THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
{WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
Case No: A16/2026
In the matter between:
SONW ABILE TSHITSHI Appellant
And
THE STATE Respondent
Summary: Criminal Law - Rape - Appeal against conviction on1y -
complainant a single witness - discrepancies between viva voce testimony and
statement not material- DNA is not a mandatory requirement for a conviction. -
guilt of appellant proven beyond a reasonable doubt - appellant's version not
reasonable possible tme - Appeal on conviction dismissed.
Coram: Le Grange J et Yake AJ
Heard: 15 May 2026
Delivered: 8 June 2026
JUDGMENT
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YAKE AJ (LE GRANGE J) Concurring:
Introduction
[I] This matter concerns an appeal against conviction only. The appellant was
convicted on a charge of rape by the Cape Town Regional Court.
[2] Aggrieved by the decision of the court a quo, the appellant, with the leave
of that court, now appeals before this court. The appeal is founded on several
grounds, which are set out in greater detail below. The respondent opposes the
appeal, contending that the trial court correctly convicted the appellant. The
grounds of appeal, may in summary be set out as follows:
a) The court a quo erred in its findings and conclusions in several material
respects:
(i) In holding that the medical report confirmed that the
complainant had been raped, notwithstanding that no DNA evidence
was obtained from swabs taken within hours of the alleged incident.
(ii) In accepting the doctor's evidence regarding a bruise on the
complainant's lower back, despite the failure to record the age and
colour of the bruise in the J88.
(iii) In disregarding the complainant's own testimony that she sustained no
injuries during the alleged rape.
(iv) In failing to give due weight to the fact that the J88 was favourable to
the appellant, in that no injuries were found on gynaecological
examination and no clinical evidence of blunt penetration of the genitals
was recorded.
(v) In finding the complainant to be a credible witness despite material
contradictions in her testimony and discrepancies between her evidence
and that of the state witnesses Botha and Goya.
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(vi) In neglecting to apply the cautionary rule to the complainant's evidence
as that of a single witness.
(vii) In rejecting the appellant's vers10n on the basis of alleged
improbabilities, rather than on cogent grounds.
(viii) In concluding that the State had proved its case beyond reasonable
doubt.
[3] It is trite that the State bears the onus of proving guilt of the appellant
beyond reasonable doubt. The appellant is under no obligation to prove his
innocence. The factual substratum underpinning the conviction may be succinctly
summarised as follows.
Factual Background
[4] In order to prove guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, the State
led the evidence of four witnesses. The complainant, who was a single witness to
the incident, Warrant Officer Botha, the first person to whom the complainant
reported the sexual assault, Doctor Lamprecht, who examined the complainant
and testified as medical expert and Sergeant Goya, the investigating officer. The
appellant testified in his own defence and called no additional witnesses. Several
documentary exhibits, were admitted into evidence, including the statement of
the complainant, statement of sergeant Goya, the statement of Warrant Officer
Botha, the medical expert report (commonly referred to as the J88), the DNA
analysis report, and the presentence report.
[ 5] The issues that require determination in this appeal, together with the
background facts that underpin and fortify the reasoning leading to my
conclusion, may be summarised as follows:
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Complainant's Testimony
[ 6] The complainant testified that she knows the appellant for approximately
a period of five to six months, during which period they were employed as
security guards at the Delft Community Hall. On 1 January 2022, she reported
for her night duty shift, scheduled to commence at 18h00. Upon her arrival, she
found the appellant already present, seated outside. After exchanging
pleasantries, she proceeded inside to commence her duties, which included
recording entries in the security journal. Shortly before midnight, the appellant
entered the building. The complainant informed him of her intention to take a
nap, whereupon the appellant took the two-way radio and returned outside.
[7] After some time, the appellant returned and instructed the complainant not
to sleep, suggesting instead that they consume alcohol. This was declined by the
complainant, explaining that she wished to take her children somewhere the
fo1lowing morning. The appellant, however, opened his bag and took out a bottle
of Gordon's gin and forced her to drink. When she refused, the appellant took out
a knife and threatened to stab her. Confronted with this threat, the complainant
ultimately relented and consumed the alcohol which the appellant continued to
pour until the bottle was nearly finished.
