SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document
in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
NORTH WEST DIVISION, MAHIKENG
Reportable
Case No: UM126/2022
In the matter between:
RUSTENBURG PLATINUM MINES
LIMITED APPLICANT
and
DANIEL MANOKO LESOJANE RESPONDENT
In re:
DANIEL MANOKO LESOJANE APPLICANT
and
RUSTENBURG PLATINUM MINES
LIMITED FIRST RESPONDENT
RUSTENBURG LOCAL MUNICIPALITY SECOND RESPONDENT
Coram: Masike AJ
Date Heard: 27 March 2026
Judgment is handed down electronically by distribution to the parties’ legal
representatives by e-mail, and released to SAFLII. The date that the judgment is
deemed to be handed down is 10 JUNE 2026 at 10h00.
Summary: Motion Proceedings – Rule 30(1) application – proceedings in the
High Court before a Judge sought to be reviewed under Uniform Rule 53 of the
Uniform Rules of Court (URC) – Rule 30 application to set aside Rule 53
application of proceedings in High Court before a Judge as an irregular
proceeding – Service by way of email requirements for service to be proper and
effective
JUDGMENT
MASIKE AJ
Introduction
[1] Before me is an interlocutory application under Rule 30(1) of the
Uniform Rules of Court (‘URC’) to set aside, as an irregular proceeding, an
application under Rule 53 of the URC. The applicant further prays for an order
directing the respondent to pay the costs of this application on a party -and-party
scale, scale ‘C’.
[2] The application is opposed by the respondent; the respondent appeared in
this Court in person at the hearing on 6 February 2026 and 27 March 2026. This
Court postponed the application from 6 February 2026 to 27 March 2026 to
allow the respondent to secure the services of a legal representati ve. The
respondent was advised to approach the North West University Law Clinic , the
North West Bar Association, or the Legal Practice Council for assistance in
appointing a pro bono attorney or pro bono counsel to assist the respondent in
presenting his argument in opposing this application . On 27 March 2026, a t the
hearing of this application, the respondent told this Court that he was ready to
proceed, even though he had not secured the services of a legal representative.
Factual Background
[3] The applicant in this application is Rustenburg Platinum Mines Limited, a
limited liability public company duly registered in terms of the company laws of
South Africa under registration number 1913/003380/06, with its principal place
of business and registered address at 1[...] O[...] Road, Rosebank, Johannesburg.
The respondent is Mr Daniel Monoko Lesojane, a male entrepreneur currently
residing at 1[...] R[...] Street, Oos-Einde, Rustenburg.
[4] This application has its genesis in an application under case number
UM44/2022. In that application, the applicant before this Court was the
applicant and the respondent before this Court was the first respondent. There
were six other respondents in that application. Those six respondents do not
feature in the application before this Court.
[5] In the application under case number UM44/2022, the applicant sought,
amongst others, interdictory relief against the respondent , from purporting to
sell to any person any immovable property, or portions of such immovable
property owned by the applicant. The applicant sought further interdictory relief
interdicting the respondents in that application from entering the immovable
property described as portions 67, 69, 70, 71, 73, 82, 83, 85, and 86 of the Farm
Waterval 303 JQ (‘the property’). The property is owned by the applicant. It is
the property that the applicant sought an order interdicting the respondent from
purporting to sell to any person, any portion thereof or entering.
[6] The application under case number UM44/2022, served before Leeuw
Judge President (as she then was) on 10 March 2022 , and a rule nisi was
granted with its return date 22 July 2022 . It is alleged in the founding affidavit
in support of the application before this Court, deposed to by Corné John Lewis,
that the order dated 10 March 2022 was served on the respondent. The
respondent, in his answering affidavit, has not taken issue with this allegation.
[7] Despite the respondent having been served with a copy of the order under
case number UM44/2022, the respondent proceeded to enter into the property
and, together with certain other individuals, commenced to erect structures on
the property. It is alleged in the founding affidavit of the applicant that attempts
were made to discuss the terms of the order under case number UM44/2022
with the respondent. It is alleged that, despite these attempts, the respondent and
those accompanying him continued to rema in on the property and to erect
structures there.
[8] In June 2022, an urgent contempt of court application was launched
against the respondent, seeking an order committing the respondent to jail for
failing to comply with the order under case number UM44/2022. That
application served before my brother, Petersen J (as he then was), and on 21
June 2022, the court found the respondent guilty of contempt of the court order
of 10 March 2022. The court sentenced the respondent to thirty days'
imprisonment. The respondent was committed to jail as per the order.
