SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document
in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT
Not Reportable
Case no: 1338/2024
In the matter between:
JOCELYN DE BRUYN APPELLANT
and
THE MASTER OF THE HIGH COURT, FIRST RESPONDENT
PRETORIA
MARTHA JOHANNA PRINSLOO N O SECOND RESPONDENT
MARTHA JOHANNA PRINSLOO THIRD RESPONDENT
MARCO KOTZE FOURTH RESPONDENT
MARIUS KOTZE FIFTH RESPONDENT
MARELIE VAN ROOYEN SIXTH RESPONDENT
Neutral citation: De Bruyn v The Master of the High Court, Pretoria and
Others (1388/2024) [2026] ZASCA 92 (26 June 2026)
Coram: MOLEFE, KGOELE and KOEN JJA and BASSON and
MAMOSEBO AJJA
Heard: 18 February 2026
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Delivered: This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties’ representatives by email, publication on the Supreme Court of Appeal
website and released to SAFLII. The date and time for the hand -down of the
judgment is deemed to be 11h00 on 26 June 2026.
Summary: Administration of Estates – spousal maintenance claim –
Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990 – Administration of Estates
Act 66 of 1965 – review of Master’s refusal of objection to liquidation and
distribution account.
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ORDER
On appeal from: Gauteng Division of the High Court, Pretoria (Kooverjie J,
Mkhabela and Mazibuko AJJ sitting as court of appeal):
‘The appeal is dismissed with costs.’
JUDGMENT
Molefe JA ( Kgoele and Koen JJA and Basson and Mamosebo AJJA
concurring):
[1] This is an appeal by Ms Jocelyn de Bruyn (the appellant) against the
judgment and order of the Gauteng Division of the High Court, Pretoria (the full
court). The full court dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the order of the
Gauteng Division of the High Court, per Nyathi J (the high court). The high
court had dismissed her application to review the decision of the Master of the
High Court, Pretoria (the Master), who refused her objection to the inclusion of
a spousal maintenance claim in the liquidati on and distribution account (L&D
account) in the estate of the late Mr Johannes Jacob Prinsloo (the deceased).
[2] The application was brought in terms of ss 35(10) and 54 of the
Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965 (the Estates Act). The appellant
sought: an order reviewing and setting aside the Master’s decision; an order
substituting it with an order upholding her objection; a declaration that no valid
claim for maintenance as contemplated in the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses
Act 27 of 1990 (the Surviving Spouses Act) was established , and an order for
the removal of the executrix of the deceased estate.
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Background
[3] The appellant is the adult daughter of the deceased, who passed away on
29 January 2015. She was born from a previous marriage of the deceased.
[4] The first respondent is the Master. The second and third respondents are
Ms Martha Johanna Prinsloo, who is cited in her official capacity as the
executrix of the deceased’s estate and in her personal capacity, respectively. She
shall be referred to as ‘the respondent’ when addressed in either capacity.
[5] The respondent married the deceased in 1989 and remained his spouse for
26 years. She was nominated and appointed as the executrix in the deceased’s
last will and testament. The fourth, fifth and sixth respondents are the
respondent’s children born from a previous marriage. They are also beneficiaries
in the deceased’s will. The Master, the fourth, fifth and sixth respondents did not
participate in the litigation and were cited merely as interested parties.
[6] In terms of the deceased’s will, the immovable property, Erf 1[...], W[...]
Ext 1 (the immovable property), was bequeathed to the appellant. The
respondent was bequeathed a lifelong usufruct over the immovable property.
She was 70 years old when her husband passed away. She has no formal
qualifications or employment experience. T he deceased supported her
throughout their marriage and made some provision for her maintenance needs
in his will. The will also gave her the power to sell all estate assets by auction.
[7] The respondent appointed a third party to assist her in the winding up of
the deceased estate and an actuary to assist in the calculation of her maintenance
claim as surviving spouse. As the executrix, she published a provisional L&D
account.
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[8] The L&D account reflects a spousal maintenance claim against the
deceased estate in terms of the Surviving Spouses Act. The claim exceeded the
entire value of the deceased estate, leaving no assets available for distribution to
the deceased’s heirs. To settle her spousal maintenance claim, the L&D account
awards the immovable property to the respondent in her personal capacity.
[9] On 20 February 2018, the appellant lodged an objection to the L&D
account with the Master regarding, inter alia, the spousal maintenance claim. In
her objection, she took issue with the ‘excessive maintenance claim’ and that it
exceeds the value of the deceased estate, leaving no assets available to the heirs.
