SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this
document in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case Number: 2026-098553
In the matter between:
In the matter between:
DOVECOT TRADING (PTY) LTD First Applicant
DOROTHY IRIS WALL Second Applicant
and
LOIS KUTLOANO MMATHOTO MOLINGOANE N.O. First Respondent
ANA PAULA DE OLIVEIRA N.O. Second Respondent
CRAFFORD ATTORNEYS Third Respondent
CAREL CRAFFORD Fourth Respondent
AFRICOR AUCTIONEERS (PTY) LTD Fifth Respondent
ANASTASSIS CHRISTOPHOROU Sixth Respondent
THE SHERIFF OF THE HIGH COURT, PALM RIDGE Seventh Respondent
BIDVEST BANK LIMITED Eight Respondent
Delivered: This judgment was prepared and authored by the judge whose name is
reflected and is handed down electronically and by circulation to the parties/their
legal representatives by email and by uploading it to the electronic file of his matter
on Caselines. The date for handing down is deemed to be 11 June 2026.
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3) REVISED: NO
11 June 2026 __________________
DATE SIGNATURE
2
JUDGMENT
CARELSE AJ
INTRODUCTION
[1] This is an urgent application for a mandament van spolie, together with final
interdictory relief and an order under section 18(3) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of
2013.
[2] The application arises from events that occurred during approximately twenty -
four hours following the delivery of an order by Kuny J in this court on 21 April 2026,
under case number 2026/067203 ("the first spoliation application"). It is the second
time this court has been required to consider whether the applicants have been
unlawfully deprived of possession of the same premises and the same stock.
[3] Both applications concern warehousing premises situated at units B […] and
C[…] , 2 […] J[…] Street, F […] I[…] Park, Alrode, Gauteng ("the J[...] Street
premises"). This application additionally concerns a storage facility at X[...] S[…] ,
4[…] G[...] Road, N[…] M[…] , Alberton, Gauteng ("the G[...] premises"), where the
second applicant leases several units for warehousing and storage.
[4] The application raises three broad questions: whether a binding preservation
arrangement was concluded at the Alberton Police Station on the evening of 21 April
2026; whether the provisional liquidators had legal authority to act as they did; and
what order, if any, should run against attorneys said to have participated personally
in an act of dispossession.
[5] The first applicant, Dovecot Trading (Pty) Ltd ("Dovecot"), purportedly carries
on business as an importer and supplier of branded sports goods distributed through
major e- commerce platforms, including Takealot, Makro, and Amazon. Dovecot
makes use of the warehousing, storage, and distribution services operated by the
second applicant at both sets of premises.
3
[6] The second applicant, Mrs Dorothy Iris Wall ("Ms Wall"), is an adult
businesswoman who, at the material time, was in control of the J[...] Street premises.
She operates a business from those premises for the receiving, storage, and
distribution of goods for various customers, including Dovecot and unrelated third
parties. She also rents several storage units at the G[...] premises for the same
purpose.
[7] The first and second respondents, Ms L Molingoane N.O. and Ms APA De
Oliveira N.O. ("the liquidators"), are the duly appointed joint provisional liquidators of
Sports Brands Direct (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) ("Sports Brands").
[8] The third respondent, Crafford Attorneys, is a firm of attorneys. The fourth
respondent, Mr C Crafford ("Mr Crafford") , is a legal practitioner in the employ of
Crafford Attorneys, cited in his personal capacity. At all material times , they acted as
the attorneys for the eighth respondent, Bidvest Bank Limited. The significance of
this is returned to below.
[9] The fifth respondent, Africor Auctioneers (Pty) Ltd ("Africor"), was appointed
by the liquidators to assist in securing what they contend are assets of the insolvent
estate. The sixth respondent, Mr A Christophorou ("Mr Christophorou"), is Africor's
sole director and is cited in his personal capacity.
[10] The seventh respondent is the Sheriff of the High Court, Palm Ridge. No relief
is sought against the Sheriff in this application. The eighth respondent, Bidvest Bank
Limited ("Bidvest"), is a registered bank and a creditor of Sports Brands. It holds a
general notarial covering bond over Sports Brands' movable assets . Bidvest filed a
notice to abide in the first spoliation application and did not participate in these
proceedings. No relief is sought against it.
[11] The third to sixth respondents — Crafford Attorneys, Mr Crafford, Africor, and
Mr Christophorou — were not parties to the first spoliation application.
Mr Christophorou — were not parties to the first spoliation application.
[12] The papers are voluminous. They contain allegations and counter -allegations
concerning the powers of provisional liquidators, the ownership of contested stock,
the corporate affairs of several entities, and the conduct of individuals whose
4
relationships have plainly deteriorated. Much of that material is peripheral to the
question I am required to decide.
[13] The real dispute is narrower. The applicants contend that possession,
restored pursuant to the order of Kuny J, was taken from them again almost
immediately. The respondents deny that any further act of unlawful dispossession
occurred and say that what followed was the product of a consensual preservation
arrangement.
[14] Although the ownership of the stock and the authority of the provisional
liquidators are not the primary questions in spoliation proceedings, neither can be
entirely put aside. The liquidators' claimed justification for their conduct is
inseparable from their powers under the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. I deal with both
issues in their proper place.
[15] I deal first with the factual background, then with urgency, the applicable legal
principles, the factual findings, and the application of those findings to the relief
claimed.
[16] There is a preliminary issue regarding condonation that must be determined
before I proceed. The first, second, fifth, and sixth respondents filed their answering
affidavit out of time and seek condonation. The application is unopposed, the delay
is not substantial, no prejudice is apparent, and the issues raised are material to the
determination of the matter. It is in the interests of justice that the affidavit be
admitted. Condonation is therefore granted.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The first spoliation application and the order of Kuny J
[17] The first spoliation application was launched in late March 2026. It concerned
the J[...] Street premises and the stock stored there. The applicants alleged that the
liquidators and Africor — without the consent of the applicants, without a court order,
and without employing the statutory mechanisms available to them under the
Insolvency Act — physically took control of the J[...] Street premises, locked out the
Insolvency Act — physically took control of the J[...] Street premises, locked out the
applicants, and prevented them from accessing or dealing with the stock.
