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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
NORTH WEST DIVISION, MAHIKENG
Case No: 4623/2025
Reportable
In the matter between :
REALKIT INVESTMENTS (PTY) LTD
and
KAGISANO TAXI ASSOCIATION
KAGISANO-MOLOPO LOCAL
MUNICIPALITY
BAROLONG BOO TLOU LE TAU
TRADITIONAL COUNCIL
TAU ROLLERMEULE (PTY) LTD
M.M. NTHUTHANG
MEC FOR COOPERATIVE GOVERNANCE
AND TRADITIONAL AFFAIRS,
NORTH WEST PROVINCE
APPLICANT
FIRST RESPONDENT
SECOND RESPONDENT
THIRD RESPONDENT
FOURTH RESPONDENT
FIFTH RESPONDENT
SIXTH RESPONDENT
MEC FOR COMMUNITY SAFETY AND
TRANSPORT MANAGEMENT,
NORTH WEST PROVINCE
PROVINCIAL COMMISSIONER,
NORTH WEST PROVINCE
SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE
Coram: Reddy J
Reserved: 26 February 2026
SEVENTH RESPONDENT
EIGHTH RESPONDENT
Delivered: Judgment is handed down electronically to the parties' legal
representatives via e-mail and uploaded to Caselines. The date that the judgment
is deemed to be handed down is 8 June 2026 at 16h00.
Summary:
Enforcement of a consent order - rescission - scope of consent order -
eviction from communal land premises - Prevention of Illegal Eviction from
and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 inapplicable - permission to
occupy - tacit term of vacant possession - authority of section 139
administrator - agreed compensation.
Realkit Investments (Pty) Ltd purchased the fixed improvements on the Ganyesa
Taxi Rank and the exclusive right of use of the premises situated in the Kagisano
Molopo Local Municipality for R500 000, in terms of a consent order made by
agreement before this Court in November 2017. The Municipality accepted the
purchase price but failed for more than eight years to deliver vacant possession.
The Kagisano Taxi Association continued to occupy the premises. In October
2022 the Municipality , under section 139(1)(b)(i)-(iii) of the Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa, 1996 administration, agreed in writing to pay R30 000
per month for every month it remained in breach; it honoured that obligation for
three months only. Realkit sought enforcement of the consent order, eviction of
the Taxi Association, and payment of accumulated compensation of R930 000
together with the continuing monthly obligation. The Municipality by counter
application sought rescission of the consent order.
Dismissing the counter-application and enforcing the consent order - A consent
order may be rescinded only on the grounds of fraud or Justus error. None of the
three grounds advanced justified rescission. The Traditional Council was not
absent from the UM50/2017 proceedings; it was represented by counsel.
Rule 42(1 )(a) of the Uniform Rules of Court is not available to the consenting
party seeking to escape its own consent. The alleged Justus error was unilateral,
in that it arose in the presence of the Municipality's own legal team and Chief
Financial Officer, and went only to the merits of the settled dispute; the
Municipality's subsequent conduct was wholly inconsistent with any genuine
belief in rescission. The consent order transferred no dominium, only fixed
improvements and a contractual right of use; the nemo plus iuris, accessio and
MFMA arguments were all rejected; and approbation and reprobation precluded
the Municipality from retaining R500 000 while repudiating the transaction . The
phrase "the use of such land" in the consent order unambiguously covers the
whole of the 5 575m2 of the taxi rank premises and not merely the Bl- B4
footprint.
On eviction and compensation - The obligation to deliver vacant possession is
necessarily implied as an incident of the sale of an exclusive right of use and is
the necessary content of the consent order on its proper interpretation . The Taxi
Association's 2002 Resolution was a purpose-specific licence conditional upon
the infrastructure arrangements that sustained the taxi rank; its substratum fell
away when the Municipality sold the improvements and the exclusive use to
away when the Municipality sold the improvements and the exclusive use to
Realkit with the Traditional Council represented and unprotesting. The
Municipality denied any obligation to deliver vacant possession or to evict the
Taxi Association. PIE is inapplicable- the Taxi Association is a commercial entity
conducting a commercial transport business and the premises are not a place of
residence. The PTO argument failed on three independent grounds. A structured
eviction was ordered with a 60-day vacation period, conditioned upon the
Municipality filing a report on steps taken to establish an alternative taxi rank
facility. The section 139 Administrator had authority to conclude the
compensation agreement; no separate council resolution was required.
Compensation of R930 000 for the period l January 2023 to 31 July 2025 was
awarded with interest at the prescribed rate, and the running obligation of
R30 000 per month continues until vacant possession is delivered.
JUDGMENT
Reddy J
Introduction
[l] The Ganyesa Taxi Rank, located on a 5 575m2 portion of communal land,
farm Ganyesa-A 1005 IN, is at the centre of a protracted dispute among a private
investor, an organ of state, and a private voluntary organisation.
[2] The applicant, Realkit Investments (Pty) Ltd (Realkit), seeks enforcement
of a Consent Order granted by this Court on 23 November 2017 under case
number UM50/2017 ("the Consent Order"). In terms of that order, Realkit
purchased from the second respondent, the Kagisano-Molopo Local Municipality
("the Municipality"), the fixed improvements on the taxi rank premises, together
with the exclusive right of use of those premises, for R500 000.
[3] The Municipality has failed, over more than eight years, to deliver vacant
possession. The first respondent, the Kagisano Taxi Association (the Taxi
Association), continues in occupation without Realkit's consent. Realkit also
claims agreed compensation from the Municipality for its continuing failure to
deliver vacant possession. By way of counter-application, the Municipality seeks
rescission of the Consent Order. The third to eighth respondents did not oppose
the application. The sixth respondent filed a notice to abide. The Taxi Association
and the Municipality oppose the application.
The parties
[4] To properly assess and navigate this application, a clear description of the
parties is necessary. The applicant, Realkit Investments (Pty) Ltd (Realkit), is a
private company. Realkit is the purchaser of the fixed improvements on the
Ganyesa Taxi Rank premises and the exclusive right of use thereof under the
Consent Order.
[5] The first respondent, the Kagisano Taxi Association ("the Taxi
Association"), is a voluntary association of taxi operators that has occupied and
operated the Ganyesa Taxi Rank since 2002, pursuant to a Traditional Council
Resolution. It opposes the application and disputes its obligation to vacate.