[10] The Master requested the actuary to perform a supplementary calculation,
taking into consideration the respondent’s life policies, to reduce the
maintenance claim. On 29 October 2018, the respondent lodged an amended
second L&D account and a supplementary actuarial report. The spousal
maintenance claim is reflected in the L&D account in an amount equivalent to
the difference between the amount of total gross assets in the estate and the total
liabilities, excluding the maintenance claim. The effect is that there is no balance
available for distribution, but the estate is also not rendered insolvent. Having
considered the amended L&D account concomitant with the amended
calculation, the Master was satisfied that the maintenance claim complied with
the provisi ons of the Surviving Spouses Act and dismissed the appellant’s
objection.
Litigation History
In the high court
[11] Aggrieved by the Master’s dismissal of the objection, the appellant
launched an application in the high court to review and set aside the Master’s
decision in terms of s 35(10) and s 54 of the Estates Act. She contended that the
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respondent’s maintenance claim does not comply with the Surviving Spouses
Act. She also applied for an order for the removal of the respondent as the
executrix of the deceased estate.
[12] The appellant contended that the respondent’s maintenance claim was
exclusively supported and motivated by an actuarial report based on information
obtained from the respondent and not verified by collateral sources; accordingly,
the report should not be a ccorded probative value. The appellant did not,
however, give a counter-view, nor her own version of what would be reasonable,
or a report from an actuary of her choice. The high court (per Nyathi J) dismissed
the application but granted the appellant leave to appeal the judgment to the full
court.
In the full court
[13] Before the full court the appellant persisted with her claim for an order
that the decision of the Master be set aside and be replaced with an order to the
effect that the objection to the L&D account is sustained. She further sought an
order that the respondent has no spousal maintenance claim against the deceased
estate. In addition, she continued with her claim for the removal of the
respondent as the executrix.
[14] The full court dismissed the appeal with costs. On petition, special leave
to appeal was granted to this Court.
In this Court
[15] The issue to be determined in this appeal is whether the full court correctly
refused the appeal to set aside the Master’s decision rejecting the appellant’s
objection to the L&D account, specifically in respect of the spousal maintenance
claim, as well as refusing to remove the respondent as the executrix of the
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deceased estate. The appellant’s case in the full court was that the respondent
has no claim for spousal maintenance.
[16] At the hearing of this appeal, counsel for the appellant however
abandoned the claim for the removal of the respondent as an executrix and the
contention that the respondent has absolutely no claim for spousal maintenance.
The case evolved to challenging o nly the amount of the spousal maintenance
claim.
Legal Principles
[17] Section 35(10) of the Estates Act provides:
‘Any person aggrieved by any such direction of the Master or by a refusal of the Master to
sustain an objection so lodged, may apply by motion to the Court within thirty days after the
date of such direction or refusal or within such further period as the Court may allow, for an
order to set aside the Master’s decision and the Court may make such order as it may think
fit.’
[18] Section 54 of the Estates Act deals with the removal of an executor from
office. In particular, s 54(1)( a)(v) allows the court a discretion to remove an
executor from office. The main factors taken into account are whether such an
executor took the interests of the estate and beneficiaries into consideration.
[19] The relevant sections governing the maintenance claim of a surviving
spouse are ss 2 and 3 of the Surviving Spouses Act. Section 2(1) provides:
‘If a marriage is dissolved by death after the commencement of this Act the survivor shall
have a claim against the estate of the deceased spouse for the provision of his reasonable
maintenance needs until his death or remarriage in so far as he is not able to provide therefor
from his own means and earnings.’
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[20] Section 3 deals with what determines reasonable spousal maintenance
needs. Factors which need to be taken into consideration include:
‘(a) the amount in the estate of the deceased spouse available for distribution to heirs and
legatees;
(b) the existing and expected means, earning capacity, financial needs and obligations of the
survivor and the subsistence of the marriage; and
(c) the standard of living of the survivor during the subsistence of the marriage and his age at
the death of the deceased spouse.’
[21] This Court in Friedrich and Others v Smit NO and Others (Friedrich),1
held that:
‘The provisions of ss 2 and 3 of the Surviving Spouses Act specifically provide that the
surviving spouse is only entitled to reasonable maintenance, and that the estate of the deceased
is liable only to the extent to which the surviving spouse is not able to provide for it from his
or her own means and earnings. Reasonable maintenance must exclude extravagant demands
of maintenance and a surviving spouse who cannot show that he or she is not able to maintain
him or herself is not eligible for maintenance from the deceased’s estate. In order to meet the
threshold set by the Surviving Spouses Act, Mrs Friedrich was required to show that she was
in need of reasonable maintenance and was unable to maintain herself.’2
Applicability of s 3 of the Surviving Spouses Act
[22] It is undisputed that the deceased and the respondent were married for 26
years at the time of his death. However, a surviving spouse has no claim against
the estate of the deceased spouse ‘merely by reason of the marriage’. 3 The
respondent still has to satisfy the provisions of s 3 of the Surviving Spouses Act:
that she is in need of a reasonable maintenance and is unable to maintain herself
from her own income and resources.
