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[2026] ZAGPPHC 566
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Manamela v National Commissioner, South African Police Services and Others (Leave to Appeal) (2026-096408) [2026] ZAGPPHC 566 (17 June 2026)
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IN THE HIGH COURT
OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA)
Case
No. 2026-096408
(1)
REPORTABLE:
YES
/NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES:
YES
/NO
(3) REVISED
DATE:
17 June 2026
SIGNATURE:
In
the matter between:
SEMAKALENG
DAPHNEY MANAMELA
APPLICANT
And
THE
NATIONAL COMMISSIONER, SOUTH AFRICAN
POLICE
SERVICES
FIRST
RESPONDENT
THE
MINISTER OF POLICE
SECOND
RESPONDENT
MAJOR
GENERAL ZEPH MKHWANAZI
THIRD
RESPONDENT
ADVOCATE
LEON HALGRYN SC
FOURTH
RESPONDENT
ADVOCATE
K MILLARD
FIFTH
RESPONDENT
ADVOCATE
H CASSIM
SIXTH
RESPONDENT
Coram:
Millar
J
Heard
on:
11
June 2026
Delivered:
17
June 2026 - This judgment was handed down electronically by
circulation to the parties' representatives by email,
by being
uploaded to the
CaseLines
system of the GD and
by release to SAFLII. The date and time for hand-down is deemed
to be 09H00 on 17 June 2026.
JUDGMENT
– LEAVE TO APPEAL
MILLAR J
[1]
On 18 May 2026 I granted an order
dismissing the application brought by the applicant, Ms. Manamela to
hold the first respondent,
the National Commissioner of Police in
contempt of a court order granting an interdict against the holding
of a statutory board
of enquiry pending the finalization of certain
proceedings
inter alia
before the Supreme Court of Appeal. Ms. Manamela has applied for
leave to appeal against that order. It is opposed.
[2]
The
test for the granting of leave to appeal pertinent to the present
matter is set out in section 17(1) of the Superior Courts
Act
[1]
as follows:
“
(
1)
Leave to appeal may only be given where the judge or judges concerned
are of the opinion that-
(a)
(i) the
appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success or
(ii) there is
some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard,
including conflicting judgments on the matter under
consideration”
[3]
The application for leave to appeal was
brought on 5 grounds. The first was that there had been a
misinterpretation of the
court order of 11 October 2024. The
second was that the court had mis-directed itself in relying upon the
hierarchy of courts
in interpreting the order. The third ground
was that the court erred in dismissing the contempt application, the
fourth that
the court had failed to properly address the applicant’s
claim for interdictory relief. Lastly, that the court had erred
in awarding punitive costs against Ms Manamela.
[4]
The first two grounds can conveniently be
dealt with as one. Neither in my view has any merit. The
interpretation of
the order interdicting the proceedings was
specifically dealt with in paragraphs [16] to [18] of the judgment.
[5]
The Constitutional Court is the apex court
in the Republic, and it is inconceivable that a judgment of that
court, dismissing an
application for leave to appeal against a
judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal (as occurred here), could
nevertheless be thwarted
and rendered nugatory by a judgment handed
down in the High Court.
[6]
It is quite clear that the judgment handed
down by the High Court interdicting the board of enquiry was done so
pending the determination
of the proceedings in the Supreme Court of
Appeal. In this regard, it was interlocutory in nature and
expired when the application
for leave to appeal in the
Constitutional Court was dismissed.
[7]
Regarding the third ground, an essential
element in any application for contempt are the elements of
willfulness and
mala fides.
The
mere fact that there was a difference of opinion regarding the
interpretation of the order of 11 October 2024 obviates these
elements.
[8]
This was the conclusion that I reached in
paragraph [14] of the judgment. I am of the view that this
approach was sound.
Although Ms Manamela argued that the
interpretation of the order and the requirements for civil contempt
had been conflated and
ought to have been dealt with separately, it
was stated in the application for leave to appeal, in respect of what
was contended
to be the misinterpretation of the order that
“
at
minimum, the court ought to have found that the order was ambiguous
and required judicial clarification.
”
This
argument to my mind, is dispositive of this ground of appeal.
[9]
Regarding the fourth ground of interdictory
relief, I dealt with this in paragraphs [21] to [23] of the
judgment. Ms Manamela
failed to establish a right to paid legal
representation and additionally, although having previously some 3
years prior, indicated
her intention to apply for this, had been
dilatory and had done nothing until the urgent application was
brought on 14 May 2026.
[10]
Lastly, in respect of costs, this is
eminently a matter within the discretion of the court. The
reasons for the granting of
a punitive costs order was set out in
paragraph [25] and its sub-paragraphs and I am not persuaded that
another court would come
to a different conclusion.
[11]
During the application, the court was
informed that after the dismissal of the application, the board of
enquiry had been constituted
and was underway. Ms Manamela was
represented at the board of enquiry and participating in its
process. Counsel
who appeared before me, indicated that
they both appear at the board and that I could take cognizance of the
fact that the board
had commenced and Ms Manamela was participating.
It was argued for the respondents that the present application for
leave
to appeal is moot. It was argued that Ms Manamela was not
merely attending the board of enquiry but was actively
participating.
[12]
In
this regard, I was referred to
Zuma
v Secretary of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of
State Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the Public Sector
including
Organs of State,
[2]
in which this approach was specifically rejected. It was argued
for the respondents that on this ground alone the application
for
leave to appeal ought to be dismissed.
[13]
It was argued for Ms Manamela that the
proper enquiry was not whether events have progressed since the
judgment but whether the
order sought on appeal would have any
practical effect or result. This argument advanced on behalf of
Ms Manamela understandably
represents the “best of both
worlds”. It enables her to participate fully in the board
of enquiry with the prospect
of findings that may well suit her while
at the same time retaining a right to appeal against the very
proceedings should the findings
not suit her. This is the very
situation that the
Zuma
case has deprecated.
[14]
I have considered the grounds upon which
the application has been brought and the reasons given by me in the
judgment for the order
granted. I have also considered the
submissions made by counsel for the granting of leave to appeal on
the part of the applicant
and those opposing the granting of leave to
appeal on behalf of the respondents both in argument as well as in
their respective
written heads of argument.
[15]
I am not persuaded that another court would
come to a different conclusion or that there is some other compelling
reason why leave
to appeal should be granted. Additionally, I
am persuaded that by Ms Manamela’s participation in the board
of enquiry,
she has perempted her right to appeal in any event.
[16]
The costs will follow the result.
[17]
In the circumstances, I make the following
order:
[17.1]
The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
[17.2]
The applicant is ordered to pay the costs of the first, third and
fourth respondents
on the scale as between party and party, such
costs are to include the costs consequent upon the engagement of two
counsel, where
so employed, on scale C.
A MILLAR
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
HEARD ON:
11 JUNE 2026
JUDGMENT DELIVERED ON:
17 JUNE 2026
COUNSEL FOR THE
APPLICANT:
ADV. T GOVENDER
INSTRUCTED BY:
THAPELO KHARAMETSANE
ATT.
REFERENCE:
MR. T KHARAMETSANE
COUNSEL FOR THE FIRST,
THIRD AND
FOURTH RESPONDENTS:
ADV. M MOJAPELO SC
ADV.
L MUKOME
INSTRUCTED BY:
STATE ATTORNEY,
PRETORIA
REFERENCE:
MS. C CORY
[1]
10
of 2013. See also
Dexgroup
(Pty) Ltd v Trustco Group International (Pty) Ltd and Others
2013 (6) SA 520 (SCA).
[2]
2021
JDR 2069 (CC).