5
[18] On 21 April 2026, Kuny J handed down his judgment dated 19 April 2026 and
granted the following order:
(a) Bidvest and the liquidators, and/or any party acting on their instructions,
were directed to immediately restore to the applicants undisturbed
possession of the J[...] Street premises together with the stock
identified in a schedule;
(b) the stock was released from judicial attachment;
(c) the applicants were permitted to remove the locks placed on the
premises by the respondents; and
(d) Bidvest, the liquidators and any party instructed by or deriving
permission from them were interdicted and restrained from interfering
with or entering the premises, or dealing with, removing, realising or
disposing of any stock located there, without the prior written consent of
the first applicant or pursuant to a valid court order.
(e) Bidvest and the liquidators were ordered to pay the costs of the
application.
[19] The order not only restored possession but also regulated the circumstances
under which Bidvest, the liquidators and those acting through them could thereafter
interfere with that possession. These express requirements form an important part of
the objective factual matrix against which the alleged oral preservation arrangement
must be assessed.
[20] Kuny J made several findings directly relevant to this application. He held that
the applicants were in peaceful and undisturbed possession of the premises and
stock; that Dovecot's directors , being in KwaZulu- Natal, did not negate possession,
which could be exercised through an agent, bailee, or custodian; and that ownership
of the goods was not before the court. He specifically rejected the liquidators'
reliance on section 19 of the Insolvency Act, holding that section 19 did not justify the
dispossession because the property was claimed by a third party, the required
6
statutory notice had not been given, and the procedures prescribed in section 69(3)
had been bypassed entirely.
[21] Kuny J further recorded that the liquidators did not dispute the allegation that
Messrs Crafford and Glover, a legal practitioner at Crafford Attorneys, were present
when goods were attached and the J[...] Street premises locked during the first
spoliation, and that Bidvest's legal representatives were actively involved in a
coordinated process of what was found to be unlawful dispossession, despite
Bidvest having filed a notice to abide. Those findings were published before the
events giving rise to this application.
[22] In this application, the liquidators expressly abandon reliance on section 19 of
the Insolvency Act.
Events of 21 April 2026
[23] The Kuny J order was electronically transmitted to the parties at 12h12 on 21
April 2026.
[24] At 13h08, Ms Wall sent a WhatsApp message to a representative of Sentinel
Security — the private security company retained by the liquidators and Africor to
guard the J[...] Street premises — requesting that the locks be removed in
compliance with the order. Receipt was acknowledged. The subsequent exchange
between Ms Wall and Sentinel Security led Ms Wall to believe that Mr Christophorou
was directing proceedings from behind the scenes and that he was delaying the
implementation of the Kuny J order . A Sent inel Security vehicle arrived at
approximately 15h00, but without keys to open the locks.
[25] At 15h04, Ms Wall had the lock cut with a bolt cutter and regained access to
the J[...] Street premises. The cutting of the lock was the exercise of a right expressly
conferred by the Kuny J order, which permitted the applicants to remove the locks
placed by the respondents. It was not an act of self-help.
[26] After access was regained, stock was loaded onto a truck to fulfil pending
customer orders. At approximately 15h31, Mr Christophorou arrived at the premises.
customer orders. At approximately 15h31, Mr Christophorou arrived at the premises.
He entered through the open roller shutter door without consent and refused to leave
7
when asked to do so. He demanded that loading cease, allegedly used abusive
language, and threatened Ms Wall. He was unsuccessful in stopping the loading.
[27] At approximately 17h15, the Sheriff arrived at the premises, having been
called by the liquidators. Attorney Risiva Khosa, acting for the liquidators, also
arrived. He was advised by the applicants' attorney, Mr Grant, that his conduct in
trying to prevent stock removal was unlawful and in contempt of the court order. At
17h37, the Sheriff confirmed to Ms Wall that the order permitted the applicants to
operate and that there was no lawful basis to prevent dealings with the stock. The
loaded truck departed.
[28] The leave to appeal application was emailed to the applicants' attorneys at
17h43 and uploaded on Court Online shortly thereafter. According to the applicants,
it came to their attorneys' attention only the following day. When the stock was
loaded and the truck dispatched, the Kuny J order was operative and untouched.
Whatever effect the service of the leave application may subsequently have had on
the order, it could not retrospectively render unlawful the loading and removal of
stock already completed before service.
[29] The situation at the premises deteriorated. According to the applicants, Mr
Christophorou returned with members of the South African Police Service ("SAPS")
at around 17h37 and blockaded the premises with a vehicle, preventing further stock
from being removed. Messrs Crafford and Glover arrived at the J[...] Street premises
at approximately 20h50. Their presence there at that hour — in circumstances where
Bidvest had filed a notice to abide and a court had hours earlier published a
judgment noting their pri or involvement in unlawful dispossession — is a matter to
which I return below.
[30] Shortly after 21h00, the parties proceeded to the Alberton Police Station. Ms
Wall did not accompany them. What occurred at the police station is the factual heart
of this case.
of this case.
[31] After the parties returned from the police station, locks were placed on the
J[...] Street premises by both sides. The respondents' locks were placed by Mr
Christophorou and Sentinel Security at 22h16. Ms Wall placed her own lock at
approximately the same time.
8
[32] The following facts concerning the events of 21 April 2026 are common cause
or not seriously challenged:
(a) The Kuny J order was transmitted at 12h12 on 21 April 2026.
(b) Ms Wall obtained access to the J[...] Street premises at 15h04.
(c) Stock was loaded onto a truck and dispatched from the premises.
(d) The Sheriff arrived at approximately 17h15 and at 17h37 confirmed that
the order was operative and permitted dealings with the stock.
(e) The leave to appeal application was transmitted to the applicants'
attorneys at 17h43.
(f) Mr Christophorou returned with members of the SAPS after the truck
departed.
(g) Messrs Crafford and Glover arrived at the J[...] Street premises at
approximately 20h50.
(h) The parties proceeded to the Alberton Police Station shortly after
21h00; Ms Wall was not present.