[9] On 21 July 2022, the applicant was granted an order directing the
demolition and removal of the structures erected on the property and the
eviction of the persons present there . That application was under case number
UM126/2022 and served before Hendricks D eputy Judge President (‘D JP’) (as
he then was). On 14 October 2022, the respondent filed an application for the
rescission of the judgment granted by the court on 21 July 2022 in case number
UM126/2022. The respondent contended that the order granted on 21 July 2022
in case number UM126/2022 was erroneously issued, as he did not receive
notice of the application because he was in jail at the time.
[10] The applicant opposed the rescission application . The application for
rescission of judgment, served before Reid J, on 30 January 2025, was
dismissed. The respondent on 7 May 2025 brought an application under Rule 53
of the URC, seeking to review the order dismissing the rescission application on
the basis, amongst others, that there were procedural irregularities in that
application. On 21 May 2025, the applicant served a notice titled ‘FIRST
RESPONDENT’S NOTICE IN TERMS OF RULE 30’. From the reading of the
notice in terms of Rule 30, it is obvious to this Court that this was a notice in
terms of Rule 30(2)(b) of the URC.
[11] The notice stated the applicant's complaint regarding the Rule 53
application. The notice, in terms of Rule 30, further warned the respondent that
the applicant would bring an application to set aside the Rule 53 application as
an irregular step if the respondent did not remove the cause of complaint within
10 days of service of the notice. The respondent failed to reply to the notice. On
11 June 2025, the applicant served the Rule 30 application on the respondent by
way of email. The respondent has op posed the application and filed an
answering affidavit to the affidavit in support of the application of the Rule 30
application.
[12] In the answering affidavit of the respondent, the respondent contends that
the Rule 53 application has been brought on the grounds, amongst others, of
judicial bias, gross irregularity, procedural unfairness, and reliance on
inadmissible evidence by the presiding Judge in the application for rescission of
judgment. It is contended by the respondent that the Rule 30 application seeks
to pre -empt the outcome of the Rule 53 application. Various grounds were
raised by the respondent in opposing the Rule 30 application. The reasons
advanced for the opposition are the following: (a) the application is premature
and legally unsustainable. It is contended by the respondent that the
interlocutory Rule 30 application ought not to be entertained until the Rule 53
application has been adjudicated. (b) absence of urgency or exceptional
circumstances, (c) prejudice to the applicant, the respondent contended that if
the relief sought in the Rule 30 application were granted, it would cause
irreparable prejudice to his rights, it would undermine his constitutional rights
to a fair hearing and access to court. It would further circumvent the pending
review process.
[13] It is further contended by the respondent that (d) the record is incomplete
or missing . Any interim relief granted in the face of an incomplete or
unavailable record would amount to a grave injustice, ( e) misrepresentation
regarding service of notice. It is contended by the respondent that the applicant
did not serve him with the notice to remove the ca use of complaint, ( f)
mischaracterisation of the review application, ( g) unlawful electronic service,
the respondent contended that he never consented t o electronic service and that
as a result the service was irregular, invalid and prejudicial to him, ( h) irrelevant
and repetitive allegations, ( i) unsubstantiated allegations, this relates to the
allegations made against the respondent that he sold land on the property of the
allegations made against the respondent that he sold land on the property of the
applicant, the respondent contends that the land contains over two hundred
graves, many predating the discovery of platinum in Rustenburg in 1924. The
respondent further contended that he was in prison when the legal notices were
placed 18 kilometres from his residence. I understood this to refer to the
application for eviction notices , which formed part of the eviction application
the respondent sought to have rescinded.
[14] The applicant filed its replying affidavit. Because the issues raised in the
answering affidavit were akin to an argumentative point of law, the applicant in
reply denied the allegations raised in (a) to (d) , (f), and (h), as stated herein
above and indicated further legal argument would be advanced at the hearing of
the application before the court in support of the denial . Insofar as it relates to
(e), the applicant attached proof of service of the notice to oppose the Rule 53
application and proof o f service of the Rule 30 notice, which was purportedly
served on the respondent by way of email at the email address m[...].
[15] Insofar as it relates to ( g), the applicant contended that the respondent, in
its notice of opposition, gave consent for the filing of notices electronically.
Insofar as it relates to (i), the applicant stated that the dispute raised by the
respondent was considered by the court, and it does not constitute a defence to
the Rule 30 application before this Court. It was lastly contended by the
applicant that proceedings in the High Court are not reviewable in terms of Rule
53 or at all.