[6] The second respondent, the Kagisano-Molopo Local Municipality ("the
Municipality"), is a local municipality established under the Local Government:
Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998, with jurisdiction over the area where the
taxi rank is located. It is the seller under the Consent Order and the party against
whom the compensation claim is brought. It opposes the application and brings a
counter-application for rescission.
[7] The third respondent, the Barolong Boo Tlou Le Tau Traditional Council
("the Traditional Council"), is a traditional council recognised under the
Traditional and Khoi-San Leadership Act 3of2019, which repealed and replaced
the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act 41 of 2003 with
effect from 1 April 2021. It administers the communal land on which the taxi rank
is located. Moreover, it also granted the Taxi Association the 2002 Resolution
and was represented by counsel when the Consent Order was made. It has not
opposed the present application.
[8] The fourth respondent , Tau Rollermeule (Pty) Ltd, and the fifth
respondent, Mr M.M. Nthuthang, are a company and its associated natural person,
respectively, who occupied a building on the premises without Realkit' s consent.
The fifth respondent agreed in writing to procure the fourth respondent's
vacation.
[9] The sixth respondent is the Member of the Executive Council responsible
for Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, North West Province, who
filed a notice to abide. The seventh and eighth respondents are the Member of the
Executive Council responsible for Community Safety and Transport
Management, North West Province, and the Provincial Commissioner of the
South African Police Service, North West Province, cited in their capacities as
the authorities responsible for transport regulation and law enforcement,
respectively , against whom the prayer for assistance in executing the eviction is
directed. Neither opposed the application.
[ 1 O] Realkit seeks condonation for the late filing of its replying affidavit. The
explanation furnished is satisfactory. The replying affidavit was filed eleven
weeks before the hearing, and neither respondent suffered any prejudice, neither
opposed the condonation application nor sought a postponement. Having regard
to the absence of prejudice and the interests of justice being served in having this
long standing dispute resolved on the merits, condonation is granted. The replying
affidavit is admitted into the record.
Background facts
[11] Ganyesa is a rural village within the farm Ganyesa-A1006 IN, Registration
Division IN. No erven are surveyed or registered in the village. The land is
administered by the Traditional Council. The Municipality and the Traditional
Council have an arrangement under which the Municipality retains ownership of
all fixed infrastructure improvements it erects on communal land administered by
the Traditional Council.
[12] In approximately 2015, the Traditional Council designated the relevant
portion of communal land as a taxi rank. On 27 June 2016, the permission granted
to the Municipality to occupy the Ganyesa Taxi Rank for the purpose of creating
infrastructure, including paving, ablution facilities, a small office building, and
carport canopies, was confirmed in writing.
[13] The Taxi Association has operated from the premises since 2002, on the
strength of a resolution ("the 2002 Resolution") adopted by Kgosi Letlhogile of
the Traditional Council on or about 23 April 2002, authorising it to establish a
taxi rank there. This resolution was permission to occupy the land as a taxi rank,
not an unconditional or perpetual right of occupation independent of the
infrastructure arrangements that sustained the rank.
[14] Additionally, in 2015, Realkit's co-directors approached the Traditional
Council to be allocated vacant land adjacent to the taxi rank for the construction
of a Choppies franchised supermarket. The Traditional Council directed Realkit
to consult the Taxi Association first. On 24 February 2015, the Taxi Association
confirmed in writing that it had no objection to a supermarket in the immediate
vicinity of the taxi rank premises. The Traditional Council subsequently passed a
resolution granting Realkit permission to construct its retail building. The then
Municipal Manager, Mr. Khuduge, actively supported the proposed investment.
[ 15] On 2 March 201 7 construction of the retail building commenced. This
necessitated the removal of a portion of paving installed by the Municipality. The
Municipality objected and on 18 May 2017 obtained an ex parte spoliation order
(case number Ml98/2017) against Realkit. The Traditional Council was cited and
served in those proceedings but declined to participate.
[16] On 2 November 2017, the Municipality launched a further application
( case number UM50/20 17) to interdict Realkit from continuing its building
activities. Following negotiations assisted by their respective legal teams, the
Municipality's legal representatives reached a settlement on behalf of their
clients. The Traditional Council was also legally represented and appears as the
second respondent in the Consent Order. The agreement was made an Order of
Court on 23 November 2017 before Kgoele J.
[17] For purposes of context, the operative provisions of the Consent Order
read, in material part:
" I. THAT: The 1st Respondent [i.e. the Company] purchases the improvements
of a fixed nature on the land upon which the Ganyesa Taxi Rank is situated and
the use of such land from the Applicant [i.e. the Municipality] at a price of
R500,000.00.
2. THAT: Payment of the purchase price referred to in paragraph 1 above will
be made as follows: [Rl00 ,000.00 on or before 15 December 2017; and the
balance in monthly instalments of R40,000.00 commencing 31 January 2018.]
3- 5. THAT: [Acceleration, interest and payment provisions.]"
[ 18] The Consent Order contains no express term requiring the Municipality to
deliver vacant possession by a specified date. Nevertheless , such an obligation is
necessarily implied as an incident of the sale of the exclusive right of use of the
premises. A seller of a right of use is obliged to deliver what was sold, to remove
obstacles to the buyer's exclusive enjoyment. This is a well-established principle
of the general law of sale. A seller warrants undisturbed possession and is obliged
to procure that the purchaser may enjoy the thing sold without interference.'
[ 19] The implied obligation to deliver vacant possession is well-founded in the
law of sale and, as a matter of the interpretation of the Consent Order as a court
order, is reinforced by the principle that a consent order must be interpreted so as
to give effect to the evident common intention of the parties and to the order's
evident purpose.2
[20] On a proper interpretation of the Consent Order, the sale of an exclusive
right of use would be illogical unless it carried with it an obligation on the seller
to put the buyer in a position to actually exercise that exclusive right. The
obligation to deliver vacant possession is the necessary import of the order,
without which the disposition would be devoid of practical effect. It is common
1 BK Tooling (Edms) Bpk v Scope Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk 1979 ( I) SA 391 (A) at 418 ; Frye 's (Pty)
Ltd v Ries 1957 (3) SA 575 (A) at 581 H-582A.
2 Eke v Parsons 2016 (3) SA 37 (CC) paras 27-3 1.
cause that Realkit duly paid the full purchase price in the amount of R500 000
and that the Municipality accepted payment in full.
[21] Following the Consent Order, Realkit completed construction of its retail
building. The Municipality, however, failed to deliver vacant possession of the
remaining premises. The Taxi Association continued to occupy the canopies, the
office building, and the portions of the premises depicted on Annexure "F A2".