(i) Locks were placed on the J[...] Street premises by both sides at
approximately 22h16.
[33] What is not common cause is why those things occurred.
Events of 22 April 2026 and the G[...] premises
[34] On the morning of 22 April 2026, a Toyota Quantum was transporting stock
from the G[...] premises when it was stopped by officers of the Ekurhuleni
Metropolitan Police Department ("EMPD"). The driver was informed that the vehicle
was being seized on suspicion of containing stolen property, and it was ultimately
taken to Alberton Police Station. The applicants contend that Mr Christophorou
instigated the EMPD’s involvement.
9
[35] Mr Christophorou arrived at the police station, together with the first
respondent (Ms Molingoane), Mr Crafford, and an attorney in the employ of Crafford
Attorneys named Thulani Morudu ("Mr Morudu").
[36] The Quantum belongs to M5 Sports Supplies (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation). By
arrangement with that entity's liquidator, Mr Eugene Nel, Dovecot had retained
possession of the Quantum pending handover to Ian Wyles Auctioneers of Durban.
By subsequent agreement with Mr Nel, the Quantum was handed over to Mr
Christophorou, acting as agent for Mr Nel. The stock inside the vehicle was
contested: the applicants claimed it belonged to Dovecot; the respondents claimed it
was stolen stock belonging to Sports Brands.
[37] Ms Wall refused to release the stock and it was offloaded from the Quantum
into storage units leased by Ms Wall at the G[...] premises. Mr Morudu placed locks
on those storage units on behalf of the respondents. Ms Wall did not place her own
lock at G[...].
[38] The applicants further allege that the respondents attempted to attach certain
storage units at the G[...] premises over the period 10 to 15 April 2026. Locks that
had been placed on those units were ultimately removed and possession of the
stock remained with Dovecot under Ms Wall's control. The events of 22 April , so the
applicants contend, were a continuation of a course of conduct at the J[...] Street
premises. The respondents say the locking on 22 April was the implementation of
the preservation arrangement said to have been concluded the previous evening.
URGENCY
[39] The respondents challenge urgency. The third and fourth respondents submit
that the applicants’ case rests principally on commercial and financial prejudice,
which, in itself, does not ordinarily constitute the exceptional circumstances required
to justify a departure from the ordinary timeframes.
[40] The urgency of the mandament van spolie does not derive from the
[40] The urgency of the mandament van spolie does not derive from the
commercial consequences of the deprivation. It derives from the nature and purpose
of the remedy itself. The principle spoliatus ante omnia restituendus est — the
despoiled person must be restored before all else — commands speed. As the
10
Constitutional Court affirmed in Ngqukumba v Minister of Safety and Security and
Others 2014 (5) SA 112 (CC) at para 10, the policy underlying the mandament is the
restoration of the status quo ante, before the merits of competing claims are
investigated. That is not a discretionary feature of the remedy — it is its defining
characteristic and requires promptness . This does not, however, mean that every
spoliation application is inherently urgent.
[41] There is, moreover, an independent source of urgency. The applicants allege
that they were again deprived of possession within hours of an order of this court
that had restored it. An allegation that a court order has been defeated or
circumvented in this way implicates not only the interests of the applicants but the
authority and dignity of this court and the administration of justice in general , which
should be addressed speedily.
[42] The applicants remain excluded from undisturbed possession of both sets of
premises. Every day of exclusion means unfulfilled orders, lapsed platform listings,
and accumulating reputational harm. There was no unreasonable delay in bringing
the application. Substantial redress would not be obtained at a hearing in due
course. I am satisfied that the matter is urgent and that it be enrolled and heard as
such.
APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES
The mandament van spolie
1
[43] The requirements for the mandament van spolie are settled. An applicant
must establish two things: first, that the applicant was in peaceful and undisturbed
possession of the property immediately prior to the alleged deprivation; and second,
that the respondent unlawfully deprived the applicant of that possession. The title to
the property is irrelevant. The spoliation remedy is possessory and preliminary in
nature. The court does not determine rights — it restores the status quo ante so that
the parties may pursue their competing claims through appropriate legal processes.2
the parties may pursue their competing claims through appropriate legal processes.2
1 In general, see the chapter, Mandament van Spolie, in Erasmus: Superior Court
Practice, vol 2, D7-1 to D7-20 and the authorities quoted there.
2 Nino Bonino v De Lange 106 TS 120 at 122; Tswelopele Non-Profit Organisation and
11
[44] Possession for the purpose of the mandament means factual control of the
property exercised with the intention to hold or use it for the possessor's benefit. It
need not be juridical possession, need not be exclusive or continuous, and may be
exercised through an agent, bailee, or custodian.
3
[45] A deprivation of possession is not unlawful if the possessor consented to it.
Consent, to operate as a defence to spoliation, must be freely, voluntarily, and
informedly given by the possessor or a person duly authorised to bind the possessor.
A deprivation that is not consented to, and that is not authorised by law or court
order, is unlawful regardless of the depriver's motive or belief in their entitlement.
The Plascon-Evans rule and disputes of fact
[46] The applicants seek final relief. In terms of the rule in Plascon -Evans Paints
Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 623 (A) at 634H -635C, where final
relief is sought on motion and the parties' versions differ, the court must generally
accept the respondents' version together with the admitted facts, unless that version
fails to raise a real, genuine and bona fide dispute of fact, or is so far -fetched or
clearly untenable that it may be rejected.
[47] A real, genuine and bona fide dispute of fact can only exist where the party
purporting to raise the dispute has, in its affidavit, seriously and unambiguously
addressed the fact said to be disputed. Where a matter lies peculiarly within the
knowledge of the disputing party and that party rests its case on a bare or
ambiguous denial, the court will have difficulty finding that a genuine dispute of fact
exists. There is a serious duty on a legal adviser settling an answering affidavit to
ascertain and engage with the facts in dispute and to reflect them fully and
accurately in the affidavit. Where that duty has not been discharged, the court is
entitled to adopt a robust approach.
4
The final interdict
entitled to adopt a robust approach.