Legal Principles
[16] Uniform Rule 53(1) reads as follows:
‘(1) Save where any law otherwise provides, all proceedings to bring under review the
decision or proceedings of any lower court and of any tribunal, board or officer
performing judicial, quasi -judicial or administrative functions shall be by way of
notice of motion directed and served by the party seeking to review such decision or
proceedings on the magistrate, presiding officer or chairperson of the court, tribunal
or board or to the officer, as the case may be, and on all other parties affected —’
[17] Uniform Rule 30(1) read with 30(2)(a), (b), (c) and 30 (3) reads as follows:
‘(1) A party to a cause in which an irregular step has been taken by any other party
may apply to court to set it aside.
(2) An application in terms of subrule (1) shall be on notice to all parties specifying
particulars of the irregularity or impropriety alleged, and may be made only if —
(a) the applicant has not himself taken a further step in the cause with knowledge
of the irregularity;
(b) the applicant has, within ten days of becoming aware of the step, by written
notice afforded his opponent an opportunity of removing the cause of
complaint within ten days;
(c) the application is delivered within fifteen days after the expiry of the second
period mentioned in paragraph (b) of subrule (2).
(3) If at the hearing of such application the court is of opinion that the proceeding or
step is irregular or improper, it may set it aside in whole or in part, either as against all
the parties or as against some of them, and grant leave to amend or make any such
order as to it seems meet.’
Analysis
[18] The respondent has contended that he never consented to electronic
service, and such service is therefore irregular, invalid and prejudicial to him. I
have considered the Rule 53 notice of motion that was served on the applicant.
In the Rule 53 notice of motion that was served on the applicant, the respondent,
in terms of subrule 6(5)(b)(i)1 indicated the following address as the address he
1(5) (a) Every application other than one brought ex parte shall be brought on notice of motion as near as may be
in accordance with Form 2(a) of the First Schedule and true copies of the notice, and all annexures thereto, shall
be served upon every party to whom notice thereof is to be given.
(b) In a notice of motion the applicant shall —
(i) appoint an address within 25 kilometres of the office of the registrar and an electronic mail address, if
available to the applicant, at either of which addresses the applicant will accept notice and service of all
documents in such proceedings;
would accept services of notices and of all documents in such proceedings: 1[...]
R[...] Street Osseinde, Rustenburg, Cell: 0[...] and email address m[...]
[19] Subrule 6(5)(b)(i) of the URC permits the service of documents on the
applicant at the addresses reflected in the notice of motion. The subrule requires
the applicant to appoint an address within 25km of the office of the registrar of
the court and an electronic mail address, if available to the applicant, at either of
which addresses the applicant will accept notice and service of all documents in
such proceedings . Subrule 6(5)(b)(i) must be read together with Rule 4A(1) 2,
which provides, amongst other things, that service may be effected:
(a) by hand at the physical address for service provided;
(b) by registered post to the postal address provided; or
(c) by facsimile or electronic mail to the respective addresses provided.
[20] By including the email address in the notice of motion under Rule 53 of
the URC, the respondent indicated to the applicant that the email address is one
of the addresses he is prepared to accept service of notices and documents.
There is accordingly no merit in the submission that the respondent did not
consent to electronic service; the service was proper and effective. The
respondent opposed the Rule 30 application and filed his affidavit in opposition.
The Rule 30 application clearly came to the respondent's attention.
[21] The applicant has provided proof that the respondent was served with the
Rule 30 notice on 21 May 2025. This court found the proof of service on page 4
2 4A Delivery of documents
(1) Service of all subsequent documents, not falling under rule 4(1)(a), in any proceedings on any other party to
the litigation may be effected by one or more of the following manners to the address or addresses provided by
that party under rules 6(5)(b), 6(5)(d)(i), 17(3), 19(3) or 34(8), by —
that party under rules 6(5)(b), 6(5)(d)(i), 17(3), 19(3) or 34(8), by —
(a) hand at the physical address for service provided;
(b) registered post to the postal address provided; or
(c) facsimile or electronic mail to the respective addresses provided.
of the indexed and paginated documents, Index Rule 30 Application. The Rule
30 notice was served by way of email at the given email address of the
respondent, m[...]. This dispels the respondent's allegation that he was never
served with the Rule 30 notice.
[22] The Rule 53 notice of motion of the respondent was served on the
corresponding attorneys of the applicant on 7 May 2025. This Court is satisfied
that the Rule 30 notice was served on the respondent within 10 days of the
service of the Rule 53 notice of motion. It is not in dispute that the respondent
did not react to the Rule 30 notice. The Rule 30 application was served on the
respondent on 11 June 2025 by email to his chosen address, m[...]. Service of
the Rule 30 application was effected within 15 days after the lapse of the 10-day
period for the respondent to remove the cause of complaint. I am accordingly
satisfied that the application in terms of Rule 30 is properly before this Court.
