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Rustenburg Platinum Mines Limited and Another v Langa and Others (LCC96/2024) [2026] ZALCC 30 (10 June 2026)
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IN
THE LAND COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
HELD
AT RANDBURG
CASE
NO
:
LCC 96/2024
Before:
The Honourable Ncube J and Maluleke AJ
Heard
on: 14 April 2026
Delivered
on: 10 June 2026
(1)
REPORTABLE: Yes☐/ No ☐
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: Yes☐ / No ☐
(3)
REVISED: Yes ☐ / No ☐
Date:
10 June 2026
In the matter between:
RUSTENBURG
PLATINUM MINES LIMITED
First Applicant
MOGALAKWENA
PLATINUM LIMITED
Second Applicant
and
ELISA
RAMASELA LANGA
First Respondent
ALBERT
LESETJA CHABA
Second Respondent
GLEN
PHAKGADI
Third Respondent
FRANS
RENELANE PHAKGADI
Fourth Respondent
POLVIANCE
RANKOTSANA PHAKGADI
Fifth Respondent
JACK
MADIMETJA PHAKGADI
Sixth Respondent
PINNY
MOKGAETJI PHAKGADI
Seventh Respondent
RENNIE
PHAKGADI
Eighth Respondent
SELINAH
MOKGAETJI MOTHAPO
Ninth Respondent
LERATO
MOTHAPO
Tenth Respondent
MARIA
NONG
Eleventh Respondent
THE MINSTER OF MINERAL
RESOURCES
AND
ENERGY
Twelfth Respondent
THE DIRECOR-GENERAL OF
THE DEPARTMENT
OF MINERAL RESOURCES
AND ENERGY: MINERAL
AND
PETROLEUM REGULATION
Thirteenth Respondent
THE DEPUTY
DIRECTOR-GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF MINERAL
RESOURCES
AND
ENERGY
Fourteenth Respondent
THE REGIONAL MANAGER:
LIMPOPO REGION
THE DEPARTMENT OF
MINERAL RESOURCES
AND
ENERGY
Fifteenth Respondent
THE
MOGALAKWENA LOCAL MUNICIPALITY
Sixteenth Respondent
THE CHIEF DIRECTOR,
LIMPOPO: DEPARTMENT
OF AGRICULTURE AND
RURAL DEVELOPMENT:
WATERBERG
DISTRICT
Seventeenth Respondent
ORDER
The
following order is made:
Leave
to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal is granted.
Leave
is granted solely on the basis that compelling reasons exist as
contemplated in
section 17(1)(a)(ii)
of the
Superior Courts Act 10
of 2013
.
No
finding is made that the appeal enjoys reasonable prospects of
success under
section 17(1)(a)(i).
Costs
shall be costs in the appeal.
JUDGMENT
MALULEKE AJ (Ncube J
concurring)
I
ntroduction
[1]
This is an application for leave to appeal against the whole judgment
and order
of
this Court delivered on 4 February 2026.
[2]
The application is directed to the Supreme Court of Appeal in terms
of
section 31
of
the Land Court Act 6 of 2023 read with
section 17
of the
Superior
Courts Act 10 of
2013
.
Parties
[3] The First
Applicant is Rustenburg Platinum Mines Limited (RPM), a holder of a
mineral right in terms of the Mineral and
Petroleum Resources
Development Act 28 of 2002 (MPRDA), which includes a part of the
mining area within the Zwartfontein. Historically,
the mining area
was occupied by the communities comprising almost 1000 households
that made up Motlhotlo community. It included
the Ga-Sekhaolelo
community which resided on the farm Overysel 815 LR and the Ga-Puka
community which resided on the farm Zwartfontein,
which the First to
Eleven Respondents are part of.
[4] The Second
Applicant is Mogalakwena Platinum Limited (MPL), a lessee of farm
Zwartfontein.
[5] The Applicants
are wholly owned subsidiaries of Anglo-American Platinum Limited
(AAPL). Mr Tebogo Makhubedu is a Senior
Land Rights Manager at AAPL.
He is the deponent to the founding affidavit.