The fourth and fifth respondents (Tau Rollermeule (Pty) Ltd and Mr Nthuthang)
further occupied a building erected on the premises without Realkit's consent,
though the fifth respondent agreed in writing to procure vacation by the fourth
respondent.
[22] The inclusion of a vacant possession requirement 1s not an improper
expansion of the Consent Order, but an essential interpretative step. The
applicable test is not whether such a term would be reasonable, but whether it is
required in order to give business efficacy to the transaction and to avoid
rendering the rights ostensibly conferred devoid of practical content.
[23] A construction that permits the seller to confer an "exclusive right of use"
while simultaneously retaining the liberty to permit competing occupation leaves
the right empty. Such an interpretation would be inconsistent with both the
language used and the commercial purpose of the agreement, and must therefore
be rejected in favour of one that renders the order effective and coherent.
[24] Properly understood, the obligation to deliver vacant possession is not an
additional term imposed ex post facto, but an inherent incident of the right
expressly conferred, without which the Consent Order would fail to achieve its
evident object.
[25] From August 2021, Realkit's director made numerous attempts to secure
compliance from the Municipality. In October 2022, the Municipality, acting
under a section 139(1 )(b )(i)-(iii) intervention through its representative, Mr. Sello
Maroga, agreed in writing to pay R30 000 per month for each month it remained
in breach of its obligation to afford Realkit vacant possession by relocating the
Taxi Association.3 The Municipality honoured this agreement only from October
to December 2022. From January 2023, it ceased payment without offering an
explanation. By 31 July 2025, the accumulated outstanding compensation totalled
R930 000.
Matters to be decided
(26] Against this background, five issues arise for consideration. These are:
(i) Whether the Consent Order is subject to rescission on any of the grounds
advanced by the Municipality.
(ii)On a proper interpretation of the Consent Order, whether Realkit acquired
the exclusive right of use of the whole of the premises or only the B 1- B4
footprint.
(iii) Whether the Taxi Association is subject to eviction, having regard to the
period of its occupation and any equitable considerations arising therefrom.
(iv) Whether the Municipality is liable for the agreed compensation of
R30 000 per month from January 2023.
(v) Whether the relief granted should be qualified by conditions relating to the
Taxi Association 's relocation or the provision of an alternative taxi rank.
3 s 139{ I )(b)(i)-( iii) of the Constitution of the Republ ic of South Africa, 1996
The submissions of the parties
Rea/kit 's submissions
[27] Advocate Hitge made the following submissions across all five issues. On
rescission, Advocate Hitge contended that the Traditional Council was not absent
from the UM50/2017 proceedings but was actively represented by Advocate
Monnahela. That being so, Advocate Hitge claimed that the Municipality was
advised throughout by senior counsel and its Chief Financial Officer, and cannot
now claim fundamental error; what was sold was a contractual right of use, not
dominium over the land. Advocate Hitge averred that neither the nemo plus iuris
principle nor the Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of2003 ,(MFMA), land
alienation provisions were engaged; and in any event the Municipality is estopped
from resiling from a transaction in reliance on which Realkit paid R500,000 and
constructed its retail building.
[28] Advocate Hitge alleged that on the plain language of the Consent Order,
"the improvements of a fixed nature on the land upon which the Ganyesa Taxi
Rank is situated and the use of such land", unambiguously covers the whole of
the taxi rank premises (5 575m2 , figures A to G on Annexure "FA2"), and the
settlement was always intended to fund an alternative rank to which the Taxi
Association would be relocated , freeing the existing premises for Realkit's
exclusive use.
[29] In respect of the eviction, Advocate Hitge maintained that the Taxi
Association occupies the premises without lawful authority, contrary to Realkit's
court-sanctioned right of exclusive use. To this end, Advocate Hitge argued that
the 2002 Resolution was always conditional upon the infrastructure arrangements
that gave the rank its existence, and those arrangements were fundamentally
altered when the Municipality sold the exclusive use to Realkit, with the
Traditional Council present and unprotesting.
[30] Critically, Advocate Hitge contends that the Taxi Association is a legally
advised commercial entity that has occupied, in full knowledge of Realkit's
exclusive rights of use, for more than eight years, and that the community service
argument cannot override established property rights.
[31] In respect of compensation, Advocate Hitge asserts that the October 2022
agreement was concluded by a duly authorised s139 Administrator. The
Municipality honoured it for only three months; the arrears total R930 000,
calculated over thirty-one months at R30 000 to 31 July 2025, and the running
obligation continues until vacant possession is delivered.
[32] Advocate Hitge concludes that Realkit seeks enforcement of the Consent
Order, a structured eviction order, payment of arrears, and a continuing monthly
compensation order.
The Taxi Association's submissions
[33] Mr. Morweng for the Taxi Association aligned himself with the
Municipality 's three grounds and adds that the fixed improvements on the
premises have become part of the communal land by accessio and could not be
sold separately. Additionally, Mr. Morweng supports the Municipality 's
contention that Realkit 's rights are limited to the B 1-B4 building footprint. Mr.
Morweng submitted four contentions on the eviction. First, it is not bound by the
Consent Order as it was not a party to UMS0/2017. Second, its 2002 Resolution
has never been formally withdrawn by the Traditional Council and therefore
constitutes a subsisting permission to occupy, a quasi-real right that can only be
extinguished by the Traditional Council as grantor, not by a transaction between
the Municipality and a third party. Third, the eviction would deprive the Ganyesa
community of an essential public transport service upon which the rural
community depends. Fourth, the length of occupation since 2002, now more than
two decades, weighs in favour of a measured approach by this Court.
[34] Finally, Mr. Morweng submits further that any eviction order should be
conditioned on the Municipality first establishing an alternative taxi rank facility.
The Municipality 's submissions
[35] Advocate Muza advanced that the rescission application pivots on three
grounds. First, in terms Rule 42(1)(a) of the Uniform Rules of Court, the Consent
Order was erroneously granted in the absence of the Traditional Council as the
true landowner; second, there existed a Justus error in that the Municipality
entered the settlement under a fundamental mistake in that it did not appreciate
that it lacked legal authority to alienate the use of communal land belonging to
the Traditional Council ; and third the principle of illegality found application .
Towards this end, Advocate Muza claimed that the underlying agreement is void
on the nemo plus iuris principle , compounded by the absence of a Municipal
Council resolution authorising the alienation, as required by the MFMA and the
Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000.