[23] The authors of Erasmus: Superior Court Practice at page RS 29, 2026, D1
Rule 53-2, have written that the proceedings of the High Court are not subject to
review. This principle is generally accepted . In Gentiruco AG v Firestone SA
(Pty) Ltd 3 (Gentiruco), the Appellate Division said that it was common cause
that the proceedings of the (then) Supreme Court “are not reviewable; the only
remedy of an unsuccessful litigant is an appeal. The reason is that by statute
only ‘the proceedings of inferior courts’ have been and are reviewable.” Prior to
the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959 (‘Supreme Court Act’) , 'inferior court' was
not defined, but it obviously did not then include any court of the Supreme
Court.
[24] Inferior court was defined in the Supreme Court Act as any court (other
than the court of a division) which is required to keep a record of its
3 1972 1 SA 589 (A) 601E.
proceedings, and includes a magistrate or other officer holding a preparatory
examination into an alleged offence 4. Section 19(1), (a), (b) of the Supreme
Court Act read as follows:
‘19. (1) A provincial or local division shall have jurisdiction in and over all persons residing
or being in and all causes arising and all offences triable within in area of jurisdiction and all
other matters of which it may according to law take cognizance, and shall, subject to the
provisions sub-section (2) in addition to any powers or jurisdiction which may be vested in it
by law, have power –
(a) to hear and determine appeals from all inferior courts within its area of jurisdiction;
(b) to review the proceedings of all such courts;’
[25] The whole Supreme Court Act was repealed by section 55(1)(a) of the
Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 (‘the Superior Courts Act’) . The Superior
Courts Act has not preserved the meaning of an inferior court; s 21 (1)(a), (b) of
the Superior Courts Act reads as follows:
‘21. Persons over whom and matters in relation to which Divisions have jurisdiction
(1) A Division has jurisdiction over all persons residing or being in, and in relation to all
causes arising and all offences triable within, its area of jurisdiction and all other
matters of which it may according to law take cognisance, and has the power—
(a) to hear and determine appeals from all Magistrates’ Courts within its area of
jurisdiction;
(b) to review the proceedings of all such courts;’
[26] The High Court has jurisdiction to review decisions from the Magistrate’s
Court within its area of jurisdiction. In Vereniging van Bo -Grondse
Mynamptenare van Suid -Afrika v President of the Industrial Court and Others 5
Franklin J said the following:
4 s 1 of Act 59 of 1959.
5 1983 (1) SA 1143 (T) at page 1146D – F.
‘Apart from the inherent power of the Supreme Court to review the proceedings of domestic
tribunals other than courts of law, by statute only the proceedings of inferior courts have been
and are reviewable by a Provincial or Local Division of the Supreme Court.’
[27] Section 21 (1)(a) and (b) of the Superior Court s Act is worded in similar
terms to s 19(1)(a) and (b) of the repealed Supreme Court Act. From the reading
of s 21(1)(a) and (b), the High Court enjoys jurisdiction to review proceedings
of all Magistrates’ Courts within its area of jurisdiction. In my view, the current
position is th e following , apart from the inherent power of the High Court to
review the proceedings of a domestic tribunal, or as prescribed by Rule 53(1), to
review the proceedings of a board or officer performing judicial, quasi -judicial
or administrative functions other than courts of law, by statute only the
proceedings of the Magistrate’s Courts have been and are reviewable by a
Division of the High Court.
[28] Rule 30(3) of the URC empowers a High Court to set aside a proceeding
or step which, in the court's opinion, is irregular or improper. It is a trite law that
Rule 30 may be invoked only when a complaint relates to an irregularity in the
form of a proceeding or step taken, rather than to a matter of substance 6. The
applicant's complaint in this application is that proceedings before a Judge of
the High Court are not reviewable.
[29] When this application was heard, I asked the respondent whether he had
any submissions to make beyond those in his answering affidavit. I specifically
asked the respondent, having heard the submissions of counsel for the applicant,
that review is not the proper procedure to follow where a party is not satisfied
with the proceedings before a Judge in the High Court, but rather that the
procedure is to appeal the Judge's judgment . What were his submissions in
6 Singh v Vorkel 1947 (3) SA 400 (C) at 406.
response to that? The respondent proceeded to address this Court on the merits
of the application that served before Judge President Leeuw (as she was then) ,
the merits of the application that served before Hendricks DJP (as he was then)
and the merits of the application that served before Reid J. This Court was
constrained to remind the respondent that he had to address it only on the merits
of the application that served before it, in particular to make submissions why
the respondent is of the view that t he applicant is mistaken when it says the
proceedings before Reid J cannot be taken on review. After a lengthy debate
between the respondent and this Court on which application this Court is tasked
with, the respondent said the judgment of Reid J could not be appealed because
the application for rescission of judgment was not heard by Reid J, which is
why he brought the application under Rule 53.
