About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: Mpumalanga High Court, Mbombela
You are here:
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: Mpumalanga High Court, Mbombela
>>
2026
>>
[2026] ZAMPMBHC 47
|
Noteup
|
LawCite
Malumane v Member of the Executive Council, Mpumalanga Department of Health and Others (2026-095555) [2026] ZAMPMBHC 47 (11 June 2026)
Download original files
PDF format
RTF format
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
MPUMALANGA
DIVISION, MBOMBELA MAIN SEAT
Case
No.:
2026-095555
(1)
REPORTABLE:
NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES:
NO
(3)
REVISED
NO
DATE
11/06/2026
SIGNATURE
In
the matter between:
DR
BRUCE MALUMANE
APPLICANT
And
MEMBER
OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL,
MPUMALANGA
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
FIRST RESPONDENT
HOD:
MPUMALANGA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
SECOND RESPONDENT
CHIEF
EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF
MAPULANENG
HOSPITAL
THIRD RESPONDENT
THE
SENIOR CLINICAL MANAGER
MAPULANENG
HOSPITAL
FOURTH RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
VUKEYA
J
This
judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties’ representatives by email. The date and time
for
the hand-down of the judgment is deemed to be 11
June 2026 at 10h00.
Introduction
[1]
In this urgent application, the
applicant alleges that the respondents, who are his employers,
made
certain unlawful deductions from his salary without his consent and
without any agreement between them. He prays to this Court
that these
deductions be declared to be unlawful and in contravention of section
34 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75
of 1997 ("the
BCEA").
[2]
The applicant’s further
prayer is for the respondents to be interdicted from making
any
further unlawful deductions from his salary and that they be directed
to repay to him the sum of R 105,000.00 (One Hundred
and Five
Thousand Rand) unlawfully deducted from his salary together with
interest at the prescribed rate from the date of deduction
to the
date of payment.
[3]
The applicant is a Clinical
Manager (Grade 2) Medical Doctor at Mapulaneng Hospital and
holds
office as a National Treasurer of the South African Medical
Association Trade Union ("SAMATU"), a registered trade
union for medical practitioners in South Africa. By virtue of his
office as a National Treasurer of SAMATU, the applicant is an
office-bearer of the union.
[4]
He stated in his founding
affidavit that his duties and responsibilities are set out in
the
SAMATU Constitution and they include, but are not limited to,
managing and overseeing the finances of the union; presenting
financial reports; attending NEC meetings to provide financial
oversight and advice; attending collective bargaining forums and
wage
negotiations on behalf of SAMATU members. The applicant therefore
avers that his participation in SAMATU activities as an
office-bearer
constitutes protected trade union activities in terms of section 23
of the Constitution and section 5 of the LRA.
Points
in limine
[5]
The respondents opposed the
application and raised two points
in limine
as follows:
5.1. Lack of urgency.
5.2. Lack of
jurisdiction.
Urgency
[6]
In opposing the application, the
respondents contended that the application was not urgent
as the
applicant had failed to exhaust internal remedies, such as lodging a
grievance and ensuring that the process has been completed.
They
submitted that employees were expected to follow formal grievance
procedures, particularly in the public service, where grievances
must
be addressed within 30 days before further action is taken. According
to the respondents, the applicant lodged a grievance
on the 13th of
April 2026 and in less than 10 days had already instructed his
attorneys to approach this court on an urgent basis
without even
waiting for the investigations and outcome of the grievance.
[7]
It was the respondent’s
submission that the applicant could afford to have the grievance
process completed as he alleges in his application that even after
the deductions, he still presented himself to work and therefore
the
application was brought prematurely. According to the respondents,
the applicant could also explore other internal procedures
available
to him, namely, he could have the allegations resolved by escalating
the matter to the Department or to the Director
of Labour Relations.
[8]
The respondents further
submitted that the applicant could be afforded substantial redress
at
a hearing in due course because the alleged deductions are not
continuing and on-going. The respondents allege that the only
money
which is less from the applicant's salary is days where he took
unauthorised leave of absence which is deemed as a leave
without pay.