[36] Notably, Advocate Muza underscored that Realkit's rights are limited to
the B l-B4 footprint on Annexure "F A2", and that the R500 000 was
compensation for infrastructure destroyed by Realkit during construction, rather
than a purchase of the exclusive use of the whole taxi rank premises .
[37] In respect of the eviction, Advocate Muza maintained that the Taxi
Association 's occupation did not render the Municipality liable, and that the
Municipality bore no obligation under the Consent Order to evict unlawful
occupiers from the premises. Advocate Muza submitted that even if the Consent
Order were valid, the Municipality could not be held responsible for occupations
that took place after the order was granted, and that Realkit's remedy lay against
the Taxi Association directly.
[38] Insofar as the issue of compensation, Advocate Muza presented a three
tier proposal , first that the Consent Order contains no express obligation to deliver
vacant possession; second, the October 2022 agreement is unenforceable for
want of a council resolution; and third, Realkit was in breach of its own payment
obligations under the acceleration clause and cannot claim. By way of counter
application, the Municipality seeks rescission of the Consent Order on the
grounds alluded to above.
The applicable lee;al framework
[39] A compromise or settlement (transactio) is a contract whose object is the
prevention, avoidance , or termination of litigation. Once reduced to an order of
court, a consent order has the same standing and effect as any other court order4.
4 Eke v Parsons 2016 (3) SA 37 (CC) paras 27-3 1. M.B. v R.B.( 259/2023) [2024) ZASCA 116 ( 24 July 2024)
para 9, Road Accident Fund v Taylor 2023(5) SA 147 para 41 .
A consent order will be interpreted like all Court orders5• The necessary starting
point is always whether the grounds advanced justify rescission. If they do not,
questions about the enforceability of the underlying settlement agreement become
academic.
[ 40] The circumstances in which a consent order may be rescinded are severely
limited. The grounds recognised at common law are fraud andjustus error. The
scope of Justus error as a ground for setting aside a court order is described as
relatively rare and exceptional. The error must vitiate consent itself; it must go to
the root of the agreement, not merely to the merits of the underlying dispute that
the compromise has put to rest.
[ 41] Rule 4 2( 1 )(a) em powers the Court to rescind an order erroneously sought
or erroneously granted in the absence of any party affected thereby. The rule is
designed to address situations in which an order was entered without a party
having had an opportunity to be heard. A consent order cannot, by definition,
have been made in the absence of the consenting party.
Analysis
[42] The Municipality's submission that the Traditional Council was absent
from the proceedings fails for two independent reasons. First, an examination of
the Consent Order reveals that the Traditional Council appears as the second
respondent in the case, and that Advocate Monnahela appeared on behalf of the
respondents including the Traditional Council. The Traditional Council was
therefore not absent. It was represented before the Court when the order was
made. The Traditional Council has filed no papers in the present proceedings
5 Op cit fn 2 para 26.
challenging the Consent Order or asserting any right inconsistent with its
enforcement. Its silence, duly cited and served as it was, is telling.
(43] Second, Rule 42(l)(a) may be invoked only by or on behalf of the allegedly
absent party. The Municipality cannot bonow a third party's procedural right.
Simply put, the consenting party seeks to escape the consequences of its own
consent, and that is not what the Rule permits.
(44] The Municipality contends that it was mistaken about its legal authority to
dispose of the premises' use. Even accepting, for purposes of argument, that such
a mistake existed, it does not constitute a Justus error sufficient to vitiate consent
and found rescission of a court order. Realkit correctly submits that the error was
unilateral, induced by neither fraud nor misrepresentation on its part, and arose
in the presence of the Municipality , properly represented by seasoned legal
practitioners and its Chief Financial Officer.
[ 45] The Municipality ' s deponent in these proceedings, Mr. Ntsimane, is the
same Chief Financial Officer who was personally present in court on 23
November 2017 when the Consent Order was made. His conspicuous failure to
allege that he or the Municipality's legal team lacked a mandate to settle on those
terms is telling. The mandate existed; the Municipality exercised it and is bound
by it.
[ 46] Moreover, the alleged error goes to the merits of the original underlying
dispute, the extent of the Municipality's authority over premises situated on
communal land and the propriety of settling on the terms it did. That is exactly
the category of enor that a settling party contractually accepts as inherent in the
risk of compromise . As the apex Court observed in Eke v Parsons6 a settlement
is a product of give and take; a party may sometimes receive more by compromise
than litigation would have yielded, and sometimes less. That is the nature of the
bargain.
[47] The Municipality's subsequent conduct reinforces this conclusion. It
engaged in compliance negotiations for years, paid the agreed compensation for
October to December 2022, and continued to invoke the Consent Order as the
yardstick for its obligations. This conduct is wholly inconsistent with any genuine
belief that the Consent Order was susceptible to rescission on grounds of error.
The counter-application was filed years after the Consent Order was entered and
only after the Municipality found itself unable to escape its financial liability
through continued inaction.
[ 48] The Municipality and Taxi Association submit that the Consent Order is
brutum Ju/men, because the Municipality never had dominium over the taxi rank
premises and therefore could not lawfully transfer the exclusive right of use. The
Taxi Association adds that the fixed improvements have become part of the land
by accessio. The Municipality further contends that no Municipal Council
resolution authorised the alienation of land as required by the MFMA and the
Municipal Systems Act.
[ 49] Realkit submits in answer that no dominium was transferred, only a
contractual right of use and ownership of the improvements, and that a seller need
not own the merx to sell a right of use. It further submits that the Municipality is
6 Op cit fn 2 para 24
estopped by its conduct and that the doctrine of approbation and reprobation
precludes it from retaining R500 000 while repudiating the transaction.
[50] To my mind, Realkit's submissions are correct. The subject matter of the
Consent Order is properly understood. The Order does not purport to transfer
dominium over the land. The land remains communal land administered by the
Traditional Council. In my view, what was sold was (a) the fixed improvements
erected by the Municipality on the communal land, which the Municipality
owned by virtue of its arrangement with the Traditional Council; and (b) the use
of the land, an exclusive contractual right of occupation. It is a well-established
principle that a seller need not be the owner of the merx in order to conclude a
valid agreement of sale or to confer a right of use. 7
[51] Considered in its proper context, the accession argument conflates the
ownership of the improvements with the ownership of the land. The Traditional
Council's own arrangement with the Municipality, in terms of which the
Municipality retained ownership of its improvements, constitutes a derogation
from the superficies solo cedit rule as between those parties. The accessio
principle would be relevant only if Realkit sought to register a real right of
ownership over the land, but it does not.