[8] The appellant thereafter instructed the complainant to undress, and he
likewise undressed himself. Despite the complainant's attempts to resist, the
appellant overpowered her and proceeded to insert his penis into her vagina
without her consent. The complainant was unable to recall whether the appellant
ejaculated, but she confirmed that no condom was used. At that stage, she was
uncertain of the whereabouts of the knife.
[9] During the course of the assault, the complainant repeatedly requested
permission to go to the bathroom. After some time, the appellant stopped what he
was doing and accompanied her to the bathroom. On their arrival, she asked the
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appellant to leave, explaining that she was unable to relieve herself while he
remained at the door. Indeed, the appellant left, and that is when she seized the
opportunity to escape. Naked, she crawled out of the bathroom, but the appellant
noticed her and gave chase. She managed to run out of the yard of the community
hall through a hole in the fence, at which point the appellant stopped his pursuit.
[1 O] Once outside, the complainant encountered a homeless man, who
requested his girlfriend to provide her with a skirt to wear. Thereafter, she
proceeded to seek help in a nearby house, where she was advised to report the
matter to the police. She duly went to the police station, and at the police station,
she met Warrant Officer Botha. At the time of her arrival at the police station, she
was still intoxicated. She informed Botha of the incident, whereupon Botha
contacted the standby investigating officer, Sergeant Goya ("Goya"). Goya later
arrived and took her to hospital, where she was examined by Dr Lamprecht.
Following the medical examination, Goya took down her statement and thereafter
accompanied the complainant to point out the crime scene. By the time her
statement was taken by Goya, she was sober. She further testified that, subsequent
to the incident, she became the subject of ridicule at her workplace.
[ 11] Under cross examination, she was confronted with the inconsistency
between the statement that she made to Botha and later to Goya and her viva voce
evidence. She denied ever informing Botha that the appellant's friend was present
on the night in question and that he threatened her with an okapi knife. She
maintained that only she and the appellant were present, and that it was the
appellant who threatened her with a knife. She further denied having told Goya
that the appeJlant wanted to rape her for the second time.
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Doctor Lamprecht
[ 12] Doctor Lamprecht who at the time was stationed at Thuthuzela Care Centre
at Victoria Hospital, confirmed that on 2 January 2022, at 12:44, he examined the
complainant following the alleged rape and thereafter compiled the J88 which
was handed in as exhibit B. At the time of the examination, the complainant was
completely sober. She provided history that she had been raped by a colleague at
work who forced her to consume alcohol, thereafter, threatened her with a knife
and raped her without condom. She further reported that, subsequent to the
incident, she had both wiped herself and urinated.
[ 13] On physical examination, Dr Lamprecht noted an abrasion on the
complainant's knee and a bruise on her lower buttock. In his opinion, these
injuries were consistent with the complainant's history given to him that she had
been pushed down and had fallen while attempting to flee. On gynaecological
examination, he found no clinical evidence of blunt genital penetration. However,
he emphasised that the absence of such findings does not exclude the possibility
of penetration.
[14] When question about the absence of clinical evidence of blunt genital
penetration, Dr. Lamprecht explained that a number of factors may play a role in
absence of observable injuries. These include whether force was applied during
penetration, the angle at which such force was exerted, presence or absence of
any lubrication, the complainant's movements, whether she resisted or fought
back and her state of intoxication. According to Dr Lamprecht, each of these
factors can reduce the likelihood of injuries being sustained or detected.
[ I 5] Under cross-examination, Dr Lamprecht was questioned regarding the
absence of DNA evidence, notwithstanding the complainanfs assertion that no
condom had been used. He explained that the fact that the complainant was
examined shortly after the alleged rape does not necessarily mean that DNA
examined shortly after the alleged rape does not necessarily mean that DNA
would be detected. He asserts that time is not the only factor to be considered;
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other intervening circumstances may play a role, such as the complainant having
urinated and wiped herself, the possibility of azoospermia (where semen contains
no spermatozoa), or other variables. He maintained that although spennatozoa
can remain in the body for several days, a negative DNA result may nonetheless
occur due to such intervening factors.