4
The final interdict
Others v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality and Others 2007 (6) SA 511
(SCA)
at para 21; Ngqukumba v Minister of Safety and Security and Others 2014 (5) SA 112
(CC) at para 10.
3 Blendrite (Pty) Ltd and Another v Moonisami and Another 2021 (5) SA 61 (SCA) at
para 5; Yeko v Qana 1973 (4) SA 735 (A) p739 D-F.
4 Wightman t/a JW Construction v Headfour (Pty) Ltd and Another 2008 (3) SA 371
(SCA) at paras 11-13.
12
[48] To obtain a final interdict, an applicant must establish: (a) a clear right; (b) an
injury actually committed or reasonably apprehended; and (c) the absence of any
other adequate remedy.5
FACTUAL FINDINGS
[49] Before I apply the law to the facts, I make the following findings on the
material disputed issues. In doing so, I am guided by the Plascon-Evans rule and the
approach in Wightman. These findings govern the analysis that follows.
First disputed issue: was peaceful and undisturbed possession restored
to the applicants?
[50] The respondents contend that the applicants never regained peaceful and
undisturbed possession after the Kuny J order. They say Sentinel Security was at all
times in physical control of the premises and that Mr Christophorou's arrival
confirmed the continuation of the respondents' possession.
[51] I reject that argument. The Kuny J order was premised on a finding that
possession had been unlawfully taken from the applicants. It directed immediate
restoration and expressly authorised the removal of the locks. When Ms Wall had the
lock cut at 15h04 and entered the premises, she was exercising a right specifically
conferred by the order.
[52] The applicants then held active, practical possession: they were physically
present at the premises; stock was loaded and dispatched; and the Sheriff confirmed
the order's validity and the absence of any lawful basis to prevent dealings with the
stock. These are the acts of persons in factual control. Mr Christophorou's uninvited
entry at 15h31 and refusal to leave — which were themselves potential violations of
the interdict in the Kuny J order — could not negate possession that the order had
restored. A spoliator cannot assert continued possession by persisting in the very
conduct that a court has found unlawful.
[53] Sentinel's continued physical presence at the premises under the instructions
of those found to have unlawfully dispossessed the applicants does not constitute
of those found to have unlawfully dispossessed the applicants does not constitute
5 Setlogelo v Setlogelo 1914 AD 221.
13
possession adverse to rights established by the Kuny J order. Possession is a
factual concept to be assessed against the full background, including the court order
that had just restored it.
[54] I therefore find that t he applicants were in peaceful and undisturbed
possession of the J[...] Street premises and the stock stored there from at least
15h04 on 21 April 2026.
Second disputed issue: was a binding preservation arrangement
concluded at the Alberton Police Station?
[55] The respondents' version is that a consensual dual -lock preservation
arrangement was proposed by the SAPS and agreed to by all parties at the Alberton
Police Station on the evening of 21 April 2026. They rely on affidavits from four
attorneys — Mr Crafford, Mr Glover, Mr Morudu, and Mr Risiva Khosa — all of whom
say they witnessed the arrangement being proposed and accepted. The
arrangement was, they say, confirmed and extended to the G[...] premises on 22
April 2026.
[56] The applicants deny that any binding agreement was reached. Ms Wall was
not present at the police station (an issue on which the respondents’ deponents
contradict themselves). She says that her daughter, Ms Jade Wall ("Jade", used for
convenience and without disrespect), who was present, had no authority to bind the
applicants to any arrangement that would qualify the possession established by the
Kuny J order.
[57] I am of the view that the Kuny J order prohibited interference with the
applicants' possession without two things: prior written consent or a valid court order.
Those requirements were expressly incorporated into the order granted by Kuny J
and formed part of the legal framework governing subsequent conduct by the
parties. Any arrangement which had the effect of authorising conduct otherwise
prohibited by the Kuny J order had to be assessed against the order's requirement of
prior written consent.
[58] The alleged preservation arrangement was oral. No written agreement was
[58] The alleged preservation arrangement was oral. No written agreement was
produced, signed, or exhibited. No email, WhatsApp message, or note recording its
14
terms was generated. No written consent from Dovecot was obtained. The absence
of any written consent substantially weakens the respondents' contention that a
binding arrangement was concluded.
[59] The respondents further rely on the evidence of four legally qualified persons.
The presence of four attorneys makes the complete absence of any
contemporaneous written record more, not less, significant.
[60] This was not an informal discussion between laypersons. It occurred hours
after a High Court order. It purported to alter the legal status quo established by that
order. It involved attorneys, provisional liquidators, auctioneers, SAPS members, and
contested stock worth several million rand. Any attorney present who genuinely
believed an agreement had been reached would have sent an email, a WhatsApp
message, or even prepared a brief note. None was produced. Nor was any
communication sent the following morning before the G[...] events unfolded. That
omission, in circumstances that plainly demanded documentation, cannot be
explained away as a mere oversight.
[61] Ms Wall specifically states that Jade was not authorised to bind the applicants
to any arrangement qualifying, limiting, or surrendering the possession established
by the Kuny J order. This is confirmed under oath by Jade.
6 There is no written
power of attorney. There is no representation by Dovecot or Ms Wall that Jade had
such authority. A respondent who relies on consent given through an intermediary
must prove not only the fact of consent but the authority of the intermediary to give it.
An unauthorised surrender of possession by an employee or third party does not
defeat the mandament. Nor can ostensible authority be founded merely on the
conduct or say-so of the alleged agent; the representation must emanate from the
principal.
7 That burden has not been discharged.
[62] The respondents attribute a central role to the SAPS in proposing the dual -
[62] The respondents attribute a central role to the SAPS in proposing the dual -
lock arrangement. On their version, it was the SAPS who suggested the
arrangement and created the environment in which it was agreed. Yet no affidavit
6 Erasmus v Dorsyd Farms (Pty) Ltd 1982 (2) SA 107 (T) at 111.
7 Potchefstroom se Stadsraad v Kotze 1960 (3) SA 616 (A) at p629; Monteiro and
Another v Diedricks 2021 (3) SA 482 (SCA) at para 17.
15
from any SAPS officer was filed. The court has no direct, first -hand evidence from
the party said to have been the architect of the arrangement.
