committal to prison for a period of 60 days, alternatively for such period as the
court deems appropriate.
2 The first, second and third applicants are, respectively, the Public Investment
Corporation SOC Ltd; Kabelo Rikhotso, Chief Investment Officer and Executive
Director, PIC; and Lindiwe Dlamini, Executive Head of Legal, PIC. The
respondent is Ralebala Matome Mampeula, a businessman who previously had
a business relationship with the first applicant and is currently involved in
litigation with it.
3 This application is the third application in a series of applications that
commenced on 5 August 2025 (“the first application”) to interdict the respondent
from making defamatory statements about the applicants. The applicants
alleged in that application that a case for urgent relief had been made out.
However, they did not pursue the application on an urgent basis. Ultimately,
even though a full set of affidavits was filed over a period of a number of months,
the first application was apparently never heard.
4 Instead, in January 2026 the applicants renewed their urgent application with a
fresh set of papers ( “the second application ”). In addition to a new founding
affidavit, the applicants incorporated their founding and replying affidavits in the
first application. On 26 January 2026 the respondent ’s attorneys of record
withdrew. The second application appears to have proceeded on an unopposed
basis and on 4 February 2026 Mohamed J granted an order as follows:
1 Pending the final determination of action proceedings to be
launched by the applicants against the respondent within 30 days
of this order, the respondent is interdicted from making,
publishing or repeating the publication or the making of any
defamatory and/or injurious allegations of corruption, extortion,
bribery and adultery by (sic) the applicants or any other
statements including those that suggest that the applicants are
implicated in criminal investigations for corruption, bribery and
extortion.
implicated in criminal investigations for corruption, bribery and
extortion.
(“the Mohamed J Order”)
5 On 23 February 2026, the applicants issued a combined summons out of this
court against the defendant. The relief sought in the summons is as follows:
(a) A declaratory order that the impugned statements are defamatory and
wrongful.
(b) The defendant is ordered to retract the allegations by publishing a
statement to the recipients of the defamatory statements and through all
social media publications under the control of the defendant in the
following terms:
“Between 2 July 2025 and 9 January 2026,
................. Ms Lindiwe Dlamini and Mr
Kabelo Rikhotso.” [redacted]
(c) The defendant is ordered to make payment to the second plaintiff in the
sum of R8 000 000 (eight million rand) with interest at the prescribed rate
of 10,5% per annum from the date of summons to date of final payment.
(d) The defendant is ordered to make payment to the third plaintiff in the
sum of R8 000 000 (eight million rand) with interest at the prescribed rate
of 10,5% per annum from the date of summons to date of final payment.
(e) An interdict restraining the defendant from publishing, making, repeating
or facilitating or encouraging the publication of any defamatory and/or
injurious allegations of fraud, corruption, extortion, bribery and adultery
by the plaintiffs or any other st atements, including those that suggest
that the plaintiffs are implicated in criminal investigations for fraud,
corruption, bribery and extortion.
(f) Ordering the defendant to pay the costs of the action, including the costs
of two counsel, on Scale C of Rule 67A.
(g) Further and/or alternative relief.
6 The documents filed on CaseLines in this matter comprise approximately 1 145
pages and are in a disorderly state. They do not follow a chronological order.
The various urgent applications are not separately identified. The papers in the
different applications merge into one another and are sometimes difficult to tell
apart. Voluminous duplicate documents appear in the papers. Notwithstanding
this, the applicants’ practice note requested the court to read all of the papers.
this, the applicants’ practice note requested the court to read all of the papers.
BACKGROUND
7 On 9 March 2026, at 14h20, the applicants served an urgent application on the
respondent seeking the following relief:
7.1 Declaring the respondent to be in breach of, and wilful contempt of, the
order of Mohamed J.
7.2 Directing the respondent to forthwith comply with the order and cease
acting in contravention thereof.
7.3 Ordering that the respondent forthwith be committed to imprisonment for
a period of 60 days, alternatively such period as the court deems
appropriate.
7.4 Directing the respondent to pay the costs of this application on the scale
as between attorney and client, including the costs of two counsel.
7.5 Granting further and/or alternative relief.
8 The applicants alleged in their founding affidavit that on or about 9 February
2026 the respondent reposted an interview in which he allegedly accused the
applicants of corruption, extortion, bribery and theft. In support of this allegation
the applicants annexed a screenshot of a post on the Mampeula Foundation ’s
LinkedIn profile allegedly established and controlled by the respondent.