[ 16] Warrant Officer Botha confinned that, while on duty, the complainant
arrived at the police station and reported that she had been raped. During the
interview, Botha observed that the complainant was under the influence of
alcohol, as she could smell it on her and observed how she was walking. She
noted that the complainant was crying uncontrollably and it took approximately
an hour to calm her down. Thereafter, Botha contacted the standby investigating
officer, Sergeant Goya. Owing to the complainant's intoxicated state, Botha
opened a skeleton docket and recorded a statement on her behalf. According to
Botha, the complainant reported that her colleague at work had forced her to
consume alcohol, and that his friend, who was present, had threatened her with
an okapi knife. After they drank, the friend left, and it was then that the appellant
raped her without a condom. Following the rape, she went to the toilet naked, and
when the appellant was searching for toilet paper, she seized the opportunity to
escape. A homeless man provided her with clothing, after which she proceeded
to the police station to report the matter.
[ 17] Sergeant Goya, the investigating officer confirmed that he was doing
standby duties and was at home when he received a call regarding a rape case that
had been opened. He proceeded to the police station where he met the
complainant. Upon interviewing her, he realised that she was under the influence
of alcohol, as her account was incoherent. He then decided to take her to a doctor
where she was examined. The complainant also attended counselling session.
where she was examined. The complainant also attended counselling session.
Once this was completed, he interviewed her again. On this occasion, the
complainant was sober, and he was able to take down her statement. Thereafter,
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she took him to point out the crime scene and subsequently took her home. Under
cross- examination, Goya indicated that the complainant had informed him that
the appellant wanted to rape her for the second time. With that, the State closed
its case.
[ 18] After the close of the State's case, the appellant applied for a discharge in
terms of section 174 of the CPA. The court a quo dismissed the application,
holding that the appellant had a case to answer. I find no fault on the ruling of the
Regional Magistrate; in my view, she correctly exercised her discretion in
refusing the discharge.
[19] The appellant testified in his defence and denied raping the complainant.
He confirmed that they were working the same night shift but allege that the
complainant was already intoxicated when she arrived at work. He further
conceded that they consumed alcohol together and the complainant was in and
out. At some stage, the complainant went out and while waiting for her, he passed
out. When he woke up the following morning, the complainant was no longer
present, although her clothes remained there. He stated that he collected her
clothes and gave them to someone, after which he was arrested. He maintains that
he had no knowledge of the alleged rape of the complainant. That concluded the
defence case.
The findings of the trial court
[20] After considering the conspectus of the evidence, the court a quo
acknowledged that the complainant was a single witness and accordingly
exercised the necessary caution in terms of section 208 of the CPA. The court a
quo also examined the discrepancies between the complainant's viva voce
evidence and the statement she had given to Botha, and attributed these to several
factors: the lapse of time between the incident and her testimony in court; the
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complainant's intoxication and trauma at the time of reporting; the fact that Botha
and the complainant communicated in English although the complainant's home
language is Xhosa, which may have led to miscommunication; the circumstances
that Goya who also speaks Xhosa, could not take the statement after Botha
already took it. The court a quo ultimately found that these discrepancies were
not material.
[21] The court a quo made credibility findings in respect of the complainant's
evidence and held that she testified in a logical and chronological manner. She
was found to be a credible witness and her version was accepted. The court a quo
likewise accepted the evidence of Dr Lamprecht holding that he was able to
substantiate his findings.
[22] To the contrary, the court a quo rejected the appellant's bare denial and
found that, in light of the complainant's version and the totality of evidence, the
appel1ant's version, was not reasonable possible true.
Applicable legal principles
[23] It is settled law that in a matter such as the present, this court's powers to
interfere on appeal with the findings of fact of the trial court are limited in the
absence of demonstrable and material misdirection. Where there is no
misdirection on the facts, the presumption is that its findings are correct, and the
appellate court will only interfere with them if it is convinced that they are wrong.
This principle was restated inS v Jochems 1991 (I) SACR (A) at 211 E-G as
follows:
'It is a time-honoured principle that once a trial court has made credibility findings, an
' appeal court should be deferential and slow to interfere therewith unless is convinced
on a conspectus of the evidence that the trial court was clearly wrong. R v Dhlumayo
and Another 1948 (2) SA 677 (A) at 706; S v Kebana 12010) I All SA 310 (SCA)
para 12. As the saying goes, he was steeped in the atmosphere of the trial. Absent any
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positive finding that he was wrong, this court is not at liberty to interfere with his
findings.'