[6] The First to
Eleventh Respondents are, Elisa Ramasela Langa, Albert Lesetja Chaba,
Glen Phakgadi, Frans Renelane Phakgadi,
Polviance Rankotsana
Phakgadi, Jack Madimetja Phakgadi, Penny Mokgaetji Phakgadi, Rennie
Phakgadi, Selina Mokgaetji Mothapo, Lerato
Mpthapo and Maria Nong,
respectively.
[7] The Twelfth to
Seventeenth Respondents are: the Minister of Mineral Resources and
Energy (Minister) who is cited in his
capacity as the Head of the
Department of Mineral Resources and Energy (DMRE), the Director
General of the DMRE (Director General)
,
the Deputy Director
General of the DMRE (DDG); the Regional Manager, DMRE (Regional
Manager), the Mogalakwena Local Municipality
and the Chief Director,
Limpopo Department: Agriculture and Rural Development: Waterberg
District respectively
.
Background
[8]
The Applicants applied to this Court for:
1.
A declaration that the process in terms of
section 54 of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act, 28
of 2002 (MPRDA)
has concluded, save for the right of the First to
Eleventh Respondents to, in terms of section 54(4) of the MPRDA,
refer any dispute
regarding compensation to arbitration in accordance
with the
Arbitration Act, 42 of 1965
or to a competent court;
2.
An order evicting the First to Eleventh
Respondents and all persons claiming rights of residence through
them, from the farm Zwartfontein
in the Mogalakwena Local
Municipality, Limpopo within 30 days of the granting of the order;
3.
An order confirming that the Applicants are
entitled to demolish the dwellings occupied and / or retained by the
First to Eleventh
Respondents on Zwartfontein upon their vacating of
Zwartfontein, and the return of any salvaged material to such
Respondents;
4.
In respect of the Third to Eleventh
Respondents, a final order directing them to make a selection of
alternative permanent housing
to be constructed for them by the
Applicants, in accordance with the Relocation Agreement concluded in
August 2012, and the Addendum
thereto concluded in February 2018.
[9]
The Court dismissed the application with costs and now the Applicants
seek
Leave
to appeal the decision.
Issues
to be determined
:
[10]
Issues to be determined are whether:
a. The Court
correctly interpreted and applied IPILRA, particularly the
requirement of community consent.
b. The Court
correctly interpreted and applied the relationship between IPILRA,
ESTA and the MPRDA.
c. The applicants
exhausted the
section 54
MPRDA process before instituting eviction
proceedings.
d. The Court
overlooked material evidence relating to community resolutions and
consent.
Applicants’ case
[11]
The Applicants contend that this Court erred in its interpretation
and application of
The
Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act 31 of 1996 (IPILRA),
the Extension
of
Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997(ESTA) and section 54 of the MPRDA.
[12]
On the finding that there was no Community consent, the Applicants
content that
the
Court failed to consider evidence demonstrating that:
12.1. the Ga-Puka
community adopted resolutions in 2002 and 2012;
12.2. the
resolutions authorised relocation;
12.3. consent was
provided in accordance with section 2(4) of IPILRA.
[13]
The Applicants submit that the Court failed to properly consider
evidence
concerning
community resolutions and consent. The Court erred in concluding that
the
eviction
application was premature. Further that the Court conflated
consultation and
consent
and therefore misapplied
Baleni
[1]
and
Maledu
[2]
.
[14]
On whether section 54 process were exhausted or not, the Applicants
contend
that:
14.1. they
exhausted all reasonable steps under section 54;
14.2. the Regional
Manager failed to perform statutory obligations;
14.3. the Court
incorrectly held that the application was premature.
[15]
The Applicants content that the Court mischaracterised their case.
They argue
that
they never contended that relocation agreements authorised eviction
without a
court
order. Rather, they contend, IPILRA consent existed and that ESTA
remained
the
procedural mechanism for eviction.
[16]
The Applicants further argue that the Court’s failure to
consider the replying
evidence,
led to its failure to evaluate evidence placed before it in reply
regarding
community
resolutions and subsequent confirmatory affidavits.
Respondent’s
case
[17]
The Respondents argue that there is no reasonable prospects of
success at the
SCA.
That the Court correctly found that:
17.1. IPILRA
consent was not established;
17.2. The
relocation arrangements did not satisfy IPILRA;
17.3. Section 54
was not exhausted.
