gauteng Division ,
Pretoria, Case No 8281/2013 (31 August 2016).
12 Drake Flemmer and Osmond Inc v Gajjar N .O. [2017] ZASCA 169; [2018] 1 All SA 344 (SCA); 2018 (3)
SA 353 (SCA).
13 High Court judgment above n 6 at paras 29 - 30.
14 Minister of Police v Khedama , unreported judgment of the High Court, Kwa-Zulu Natal Division
Pietermaritzburg, Case No AR259/2022 (18 March 2024) (Full Court judgment).

Pietermaritzburg, Case No AR259/2022 (18 March 2024) (Full Court judgment).
15 Id at para 46(2)(a).
16 Id at para 39.
17 Full Court judgment above n 14 at para 39.

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[19] The Court invoked section 2A(5) of the PRI Act which provides a court with
the discretion to make such an order as appears just in respect of the payment of
interest on an unliquidated debt, the rate at which interest shall accrue and the date
from which interest sh all run. In this regard, the Court also relied on Drake Flemmer
and Adel Builders18 to confirm its discretion in terms of section 2A(5). The Court also
made reference to the minority judgment in De Klerk SCA19 which held that “[s]ince
the general damages and medical expenses have been expressed in the value of money
as at the date of court a quo’s judgment, mora interest should not run from an earlier
date”.20

[20] The Full Court concluded that the High Court had misdirected itself by
awarding interest that far exceeded the principal amount claimed.21 This was because,
in a case of unlawful detention, damages are assessed at a monetary value as at the
date when judgment is delivered, and not as at the date of summons. Section 2A(5) of
the PRI Act should have been invoked to award interest only from the date of
judgment; i t could not have been the intention of the Legislature, when enacting
section 2A, that interest should be awarded on general damages from the date of
summons in cir cumstances where the general damages had been assessed using
monetary values as at the date of judgment.22

Supreme Court of Appeal
[21] On a further appeal brought by the respondent as to quantum and the question
of interest, the Supreme Court of Appeal increased the award to R 580 000, finding
that the Full Court’s award was inadequate , given the horrific conditions and
constitutional violations suffered by the respondent. Most importantly , for purposes
of this judgment , the Supreme Court of Appeal resto red the calculation of interest

18 Adel Builders (Pty) Limited v Thompson [2000] ZASCA 167; [2000] 4 All SA 341 (A); 2000 (4) SA 1027
(SCA).

(SCA).
19 De Klerk v Minister of Police [2018] ZASCA 45; 2018 (2) SACR 28 (SCA); [2018] 2 All SA 597 (SCA).
20 Id at para 55.
21 Full Court judgment above n 14 at para 44.
22 Id.

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from the date of service of summons to the date of payment .23 It held that section
2A(2)(a) creates a peremptory obligation to award interest from the date of service on
every unliquidated debt. 24 The Supreme Court of Appeal did not allude to the
anomaly of awarding interest from the date of summons on an amount of general
damages valued as at the date of judgment or consider the discretionary application of
section 2A(5) to address this anomaly.

Before this Court
Applicant’s submissions
[22] In this Court, the applicant contends that this Court’s jurisdiction is engaged
under section 167(3)(b)(ii)25 of the Constitution, in that the matter raises an arguable
point of law of general public importance which ought to be considered by this Court.
According to the applicant, this arguable point of law is whether a litigant who sues
for general damages arising from unlawful arrest and detention is entitled to interest
on the damages award in terms of the PRI Act from the d ate of judgment , or from
service of summons or demand to date of payment . The applicant further argues that
this arguable point transcends the interests of the present parties, in that the outcome
of this case has very wide ramifications, particularly for organs of state, who are often
sued for general damages, in cases of wrongful arrest and/or medical negligence.

[23] The applicant further argues that there is a compelling need for judicial
certainty and the proper administration of justice , as there are conflicting decisions by
the Supreme Court of Appeal and the High Court on the same issue. The applicant

23 Khedama v Minister of Police [2025] ZASCA 79; 2025 (9K6) QOD 41 (SCA); [2025] JOL 69070 (SCA)
(Supreme Court of Appeal judgment) at para 29 of the order.
24 Id at para 27.
25 Section 167(3) of the Constitution provides that this Court:
“(b) may decide—
(i) constitutional matters; and

“(b) may decide—
(i) constitutional matters; and
(ii) any other matter, if the Constitutional Court grants leave to appeal on the grounds
that the matter raises an arguable point of law of general public importance which
ought to be considered by that Court.”

