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[2026] ZALCCT 90
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IMATU obo Sauls v City of Cape Town and Others (CA485/24) [2026] ZALCCT 90 (9 June 2026)
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THE
LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA,
CAPE TOWN
Case
no:
CA485/24
(1)
Reportable Yes/No
(2)
Of interest to other Judges: Yes/No
(3)
Revised
In the matter between:
IMATU
obo YANNICK SAULS
Applicant
and
THE
CITY OF CAPE
TOWN
First Respondent
SOUTH AFRICAN LOCAL
GOVERNMENT
BARGAINING COUNCIL
(SALGBC)
Second Respondent
COMMISSIONER ELVISO
ADAMS N.O.
Third Respondent
Heard
:
In Chambers
Delivered
:
09 June 2026
JUDGMENT
MKHATSHWA,
AJ
Introduction
[1]
This is an opposed application for leave to appeal
to the Labour Appeal Court against the whole judgement and order of
this Court
delivered on 26 January 2026.
[2]
The parties are cited as they were in the review
application.
Grounds of appeal
[3]
The First Respondent argues that this Court erred
in a number of respects under the following headings:
3.1
Misapplication of the review test (
Sidumo
Test).
3.2
Failure to consider the totality of the evidence.
3.3
Misdirection on nexus between off-duty misconduct
and employment.
3.4
Failure to engage with the First Respondent’s
case.
3.5
Impermissible interference with sanction.
3.6
Mischaracterisation of evidence regarding
reputational harm and trust
3.7
Irregular reliance on consistency.
3.8
Error in substituting reinstatement.
The
test for an application for leave to appeal
[4]
Applications for leave to appeal are regulated by
Rule 67 of the Rules for the Conduct of Proceedings in the Labour
Court.
The Rule does not deal with the test for the granting or
otherwise of the application.
[5]
Guidance
is to be found in section 17 of the Superior Courts Act
[1]
.
The point was made in
Dexgroup
(Pty) Ltd v Trust Group International (Pty) Ltd and others
[2]
that
the need to obtain leave to appeal is a valuable tool in ensuring
that scarce judicial resources are not spent on appeals that
lack
merit.
[6]
In terms of section 17(1)(a)(i) of the Superior
Courts Act, leave to appeal may only be given where the judge or
judges concerned
are of the opinion that the appeal would have a
reasonable prospect of success.
[7]
Although
stated
obiter
,
it was held in
Mont
Chevaux Trust v Tina Goosen
[3]
that
the wording of the subsection raises the bar of the test that has to
be applied to the merits of the proposed appeal before
leave should
be granted in that the use by the legislature of the word “would”
indicates a measure of certainty that
another court will differ from
the court whose judgement is sought to be appealed against. It
has also been held that the
use by the legislature of the word “only”
in section 17 (1) is a further indication of a more stringent
test
[4]
.
[8]
The
point was emphasized by the Supreme Court of Appeal in
MEC
for Health, Eastern Cape v Mkhitha
[5]
,
where
Schippers AJA held as follows:
“
[16]
Once again it is necessary to say that leave to appeal,
especially to this court, must not be granted unless there truly is a
reasonable
prospect of success.
Section 17(1)(a)
of the
Superior
Courts Act 10 of 2013
makes it clear that leave to appeal may only be
given where the judge concerned is of the opinion that the appeal
would have a
reasonable prospect of success; or there is some other
compelling reason why it should be heard.
[17]
An applicant for leave to appeal must convince the
court on proper grounds that there is a reasonable prospect or
realistic chance
of success on appeal. A mere possibility of success,
an arguable case or one that is not hopeless, is not enough. There
must be
a sound, rational basis to conclude that there is a
reasonable prospect of success on appea
l
.”
[9]
Having considered the grounds advanced by the
First
Respondent
for leave to appeal
and the
Applicant’s detailed
submissions
in
response thereto,
this Court
ha
s
concluded
that the appeal has no reasonable
prospects of success or that another court will come to a different
conclusion.
There is also no other compelling reason why
the appeal should be heard as there are no conflicting judgments on
the matter at hand.
Therefore, there is no basis on which
this
Court
can grant the present application.
[10]
In the result, the following order is made:
Order
1. The Application
is dismissed.
2. The
re
is no order as to costs
.
M.
Mkhatshwa
Acting Judge of the
Labour Court of South Africa
[1]
Act 10 of 2013.
[2]
2013
(6) SA 520
(SCA) at para 13.
[3]
2014
JDR 2325 (LCC)
.
See
also
Acting
National Director of Public Prosecutions v Democratic Alliance In re
Democratic Alliance v Acting National Director of
Public
Prosecutions
(19577/09) [2016] ZAGPPHC 489 (24 June 2016) at para 25.
[4]
See:
Matoto
v Free State Gambling and Liquor Authority
(4629/2015)
[2017] ZAFSHC 80
(8 June 2017).
[5]
2016
JDR 2214 (SCA) at paras 16 and 17. See also:
Black
Bond Surfacing (Pty) Ltd v Dynapac Ltd
(59158/2021) [2022] ZAGPJHC 974 (7 December 2022).