[30] I have considered the judgment of Reid J dated 31 January 2025 against
the submission by the respondent that the application for rescission of judgment
was not heard by Reid J on 30 January 2025 . From the reading of the judgment
of Reid J, there were two issues to be determined by Reid J on 30 January 2025 .
In the application for rescission of judgment, the respondent sought condonation
for the late filing of the application, and secondly, the respondent sought
rescission of the judgment of Hendricks DJP . In the application that served
before Reid J, the respondent ap peared in person. After being addressed on the
merits of the application for condonation, Reid J was not satisfied that the
respondent made out a proper case for condonation for the late filing of the
application for rescission of judgment and proceeded to dismiss the application
for condonation. Reid J then went on to say in paragraphs 19 and 20 of her
judgment the following:
‘[19] On this basis, the applicant has not made out a case for condonation and the
‘[19] On this basis, the applicant has not made out a case for condonation and the
application for condonation stands to be dismissed.
[20] The rescission application need not be considered as the condonation application met
with failure.’
[31] As Reid J pointed out in her judgment dated 31 January 2025, the
respondent having failed to make out a case for condonation, it was
unnecessary for Reid J to consider the application for rescission of judgment
itself. It is clear that the application for rescission of judgment failed to make it
out of the proverbial starting blocks. There is accordingly no merit in the
submission of the respondent that the application for rescission of judgment
was not heard by Reid J.
In conclusion
[32] It is clear from what I have stated above that the proceedings before a
Judge sitting as a Judge of a High Court cannot be reviewed. The only remedy
for an unsuccessful litigant is an appeal . There is accordingly no merit in the
submission raised by the respondent in (a) . The application that served before
this Court was not brought on urgency or under exceptional circumstances. The
relief available under Rule 30 (1) is not exceptional or extraordinary. There is
accordingly no merit in (b).
[33] I disagree that the respondent will be prejudiced by this Court granting
the relief sought in the Rule 30 application. Rule 30(1) was intended as a
procedure whereby a hindrance to the future conducting of the litigation,
whether it is created by a non -observance of what the Rules of Court intended
or otherwise, is removed.7 As I have stated above and referred to the authorit ies,
the proceedings of the High Court are not reviewable. Accordingly, the issues
raised in (c) and (f) have no merit and cannot be sustained. On the issue raised
7 SA Metropolitan Lewensversekeringsmaatskappy Bpk v Louw NO at 333G–H.
in (d), it is immaterial that the respondent alleges that the record is incomplete
or missing. The Rule 30 application addresses the irregular application that the
respondent has brought before the court, and the record is not needed to make
such a determination.
[34] At the hearing of this application, I was not informed of the irrelevant,
immaterial, and repetitive allegations that had no bearing on the interim relief
sought. On the aspect that the applicant alleged that the respondent unlawfully
sold land belonging to it, but has failed to place any supporting evidence before
this Court and that it further fails to disclose that the disputed land contains over
two hundred graves, many predating the discovery of platinum in Rustenburg in
1924 and the issue of legal notices which were mounted 18 kilometres from his
residence could not reasonably come to his attention when he was unlawfully
detained at Mogwase Correctional Centre . This issue has no bearing on the
application before this Court. The defences raised in (h) and (i) are without
merit and cannot be sustained.
[35] I am satisfied that the applicant has made out a proper case for the relief
sought, and the respondent's Rule 53 proceeding instituted under case number
UM126/2022 stands to be set aside as an irregular proceeding.
Costs
[36] It is a trite principle in our jurisprudence that costs follow the cause, and I
have not found any reason to deviate from this principle. The purpose of an
award of costs is to indemnify a successful party who has incurred expenses in
instituting or defending an action.8
8Texas Co (SA) Ltd v Cape Town Municipality 1926 AD 467 at 488.
[37] This application was not complex, and the issue was crisp. It certainly did
not warrant the employment of two counsel.
Order
[38] Resultantly, the following order is made.
1. The respondent's Rule 53 proceeding instituted under case number
UM126/2022 is set aside as an irregular proceeding.
2. The respondent is ordered to pay the costs of the application ,
including the costs of one counsel on a party and party scale, scale
“A”.
_______________________
T MASIKE
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
NORTH WEST DIVISION, MAHIKENG
APPEARANCES
For the applicant: Adv Mark Smit with him Adv N Ferris
Instructed by: Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyer Inc.
C/o Minchin & Kelly Inc.
For the respondent: In person
Instructed by: In person