1 Friedrich and Others v Smit NO and Others [2017] ZASCA 19; 2017 (4) SA 144 (SCA) (Friedrich).
2 Ibid para 17.
3 Friedrich para 15.
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[23] It is the appellant’s case that the respondent’s claim for maintenance fails
to properly address the factors listed in s 3 of the Surviving Spouses Act,
specifically, in light of Friedrich. The appellant’s fundamental issue with the
maintenance claim remains that the claim was supported solely and exclusively
by actuarial reports, with all the information being provided by the respondent
and without any independent verification.
[24] The appellant contends that the deceased was not solely responsible for
the respondent’s maintenance, as she was employed by the deceased’s company
and received income from that employment. Furthermore, that there was no
independent executor to scrutinise her claim, as she was both the claimant and
the executrix.
[25] The respondent’s answer is that the appellant lacks good faith and that her
intentions are simply to delay the finalisation of the estate. The appellant’s
objections to the actuarial report are without merit as she has neither produced
evidence to dispute the respondent’s itemised expenses nor identified any
specific inaccuracies.
Analysis
[26] The Master provided the following reasons for refusing to uphold the
appellant’s objection. The total gross assets reflected in the amended first and
final L&D account amounted to R4 831 500, while the total liabilities were
R1 460 646.74, leaving a distributable balance of R3 370 853.26, excluding the
maintenance claim. The actuary calculated an amended maintenance claim at
R5 114 144, but this amount was reduced to align with the available distributable
balance. Consequently, the maintenance claim was adjusted by R1 620 923 to
prevent the estate from becoming insolvent.
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[27] Having considered the amended L&D accounts together with the revised
actuarial report, the Master was satisfied that the maintenance claim complied
with the Surviving Spouses Act. The Master accordingly dismissed the
appellant’s objection to the respondent’s maintenance claim.
[28] Evidence was required from the respondent to show that she is entitled to
any spousal maintenance.4 In order to determine an inability to support herself,
this Court has held that:
‘In this determination, the factors listed in s 3 of the Surviving Spouses Act should be taken
into account but as the Act stipulates, these are not exhaustive: any other factor may be taken
into account.’5
[29] The onus to adduce evidence to establish these factors is clearly on the
respondent. Section 3(a) requires that in determining the reasonable needs of a
surviving spouse, it is necessary at the outset to examine the amount available
in the deceased estate for distribution to the heirs and legatees. This relates to
the estate’s ability to meet a spous al maintenance claim. As determined by the
Master, the estate reflects a distributable balance of R3 493 221.01, excluding
the maintenance claim. Accordingly, t here are sufficient funds in the estate for
distribution to the beneficiaries.
[30] In his will, the deceased unequivocally expressed his intention that the
respondent’s maintenance should be provided for. He bequeathed to her the
usufruct of the immovable property, which would enable her to derive a rental
income and thereby secure her maintenance. In Robertson v Robertson’s
Executors,6 the court stated:
4 Friedrich para 14.
5 Friedrich para 17.
6 Robertson v Robertson’s Executors 1914 AD 503.
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‘Now the golden rule for the interpretation of testaments is to ascertain the wishes of the
testator from the language used. And when these wishes are ascertained, the Court is bound
to give effect to them, unless we are prevented by some rule or law from doing so.’7
[31] This Court in Spangenberg and Others v Engelbrecht NO and Another ,8
held that:
‘. . . [I]f the intent of the testator can be ascertained from the language used, there is no reason
to further consider the further requisites as set out in Endumeni, because the interpretation of
the will is based only on the subjective intention of the testator as can be ascertained from the
words used by the testator.’9
[32] Turning to the second ground, it is necessary to consider the evidence
relating to the surviving spouse’s existing means, earning capacity, financial
needs and obligations, as well as the duration of the marriage. These factors, as
set out in s 3(b), are central to determining the spouse’s needs and her ability to
maintain herself. This is to determine whether the respondent had a valid claim
under the applicable statutory framework.
[33] The respondent and the deceased were married in 1989, and at the time of
the deceased’s death on 29 January 2015, they would have been married for 26
years. The respondent was born on 15 November 1945, and she was 70 years
old at the time of her husband’s death, well above the retirement age.