[9]
On the issue of urgency, it was
argued on behalf of the applicant that he has satisfied
both stages
of urgency as envisaged in Rule 6 (12) (a) and (b). It was submitted
that the respondents unlawfully deducted R105,000.00
from the
applicant's April 2026 salary comprising of R50,000.00 and classified
it as "leave without pay" and then went
further to deduct
R55,000 and classified it as "overtime", without the
written consent required by section 34(1)(a) of
the BCEA, and without
the authority of any applicable law, collective agreement, court
order, or arbitration award as required
in terms of section 34(1)(b)
of the BCEA.
[10]
This, according to the applicant, is actual
prejudice and one that is immediate and ongoing. The deprivation
of
the total sum of R105, 000.00, has caused, and continues to cause,
severe financial disruption to the applicant, who relies
on his
monthly salary to meet bond repayments, vehicle finance, medical
expenses, and the support of his dependants. It was further
submitted
that the applicant faces cascading consequences of being unable to
meet financial obligations budgeted for based on his
full contractual
salary. The risk of default, damage to credit standing, and potential
enforcement action by creditors are the
direct and foreseeable
consequences of the respondents' unlawful conduct.
[11]
I found in favour of the applicant and ruled
that the application was to be heard as an urgent application
in
terms of Rule 6 (12) of the Uniform Rules of Court. My view was, and
still is, that the respondents had deducted more than half
of the
applicant’s salary without warning in a single month, and this
may have indeed caused a huge financial setback and
disruption to his
monthly budget, causing him to be unable to meet all his financial
obligations. I was also convinced that the
applicant would not be
afforded substantial redress at a hearing in due cause as he was
uncertain whether the deductions would
continue monthly and if the
matter were to be heard in the normal cause, the applicant would
suffer an even bigger financial loss.
The point
in limine
relating to lack of urgency was thus dismissed.
Jurisdiction
[12]
The respondents further raised a
point in
limine
relating to jurisdiction. They submitted that the Labour
Court has exclusive jurisdiction over disputes involving alleged or
threatened
violations of fundamental constitutional rights arising
specifically from employment and labour relations. It was argued on
their
behalf that disputes over union rights fall under the Labour
Court's purview and not the High Court. According to the
respondents,
section 5 of the Labour Relations Act, which the
applicant specifically relies on, provides protection exclusively
under the Labour
Court's jurisdiction, more so because the applicant
also relies on or alleges that there is an unfair labour practice
being committed
against him by the respondents.
[13]
Section 34 of the BCEA states that:
(1) An employer may not
make any deduction from an employee's remuneration unless- (a)
subject to subsection (2), the employee in
writing agrees to the
deduction in respect of a debt specified in the agreement; or (b) the
deduction is required or permitted
in terms of a law, collective
agreement, court order or arbitration award.
[14]
In terms of Section 77 of the BCEA, subject to the
Constitution and the jurisdiction of the Labour Appeal
Court, and
except where the BCEA provides otherwise, the Labour Court has
exclusive jurisdiction in respect of all matters in terms
of the
BCEA, except in respect of an offence specified in sections 43, 44,
46, 48, 90 and 92. It further provides that the Labour
Court has
concurrent jurisdiction with the civil courts to hear and determine
any matter concerning a contract of employment, irrespective
of
whether any basic condition of employment constitutes a term of that
contract.
[15]
Subsection (1) of the BCEA does not prevent any
person relying upon its provisions to establish that a basic
condition of employment constitutes a term of a contract of
employment in any proceedings in a civil court or an arbitration held
in terms of an agreement. If, according to section 77 (5),
proceedings concerning any matter contemplated in terms of subsection
(1) are instituted in a court that does not have jurisdiction in
respect of that matter, that court may at any stage during
proceedings
refer that matter to the Labour Court.
[16]
The Constitutional Court in
Amalungelo Workers'
Union and Others v Philip Morris South Africa (Pty) Limited and
Another
(CCT20/18)
[2019] ZACC 45
;
2020 (2) BCLR 125
(CC);
[2020]
3 BLLR 225
(CC); (2020) 41 ILJ 863 (CC) (26 November 2019) stated the
following at paragraph 20-25:
[20] As the
heading to this provision suggests, the subject-matter of section 77
is the jurisdiction of the Labour Court.
The section tells us
in unambiguous terms that the Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction
over matters arising from the Basic Conditions
Act. The
only exception is in respect of where the Act itself provides
otherwise. For example, section 77(3) stipulates
that the
Labour Court enjoys concurrent jurisdiction with civil courts in
matters concerning contracts of employment.