[63] The absence of SAPS evidence is not, by itself, decisive. But where the
respondents bear the burden of proving a preservation arrangement and rely on
SAPS as its architect, the failure to adduce evidence from any SAPS officer leaves a
material evidential gap.
[64] Even accepting that discussions took place at the police station, the
respondents do not establish a defence. On their own version, the arrangement was
oral. It therefore did not satisfy the express requirement in the Kuny J order of prior
written consent or a court order. Further, the respondents have not established that
Jade had authority to waive or qualify the applicants’ court -ordered possession. The
consent defence accordingly fails even before it becomes necessary to resolve every
factual dispute about the police-station discussions.
[65] I accept that discussions took place at the Alberton Police Station and that the
SAPS was involved in managing a volatile situation and trying to defuse the
immediate tension between the parties . What I do not accept is that those
discussions crystallised into a binding, voluntary, and informed preservation
arrangement capable of qualifying rights established by a court order. On the
objective facts and probabilities, and having regard to the approach in Wightman, the
respondents’ version does not raise a real, genuine, and bona fide dispute of fact. I
am satisfied that no binding preservation arrangement was concluded.
Third disputed issue: the G[...] premises on 22 April 2026
[66] Mr Morudu placed locks on Ms Wall's leased storage units at the G[...]
premises on 22 April 2026. This is not seriously disputed. Ms Wall did not consent to
this. The locks were not placed pursuant to any court order, any lawful authority, or
any binding preservation arrangement — for the reasons stated above. This is a
any binding preservation arrangement — for the reasons stated above. This is a
separate and independent act of dispossession at the G[...] premises.
Summary of factual findings
[67] I find:
16
(a) The applicants were in peaceful and undisturbed possession of the
J[...] Street premises from at least 15h04 on 21 April 2026.
(b) No binding preservation arrangement was concluded at the Alberton
Police Station on the evening of 21 April 2026.
(c) Jade Wall did not have authority to bind the applicants to any
arrangement qualifying the possession established by the Kuny J order.
(d) The placement of locks on the J[...] Street premises at 22h16 on 21
April 2026 reduced the applicants from sole, unilateral access to
dependent access requiring the cooperation of persons aligned with the
respondents.
(e) Mr Morudu's placement of locks on the G[...] storage units on 22 April
2026 deprived Ms Wall of possession of those units and the stock
stored therein without her consent or any lawful authority.
APPLICATION: SPOLIATION
The leave to appeal argument
[68] The respondents argue that the Kuny J order was suspended upon service of
the leave to appeal application, and that the applicants cannot rely on that order as
the foundation for their possession in this application. This argument fails for two
reasons. First, this application does not seek to enforce the Kuny J order. It asserts
an independent cause of action arising from a fresh act of spoliation. Second, even if
the order were suspended as from the time of service — at 17h43 on 21 April 2026
— the restoration of possession, the loading of stock, and the Sheriff's endorsement
had all occurred before that service. Suspension cannot retrospectively invalidate
acts completed before it took effect.
Possession
[69] On the factual findings above, the first requirement for the mandament —
peaceful and undisturbed possession — is established in respect of both sets of
premises. The applicants held possession of the J[...] Street premises and the stock
17
there from at least 15h04 on 21 April 2026, confirmed by the implementation of the
Kuny J order and the Sheriff's endorsement at 17h37. In respect of the G[...]
premises, Ms Wall held leasehold possession of the storage units through her lease
with X[...] and factual control of the stock within them immediately before the events
of 22 April 2026.
Dispossession
[70] At 22h16 on 21 April 2026, the respondents' locks were placed on the J[...]
Street premises. This reduced the applicants from a state of sole, unilateral access
— the state established by the Kuny J order — to one in which their access required
the participation or cooperation of persons aligned with the respondents. That is a
material diminution in the quality of possession and constitutes dispossession. At the
G[...] premises, Mr Morudu's placement of locks on 22 April 2026 similarly
dispossessed Ms Wall of her leased storage units and the stock within them.
The preservation agreement defence
[71] The respondents' primary defence to the dispossession is consent in the form
of the alleged preservation arrangement. On the factual findings above, that defence
fails for three independent reasons.
[72] First, the liquidators had no authority to conclude such an arrangement. The
Master's authorisation was limited to engaging attorneys for legal work. It did not
extend to concluding preservation arrangements over third- party property in the
possession of a person claiming independent ownership. I deal with this in the
section that follows.
[73] Second, Jade Wall did not have authority to bind the applicants to any
arrangement qualifying the possession restored by the Kuny J order. As found
above, there is no written authority, no representation by the applicants that Jade
was so authorised, and no affidavit from Jade herself confirming the respondents’
version.
[74] Third, the Kuny J order required that any arrangement that purported to
authorise conduct otherwise prohibited by the Kuny J order had to be considered
18
against the order's requirement of prior written consent . The alleged oral
arrangement does not satisfy this requirement.
[75] Each of these grounds is independently sufficient to reject the consent
defence.
[76] I find that the deprivation of possession at J[...] Street at 22h16 on 21 April
2026 and the deprivation at G[...] on 22 April 2026 were unlawful. The requirements
for the mandament van spolie are established in respect of both sets of premises.
THE LIQUIDATORS’ ASSERTED AUTHORITY
[77] The applicants pressed in argument the question of the liquidators' authority
to act as they did. Having considered it, I find that this issue is not merely procedural
in character — it goes to the lawfulness of the liquidators' entire course of conduct,
from the first spoliation through to the events of 21 and 22 April 2026. The finding
here provides an additional and independent basis for rejecting the preservation
arrangement defence: even if the arrangement had been concluded, the liquidators
had no authority to conclude it.
The Master's authorisation
[78] The Master's authorisation in respect of Sports Brands, as reflected in the
documents annexed to the replying affidavit, was limited. It authorised the liquidators
to engage the services of attorneys and, if required, counsel to perform legal work on
behalf of the insolvent estate. No document before me demonstrates authority
extending to appointing auctioneers, retaining private security companies, attending
third-party premises in person, securing or seizing goods in the possession of a third
party whose ownership is disputed, or concluding preservation arrangements over
such goods. Those are not acts of legal work. They required separate, express
authority from the Master, which was not obtained.