[24] In Minister of Safety and Security & others v Craig & others NNO 2011
(1) SACR 469 (SCA) para 58, Navsa JA stated that although courts of appeal are
slow to disturb findings of credibility, they generally have greater liberty to do so
where a finding of fact does not essentially depend on the personal impression
made by a witness' demeanour, but predominantly upon inferences and other facts
and upon probabilities. In such a case, a court of appeal with the benefit of a full
record may often be in a better position to draw inferences.
Submissions by the parties
[25] At the hearing of this appeal, Ms Adams, who appeared for the appellant,
submitted that the court a quo failed to exercise the necessary caution in its
evaluation of the evidence. Instead, the court dealt with the evidence in peace
meal fashion and overlooked the material contradictions concerning the
surrounding circumstances of rape. Counsel further contended that the court
neglected to reconcile the complainant's failure to testify about any injuries in Dr
Lamprecht's findings, as well as Goya's assertion that the complainant's face was
swollen. It was argued that the complainant's description of the ordeal as
'gruesome' was not supported by the evidence, given the absence of any physical
assault. Counsel also criticised the court a quo's reliance on miscommunication
between Botha and the complainant, submitting that such reliance constitutes
misdirection. Ms Adams maintained that the complainant's state of sobriety
materially undermined her credibility and should have been accorded greater
weight in the court's assessment.
[26] Ms Adams contended that the complainant's evidence was beset with
inconsistencies and material contradictions. In her submission, these deficiencies
rendered the complainant's testimony unreliable and, consequently, the State
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failed to discharge its onus of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Counsel
therefore urged that the appeal against conviction ought to succeed and that the
conviction be set aside.
[27] On the other hand, Ms Van der Merwe, counsel for the respondent,
submitted in her papers that the court a quo correctly evaluated the evidence in
its entirety, mindful of the onus resting upon the State. She argued that the court
exercised the necessary caution as required by section 208 of the CPA and, on
that basis, found the complainant's testimony to be satisfactory.
[28] Counsel contended that the court a quo made positive credibility findings
in favour of the complainant, holding that her evidence was logical,
chronological, and that she was a_ credible witness. It was submitted that the court
duly considered the discrepancies between the complainant's viva voce testimony
and the version she conveyed to Botha and correctly attributed those
inconsistencies to her state of intoxication and the language barrier. The court
further found that Dr Lamprecht's evidence, when read together with that of the
complainant, demonstrated that the complainant was not fabricating her account.
On this basis, counsel argued that the appeal against conviction ought to be
dismissed.
Discussion
[29] Against this backdrop, I turn to evaluate the merits of the appeal. The
central issue for determination is whether the State succeeded in proving the
appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In approaching this enquiry, it is
necessary to consider the totality of the evidence, the credibility findings made
by the court a quo, and the weight to be accorded to the discrepancies highlighted
by the appellant. The proper test is not whether the complainant's evidence was
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flawless, but whether, notwithstanding the imperfections, it remained sufficiently
reliable and trustworthy to sustain a conviction.
[30] It is trite that the duty to prove an accused's guilt rests squarely upon the
State, and the accused bears no obligation to assist the prosecution in discharging
this onus (see S v Mathebula 1997 (1) SACR 10 (W)). In assessing whether the
State has succeeded in proving its case against the accused beyond a reasonable
doubt, the court is enjoined to consider the evidence in its totality. The proper
approach is that the conclusion reached, whether to convict or acquit an accused,
must account for all the evidence presented, and not merely isolated portions
thereof (see S v Van der Meyden 1999 (1) SACR 447 (WLD) at 449h).
[31] It is common cause that the appellant and the complainant were known to
each other, being colleagues in the same workplace. The complainant's evidence
is that the appellant raped her. The appellant, on the other hand, denied the
allegation and insisted that nothing occurred between them. The trial court,
having carefully considered the evidence, rejected the appellant's version and
concluded that the State had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. For the
reasons that follow, I am satisfied that the findings of the trial court are correct
and beyond reproach.