[52] The MFMA and Municipal Systems Act authority point fares no better.
Realkit has placed before the Court the uncontested fact that the Municipality's
legal representatives and Chief Financial Officer appeared in court on 23
November 2017 and consented to the order. The Municipality has not alleged that
its legal team lacked a mandate to settle, nor produced the Administrator's
7 Op cit fn I F,ye 's (Pty) ltd v Ries at 581 ; Mighty Solutions t/a Orlando Service Station v Engen Petroleum
Ltd and Another 2016 (I) SA 62 1 (CC) paras 29-34
instrument of appointment to show any limitation on his authority. A municipality
is bound on the basis of actual or ostensible authority by the representations of its
duly authorised legal representatives. The Municipality is accordingly estopped
from denying that its legal team had authority to settle. In any event, the MFMA
requirement for a council resolution pertains to the alienation of land itself, not
to the conferral of a contractual right of use. No land alienation occurred here.
[53] Conclusively, even if any of the foregoing arguments were well-founded,
which I find they are not, the doctrine of approbation and reprobation, nemo
potest venire contrafactum proprium, (no one may go against their own previous
conduct) precludes the Municipality from retaining the benefit ofR500 000 while
repudiating the transaction. Moreover, a party that believes a court order is void
must challenge it through the appropriate process and may not simply disregard
it.8
[54] It follows that the counterapplication is accordingly dismissed. The
Consent Order of 23 November 2017 stands and falls to be enforced.
The scope of the consent order
(55] The Municipality submits that Realkit's rights under the Consent Order are
limited to the B l- B4 footprint depicted on Annexure "F A2", and that the R500
000 was merely compensation for infrastructure destroyed by Realkit during
construction, not a purchase of the exclusive use of the whole taxi rank premises.
8 Tongoa ne and Others v National Minister for Agriculture and Land Affairs and Others 2010 (6) SA 2 14 (CC) ;
Zuma v Secretary of the Judicial Commission of lnquity into allegations of stale capture;corruption and fraud in
the public sector including Organs of state and others [202 1 l ZACC 28 para 82; 202 1 ( I I )BCLR 1263 (CC).
[56] Realkit submits that the plain language of the Consent Order is
unambiguous. It purchased "the improvements of a fixed nature on the land upon
which the Ganyesa Taxi Rank is situated and the use of such land". The phrase
"such land" refers to the land upon which the whole taxi rank is situated, the 5
575m2 depicted by figures A to G on Annexure "FA2" not merely the B 1- 84
building footprint. It further submits that the settlement was always intended to
fund the establishment of an alternative taxi rank, to which the Taxi Association
would be relocated, freeing the existing premises for Realkit's exclusive
development.
[57] In my view, Realkit's interpretation is correct. The Municipality 's reading
is irreconcilable with the plain language of the Consent Order. The phrase "such
land" can refer only to "the land upon which the Ganyesa Taxi Rank is situated,"
that being, the whole of the taxi rank premises. Had the parties intended to limit
the sale to a portion, they would have said so expressly and identified that portion
on the sketch plan.9 The bilateral purpose of the settlement to relocate the Taxi
Association, free the premises for Realkit confirms this reading.
[58] The Municipality's alternative characterisation of the R500 000 as
"compensation for destruction" is a belated reconstruction unsupported by any
contemporaneous document. This characterisation is rejected.
The eviction of the taxi association
[59] The most substantive issue raised by the Taxi Association is its pre-existing
2002 Resolution. It is common cause that this resolution was a permission to
9 Nata/Join/ Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 201 2 (4) SA 593 (SCA) para 20.
occupy the land as a taxi rank, not an unconditional right of occupation
independent of the infrastructure and legal arrangements that gave the taxi rank
its form. The Municipality itself held a senior permission granted by the
Traditional Council in 2016 to occupy the same premises for the purpose of
constructing the taxi rank infrastructure.
[60] When the Municipality sold the improvements and the exclusive use of the
premises to Realkit, with the Traditional Council represented and unprotesting
before the Court, the legal basis on which the taxi rank operated was
fundamentally altered. The Taxi Association's 2002 Resolution was always
conditional upon and subordinate to that broader infrastructure arrangement. The
conditionality of the 2002 Resolution is apparent from the nature of the right it
conferred. The resolution authorised the Taxi Association to establish and use a
taxi rank on the premises, a purpose that is inseparable from the infrastructure
that makes a taxi rank functional. That infrastructure was owned by the
Municipality and was the subject matter of the Consent Order.
[ 61] It is a reasonable and necessary inference that a permission to occupy land
for a specific commercial purpose, dependent on infrastructure owned by a
separate party, is conditional upon the continued existence of that infrastructure
arrangement. Once the Municipality lawfully disposed of those improvements
and the exclusive use of the premises, the substratum of the 2002 Resolution fell
away.
[62] Critically, the Traditional Council has been cited and served throughout
these proceedings and has filed no affidavit asserting that the 2002 Resolution
remains current and operative or objecting to the eviction. In the absence of any
affidavit from the Traditional Council confirming that it has reaffirmed the Taxi
Association's right to occupy in the face of the Consent Order, the Taxi
Association cannot rely on the 2002 Resolution to shield itself from eviction by
a party holding a court-ordered right of exclusive use.
[63] The argument that the Consent Order does not bind the Taxi Association
because it was not a party to UMS0/2017 is equally without merit. Realkit does
not seek to impose any personal contractual obligation on the Taxi Association.
The eviction is sought in the exercise of Realkit's court-sanctioned right of
exclusive use. Any person who occupies property without the authority of the
holder of an exclusive right of use, whether or not they were a party to the
proceedings establishing that right, does so unlawfully against that right holder.
[64] It is necessary to clarify that this conclusion does not proceed from any
assumption that the Taxi Association is bound contractually by the Consent
Order. It is not. The legal basis for the eviction lies instead in the vindication of
a court-confirmed right of exclusive use which has been authoritatively
determined, subject only to legally cognisable competing rights.
[65] Where such a right has been established by a court order, a third party who
asserts an independent right of occupation bears the onus of demonstrating that
right in a manner that is legally sustainable and capable of prevailing against the
right so established. For the reasons already given, the Taxi Association has failed
to establish such a right, whether based on the 2002 Resolution or otherwise.
[ 66] In this sense, the present eviction is not the enforcement of a contract
against a non-party, but the enforcement of a legally established entitlement to
exclusive use against continued occupation that lacks a legally cognisable
foundation capable of defeating that entitlement.