[18]
The Respondents further argue that
Baleni
and
Maledu
were
correctly applied
by
the Court and that:
18.1. consent is a
substantive prerequisite;
18.2. section 54 is
a compulsory dispute-resolution mechanism;
18.3. eviction
proceedings were prematurely launched.
[19]
The Respondents argue that there is no compelling reason to grant the
leave
to
appeal and contend that:
19.1. the legal
principles are settled;
19.2. the appeal
merely challenges factual findings;
19.3. there is no
novel question requiring appellate intervention.
Legal
Principles Applicable
Test
for Leave to Appeal
[20]
Section 17(1)(a)
of the
Superior Courts Act provides
that:
“
(
1)
Leave to appeal may only be given where the judge or judges concerned
are of the opinion that—
(a)
(i)
the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success; or
(ii) there
is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard,
including conflicting judgments on the matter
under consideration;”
[21]
The threshold is a stringent one. In
MEC for Health, Eastern Cape
v Mkhitha
(1221/2015)
[2016] ZASCA 176
the Supreme Court of
Appeal held that there must be a sound and rational basis for
concluding that another court would arrive at
a different conclusion.
Mere disagreement with the judgment is insufficient.
[22]
See also
Mont Chevaux Trust v Tina Goosen and 18 Others
2014
JDR 2325 (LCC) where the court held that the threshold for leave to
appeal under
section 17
is higher than under the previous legal
position. The word “would” indicates a measure of
certainty that another court
will differ.
[23]
In
Ramakatsa v African National Congress
(724/2019)
[2021]
ZASCA 31
, the
Supreme
Court of Appeal confirmed that compelling reasons remain an
independent
basis
upon which leave may be granted.
Discussion
Reasonable
prospects of success
[24]
Having considered the notice of application for leave to appeal, the
written
submissions
and oral argument, I am not persuaded that the applicants have
demonstrated
that another court would reach a different conclusion.
[25]
The applicants' criticisms are directed principally at factual
findings and
evaluative
conclusions reached by this Court after considering the evidence as a
whole.
26]
I am therefore not satisfied that the applicants have established
reasonable
prospects
of success within the meaning of
section 17(1)(a)(i).
Compelling
reasons
[27]
The matter nevertheless raises an important legal question: What is
the legal
relationship
between prior community consent under IPILRA, relocation agreements,
ESTA
eviction proceedings, and
section 54
MPRDA dispute-resolution
process?
[28]
The authorities do not appear to have finally resolved whether:
28.1. Historical
community consent remains operative in subsequent relocation
disputes;
28.2.
Section 54
must be fully exhausted where IPILRA consent is alleged;
28.3. IPILRA
communities may be evicted under ESTA while compensation issues
remain unresolved.
[29]
These questions transcend the interests of the present litigants and
are of
considerable
importance to mining-right holders, affected communities, informal
rights
holders
and Courts tasked with balancing competing constitutional and
statutory
rights.
[30]
In my view, these considerations constitute compelling reasons within
the
meaning
of
section 17(1)(a)(ii)
of the
Superior Courts Act for
the appeal to
be heard
by
the Supreme Court of Appeal.
Order
[31] The
following order is made:
1. Leave to appeal
to the Supreme Court of Appeal is granted.
Leave
is granted solely on the basis that compelling reasons exist as
contemplated in
section 17(1)(a)(ii)
of the
Superior Courts Act 10
of 2013
.
No
finding is made that the appeal enjoys reasonable prospects of
success under
section 17(1)(a)(i).
Costs
shall be costs in the appeal.
J
MALULEKE
Acting
Judge of the Land Court
T
NCUBE
Judge
of the Land Court
APPEARANCES:
For
the Applicants: Adv Christopher Loxton SC & Adv B Dhladhla
Instructed
by: Knowles Husain Lindsay Inc.
For
the Respondents: Adv Vuyani Ngalwana SC, and Adv Tutelo Makola
Instructed
by: Nyapotse Inc. Attorneys
[1]
Baleni
and Others v Minister of Mineral Resources and Others 2019 (2) SA
453 (GP)
[2]
Maledu
and Others v Itereleng Bakgatla Mineral Resources (Pty) Ltd and
Another
2019 (2) SA 1
(CC)