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relies on the S upreme Court of Appeal’s judgment of Van de r Nest26 delivered on
10 April 2025. In that judgment, the Court ordered that the calculation of interest be
reckoned from the date of the trial court’s judgment to the date of payment for
damages arising from unlawful arrest and detention. 27 According to the applicant,
neither of the parties to this application referred the court a quo to Van der Nest, nor
does it appear that the Court itself was aware of its existence .28 The applicant
contends that had the court a quo been aware of its judgment , it would have
considered itself bound thereto by the principle of stare decisis (to stand by things
decided).

[24] The applicant further states that some decisions of this Court are conflicting. It
references the judgment of De Klerk CC,29 delivered in 2019 , where this Court
ordered interest to run from 30 October 2014, being the date of service of summons to
date of payment. 30 And it also references Mahlangu,31 delivered in 2021 , where this
Court ordered payment of interest at the prescribed rate from the dat e of the High
Court’s judgment.32

[25] On the merits of the appeal, the applicant makes several arguments in relation
to the interpretation of the PRI Act on the calculation of interest on an award of
general damages. Firstly, the applicant contends that prior to the enactment of the
PRI Act, a debtor would be liable for interest on a debt only if the debtor was in mora.
If the debtor had no knowledge of their liability, then they could not be in mora and
therefore interest would not be payable on unliquidated claims. Furthermore, prior to

26 Van der Nest N.O. v Minister of Police [2025] ZASCA 42; [2025] 2 All SA 655 (SCA); 2025 (5) SA 152
(SCA).
27 Id at para 2 of the order.
28 Judgment in Van der Nest was delivered about three weeks before the present appeal was argued in the
Supreme Court of Appeal.

Supreme Court of Appeal.
29 De Klerk v Minister of Police [2019] ZACC 32; 2019 (12) BCLR 1425 (CC); 2020 (1) SACR 1 (CC); 2021
(4) SA 585 (CC).
30 Id at para 3 of the order.
31 Mahlangu v Minister of Police [2021] ZACC 10; 2021 (2) SACR 595 (CC); 2021 (7) BCLR 698 (CC).
32 Id at para 3(iii) of the order.

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the PRI Act’s amendment in 1997, section 2(1) , dealing with interest on judgment
debts, provided that the interest calculation commence d from the day on which such
judgment debt was payable, unless that judgment or orde r provide d otherwise. In
1997, the Legislature amended the PRI Act and introduced section 2A dealing with
interest on unliquidated debts. The Legislature did not amend section 2(1) dealing
with interest on judgment debts. The applicant thus argues that section 2(1) remains
relevant for the calculation and determination of interest on general damages ,
otherwise there would have been no need for the Legislature to retain this section
following the introduction of section 2(A).

[26] Secondly, t he applicant postulates that, on a literal interpretation ,
section 2A(2)(a) applies to every unliquidated debt without exception. The applicant
submits that the introduction of section 2A(2)(a) has resulted in courts granting
inconsistent awards for interest on gener al damages. The awards have either been
ordered to commence from date of judgment or from date of service of summons or
demand. According to the applicant, the result of the indiscriminate application of the
section is inequitable and disadvantageous to claimants seized with unliquidated
claims. And therefore, the words “unliquidated debts” in section 2A should be
interpreted restrictively so as to exclude its application to general damages.

[27] The applicant further contends that , in formulating the p urposive approach to
interpretation, this Court in Cool Ideas 33 reiterated that all statutory interpretation
must be consistent with the Constitution. On this basis, the applicant submits that
unless section 2A is given a restricted meaning, the principles of equality enshrined in
the Bill of Rights will be infringed . The applicant further contends that there is no
rational basis for the differentiation between claimants suing for general damages and

rational basis for the differentiation between claimants suing for general damages and
those suing for other monetary liquidated debts. It is incongruous and inequitable for
claimants of general damages to receive mora interest from the date of service of
summons or demand calculated on current monetary value in addition to awards at

33 Cool Ideas 1186 CC v Hubbard [2014] ZACC 16; 2014 (4) SA 474 (CC); 2014 (8) BCLR 869 (CC).

MATHOPO J
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current money value at date of judgment while other claimants are limited to mora
interest only from date of judgment.