[21] On a proper
interpretation of section 77(1), the Labour Court has jurisdiction in
respect of all matters arising from
the Act. And barring the
exception, that jurisdiction is exclusive to the Labour Court.
However, that exclusivity is
subject to the Constitution and the
jurisdiction of the Labour Appeal Court. This means two
things. First, where the
Basic Conditions Act is in conflict
with the Constitution, the Constitution takes precedence. This
requires that the section
be read through the lens of the
Constitution.
[22] Second, the
section acknowledges the appellate role played by the Labour Appeal
Court in relation to decisions of
the Labour Court. Therefore,
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labour Court as envisaged in the
section does not operate
against the Labour Appeal Court. Nor
does it operate against the jurisdiction of this Court which derives
directly from the
Constitution.
[23] But what is
important is the point that section 77(1) confers jurisdiction on the
Labour Court in the widest of terms.
It declares that the
Labour Court has jurisdiction “in respect of all matters”
arising from the Basic Conditions Act.
Section 77(3) expands
the Labour Court’s jurisdiction to cover disputes arising from
contracts of employment even if they
are not regulated by the Act.
But in that event, the jurisdiction is not exclusive. It is
shared with the civil courts.
[24] What locates
a matter within the jurisdiction of the Labour Court is the
application of the Basic Conditions Act to it.
All claims to
which this Act applies fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Labour Court. In addition, section 77(1A)
grants the Labour
Court exclusive jurisdiction to award civil relief arising from a
breach of certain provisions of the Act.
[9]
And if a matter that falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Labour Court is brought before another court, section
77(5) mandates
the transfer of that matter to the Labour Court, regardless of the
stage at which the transfer is effected.
[25] The scheme
that emerges from the reading of section 77 as a whole is that the
Labour Court, subject to few specified exceptions,
enjoys exclusive
jurisdiction over all disputes and claims arising from the provisions
of the Basic Conditions Act. This
means that on a proper
reading of section 77, as soon as a dispute is ripe for litigation,
the claimant is entitled to refer it
to the Labour Court.
[17]
Clearly, this application is based on section 34
of the BCEA, which prohibits an employer from making deductions
from
an employee's remuneration unless a written agreement specifying the
debt exists; or the deduction is permitted in terms of
a law, a
collective agreement, a court order, or an arbitration award. In
essence, before the court can prohibit continued deductions
from the
salary of the applicant by the respondents, who are his employers, it
must find that the deductions were contrary to section
34 of the BCEA
and therefore unlawful.
[18]
The BCEA confers jurisdiction to the Labour Court
and the Labour Appeal Court in all matters, with the exception
of
cases where it, the BCEA provides otherwise. The BCEA does indeed
provide otherwise in section 77 (3) as it provides that the
Labour
Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the civil courts to hear and
determine any matter concerning a contract of employment,
irrespective of whether any basic condition of employment constitutes
a term of that contract.
[19]
When a court’s jurisdiction is challenged,
the court should base its conclusion on the applicant’s
pleadings, as they contain the legal basis of the claim under which
the applicant had chosen to invoke the court’s competence.
(See
Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security & others
[
2009]
ZACC 26
;
2010 (1) SA 238
(CC)). Although the merits of the
application are not currently in determination until the
jurisdictional issue has been decided,
it is worth mentioning that
t
he applicant’s pleadings clearly assert a
claim under the BCEA and the LRA. It relates to the applicant’s
entitlement
to l
eave of absence for trade union activities
because it is alleged that the applicant, as an office-bearer of the
trade union, was
entitled to take reasonable leave during working
hours for the purpose of performing the functions of his office.
[20]
Section 15 of the LRA regulates this, and
furthermore, it permits the participation of union members in
the
lawful activities of a trade union, federation of trade unions or
workplace forum. What is before this Court includes a claim
for
re-payment of money due to the applicant in terms of an employment
contract, which he claims was deducted from his salary without
his
consent by the respondents, because of his participation in union
activities. Clearly, the applicant’s claim arose out
of and
related to the contract of employment between him and the respondent.
It was for payment of money due to him in terms of
his employment
contract and it is based on a contractual obligation of the employer
to pay a full salary due to his employee unless
the employee has
consented to salary deductions.