The community service and equitable considerations
[67] The Taxi Association's submission that eviction would disrupt essential
public transport services in Ganyesa carries weight as a human consideration . The
taxi rank has operated from these premises since 2002 and serves the broader
Ganyesa community. This Court is not indifferent to that reality, nor to the fact
that the Taxi Association has occupied these premises for more than two decades.
[68] Notwithstanding these considerations, the occupation must be assessed
against the particular character of the Taxi Association 's occupation after the
Consent Order. The Taxi Association is not a residential occupier. It is an
organised commercial entity that has been represented throughout and has been
on notice since at least August 2021 of Realkit's demands for vacant possession.
Its occupation since the Consent Order has not been the innocent occupation of a
vulnerable party unaware of a superior right. It has been the occupation of a
legally advised body aware of, and in defiance of, Realkit' s right.
[69] Also, the Taxi Association has not placed before the Court any evidence
that an alternative taxi rank is unavailable, that it has made efforts to identify or
establish one, or that its members would be left without any means of conducting
their business. The community-service consideration bona fide as it is, is an
argument for the Municipality to fulfil its obligation to fund a replacement taxi
rank, not an argument that Realkit should bear the cost of the Municipality's
default indefinitely.
[70] Realkit has held a court sanctioned right of exclusive use since November
2017 and has been deprived of that right for more than eight years. That
deprivation cannot continue indefinitely on the basis of equitable considerations
that are properly directed at the Municipality rather than Realkit.
[71] In arriving at this conclusion, the Court has been mindful of the broader
constitutional context in which disputes of this nature arise. The provision of
public transport services in rural communities is of considerable social and
economic importance. However , the resolution of such systemic considerations
cannot be achieved through the indefinite suspension of private rights that have
been lawfully acquired and judicially confirmed.
[72] The Constitution reqmres a balancing of competing interests that is
proportionate and context-sensitive, as required by section 26(3) of the
Constitution. In the present case, that balance is appropriately struck by
recognising Realkit's entitlement to the use of the premises while structuring the
execution of the eviction in a manner that affords the Municipality a defined
opportunity to discharge its public obligations to provide alternative facilities.
[73] The tailored eviction mechanism, including the reporting obligation
imposed on the Municipality and the deferred execution by the Sheriff, ensures
that the disruption to the community is mitigated as far as reasonably possible
without negating the substance of Realkit' s rights. In this way, the order gives
effect both to the rule of law and to the need for orderly and equitable transition.
[74] Nonetheless, this Court is of the view that a structured approach to the
execution of the eviction is warranted. The public transport disruption that an
abrupt eviction would cause is a legitimate, equitable concern. The
Municipality's obligation to establish an alternative taxi rank is the key to the
orderly resolution of this matter. Accordingly, the eviction order is conditioned
as set out in the order below. The Taxi Association is given sixty (60) days to
vacate, and the Municipality is directed to report to this Court on the steps it has
taken or proposes to take to establish an alternative taxi rank facility before the
Sheriff may execute the eviction. This approach holds the Municipality
accountable for its default while protecting the community's public transport
interests in an orderly way.
[75] Before leaving the eviction, it is necessary to address the Prevention of
Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 ("PIE").
Although neither party expressly invoked PIE, the Taxi Association's
submissions on community dependence, the length of occupation, and the
absence of alternative accommodation raised considerations that are
characteristic of the PIE enquiry, and the Court is required to satisfy itself that the
statutory regime is not applicable.
[76] PIE applies to the unlawful occupation of land by a person who occupies or
resides on land without the express or tacit consent of the owner or person in
charge, or without any other right in law to do so. The Taxi Association is an
organised commercial entity whose members conduct a commercial transport
business on the premises. The use of the taxi rank by the Taxi Association and its
members is a commercial activity. It is not a home, it is not a place of residence,
and no evidence was placed before the Court that any member resides on the
premises . PIE accordingly has no application to this eviction against the Taxi
Association as a juristic entity.
[77] For completeness, the Court also addresses whether individual members of
the Taxi Association could separately invoke PIE protection in their personal
capacities on the basis of livelihood dependence. The Constitutional Court has
affirmed that PIE must be applied sensitively where occupiers depend on land for
their livelihoods . However, that principle applies to persons who themselves
occupy or reside on the land. The individual members of the Taxi Association do
not reside on the premises, and no evidence was placed before the Court showing
that any member occupies the premises in a residential or livelihood sense beyond
the conduct of a commercial transport business.
[78] Commercial use of premises as a place from which to conduct a transport
business does not constitute "occupation" within the meaning of PIE, which is
directed at persons whose home or place of abode is on the land.10. PIE
accordingly has no application to this eviction, whether considered against the
Taxi Association as a body or against its individual members in their personal
capacities. The eviction falls to be considered solely under the common law and
the Court's inherent jurisdiction to enforce its own orders.
[79] One further aspect of the Taxi Association ' s occupation warrants careful
attention. The Taxi Association argued that the 2002 Resolution constitutes a
permission to occupy ("PTO") in the sense recognised in· communal land
contexts, a right personal to the holder but accepted in South African law as akin
to a real right, and that such a right can be revoked or extinguished only by the
Traditional Council , as grantor, not by a sale between the Municipality and a third
10 Ndlovu v Ngcobo; Bekker and Another v Jika 2003 ( I) SA 11 3 (SCA) para 19-20.
party. This contention correctly identifies the legal character of a PTO and
requires a substantive answer.
[80] A permission to occupy ("PTO") in communal land contexts is a personal
right allowing use or occupation of rural, unsurveyed land allocated by a
competent traditional authority. Although not registrable in the Deeds Office, a
PTO is generally accepted as conferring rights akin to a real right, personal in
nature but with quasi-real characteristics in that it is durable, heritable and not
lightly displaced .
[81] The Communal Land Rights Act 11 of 2004, which would have provided
a comprehensive statutory framework for PTOs and communal land tenure, was
declared unconstitutional in its entirety in Tongoane and Others v National
Minister.for Agriculture and Land Affairs and Others11 2010 (6) SA 214 (CC)
and is not in force. In the absence of governing legislation, the legal character of
rights derived from a PTO falls to be determined by reference to the common law
and customary law principles applicable to the allocation. The principle that a
PTO granted by a traditional authority cannot be extinguished by a unilateral
transaction between third parties without the involvement of the grantor is well
established in our law.
[82] Accordingly, the proper legal question is not merely whether the grantor
has been silent in litigation, but whether the legal character of the right, properly
analysed, was such as to be extinguished by the events that occurred. I
appropriately tum to address both aspects.