[34] The respondent’s evidence is that her current means and earning capacity
are derived from her employment with her son, Marco Kotze’s (the fourth
respondent) company, and she earns R9 000 per month. In addition, she rents
out a chalet situated on the immova ble property for R6 000 per month. This
7 Ibid at 507.
8 Spangenberg and Others v Engelbrecht NO and Another [2023] ZASCA 100.
9 Ibid para 25.
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rental income is, however, irregular as her tenants do not consistently meet their
monthly obligations. The actuarial report further reflects a bequeathed annuity
of R55 000 since the death of the deceased, and an amount of R181 561 received
from a policy, and investment holdings amounting to R50 235. These amounts
were deducted from her claim.
[35] Evidence of financial needs and obligations include s the medical aid
contributions, insurance for the immovable property and the salary of a domestic
worker, which amounts to a total of R8 000. The respondent is required to meet
these expenses from her monthly salary of R9 000. Her monthly vehicle
instalment of R4 175 and fuel expenses of approximately R2 000 per month are
paid by her son. In addition, the respondent is responsible for the payment of
water and electricity consumed by the appellant and her f amily, who reside on
the immovable property. It is clear that the respondent’s sources of income per
month on their own are inadequate to meet her maintenance needs.
[36] The deceased estate is not absolved from its obligation to maintain a
surviving spouse by virtue of the provisions of the Surviving Spouses Act. Her
son’s act of kindness does not preclude her entitlement to maintenance from the
estate of her deceased spouse.
[37] In Oshry NO and Another v Feldman ,10 the executors contended that
voluntary financial contributions made by the surviving spouse’s children
should be taken into account as part of her means when assessing her
maintenance claim against the deceased estate. This Court rejected this
argument, holding that such voluntary support does not constitute the survivor’s
own means for purposes of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act. To hold
10 Oshry NO and Another v Feldman [2010] ZASCA 95; 2010 (6) SA 19 (SCA); [2011] 1 All SA 124 (SCA).
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otherwise would risk depriving the surviving spouse of her statutory
maintenance claim should the children later cease or become unable to provide
support, while also preventing recourse against the deceased’s heirs in terms of
s 2(2) of the Act.
[38] The third ground concerns the standard of living enjoyed by the surviving
spouse during the subsistence of the marriage and her age at the time of the
deceased’s death. Throughout their marriage, the respondent was employed by
her husband at the company he owned. They had vehicles and a substantially
large property with ample space. There was also a farm owned by the deceased,
which was sold at the time of his death.
[39] Even after his death, the deceased made provision to ensure that her
maintenance needs were met. He bequeathed to his wife a lifelong usufruct over
the property, which would have generated rental income for her. The respondent
provided evidence that she had been unable to fully exercise her usufruct rights
due to the appellant’s continued occupation of the property, which commenced
prior to the deceased’s death.
[40] Since the appellant moved onto the property, the respondent has had to
substantially reduce her own living space to accommodate the appellant and her
family. The respondent further lost income from her previous employment at the
deceased’s company after the appellant’s husband liquidated it.
[41] Due to the respondent’s inability to exercise her usufruct, she lost
potential rental income estimated at R819 000, which she could have earned had
she been able to lease the property. In addition, she is liable for water and
electricity charges amounting to R12 216 per month, incurred by the appellant
and her family, who refuse to contribute towards these expenses and pay no rent.
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[42] It is trite that one of the invariable consequences of marriage is a
reciprocal duty of support between spouses. The full court rightly held that the
respondent established a right to spousal maintenance in at least the amount
claimed.
[43] It is evident that the respondent’s standard of living has significantly
deteriorated since the passing of her husband, and that this decline is largely
attributable to the appellant’s conduct. The appellant has adopted an obstructive
attitude from the tim e the respondent claimed her maintenance. She is a
beneficiary in the deceased estate and should have been motivated to act in the
interest of the estate. The respondent, who is elderly, was unnecessarily put
through protracted litigation.
[44] The Master’s decision to refuse the objection was correct and legally
sound. The respondent’s maintenance claim meets the requirements of the
Surviving Spouses Act. The respondent established the right to maintenance. It
is reasonable and was supported by evidence of need on the part of the
respondent. It has not been shown that the full court erred. Accordingly, the
appeal must fail.
[45] The following order is made:
‘The appeal is dismissed with costs.’
________________________
D S MOLEFE
JUDGE OF APPEAL
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Appearances:
For the appellant: N Louw
Instructed by: Strydom & Bredenkamp Inc., Pretoria
Hendre Conradie Inc., Bloemfontein
For the second and third
respondents: K Fitzroy
Instructed by: Couzyn Hertzog & Horak, Pretoria
Honey Attorneys, Bloemfontein.