9 On 11 February 2026 the applicants ’ attorneys sent a letter to the respondent
warning him that he was in contempt of the Mohamed J Order and demanding
that the LinkedIn post be deleted. The applicants also demanded an apology
from the respondent and threatened that if this was not forthcoming, they would
urgently seek to hold him in contempt of court and seek his imprisonment or the
imposition of a “hefty fine”. It is common cause that soon after the warning, the
repost of the above interview was deleted.
10 On 11 February 2026 the first applicant published a media release in which it,
amongst other things, announced that an interim order had been granted
restraining the respondent from making, publishing or repeating defamatory
allegations of corruption, extortion and bribery against PIC officials.
11 Pursuant to this, on 11 February 2026 at 15h58, the respondent sent an email
to applicants’ attorneys:
11.1 Accusing the PIC of continuing to spread unproven information and
demanding that the PIC withdraw its own media statement.
11.2 Warning the PIC that if it did not withdraw the press statement by close
of business that day, he would issue a full press release publicly detailing
the specifics of the adultery allegations against Lindiwe Dlamini and
Kabelo Rikhotso.
11.3 Asserting that the PIC ’s press statement violated a pre -existing
confidentiality agreement between the parties, and that the PIC was in
breach thereof.
11.4 Giving the PIC until the close of business on 11 February 2026 to
withdraw the press statement, failing which he would carry out his threat.
12 On 12 February 2026 the respondent sent an email to the applicants’ attorneys
distancing himself from the “Maphephandaba post ” (dealt with below). He
stated that he did not own or operate any social media or newspaper business
and that he did not have control over how the media reported on the matter. He
disassociated himself from the above post and undertook not to act in any
manner contrary to the court order.
13 The applicants’ urgent application was thereafter issued and served on 9 March
2026, apparently without any further notice to the respondent.
GROUNDS OF CONTEMPT
14 The alleged breach of the Mohamed J Order is confined to two alleged acts of
non-compliance:
14.1 The respondent allegedly made defamatory statements in the King
David podcast interview that was reposted on 9 February 2026 on the
Mampeula Foundation’s LinkedIn account.
14.2 He allegedly published defamatory comments on the social media
platform X in a post made on the Maphephandaba X profile.
Mampeula Foundation LinkedIn post
15 To prove the publication of the allegedly defamatory podcast the applicants
relied on a screenshot of a post on the LinkedIn account of the Mampeula
Foundation in which the following appeared:
Rali Mampeula likes this ... X
MAMPEULA FOUNDATION
1,981 followers
Just in case you missed the #Kingdavidstudio Podcast
Interview with our Chairman Rali Mampeula check it out
on this link
https://lnkd.in/dkdm_uB4
16 The respondent distanced himself from the post, stating that the Mampeula
Foundation is a separate juristic person with its own employees and that the
manager of the Foundation’s LinkedIn and other social media accounts, Mr Zef
Makhatini, posted the content without his knowledge or permission. In support
of the above allegation, the respondent annexed an affidavit deposed to by Mr
Makhatini in which he states:
16.1 On or about 9 February 2026 Mr Makhatini reposted a podcast interview
featuring the respondent on Mampeula Foundation’s LinkedIn page.
16.2 He did so in the ordinary course of his duties, without seeking or
receiving the respondent’s permission.
16.3 At the time of posting, Mr Makhatini was not aware of any court order
prohibiting certain publications. Once he was told by the respondent
about the letter of complaint from the applicants ’ attorneys he removed
the post.
Maphephandaba post on X
17 The second allegation of contempt is that on 11 February 2026 the respondent
“facilitated” the publication of a post on the social media X account of
“Maphephandaba”. A screenshot of the post is annexed to the applicants ’
founding affidavit. It reads:
MAPHEPHANDABA@maphepha .... 38m X
From the Grapevine: There are adultery allegations
surrounding Lindiwe Masina Dlamini, Head of Legal at
PIC, & Kabelo Rikhotso, the suspended Chief Investment.
Officer. (sic) Kabelo Rikhotso was suspended in October
2025 due to misconduct.