[32] It is important to stress that the complainant's evidence must not be
assessed in isolation. It must be assessed in conjunction with the appellant's
version and the testimony of the other state witnesses. The complainant's
evidence was that the appellant forced her to consume alcohol and thereafter
raped her. The appellant, while conceding that they drank together, denied that
he forced her to do so. He further denied raping the complainant, contending
instead that while they were drinking, the complainant left the room and, when
she failed to return, he passed out.
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[33] Much emphasis was placed by the appellant's counsel on alleged
contradictions and discrepancies between the complainant's evidence and that of
other state witnesses. It was argued that the complainant testified she sustained
no injuries, whereas Dr Lamprecht recorded injuries to her knee and lower
buttock, and Mr Goya testified that she presented with a swollen face. The
Regional Magistrate, however, correctly accepted the medical evidence, which
was consistent with the complainant's account of being pushed down before rape
and of crawling in an attempt to escape. I share the view of the Regional
Magistrate that, had these been old injuries, there would have been no reason to
record them, or the doctor would have noted that they were healed.
[34] While it is true that the complainant did not herself testify about these
injuries, it is significant that the doctor's findings were never put to her in cross
examination, depriving her of the opportunity to respond. Furthermore, the
incident occurred in January 2022, whereas the complainant testified in
September 2023. It is entirely reasonable to expect that, given her state at the time
of the incident and the lapse of time, she may not have recalled every detail,
particularly as the injuries were not of a serious nature. This omission cannot,
however, be construed as evidence of untruthfulness on her part.
[35] Counsel for the appellant sought to minimise the gravity of the offence by
submitting that the circumstances before and after the alleged rape do not support
the complainant's account of a harrowing ordeal, given the absence of evidence
of physical assault. This submission is misguided. The absence of visible physical
assault does not render the offence less serious. Rape, by its very nature is very
serious, constitutes a grave violation of bodily integrity and human dignity. It is
humiliating, degrading and brutal invasion of the privacy of the victim. See S v
humiliating, degrading and brutal invasion of the privacy of the victim. See S v
Chapman 1997 (2) SACR 3 (SCA) at 5. The humiliation and indignity suffered by
the complainant, an adult woman, compelled her to flee unclothed into the street.
This underscores the severity of the ordeal and to suggest otherwise is untenable.
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[36] Considerable emphasis was placed by the appellant's counsel on the
alleged discrepancies between the viva voce evidence of the complainant and her
statements to Botha and Goya. The Regional Magistrate correctly found that these
discrepancies were not material. It is undisputed that the complainant was
intoxicated, a fact corroborated by both Botha and Goya, who observed her in
that state. In fact, the appellant himself conceded that the complainant was
intoxicated. Botha testified that, while walking and conversing with the
complainant, she detected the smell of alcohol. She further explained that she was
unable to take down a statement from the complainant precisely because of her
intoxication.
[37] It is notable that Botha communicated with the complainant in English,
whereas Goya, who arrived later and spoke Xhosa, the complainant's home
language, was also unable to take her statement due to her condition. This
inconsistency is striking, it is difficult to reconcile how Botha could attempt to
take a statement in English while Goya, a Xhosa speaker, could not, despite
arriving after Botha. The medical evidence provides clarity. The doctor's report
records that, by the time of examination, the complainant was sober. Importantly,
the complainant did not inform the doctor of the presence of the appellant's
friend, a detail which further undermines the appellant's version.
[38] During the application for leave to appeal, the absence of DNA evidence
was raised as one of the grounds. Significantly, Ms Adams did not pursue this
line of argument. Correctly so, for it is trite that the absence of a DNA report does
not, in itself, negate sexual penetration. DNA is not a mandatory requirement for
a conviction. Courts evaluate cases based on the totality of evidence. If credible
witnesses place the appellant at the scene and his defence is rejected, the lack of
DNA does not override those facts. See Thwala v S [2018] ZACC 34 2019 (1)
DNA does not override those facts. See Thwala v S [2018] ZACC 34 2019 (1)
BCLR 156 (CC). Dr Lamprecht provided a cogent explanation as to why DNA
material may not be present even where no condom was used. Among the factors
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considered were that the complainant had urinated and wiped herself. This
evidence was not challenged, nor was any contrary evidence presented to
undennine the doctor's findings. In my view, the Regional Magistrate was
entirely justified in accepting such evidence.