[28] And lastly, i n relation to section 2A(5), the applicant submits that a court has
the power to apply its discretion in awarding interest on general damages, wh ether
such damages fall under section 2(1) or section 2A(2)(a).

Respondent’s submissions
[29] Conversely, the respondent opposes the application on the basis that this matter
does not raise any constitutional issue or an arguable point of law of general public
importance. The respondent further argues that there are no prospects of success and
consequently, it is not in the interests of justice to grant leave to appeal. On the issue
of conflicting decisions, the respondent rejects this submission and st ates that the
apparent inconsistency arises not from conflicting interpretations of section 2A, but
from the fact that some courts did not consider the provision at all and reverted
incorrectly to the pre -1997 common law position. To buttress this argument, the
respondent states that there are three categories of jurisprudence as set out hereunder.

[30] First, the respondent submits that there are cases that correctly apply
section 2A(2)(a) by recognising that the Legislature adopted a single, uniform
commencement rule for all unliquidated debts. These include the majority judgment
in De Klerk SCA, Blything and other post-amendment decisions which expressly apply
the statute. Second, the respondent submits that there are cases that dealt with interest
on unliquidated damages but fail ed to consider section 2A(2)(a) at all. The applicant
has relied on some of these, including Takawira.34 These decisions simply reverted to
the common law because the PRI Act was not considered. Third, the respondent
posits that there are older cases predating the statutory amendment, such as Bailey35

34 Takawira v Minister of Police unreported judgment of High Court of South Africa, Gauteng Division,
Johannesburg, Case No A3039/2011 (11 June 2013).
35 General Accident Versekeringsmaatskappy Suid-Afrika Bpk v Bailey N.O. 1987 (2) SA 702 (C).

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and Hartley, which either applied the common law rule or interpreted statutes that had
not yet been amended.

[31] On the merits of the appeal, the respondent contends that the PRI Act applies to
all unliquidated debts sounding in money , including delictual damages arising from
the actio iniuriarum (action for non-patrimonial damages) as is the case here. In
addition, the respondent relies on section 2A(2)(a) of the PRI Act, which in
peremptory terms provides that interest on every unliquidated debt shall run from the
date of service of summons or demand, whichever occurs first . The respondent
further subm its that since the promulgation of the PRI Act, a consistent line of
authority, including decisions of this Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal, High Court
divisions and the Magistrates ’ Courts, has awarded interest in terms of
section 2A(2)(a) in matters founded on the actio iniuriarum.

[32] Furthermore, the respondent argues that section 2A(5) is the Legislature’s
chosen mechanism to deal with fairness in particular cases. It does not permit courts
to decide, as a matter of category, that certain types o f claims fall outside the scope of
section 2A(2)(a). That approach would contradict the legislative purpose and recreate
the very uncertainty the PRI Act was intended to eliminate. The discretion is relevant
only once section 2A(2)(a) is engaged. If classes of claims were excluded from the
default rule, the discretion would be rendered superfluous in precisely the cases where
fairness concerns are most likely to arise.

[33] The respondent submits that this Court should not read into the provision a
limitation which does not appear in the text. To amplify this submission , the
respondent states that the applicant conflates two distinct concepts : the existence of a
debt and the quantification of that debt. According to the respondent , the fact that
damages require judicial assessment does not mean that a debt does not exist. The

damages require judicial assessment does not mean that a debt does not exist. The
respondent places reliance on the judgment of Crookes Brothers36 for this submission.

36 Crookes Brothers Ltd v Regional Land Claims Commission for the Province of Mpumalanga [2012] ZASCA
128; [2013] 2 All SA 1 (SCA); 2013 (2) SA 259 (SCA).

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[34] I consider first whether our jurisdiction is engaged and, if it is, whether it is in
the interests of justice that leave to appeal be granted.

Jurisdiction and leave to appeal
[35] For this Court’s jurisdiction to be engaged, the matter must either raise a
constitutional issue or an arguable point of law of general public importance that
ought to be considered by this Court. I am persuaded by the applicant’s submissions
that there i s an arguable point of law of general public importance, warranting this
Court’s attention. This Court has in the past, on different occasions, ordered the
calculation of interest to run from either the date of service or the date of the trial
court judgm ent on an award of general damages. 37 However, t he common
characteristic in these decisions is that this Court did not provide any reason or
explanation as to why interest was awa rded from either the date of service of
summons or from date of the trial court’s judgment. Nor is there anything to suggest
that such a point was argued.