[21]
The applicant correctly alleges in his founding
affidavit that he has a contractual right to receive his
full salary
as agreed in his contract of employment and therefore the unlawful
deductions constitute a breach of contract by the
respondents. The
fact that the application and the claim is based on the employee’s
contractual obligation towards the
employee, confers jurisdiction to
the civil court in terms of section 77 (3) of the BCEA. I therefore
find that this Court has
concurrent jurisdiction with the Labour
Court in terms of section 77 (3) of the BCEA.
The
merits
[22]
Facts which he alleges led to the unlawful
deductions in his salary arose from attending
several SAMATU activities and HPCSA meetings which were not voluntary
or discretionary as they were part of his official duties
as the
National Treasurer of SAMATU and as a registered medical
practitioner. He listed the following activities:
22.1. On 5-6
February 2026, he attended the Medical Dental board meeting which he
is a member of;
22.2. On 2-4 March
2026, he attended a SAMATU Northern Cape Provincial Executive
Committee (PEC) meeting held in Kimberley.
22.3. On 4-5 March
2026, he attended an HPCSA Committee Meeting via virtual meeting.
This meeting was attended by board members,
to discuss preliminary
committee of enquiry.
22.4. On 6-8 March
2026 he attended a SAMATU Provincial Shop Stewards Council meeting
held in Witbank, Mpumalanga.
22.5. On 10-11
March 2026 he attended the Health Professions Council of South Africa
(HPCSA) meetings held in Kempton Park.
22.6. On 12 March
2026 he attended a SAMATU National march against the government in
support of the unemployed doctors at
the Union Building in Pretoria.
and
22.7. On 13 March
2026 the SAMATU Finance Committee held an inspection of
buildings/properties that the union intended to
purchase, the
applicant also attended this inspection as a National Treasurer of
the Union.
[23]
The applicant avers in his founding affidavit that
prior to his attendance at these activities, SAMATU formally
requested his release from duty for these periods and confirmed that
he will be attending legitimate SAMATU trade union activities.
This
formal request to release him constituted full compliance with any
procedural requirements for the release of a union office-bearer
to
attend trade union activities. He stated that that this request was
made in good faith, was specific as to the dates and purpose
of the
activities, and was submitted well in advance of the relevant dates.
[24]
According to the applicant the respondents had a
duty to consider SAMATU's request timeously and to either
grant the
release or provide valid reasons for refusal. No lawful refusal was
communicated to SAMATU or to him prior to his attendance
at these
activities and therefore the respondents' subsequent conduct of
effecting salary deductions, constituted an unlawful and
retrospective sanction, which is impermissible in law. He fears that
because his responsibilities at SAMATU continue for the duration
of
his tenure as National Treasurer, this means a real and immediate
risk that the respondents will effect further unlawful deductions
from his salary.
[25]
His monthly salary, as a medical doctor is R203
478.11 per month, before deductions. On 15 April 2026, he
expected to
receive his full salary for the month of April 2026, together with
any lawful deductions. On 13 April 2026, Dr Malumane
approached the
Human Resource department to access his payslip and banking details
and discovered that two substantial and unauthorised
deductions had
been made from his salary described as, deduction 1: R50,000.00 -
"leave without pay" and deduction 2:
R55,000.00 -
“overtime". These two deductions amounted to R105 000.
00.
[26]
His version is that he was never given any
opportunity to make representations before the deductions were
effected and neither was he informed that such deductions were being
contemplated. He received no notice or charge sheet relating
to these
deductions. They were effected unilaterally, arbitrarily, and without
any lawful basis whatsoever. The respondents' conduct
in effecting
these deductions without process constitutes a flagrant and egregious
violation of section 34 of the BCEA, alleged
the applicant.
[27]
The applicant further avers that he has a clear
and established right to receive his full remuneration without
unlawful deductions, which right arises from multiple independent
sources one of which is in terms of section 34(1) of the BCEA,
not to
have any deduction made from his remuneration except where the
deduction is required or permitted by law, collective agreement,
arbitration award, written agreement, or court order.
[28]
According to the applicant, he has suffered actual
injury as a result of the respondents' unlawful conduct,
and has a
reasonable apprehension of further injury if the interdict is not
granted. The unlawful deduction of R105,000.00 from
his salary
constitutes actual injury that has already been committed. The injury
is not merely threatened or anticipated, it has
occurred. The money
has been deducted from his salary and is being withheld by the
respondents. He further avers that he has been
deprived of lawfully
earned remuneration that he was entitled to receive.