Powers under the Insolvency Act
[79] The winding-up of companies under the Companies Act 61 of 1973 is subject,
by virtue of section 339 of that Act, to the provisions of the laws relating to
by virtue of section 339 of that Act, to the provisions of the laws relating to
insolvency, including the Insolvency, with such changes as context may require.
19
[80] Section 69(1) of the Insolvency Act provides that a liquidator shall, as soon as
possible after appointment, take possession of all movable property, books, and
documents belonging to the estate. The duty to take custody extends, however, only
to assets that in truth form part of the insolvent estate. It does not extend to assets in
the possession of a third party who claims independent ownership. A provisional
liquidator cannot, by asserting that goods in a third-party’s possession belong to the
insolvent estate, convert that assertion into authority to seize those goods. The
question of ownership is one for a court to determine, not for the liquidator to decide
unilaterally and in its own favour.
The section 69 mechanism and why it was not used
[81] The Insolvency Act does not leave a liquidator without remedy when estate
property is believed to be in the hands of a third party. Section 69(2) provides that a
liquidator who has reason to believe that any property belonging to the insolvent
estate is concealed or withheld may apply under oath to a magistrate for a search
warrant. Section 69(3) empowers the magistrate, if satisfied, to issue a warrant
authorising the search for and seizure of the property. This mechanism was
bypassed entirely in both the first and the present application. Kuny J specifically so
found in the first application. It remained true here.
[82] Section 19 of the Insolvency Act, which the respondents expressly disavow in
this application, imposes a mandatory duty upon the Sheriff to attach and make an
inventory of the movable property of the insolvent estate. But, as Kuny J held,
section 19 does not entitle the liquidator to seize goods claimed by a third party
without establishing that those goods belong to the estate. The liquidator's remedy in
that situation is section 69 — not self-help.
[83] The questions which remain unanswered: why did the liquidators not use the
mechanisms that the Insolvency Act specifically provides? Why, if they genuinely
mechanisms that the Insolvency Act specifically provides? Why, if they genuinely
and reasonably believed that the Dovecot stock formed part of the Sports Brands
estate, did they not approach a magistrate for a section 69 warrant? Why did they
not seek the Master's authorisation for expanded powers? Why did they not apply to
a court for a preservation order?
20
[84] Every step taken by the liquidators to secure, lock, or restrict access to the
J[...] Street premises and the G[...] storage units was taken without legal authority.
The failure to invoke section 69 is difficult to reconcile with the respondents'
assertion that the stock clearly belonged to the estate. S ection 69 requires
satisfaction of a magistrate, on oath, that there is proper basis to believe the property
forms part of the insolvent estate and is being withheld. This is not an onerous
threshold for a genuinely meritorious claim.
[85] The conduct of the liquidators in this application is not an isolated event. It is
the continuation of a pattern of conduct already found unlawful by Kuny J. It was
conducted, again, without the authority of the Master, without the sanction of a court,
and without the use of the mechanisms that the Insolvency Act expressly provides.
The fact that the liquidators genuinely believe the stock belongs to the estate — if
indeed they do — does not justify self -help. Our law demands resort to due process
even where the substantive claim may be meritorious. The law gave the liquidators a
route to the stock if the stock truly belongs to the insolvent estate. They chose not to
follow the statutory mechanisms.
THE POSITION OF CRAFFORD ATTORNEYS AND MR CRAFFORD
[86] The third and fourth respondents resist any order against them on the basis
that they acted at all times as legal advisors and did not personally seize, possess,
lock, or deal with any stock.
The evidence
[87] First, Kuny J found in the first spoliation application that Mr Crafford and Mr
Glover were present when goods were attached, and the J[...] Street premises were
locked, and that Bidvest's legal representatives — being Crafford Attorneys — were
actively involved in a coordinated process of what was found to be unlawful
dispossession, despite Bidvest having filed a notice to abide. Those findings were
published and known to all parties.
published and known to all parties.
[88] Second, in this application, Mr Crafford arrived at the J[...] Street premises at
approximately 20h50 on 21 April 2026. His presence there is explained by the
liquidators themselves: Ms Molingoane states that she requested his attendance
21
because of his intimate knowledge of the matter. He was at the premises at the
liquidators' direct request. This creates a notable tension: Crafford Attorneys are
Bidvest's attorneys; Bidvest had filed a notice to abide in the first spoliation
application, which relates to substantially the same premises and stock ; yet Mr
Crafford was engaged at the liquidators' request to assist in the very events that give
rise to this second spoliation. He then accompanied the parties to the Alberton Police
Station.
[89] Third, and most significantly, Mr Morudu — a legal practitioner in the employ
of Crafford Attorneys — at the instruction of Mr Crafford who controlled and directed
the firm’s involvement, physically placed locks on Ms Wall's leased storage units at
the G[...] premises. This is not seriously disputed. This was not legal advice,
correspondence, or a court appearance. It was a physical act of dispossession
performed at premises leased by Ms Wall in relation to property she claims to own,
by a legal practitioner employed by the fourth respondent's firm. A legal practitioner
is not immune from the legal consequences of an unlawful act merely because that
act was performed in the course of professional instruction.
8
The mandament and interdict against the third and fourth respondents
[90] The mandament and interdict run against the person who committed the
unlawful deprivation or who is reasonably apprehended to continue to interfere. I n
my view, Crafford Attorneys and Mr Crafford participated directly in the acts that
resulted in the dispossession at the G[...] premises. Mr Morudu's physical placement
of locks on Ms Wall's storage units was a direct act of dispossession performed by a
person in the employ of the third respondent's firm.
[91] In respect of the J[...] Street premises, the position of the third and fourth
respondents is less clear. Mr Crafford was present at the premises and attended the
respondents is less clear. Mr Crafford was present at the premises and attended the
police station discussions. But the physical re- locking of J[...] Street was performed
by Sentinel Security and Mr Christophorou, not by Mr Crafford or his employees.