#PIC
#Maphephandaba
18 In his answering affidavit the respondent denied having facilitated the above
post. He stated that he did not know the operators of the account and that in
any event, the post was made before the Mohamed J Order was granted. He
pointed out that the applic ants did not allege or prove when the post was
published.
ONUS
19 The following principle was established in Fakie NO v CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd
2006 (4) SA 326 (SCA):
19.1 Civil contempt is a hybrid civil and criminal procedure.
19.2 Where committal is sought, the applicants must prove the elements of
contempt beyond reasonable doubt.
19.3 Once the order, service or notice, and non -compliance have been
proved, the respondent bears an evidential burden to rebut the element
of wilfulness and mala fides. If the respondent fails to raise a reasonable
doubt on those elements, contempt is proved beyond reasonable doubt.1
20 The granting of an interdict and the respondent’s knowledge of the Mohamed J
Order are common cause, and no further proof is required in this regard.
However, the respondent disputes that he breached the order. On the basis
that the applicants have sought the imprisonment of the respondent, the breach
of the order must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
DISCUSSION
21 It is common cause that the repost of the King David podcast was deleted soon
after the applicants ’ attorneys’ letter was sent on 11 February 2026. The
applicants did not provide a transcript of the podcast interview. They rely on a
general allegation that during the interview the respondent levelled allegations
of corruption, extortion, bribery and theft against the second and third
applicants. The applicants do not provide any context or identify precisely which
statements made during the interview are alleged to be defamatory.
22 It is trite that in a defamation action the plaintiff is required to allege and prove
the defamatory statement relied upon, and that the defamatory words were
published of and concerning the plaintiff. 2 Although the remedy sought in this
application is based on contempt of court, in proving the breach the applicant
must prove the prohibited statements relied upon. This cannot be done unless
the content of the defamatory statements is placed before the co urt with
1 Fakie (supra) at paragraphs 26 and 42 and see also Uncedo Taxi Service Assoc v
Maninjwa 1998 (3) SA 417 (E)
2 SA Associated Newspapers Ltd v Estate Pelser 1975 (4) SA 797 (A), International
Tobacco Co of SA Ltd v Wollheim and Others 1953 (2) SA 603 (A) at p613-4
sufficient precision, to enable the court to determine whether there has been a
breach of the prohibition and if so, the extent of the breach. The determination
of wilfulness and mala fides must necessarily involve an assessment of the
context, manner, and extent to which the prohibition has been breached. The
contempt application does not deal with this aspect at all.
23 It is significant that the King David podcast is not referred to in the second
application. There is only a general reference to “podcasts listened [to] by
millions in our country ” as part of the respondent ’s alleged wider defamatory
campaign. The content of these “podcasts” is not disclosed in the second
application. The applicants merely refer to podcasts in which defamatory
utterances are made. The express wording of the prohibition in the Mohamed
J Order refers to:
“.... the making of any defamatory and/or injurious
allegations of corruption, extortion, bribery and adultery by
(sic) the applicants or any other statements including those
that suggest that the applicants are implicated in criminal
investigations for corruption, bribery and extortion.”
24 The difficulty faced by the applicants is compounded by the wider dispute as to
whether the respondent was responsible for the reposting of the King David
podcast, or whether the post was made by Mr Makhatini without the
respondent’s knowledge or consent.
25 The applicants’ rebuttal of the respondent ’s denial that he wilfully and in bad
faith breached the Mohamed J Order is speculative for the following reasons:
25.1 It cannot, without more, be inferred from the fact that the Mampeula
Foundation was founded by the respondent and bears his name, that he
is therefore necessarily responsible for each and every post on its
LinkedIn account.
25.2 The fact that the King David podcast was reposted on 9 February 2026
and taken down on 11 February 2026 after the applicants complained
does not prove that the respondent knew about and was responsible for
the post.
25.3 Complicity between Mr Makhatini and the respondent in relation to the
King David podcast repost was not established on the facts.
26 In relation to the Maphephandaba post on X the applicants contend the
following:
26.1 That the post must have been published after the Mohamed J Order
because it was not placed before the court when the urgent interdict was
sought in the second application.
26.2 Maphephandaba allegedly confirmed that it does not have an X account.
The applicants argue that it can be inferred from this that the respondent
himself created the page in order to publish the alleged defamatory
allegations.
26.3 The allegations of adultery in relation to Dlamini and Rikhotso must have
come from the respondent, because he was the only person with
knowledge of the allegations and the only person actively propagating
them.