[29]
In response to the allegations made against the
respondents, they denied that the applicant was owed R105 000.
00 stating that the activities attended by the applicant were not
compulsory. Although the respondents admitted that the applicant
attended Union activities from the 5th to the 6th of February 2026,
According to the respondents the applicant went on an unauthorised
leave of absence from 23 February 2026 to 26 February 2026. They deny
that the applicant’s requests for leave were accordingly
authorised and approved. Furthermore, it is the applicant's duty to
ensure that his request for leave is properly communicated
and
captured on the electronic system.
[30]
It is the respondents’ version that the
applicant’s requests for the days in question were not
approved
as he failed to inform his supervisor to obtain authorisation. The
respondents deny that there was a deduction to the
applicant's salary
and state that the committed overtime was delayed because the
applicant's contract had to be renewed. According
to the respondents,
an amount of R57 216. 36 was paid to the applicant on 30 April
2026. The day which the applicant was not
remunerated for, as the
respondents’ version goes, are the days when he took an
unauthorised leave of absence from his duties
and failed to inform
his supervisor of his absence from the workplace, this amounts to R
47 000.
[31]
It is common cause that the applicant was a member
and an office bearer of SAMATU, that he was absent from
work on a few
occasions, particularly in February 2026, attending to activities of
the union and that a total amount of R105 000
was deducted from
his salary. The crisp issue for determination is the question whether
the respondents were rightfully or lawfully
entitled to deduct this
amount from his salary without the applicant’s written consent,
alternatively, without having met
all the other requirements as
envisaged by section 34 of the BCEA.
The
Legal Principles
[32]
In defining “remuneration”, the Labour
Appeal Court stated the following in
North West Provincial
Legislature and Another v National Education Health and Allied
Workers Union obo 158 Members
(JA17/22)
[2023] ZALAC 12
;
[2023] 8
BLLR 745
(LAC); (2023) 44 ILJ 1919 (LAC) (21 June 2023)
“
[8] Section 23(1)
of the Constitution provides that everyone has the right to fair
labour practices. The BCEA gives effect to and
regulates this
right
inter alia
by establishing and enforcing basic
conditions of employment,
which include that an
employer is to pay remuneration to an employee not later than seven
days after the completion of the period
for which the remuneration is
payable or of termination of the contract of employment. Remuneration
is defined in both the BCEA
and the LRA as –
‘…
any
payment in money or in kind, or both in money and in kind, made or
owing to any person in return for that person working for
any other
person, including the State, and “remunerate” has
a corresponding meaning’
. (See Section 1 of BCEA; section
213 of LRA)
[33]
Section 34 (1) of the BCEA, expressly bars deductions
from an employee’s remuneration, save for in specified
circumstances, namely, in the absence of a written agreement by the
applicant to the deduction in respect of a debt specified in
the
agreement or a collective agreement or a court order or an
arbitration award, or when the deduction is not permitted in terms
of
the law, the employer may not make any deduction from an employee’s
salary. There may be an allegation that the applicant
was absent from
work during February 2026 when his application for leave of absence
had not been approved, but that is not the
question to answer when
dealing with section 34. The real issue is whether the threshold as
required in terms of section 34 (1)
has been met.
Analysis
[34]
Even though the respondent would like the court to
find that the deduction happened because the applicant
did not apply
for leave of absence during February 2026 or that if he did apply for
leave of absence, it was not approved accordingly,
that finding will
be unmeritorious because in terms of section 34 of the BCEA, the
respondents could not unilaterally deduct such
remuneration from the
applicant’s salary without an agreement or order obtained in
accordance with the law and rules of practice.
[35]
What is clear from this application is that the
respondent did not have an agreement with the applicant to effect
any
deductions from his salary or any of the items as required in terms
of section 34 (1) but the respondents resorted to self-help.
The
Constitutional Court in
Public
Servants Association on behalf of Ubogu v Head of the Department of
Health, Gauteng and other
[2017]
ZACC 45
(CC); (2018) 39 ILJ 337 (CC);
2018
(2) BCLR 184
(CC) at para 70, (
Ubogu
)
and in
Chief
Lesapo v North West Agricultural Bank and another
[1999] ZACC 16
;
2000 (1) SA 409
;
1999 (12) BCLR 1420
(
Lesapo
)
made it clear that taking the law into one’s own hands is
inconsistent with the fundamental principles of our law.