Whether Mr Crafford's presence directed or organised that act is a matter of
8 See Bitter NO obo De Pontes v Ronald Bobroff & Partners Inc and Another 2014
(6) SA 384 (GJ) and General Council of the Bar of South Africa v Jiba and Others
2017
(2) SA 122 (GP).
22
inference, and I am not satisfied that the inference can safely be drawn on the
papers alone. The restoration and interdict orders for J[...] Street will accordingly not
name the third and fourth respondents individually.
[92] In respect of the G[...] premises, the third and fourth respondents will be
directed to deliver all keys, locks, and access devices placed by or on their behalf on
Ms Wall's storage units.
NON-JOINDER
[93] The respondents raise three non- joinder objections. Joinder is required only
where the party sought to be joined has a direct and substantial legal interest in the
subject matter of the proceedings or in the order to be made, such that the order
may prejudicially affect that party.
9
Non-joinder of X[...]
[94] Quantipro (Pty) Ltd trading as X[...] S[…] S[…] ("X[...]") is not a party to these
proceedings. It owns and operates the G[...] facility. Ms Wall is a lessee of a number
of storage units within it.
[95] An examination of the prayers confirms that the relief runs exclusively against
the first to sixth respondents. Prayer 2 directs those respondents to restore the
applicants' possession. The restoration contemplated is the undoing of what the
respondents themselves did: Mr Morudu placed locks on Ms Wall's storage units.
Directing the respondents to remove those locks, or to deliver them to the applicants,
is an order that runs entirely against the respondents and requires nothing of X[...] .
Prayer 3 permits the applicants to remove the respondents' locks from their own
leased units — a self-help authorisation under their existing lease with X[...] . Prayer
4 restrains the first to sixth respondents from interfering with the premises and stock.
None of these prayers requires X[...] to take any step whatsoever. X[...] has no direct
and substantial interest in the relief sought. The objection is dismissed.
Non-joinder of Take Ease Fulfilment (Pty) Ltd
9 Amalgamated Engineering Union v Minister of Labour 1949 (3) SA 637 (A), Gordon v
9 Amalgamated Engineering Union v Minister of Labour 1949 (3) SA 637 (A), Gordon v
Department of Health: KwaZulu-Natal 2008 (6) SA 522 (SCA), and Judicial Service
Commission v Cape Bar Council 2013 (1) SA 170 (SCA).
23
[96] It was also argued that Take Ease Fulfilment (Pty) Ltd — described as a
warehousing and fulfilment entity whose sole director is Jade Wall — should have
been joined as a party. The second applicant is the lessee at J[...] Street and the
holder of leased storage units at G[...] . She holds the possessory rights at issue in
her own name. Whether Take Ease operated from those premises is immaterial to
the possessory remedy. Take Ease has no direct and substantial interest in the relief
sought: it is not the ent ity deprived of possession, nor will any order granted directly
and adversely affect any right or interest that it holds in its own name. The objection
is dismissed.
Non-joinder of the SAPS
[97] The respondents argue that if the dual -lock arrangement was effected under
the direction of the SAPS, the SAPS has a direct and substantial interest and should
have been joined. No relief is sought against the SAPS in this application. On the
applicants' version, the SAPS was present to manage a volatile situation, not to
direct dispossession. On the respondents' own version, the SAPS proposed the
arrangement. But the relief sought is directed at the respondents. The SAPS has no
right or interest that this order could directly and adversely affect. The objection is
dismissed.
FINAL INTERDICTORY RELIEF
[98] The applicants seek a final interdict against further interference with their
possession of both sets of premises and the stock stored therein. I apply the
Setlogelo requirements.
[99] Clear right. The applicants have a clear possessory right to the J[...] Street
and G[...] premises, confirmed by the Kuny J order and established on the factual
findings in this application. They have been twice unlawfully deprived of that
possession within a matter of weeks.
[100] Injury actually committed or reasonably apprehended. A second
spoliation has been committed by substantially the same actors using the same
spoliation has been committed by substantially the same actors using the same
methods. The track record of the respondents — two unlawful dispossessions in
24
quick succession despite a court order — establishes that it is reasonable to
apprehend they will act in the same fashion in future.
[101] No adequate alternative remedy. The mandament alone restores the status
quo. It does not restrain future interference. Damages are not an adequate substitute
where ongoing exclusion from tradeable stock causes the reputational and
commercial harm described in the papers. Kuny J reached the same conclusion in
the first application. I respectfully agree.
[102] All three requirements are established. A final interdict restraining the first to
sixth respondents from interfering with the applicants' possession of both the J[...]
Street and G[...] premises and the stock stored therein is appropriate.
SECTION 18(3)
[103] The applicants additionally seek an order under section 18(3) of the Superior
Courts Act 10 of 2013, directing that the Kuny J order operate with immediate effect ,
notwithstanding the pending application for leave to appeal.
[104] I decline to determine this relief in this judgment, for two reasons. First, relief
under section 18(3) should ordinarily be sought from the judge who made the order
and before whom the application for leave to appeal is pending. That judge would be
steeped in the relevant facts and law, and the risk of inconsistency between judicial
pronouncements is real , especially as far as it may relate to a finding on the
prospects of success of the appeal . Second, the possessory relief I grant in this
judgment flows from the second and independent act of spoliation, not from the
enforcement of the Kuny J order. It is unnecessary to determine the section 18(3)
relief in order to grant the applicants their primary remedy.
[105] I note, without deciding, that the requirements for section 18(3) relief are
cumulative and demanding: the applicant must demonstrate exceptional
circumstances (of which poor prospects of success might be a factor) , irreparable
circumstances (of which poor prospects of success might be a factor) , irreparable
harm if execution is not immediately permitted, and an absence of irreparable harm
to the other party.
10 Those are matters for the appropriate judge.
10 Incubeta Holdings and Another v Ellis and Another 2014 (3) SA 189 (GSJ).
25
[106] In the circumstances, the determination of the relief sought under section
18(3) will be postponed sine die.