26.4 Reliance was also placed on the respondent ’s threat in his letter to the
applicants’ attorneys on 11 February 2026 that if the first applicant did
not withdraw its press statement he would issue a full press release
detailing the specifics of the Maphephandaba story about Dlamini and
Rikhotso.
27 The applicants’ case connecting the respondent to the Maphephandaba X post
is exceedingly tenuous. What admissible evidence connects the respondent to
the creation, control, authorship, instruction, procurement, or facilitation of the
Maphephandaba publication, apart from the fact that the publication is said to
have repeated allegations previously made by him? The applicants rely solely
on inference and speculation rather than direct evidence . They give no
explanation regarding the identity of Maphephandaba, the ownership of the
relevant account, or the mechanics by which the publication came into
existence.
28 The difficulty for the applicants begins at the threshold. The papers do not
properly identify what “Maphephandaba” is, who owns or operates it, whether
it is a media organisation, a social media profile, a pseudonymous account, or
an independent third-party publisher. The applicants appear to assume that the
court will simply accept that annexure “FA9” to their founding affidavit
establishes the dissemination of defamatory material by the respondent,
without laying any evidential foundation to that proposition. Equally absent is
any explanation of the relevant social media platform, the manner in which
content is posted or reposted, who had access to the account, whether the
account was authentic, or whether the publication could have originated from
some person other than the respondent. These are not peripheral matters. They
are fundamental facts which would ordinarily be required before any finding can
be made regarding responsibility for an online publication.
29 The evidential gap widens further because the applicants do not produce any
direct evidence linking the respondent to the publication itself. There is no
evidence that he owned the account, controlled it, posted the content,
communicated with the account holder, supplied material for publication,
instructed publication, or even had contact with the publisher. The assertion
that he “facilitated” the publication is advanced as a conclusion rather than a
fact supported by evidence.
30 Ultimately, the applicants ’ reasoning appears to be no more than that the
respondent previously advanced similar allegations and therefore must have
been responsible for their appearance on the Maphephandaba account. That
is speculation rather than proof. Similarity of content may give rise to suspicion,
but suspicion cannot substitute for evidence, particularly in contempt
but suspicion cannot substitute for evidence, particularly in contempt
proceedings where the consequences are serious. On the papers before the
court, the applicants’ attempt to connect the respondent to the publication does
not merely suffer from evidential weakness; it fails to establish the factual
foundation necessary to support the inference which they ask the court to draw.
31 I conclude that the applicants failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
respondent himself, after 4 February 2026, made, published, repeated, or
procured the publication of statements prohibited by the Mohamed J Order.
Even if it were assumed that there had been publication, the respondent ’s
version raises a reasonable doubt as to wilfulness and mala fides.
URGENCY
32 The applicants’ grounds of urgency are:
32.1 Contempt of court proceedings are by their very nature urgent.
32.2 Urgency was established when the Mohamed J Order was issued.
32.3 The applicants continue to suffer irreparable harm given the alleged
malicious and unfounded campaign of defamation being perpetuated by
the respondent against them.
32.4 The respondent is causing ongoing harm by continuing to wilfully breach
the Mohamed J Order and such breach can only be cured on an urgent
basis.
33 The applicants ’ attitude is that, because the respondent does not challenge
urgency, the issue falls away. That is not correct. Even if the respondent does
not challenge urgency, the court is entitled and, in my view, duty -bound to
consider urgency, whether when the matt er is enrolled or, at the very least,
when costs are considered.
34 The urgent application to declare the respondent in contempt was brought
approximately seven months after the first application had been brought and
almost a month after the Mampeula Foundation LinkedIn repost had been
deleted. Even if the respondent breached the Mohamed J Order, his contempt
had been purged by the removal of the post long before the urgent application
was launched, and any harm allegedly occasioned by the reposting of the
podcast had already abated.
35 The applicants did not state when the Maphephandaba post is alleged to have
been posted on X. The court would have expected the applicants to be specific
about the date, circumstances, and nature of the post.
36 The purpose of contempt of court proceedings is twofold: firstly, to vindicate the
honour and authority of the court; and secondly, to punish the guilty party and
compel compliance with the order. There are plainly cases in which
disobedience of a court o rder gives rise to urgency, and in some instances to
extreme urgency. However, the applicants ’ reliance on the broad proposition
that contempt proceedings are inherently urgent, without establishing a
concrete link between the alleged breach and the urgency asserted, is
misplaced.