11 Tongoane and Others v National Minister for Agriculture and land Affairs and Others para 109.
[83] The first question is whether the 2002 Resolution constituted a PTO in the
technical sense, or merely a licence to use the land for a particular purpose. The
distinction is legally significant in the following way. A PTO is a quasi-real right
that survives changes in the controlling infrastructure arrangements . A licence is
a personal permission that is purpose-bound and terminates when the purpose
defining conditions fall away. On a proper characterisation of the 2002
Resolution , it was not a PTO in the full sense but a purpose specific licence. The
Resolution authorised the Taxi Association "to establish a taxi rank" on the
premises. It did not grant an unconditional right of occupation over the land itself,
independent of the use to which it was to be put. The right was intrinsically bound
to the function, the establishment and operation of a taxi rank, and to the
infrastructure that gave that function its physical form.
[84] A licence granted for a specific commercial purpose, defined by and
dependent upon infrastructure owned and controlled by a third party, does not
acquire the character of a quasi-real PTO merely because it was granted by a
traditional authority. The authorities confirm that a PTO, in the strong sense,
typically involves a residential or livelihood land allocation to a household or
family. The 2002 Resolution falls outside that paradigm. It is properly
characterised as a purpose-specific licence granted to a commercial association
for a defined commercial use, terminable when the conditions defining that use
are fundamentally altered.
[85] Even if the 2002 Resolution were to be characterised as a PTO in the full
sense, it would not assist the Taxi Association on the particular facts of this case.
The foundation of the PTO argument is that the Traditional Council, as grantor,
must be involved in any extinguishrnent. That principle, correctly stated, applies
where a PTO-holder's right is sought to be displaced by a transaction to which
the grantor was entirely a stranger. That is not this case.
[86] The Traditional Council was not a stranger to the disposition of the taxi
rank premises. It was the very party that authorised the Municipality's occupation
of those premises for infrastructure purposes in 2016. It was represented by
counsel in the UMS0/2017 proceedings in which the Consent Order was made. It
occupies the position of third respondent in the present proceedings, was duly
cited and served at every stage, and has throughout maintained complete silence.
The Traditional Council is therefore not a party that was bypassed or excluded; it
is a party that was fully informed, fully represented, and fully consulted and who
elected at every material juncture to take no step to affirm the 2002 Resolution as
a right superior to the Consent Order.
[87] In those circumstances, the PTO principle, which is designed to protect
traditional authority grantees from being dispossessed without the grantor's
knowledge or involvement, has no application. The grantor participated in the
very proceedings that produced the disposition complained of and raised no
objection.
[88] On the broader principle of nemo potest venire contra factum proprium,
the Taxi Association is asserting a right it declined to assert when it had full
knowledge and every opportunity to do so. The Taxi Association cannot derive
from the Traditional Council's silence a right superior to that of the Traditional
Council itself, which by its conduct, has implicitly affirmed to be consistent with
the Consent Order.
[89] There is a further, independent ground. Even assuming the 2002 Resolution
was a PTO in the full sense and that extinguishment required the Traditional
Council's formal involvement , the Municipality's arrangement with the
Traditional Council provides that mechanism. In 2016, the Traditional Council
granted the Municipality permission to occupy and develop the taxi rank
infrastructure. Acting under that permission, the Municipality then sold those
improvements and the exclusive use of the premises to Realkit by consent order
before the Court, with the Traditional Council represented.
[90] The Traditional Council's participation in the proceedings that produced
the Consent Order, through its own legal representative, constitutes the formal
involvement of the grantor that the PTO principle requires. The 2002 Resolution,
which was always subordinate to and dependent upon the infrastructure
arrangement between the Municipality and the Traditional Council, was thereby
overtaken by the disposition sanctioned by the Court, with the Traditional
Council's participation. The Traditional Council 's silence in the present
proceedings is therefore not merely an evidentiary inference but a reflection of
the legal reality, the disposition to Realkit was effected with the Traditional
Council's representative present and unprotesting, and that constitutes sufficient
grantor involvement to displace the Taxi Association 's licence.
[91] Even recognising the heightened protection accorded to rights derived
from customary law, such rights are not insulated from the legal consequences of
court orders granted in proceedings to which the relevant traditional authority was
a party to and in which it was duly represented. The juridical significance of the
Traditional Council's participation in the UMS0/2017 proceedings is not merely
evidential but constitutive, in that it reflects that the grantor of the asserted right
was afforded a full and proper opportunity to assert, protect, or qualify that right
before the Court when the Consent Order was made.
[92] In these circumstances, the absence of any reservation, qualification, or
objection on the part of the Traditional Council must be understood, not as
passive silence alone, but as conduct consistent with acquiescence in the
disposition embodied in the Consent Order. To hold otherwise would permit a
collateral challenge to a final court order through the indirect invocation of a right
that the grantor itself declined to advance when the forum for its determination
was properly seized.
[93] The protection afforded to PTO type interests must accordingly be balanced
against the principles of legal certainty and the finality of court orders. Where a
court-sanctioned disposition restructures the substratum upon which a purpose
specific allocation rests, and where the competent authority has participated in
that restructuring without objection, the continued assertion of the prior allocation
cannot prevail in a manner that undermines the integrity of the court order.
The claim for agreed compensation
[94] The obligation to deliver vacant possession is necessarily implied as an
incident of the sale of the exclusive right of use of the premises. The
Municipa lity's first contention that it sold "the use" of the premises while
remaining free to allow third parties to continue occupying those premises is self
contradictory and cannot be correct.
[95] As to the second contention that the October 2022 compensation agreement
was reached by the Municipality 's s 139 Administrator , Mr Maroga, acting on
the Municipality 's behalf. The Municipality has placed before the Court no
evidence that the Administrator exceeded his powers, nor has it produced the
instrument of appointment to demonstrate any limitation on his authority to bind
the Municipality in relation to a compensation arrangement arising from a pre
existing court order. In the absence of such evidence, the Administrator must be
taken to have acted with authority.
[96] It bears emphasis that a party seeking to impugn the authority of a
functionary acting under a constitutional intervention must place before the Court
the factual and legal basis for such challenge. In the absence of the instrument of
appointment or any delineation of powers suggesting a limitation relevant to the
agreement in question, a bare assertion of lack of authority cannot suffice.
[97] The Municipality, which is best placed to produce such evidence, has failed
to do so. In these circumstances, both the presumption of regularity and the
objective conduct of the parties support the conclusion that the Administrator
acted within the scope of his powers.