OWNERSHIP
[107] Both sides have placed material before me concerning the ownership of the
Dovecot stock. I make no finding on ownership. That question is not before me and
is to be determined in appropriate proceedings where both sides have a full
opportunity to adduce their evidence. The ownership material has been relevant only
as contextual background — to the liquidators' claimed justification for their conduct,
to the probabilities concerning the alleged preservation arrangement, and to the
inference arising from the liquidators' failure to use the section 69 mechanism.
[108] The respondents also raise a point concerning Dovecot's deregistration,
presumably to dispute its claims relating to ownership. Dovecot was deregistered on
21 January 2024 and re- registered on 2 February 2026, with a new director
appointed on 19 February 2026. This does not assist the respondents. The
mandament van spolie is a possessory remedy available to any person in factual
possession. The events giving rise to this application occurred on 21 and 22 April
2026 — after Dovecot's re- registration and the appointment of its new director. The
deregistration history is irrelevant to Dovecot’s spoliation claim.
COSTS
[109] The applicants seek costs on a punitive scale. I decline to order attorney and
client costs against any respondent. The respondents contended throughout —
however unsuccessfully — that they acted to preserve contested estate assets
pending determination of ownership. In the absence of a contempt application
properly before me and with the ownership dispute still unresolved, a party -and-party
order adequately marks the result and leaves any further sanction to appropriate
proceedings.
[110] The first and second respondents (the liquidators). The liquidators were the
primary actors throughout. They retained private security, instructed Africor,
primary actors throughout. They retained private security, instructed Africor,
orchestrated the occupation of the premises, and assert a preservation arrangement
I find was never validly concluded and which they had no authority to conclude. They
26
did so in the face of a court order in the applicants' favour and a prior judicial finding
that their conduct was unlawful. The statutory mechanisms in the Insolvency Act —
designed specifically for recovering estate assets from third parties — were available
and unused. A party -and-party costs order is made against the first and second
respondents.
[111] The third and fourth respondents (Crafford Attorneys and Mr Crafford). Their
involvement went beyond legal advice. Mr Crafford personally attended the J[...]
Street premises on the night of 21 April 2026. The following day, an attorney
employed by his firm physically placed locks at the G[...] premises. A party-and-party
costs order is warranted.
[112] The fifth and sixth respondents (Africor and Mr Christophorou). Mr
Christophorou was present throughout — at J[...] Street, at the Alberton Police
Station and at G[...] — and Africor acted in relation to stock a court had already held
should not be interfered with. A party-and-party costs order is appropriate.
[113] No costs order is made against the seventh respondent (the Sheriff) or the
eighth respondent (Bidvest). No relief was sought against either.
[114] Although the respondents’ involvement differed, their conduct formed part of a
single and continuous course of events which necessitated the institution of these
proceedings. In the circumstances, no useful purpose would be served by attempting
to attribute separate portions of the costs to individual respondents, and a single
costs order is appropriate.
[115] Given the nature and complexity of the issues, the costs of senior counsel are
appropriate where so employed by the applicants.
ORDER
[116] I accordingly make the following order:
(a) The application is enrolled and heard as one of urgency in terms of
Rule 6(12) of the Uniform Rules of Court.
27
(b) Condonation is granted to the first, second, fifth and sixth respondents
for the late filing of their answering affidavit.
(c) The first, second, fifth and sixth respondents, and any person acting on
their instructions or under their direction or control, are directed to
immediately restore to the applicants peaceful and undisturbed
possession of the premises situated at units B […] and C[…] , 2[…] J[…]
Street, F[…] I[…] P[…] , Alrode, Gauteng ("the J[...] Street premises"),
and all stock situated there as at 21 April 2026, as identified and
itemised in the schedule annexed to the applicants' founding affidavit,
marked "FA14”.
(d) The first, second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth respondents, and any
person acting on their instructions or under their direction or control, are
directed to immediately restore to the applicants peaceful and
undisturbed possession of the units leased by the second applicant at
X[...] S[…] , 4 […] G[...] Road, N […] M[…] , Alberton ("the G[...]
premises"), and all stock situated there as at 22 April 2026, as
identified and itemised in the schedule annexed to the applicants'
founding affidavit, marked "FA24”.
(e) The first, second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth respondents, and any
person acting on their instructions or under their direction or control, are
directed to remove any locks, access devices, or other means of
restriction (“access devices”) placed by or on behalf of them at the J[...]
Street and the G[...] premises within 24 hours of the handing down of
this order , failing which the applicants are permitted to remove such
access devices at the cost of the respondent (s) responsible for the
relevant access devices.
(f) The Sheriff is authorised and directed, upon request by the applicants,
to take such steps as may be reasonably necessary to give effect to
paragraphs (c), (d) and (e) of this order.
28
(g) The first, second, fifth and sixth respondents and any person acting on
their instructions or under their direction or control, are interdicted and
restrained, from:
i. interfering with or entering the J[...] Street premises; or
ii. dealing with, removing, realising, or disposing of any stock located at
or stored at the J[...] Street premises; without the prior written
consent of the first or second applicants or pursuant to a valid court
order.
(h) The first, second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth respondents and any
person acting on their instructions or under their direction or control, are
interdicted and restrained, from:
i. interfering with or entering the units leased by the second applicant
at the G[...] premises; or
ii. dealing with, removing, realising, or disposing of any stock located at
or stored at the second applicant’s units at the G[...] premises;
without the prior written consent of the first or second applicants or
pursuant to a valid court order.
(i) The determination of the relief sought under section 18(3) of the
Superior Courts Act is postponed sine die.
(j) The first, second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth respondents shall pay the
applicants' costs of this application, jointly and severally, on the party -
and-party scale, Scale C, including the costs of senior counsel where
so employed.
___________________________
29
CARELSE AJ
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
JOHANNESBURG
Date of hearing: 21 May 2026 and 4 June 2026
Judgment delivered: 11 June 2026
Appearances:
For the Applicant: P Strathern SC
instructed by Grant and Swanepoel Attorneys Inc.
For the First, Second,
Fifth and Sixth Respondents: AJ Venter
instructed by Stoop & Associates
For the Third and Fourth
Respondents: FJ Labuschagne (Heads of Argument and 21 May
2026) and JH Lerm (4 June 2026)
instructed by Crafford Attorneys
1