37 In the case of the Mampeula Foundation LinkedIn post, no urgency can arise
when the post had been removed long before the urgent application was
brought. Any urgency that existed rests solely on the Maphephandaba post. In
this regard, there is an affirmat ive statement from the respondent on 12
February 2026 disassociating himself from this post. In light of this and the fact
that it took the applicants nearly a month to settle their application, one would
have expected the applicants to have established a proper evidential
foundation for the breach. They did not.
COSTS
38 The general rule is that costs follow the result on a party and party scale. An
order on the attorney and client scale is exceptional, and is generally made as
a mark of the court’s disapproval of the manner in which a litigant has conducted
the proceedings, rather than as a penalty in the ordinary sense. Litigants who
do not comply with practice directives may be ordered to pay costs on a higher
scale.3
39 The applicants elected to launch urgent contempt proceedings nearly a month
after the LinkedIn post had already been removed on 11 February 2026. That
interval afforded them ample opportunity to assess the evidential material
properly, identify the precis e prohibited statements relied upon, and place
before the court a coherent and properly organised record. They did not do so.
Instead, they sought grave relief, including imprisonment and punitive costs, on
a factual foundation that was ultimately inadequate.
40 The court was further burdened with prolix and disordered papers. While no
formal rule prescribes a maximum page limit for urgent applications, the filing
of some 1 145 pages of papers, containing duplicate documents and
intermingled applications, is inco nsistent with the obligation resting upon
litigants seeking urgent relief to present a focused, coherent and manageable
record. Litigants, especially where urgent and penal relief is sought, ought to
present their cases with precision and discipline. The burden placed upon both
the court and the opposing litigants by unnecessarily prolix papers is
self-evident.
41 The prejudice occasioned by prolix urgent litigation extends beyond the
immediate parties. Judges sitting in the urgent court are required to manage
substantial rolls comprising numerous matters, often of considerable
complexity, competing for limited judicial time. The unnecessary filing of
duplicate, repetitive and disorganised material diverts judicial reso urces away
from other litigants seeking urgent relief and impedes the efficient
administration of justice.
42 The applicants’ prayer for punitive costs attracts scrutiny against them. They
had nearly a month to formulate their case after the LinkedIn post had been
3 Caterham Car Sales & Coachworks Ltd v Birkin Cars (Pty) Ltd and Another 1998 (3)
SA 938 (SCA), Premier, FS v Firechem FS (Pty) Ltd 2000 (4) SA 413 (SCA), Bonugli
v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 2012 (5) SA 202 (SCA)
removed, yet they launched urgent committal proceedings without placing
before the court clear evidence of the prohibited statements relied upon. They
then invited the court simply to read “all the papers”. That is not an acceptable
manner in which to seek grave relief. Moreover, the basis upon which the first
applicant, a public entity entrusted with public funds, was separately defamed
was not articulated on these papers. The court is left with the overri ding
impression that the contempt application was brought ab irato, to punish the
respondent. In those circumstances, I am satisfied that the manner in which the
applicants conducted this litigation, and not merely their failure on the merits,
justifies an order on the attorney and client scale.
43 As will be seen below, this judgment has been delivered some two and a half
months after the matter was heard. Judgment in urgent matters is usually
delivered within a substantially shorter period.
44 At the conclusion of the hearing on 2 April 2026 the court reserved judgment.
The court put to counsel that, if indeed the respondent was found to have been
in contempt, there appeared to be no danger, on the facts, of him repeating
such contempt. The alleged breaches on the applicants’ papers were historical
and unlikely to recur. If they did, the applicants would have had reason to set
their urgent application down again duly supplemented with details of any new
breach that may have been committed. No such further breach was brought to
the attention of the court.
45 I conclude that the applicants failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
respondent was in contempt of the Mohamed J Order based on either the
Mampeula Foundation LinkedIn repost or the Maphephandaba post.
Furthermore, in my view, the facts of the matter did not establish a basis for the
urgency contended for by the applicants. These findings are independent and
dispositive in their own right.
46 In all the circumstances the following order is made:
dispositive in their own right.
46 In all the circumstances the following order is made:
1 The application to declare the respondent in contempt of the