[36] Therefore, it is clear that there are divergent views on this aspect which require
this Court to provide direction and clarify the correct legal position. These conflicting
decisions raise an arguable point of law which in this matter implicates the
interpretation of the PRI Act. In addition, this interpretation is not confined to the
parties before this Court. There are many litigants who have pending general damages
claims in our courts , and there will be many more in the future . In my view, this
matter is accordingly a matter of general public importance.

[37] It is thus in the interests of justice that leave to appeal be granted.
Consequently, leave to appeal is granted. I now consider the merits of the appeal.


37 De Klerk CC above n 29 and Mahlangu above n 31.

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Issue for determination
[38] This Court is called upon to determine whether interest on general damages for
unlawful arrest and detention runs from date of service of summons or from date of
judgment.

Analysis
Statutory interpretation of the PRI Act in relation to general damages
[39] The determination of the correct interpretation of the PRI Act in relation to
general damages is dependent on the classification of such damages . In essence, what
is the classification of general damages? Given that the PRI Act differentiates
between liquidated and unliquidated claims, are general damages liquidated or
unliquidated in nature? The answers to this enquiry will provide direction as to which
provision of the PRI Act must find application.

[40] Even though the difference between liquidated and unliquidated claims is
evidently clear, I still see fit to outline the difference s. Section 2(3) of the PRI Act
defines “judgment debt ” as a sum of money due in terms of a judgment or order.
Basically, this is a liquidated claim , as the sum of money has been determined by the
court. On the other hand, the PRI Act does not provide a definition for an
unliquidated debt. It is trite law t hat d elictual damages are almost always
unliquidated.38 This is particularly true of general damages, where the trial court has a
wide discretion in assessing what would be a just and equitable solatium
(compensation) in the circumstances of the case. 39 It follows that general damages are
unliquidated as the exact amount is not predetermined but will be assessed at a later
stage. There is no dispute between the parties on this point.


38 Victoria Falls above n 2 at 31-2; Hartley above n 2 at 841H-842B.
39 Minister of Safety and Security v Seymour [2006] ZASCA 71; 2006 (6) SA 320 (SCA) ; [2007] 1 All SA 558
(SCA) at para 11 citing Protea Assurance Co Ltd v Lamb 1971 (1) SA 530 (A) ; 2 All SA 100 (A) at 534H -

536B, and Sandler v Wholesale Coal Suppliers Ltd 1941 AD 194 at 199-200.

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[41] To provide for a holistic understanding of the issue, one must have regard to
the position of interest on unliquidated claims before the section 2A amendment. The
common law position prior to the amendment in respect of monetary unliquidated
debts was that a party was not entitled to interest from a date earlier than the date of
judgment. The leading authority which dealt with the issue of interest on unliquidated
monetary debts was Hartley. In that matter, t he Court held that there was no legal
authority which prescribed interest to be awarded from a date earlier than date of
judgment in respect of unliquidated damages. The Court further reasoned that, as it
was not possible for the defendant to know or ascertain what damage its breach of
contract had caused, it could not be held liable for interest on the amount of da mages
prior to judgment.

[42] In Hartley, these principles were reinforced by the Appellate Division when it
said:

“It follows that there is no mechanism by which a court can compensate a plaintiff
like the present for the ravages of inflation in respect of monetary losses incurred
prior to the trial. In other jurisdictions a statutory power to award interest is used fo r
this purpose. . . . Whether our courts should have a similar power, and what precise
form it should take, is not, however, something we can lay down. It is essentially a
matter of policy which is for the Legislature to decide.”40

[43] From the aforementioned reasoning , the Appellate Division ruled that the
application of the PRI Act was limited to interest bearing debts in terms of
section 1(1) of the PRI Act and there can be no mora interest in respect of
unliquidated claims for damages.