[98] As to the third contention that the Consent Order's acceleration clause
operates only upon Realkit 's failure to make payment. It is common cause that
the full purchase amount of RS00 000 was paid. The Municipality accepted all
payments without protest and never placed Realkit formally in mora. This
contention is devoid of merit.
[99] The notice of motion at prayer 1.7 claimed R630 000 being the arrears
calculated in the founding affidavit for the period January 2023 to September
2024 (21 months at R30 000). By the date of the hearing on 26 February 2026,
the arrears had grown to R930 000 (31 months to 31 July 2025), as set out in the
founding and replying affidavits. The respondents had full opportunity to address
this figure in their papers and did so. The amount of R930 000 is accordingly
properly before the Court and will be granted.
[100] The obligation to pay the monthly compensation of R30 000 continues
until the Municipality delivers vacant possession of the entire premises to Realkit.
This ongoing obligation falls within prayer 4 and gives effect to the parties agreed
formula; the respondents were fully aware of this claim from the founding
affidavit and addressed it in their papers. Realkit retains the right to approach the
Court, on notice to the Municipality , should the order require variation,
supplementation, or enforcement.
Costs
[ 101] Realkit has been substantially successful on all five issues. The ordinary
rule is that costs follow the event. Both the Taxi Association and the Municipality
have opposed the application on the grounds that it is without merit. The Taxi
Association is to bear the costs of opposing the main application insofar as they
relate to the eviction. The Municipality is to bear the costs of the main application
insofar as they relate to enforcement and the compensation claim, and the costs
of the counterapplication. The costs of the condonation application are costs in
the cause and are borne by the Municipality and the Taxi Association in
accordance with this allocation.
Order
[ 102] As a result, the following order is made:
1. Condonation is granted for the late filing of the Applicant's replying affidavit.
The replying affidavit is admitted as part of the record.
2. The counter-application of the Second Respondent (Kagisano-Molopo Local
Municipality) for rescission of the Consent Order made under case number
UMS0/2017 on 23 November 2017 ("the Consent Order") is dismissed with
costs.
3. The Consent Order of 23 November 2017 is declared to be of full force and
effect and enforceable in accordance with its terms.
4. The First Respondent (Kagisano Taxi Association), its members, and all
persons claiming through or under it, are ordered to vacate the premises upon
which the Ganyesa Taxi Rank, Ganyesa, Vryburg District, North West
Province is situated as depicted by figures A, B, C, D, E, F and G on Annexure
"FA2" to the Founding Affidavit ("the premises") within 60 (sixty) calendar
days of service of this order upon the First Respondent.
5. The First Respondent and its members are prohibited from re-entering the
premises following vacation thereof.
6. Simultaneously with the service of this order upon the First Respondent , the
Second Respondent shall be served with a copy of this order. Within 30
(thirty) calendar days of such service, the Second Respondent shall file with
the Registrar of this Court and serve on the Applicant's attorneys a written
report setting out, (a) the steps it has taken or proposes to take to establish an
alternative taxi rank facility in or near Ganyesa for the use of the First
Respondent and its members; and (b) a proposed timeline for the completion
of such alternative facility.
7. The Sheriff of this Court is authorised and directed to evict the First
Respondent, its members, and all persons claiming through or under it, from
the premises only after, (a) the expi1y of the 60 (sixty) day period referred to
in paragraph 4 above; and (b) the Second Respondent has filed the report
referred to in paragraph 6 above, or the 30 (thirty) day period for filing that
report has expired without a report being filed, whichever is the earlier. The
filing of a report by the Second Respondent shall not of itself be taken as
satisfying the Second Respondent 's substantive obligation to establish an
alternative taxi rank facility, and the Applicant's right to approach this Court
on notice to the Second Respondent for any further relief arising from a
deficient or unsatisfactory report is expressly preserved. The Sheriff may
obtain the assistance of members of the South African Police Service (North
West Province) if necessary.
8. The Fourth Respondent (Tau Rollermeule (Pty) Ltd) and Fifth Respondent
(M.M. Nthuthang) , together with all persons claiming through or under them,
are ordered to vacate the building depicted between figures A and G on
Annexure "FA2" within 30 (thirty) calendar days of service of this order,
failing which the Sheriff is authorised and directed to remove them and their
property from the building forthwith.
9. The Second Respondent is ordered to pay to the Applicant the sum of R930
000 (nine hundred and thirty thousand rand), being agreed compensation for
the period 1 January 2023 to 31 July 2025, together with interest thereon at
the prescribed legal rate per annum from the date of this judgment to date of
final payment.
10. The Second Respondent is further ordered to continue paying the agreed
compensation of R30 000 (thirty thousand rand) per month commencing 1
August 2025, for each and every month during which it persists in breach of
its obligation to afford the Applicant vacant possession of the whole of the
premises, until the date upon which vacant possession is actually afforded to
the Applicant. For the purposes of this paragraph, the date upon which vacant
possession is afforded shall be, (a) the date on which the Sheriff confirms
execution of the eviction order in a written return of service; or (b) such earlier
date as the First Respondent delivers written notice of voluntary vacation of
the whole of the premises to the Applicant's attorneys of record, whichever is
the earlier. The Applicant retains the right to approach the Court on notice to
the Second Respondent for any variation, supplementation or enforcement of
this order.
11. The First Respondent is ordered to pay the costs of the main application
insofar as they relate to the eviction relief, including the costs of the rule nisi
proceedings of 11 July 2025 and the costs of the condonation application
attributable to the eviction component, together with the costs counsel.
12.The Second Respondent is ordered to pay: (a) the costs of the mam
application insofar as they relate to the enforcement of the Consent Order, the
agreed compensation claim, and the counter-application; (b) such portion of
the general costs of the application (including the rule nisi and condonation)
as are attributable to its participation, including the costs of counsel.
REDDY J
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA,
NORTH WEST HIGH COURT
Appearances
For the Applicant: Advocate M.G. Hitge
Instructed by: Dr Hardus van der Westhuizen Inc Attorneys, Vryburg (c/o
Nienaber & Wissing Attorneys, Mahikeng)
For the First Respondent: Mr. Morweng
Instructed by: Morweng Attorneys, Mahikeng
For the Second Respondent: Adv C.Z. Muza (with Adv B.J. Maboea)
Instructed by: Sephecholo Lechuti Lesofe Inc, Mmabatho
Third to Eighth Respondents: No appearance
Sixth Respondent : No appearance