[36]
I therefore find that the respondents acted
contrary to section 34 (1) of the BCEA by deducting an amount
of
R105 000. 00 from the applicant’s remuneration without
following due processes.
[37]
After the hearing of the application, I requested
the parties to file short heads of argument alternatively,
supplementary affidavits to address the issue pertaining to the
amount allegedly refunded to the applicant by the respondent and
the
balance that could be due to him. The applicant filed an affidavit
dated 8 May 2026, stating that the amount of R57 216.36
deducted
from his salary for overtime was refunded on 30 April 2026 and that
the respondent still owed him an amount of R48 581.41.
This is
in line with what the respondents stated in their papers. The
Respondents still maintain that the applicant is not entitled
to
monies of the days he was on unauthorised leave of absence from work.
[38]
The respondents argued that the question whether
the deduction was lawful or not and whether the Applicant
is entitled
to the monies as claimed creates a material dispute of fact. This is
not correct. The question under the circumstances
of this case is
whether the defence framed by the respondent against the facts
alleged by the applicant are indeed truly disputes
of fact, or
whether the defence is merely a ‘bare denial’ of the
applicant’s material allegations. In
Plascon-Evans Paints
Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd
(53/84)
[1984] ZASCA 51
;
[1984] 2 All SA 366
(A);
1984 (3) SA 623
;
1984 (3) SA 620
(21 May
1984) the Supreme Court of Appeal adopted an approach which requires
the adjudicator to establish which facts are common
cause between
both applicant and respondent; and thereafter consider which facts
that are denied by the respondent are, genuine
and
bona fide
,
a dispute of fact.
Conclusion
[39]
In
casu
, the parties are not apart on the
fact that the applicant was absent from work on the alleged dates to
attend to activities of
the union. Whether his leave of absence had
been approved or not is beside the point because money was deducted
from his salary
for being absent from work. It is not disputed that
monies were deducted from his salary because of this reason. It is
also not
in dispute that there was no agreement between the applicant
and the respondents to effect the deduction and that the respondents
unilaterally caused an amount of R105 000 to be deducted from
the salary of the applicant. That is the crux of this whole
application.
[40]
Clearly, there is no dispute of fact in this
application. The questions to be determined are whether
the
respondents’ actions were justified in terms of the law or not,
whether they were in accordance with section 34 (1) of
the BCEA or
not. This is not a question of fact but of law. My finding on
this issue is that the respondents’ conduct
was contrary to
section 34 and therefore unlawful.
Order
[41]
In the result, the following order is made:
41.1. The
application is urgent in terms of Rule 6 (12) of the Uniform Rules of
Court.
41.2. It is
declared that the deductions made by the First Respondent against the
salary of the applicant amounting to R105 000.
00, were unlawful
and in contravention of
section 34
of the
Basic Conditions of
Employment Act 75 of 1997
.
41.3. The
respondents are interdicted from making any further unlawful
deductions, from the applicant’s salary.
41.4. The
respondents are directed to repay to the applicant the sum of
R48 581.00 (Forty-Eight Thousand, Five Hundred
and Eighty One
Rand and Forty-One Cents) which was unlawfully deducted from the
applicants salary, together with interest at the
prescribed rate of
10.5% from the date of deduction to the date of payment.
41.5. Costs of
this application are to be paid by the respondents, jointly and
severally, the one paying the other to be
absolved, on a party and
party scale (Scale B).
LD
VUKEYA
ACTING
DEPUTY JUDGE PRESIDENT
Appearances:
For
the Applicant: Adv MR Maphuto
ATTORNEYS
FOR THE APPLICANT:
PM
NDOBELA AND ASSOCIATES INC
45 B EMKHE STREET
NELSPRUIT
TEL: (013) 110 1142
REF
NO: LIT/SHZ/MAT2192
EMAIL:
[email protected]
For
the Respondents: Mr S Mndawe
Attorneys
for the Defendants:
STATE
ATTORNEY
NELSPRUIT
3rd
Floor, Admin Block,
West
Wing R104 Samora Machel Drive
NELSPRUIT
Tel: 013101 3722
Email:
[email protected]