[44] The Appellate Division in Hartley went further to deal with the issue of
currency nominalism which necessitated the introduction of section 2A. It held that
the essence of currency nominalism is that a debt sounding in money has to be paid in

the essence of currency nominalism is that a debt sounding in money has to be paid in
terms of its nominal value irrespective of any fluctuation in the purchasing power of

40 Hartley above n 2 at 841I-842A.

MATHOPO J
18
money. The practical effect of this is that the risk of currency depreciation is placed
on the creditor and the debtor enjoys the risk of an appreciation. The Court remarked:

“If a plaintiff through no fault of his own has to wait a substantial period of time to
establish his claim it seems unfair that he should be paid in depreciated currency. Of
course, in respect of many debts this problem is resolved (or partially resolved) by an
order for the payment of interest, and the [PRI Act] is flexible enough to permit the
Minister of Justice to prescribe rates of interest which reflect the influence of inflation
on the level of rates generally (see section 1(2)).”41

[45] In the same judgment, the Appellate Division held:

“In assessing general damages, one is dealing, not with a monetary debt, but with the
valuation of a non-monetary loss. Such a valuation must obviously be made in terms
of currency values as they are at the time of valuation, and not in terms of the values
of an earlier time. In the same way, as it was put in argument, a valuer determining
the present value of a farm would not use the currency values of the past. A
monetary debt is not, however, subject to a similar type of valuation. It has to be paid
according to its nominal value.”42

[46] That judgment called for legislative intervention to provide a mechanism to
compensate claimants of unliquidated claims for pecuniary losses suffered prior to the
trial. In 19 97, the Legislature complied with this plea and introduced section 2A to
counter currency nominalism in respect of unliquidated monetary claims.

[47] In the context of general damages, the claimant suffers a non -pecuniary loss
which is not susceptible to measurement in money at the date of the delict. It is a
matter of discretionary assessment by the trial court , and the amount regarded by the
trial court as fair and reasonable as at the date of its judgment. The inescap able

trial court as fair and reasonable as at the date of its judgment. The inescap able
question to be answered is, why should general damages bear interest that commences
from the date of service of summons or demand, whichever is earlier? Put differently,

41 Id at 841F-H.
42 Id at 841F.

MATHOPO J
19
why must a creditor pay interest on damages before the damages are assessed , given
that such damages are assessed in monetary values prevailing at the date of judgment
and not at the earlier date of demand or summons?

[48] The respondent’s answer to this crucial question is that section 2A(2)(a) applies
to unliquidated debts without any limitations. Moreover, the respondent submits that
the Legislature was fully aware that some unliquidated claims require judicial
assessment and, rather than excluding them, it adopted a uniform rule in
section 2A(2)(a).

[49] These arguments miss the point . There are different types of unliquidated
claims, general non-pecuniary damages (as in the present case) and unliquidated
claims for pecuniary loss. My understanding is that section 2A(2)(a) was primarily
meant to apply to the latter damages. This is because a claim for pecuniary damages ,
on the one hand, must be assessed according to its nominal value at the date of the
delict or breach of contract ; whereas a claim for non -pecuniary damages, on the other
hand, is assessed according to its nominal value as at the date of its judgment.

[50] A finding that interest on general damages runs from date of service of
summons or demand, whichever is earlier, would mean that a creditor must pay
interest on such damages despite the fact that they have been valued as at the date of
judgment, and not as at the date of the delict or the date of the demand or summons.
Such an interpretation would lead to great injustice and unjustified enrichment and it
cannot be what the Le gislature intended. Notwithstanding that, general damages
manifest immediately when the delict is committed, and the debt (the right to sue for
them) arises when the delict is committed. The critical point is not the manifestation
or coming into existenc e of the debt, but the fact that such a debt almost invariably is
assessed in values prevailing at the date of judgment, making it unsound to award

assessed in values prevailing at the date of judgment, making it unsound to award
interest from an earlier date.

MATHOPO J
20
[51] To illustrate the point , if for instance , a trial court assesses general damages
and concludes that the appropriate figure would be R 1 million as at the date of the
judgment, it would be unreasonable to order interest on the aforesaid sum from the
date of demand or service of summons , which might have occurred several years
earlier, as in the present case . This would result in overcompensation to the claimant
and would be contrary to the purpose of section 2A. The Full Court correctly
recognised this anomaly. As noted earlier, if t he High Court’s award of general
damages of R1 million had stood, interest at 15.5% from the date of summons to the
date of judgment would have amount ed to more than R1.25 million . Overall, the
respondent would then have received R2.25 million as at the d ate of judgment, despite
the fact that the High Court considered that the general damages to which she was
entitled as at that date came to only R1 million.

[52] In this case , the Supreme Court of Appeal decided that the appropriate sum of
general damages should be less than what the trial court had ordered but more than
what the Full Court had allowe d. It ordered interest to run at the prescribed rate from
December 2013, when summons w as served, to the date of payment. In this regard,
the Supreme Court of Appeal wrongly relied on Drake Flemmer as authority for the
proposition that interest should run from date of service of the summons or demand.
The Court in Drake Flemmer was seized with a claim for contractual damages and not
general damages. The latter damages are not assessed at the date of delict but when
the trial court gives judgment. In relation to general damages, courts have never
attempted to work out what would have been an appropriate award of general
damages at the date of the delict.

[53] A careful reading of t he Supreme Court of Appeal’s judgment in the present

[53] A careful reading of t he Supreme Court of Appeal’s judgment in the present
case does not indicate that the Court grappled with the provisions of section 2A(5),
which empowers courts to exercise a discretion when awarding interest in respec t of
any unliquidated debt . There is also nothing to suggest that the Supreme Court of
Appeal (which delivered judgment in May 2025) assessed the appropriate amount of
general damages as at December 2013, when summons w as served. By ordering

MATHOPO J
21
interest to run at the prescribed rate from December 2013, the Supreme Court of
Appeal effectively increased the respondent’s general damages considerably. This
would not only be unconscionable but contrary to the spirit and purport of the PRI
Act.

[54] What then is the correct application of the PRI Act in relation to interest on
general damages in such circumstances ? The solution to this problem is to be found
in section 2A(5) which confers a discretion upon a court to depart from
section 2A(2)(a) and dictate the rate at which interest shall accrue and the date from
which such interest shall run on an unliquidated debt. I accept that there is no
rationale for the finding that interest should run before judgment has been awarded in
respect of general damages because at that stage the defendant could not have been
expected to know and ascertain what damage its breach had caused. Accordingly, it is
fair and reasonable that the court should order a departure from the date of demand or
service of summons if it is assessing the general damages at the date of judgment.
Consequently, it follows that interest should be ordered to run from the date of
judgment, and this would in any event follow from section 2A of the PRI Act.

[55] This approach accords with the purpose of section 2A of the PRI Act. It was
enacted to ensure that claimants were not undercompensated in respect of damages
(typically pecuniary damages) assessed in monetary values prevailing at some earlier
date, typically the d ate of a contractual breach or delict. It was not enacted to
overcompensate claimants by giving them a windfall in the form of interest on an
award assessed in monetary terms at the date of the judgment rather than at an earlier
date.

Conclusion
[56] I therefore conclude that interest on general damages should ru n from date of
judgment to the date of payment. This of course assumes that the trial court , as I

judgment to the date of payment. This of course assumes that the trial court , as I
believe is invariably the case, expresses general damages in monetary values it regards
as appropriate at the date of judgment.

MATHOPO J
22

Costs
[57] Since the applicant was successful on the only point it raised in this Court; I see
no reason why the respondent should not be ordered to pay the applicant’s costs. In
relation to the costs order made by the Supreme Court of Appeal, the present
respondent (as appellant in the Supreme Court of Appeal) pursued two issues, namely,
the quantum of general damages and the date from which interest should run. She was
successful on both issues, but ought to have succeeded only on the issue of the
quantum of general damages. This means that the respondent would have been partly
successful and therefore, an order for the parties to pay their own costs in the Supreme
Court of Appeal is fair.

Order
[58] The following order is made:
1. Leave to appeal is granted.
2. The appeal is upheld.
3. Paragraph 1 of the order of the Supreme Court of Appeal dated
2 May 2025 is set aside.
4. Paragraph 2(b)(2) of the order of the Supreme Court of Appeal dated
2 May 2025 is set aside and replaced with the following:
“The applicant is ordered to pay interest on the aforesaid amount at the
prescribed rate per annum from the date of the trial court ’s judgment to
date of payment.”
5. Each party is to bear its own costs in the Supreme Court of Appeal.
6. The respondent is ordered to pay the costs of the applicant, including
costs of two counsel where applicable, in this Court.

For the Applicant:



For the Respondent:





M Govindasamy SC and M E Mbambo
instructed by Office of the State
Attorney, Durban

T N Aboobaker SC and M Maharaj
instructed by Abdul Shaikjee Attorneys
Incorporated