[39] I have also considered the further discrepancies raised by the appellant in
his grounds of appeal. In my view, these contradictions are immaterial and do not
strike at the core of what transpired between the appellant and the complainant.
It is important to remind ourselves that contradictions, per se, do not lead to total
the rejection of a witness' evidence.
[ 40] Furthermore, not every contradiction or error made by a witness
unfavourably affects their overall credibility. (S v Oostlwizen 1982 (3) SA
571 (T)). In each case, the court must consider the nature of the contradictions,
their number and importance and their bearing on the parts of the witness'
evidence. In my view, these discrepancies are immaterial and do not discount the
reliability and credibility of the complainant.
[ 4 I] It is my view that the complainant was a candid and truthful witness, and
the record certainly lends credence to that conclusion. Her version was
corroborated in material respects by all the State witnesses, and she remained
adamant throughout her testimony that it was the appellant who raped her. Indeed,
to some extent, certain aspects of her evidence even find partial corroboration in
the appellant's own version.
[ 42] The complainant in this matter was a single witness. Section 208 of the
CPA provides that an accused may be convicted of any offence on the single
evidence of any competent witness. The requirement, however, is that such
testimony must be clear and satisfactory in all material respects. At the same time,
the cautionary rule applicable to single-witness evidence must not be allowed to
15
displace the exercise of common sense. (S v Artman and Another 1968 (3) SA 339
(A).
( 43] As a single witness, the complainant's evidence had to either be: (a)
substantially satisfactory in every material respect, or (b) corroborated. (Phogole
v The State (370/2023) [2024] ZASCA 54 (9 May 2025)) para 77. Her evidence
had to be approached with caution. In S v Webber 1971 (3) SA 754 (A) at 758F
H, the court held:
'A conviction is possible on the evidence of a single witness. Such witness must be credible,
and the evidence should be approached with caution. Due consideration should be given to
factors which affinn, and factors which detract from the creditability of the witnesses. The
probative value of the evidence of a single witness should also not be equated with that of
several witnesses.'
[ 44] Our court have consistently emphasised that there is no rigid formula by
which the credibility of every single witness may be detemiined, but it is essential
to approach the evidence of a single witness with caution and to weigh up by
balancing the evidence of a witness against all the factors which may diminish
the credibility of the witness. (see S v Sauls 1981 (3) SA 172 (A) at I 80E-H).
Having carefully considered the record, I am satisfied that the complainant's
evidence meets the standard required under section 208 of the Criminal Procedure
Act and passes the cautionary rule.
[45] By contrast, the appellant's version cannot withstand scrutiny. He
advanced a bare denial, suggesting that the complainant falsely implicated him
without any apparent motive. He would have this Court believe that the
complainant ran into the street naked, leaving her clothing behind, merely to
fabricate a case against him. Yet, in the same breath, the appellant, who was alone
with the complainant, claims to have discovered her clothing beside him only the
following morning when he awoke, professing ignorance as to how it came to be
there. This explanation is implausible. In fact, it indirectly corroborates the
there. This explanation is implausible. In fact, it indirectly corroborates the
16
complainant's evidence, for it confirms that she departed without her clothing,
thereby lending support to her version of events.
[ 46] The appellant's version in this regard is both suspicious and deeply
concerning. If, as he contends, nothing transpired between himself and the
complainant, it defies logic to suggest that the complainant would voluntarily
undress herself at her workplace and run into the street in the middle of the night,
naked, thereby exposing herself to humiliation, merely to fabricate a case against
him. I share the sentiments of the Regional Magistrate that the complainant had
no conceivable reason to falsely implicate the appellant while leaving the true
assailant roaming around free.
[47] Considering the evidence in its totality, it is clear that the appellant took
advantage of a defenceless woman, fully aware that she was alone and that no
one would come to her aid. The appellant is fortunate that the State did not invoke
the provisions of section 51 (I) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, for his
conduct in intoxicating the complainant points strongly to premeditation. In my
view, the appellant's version is far from being reasonable possible true, devoid of
common sense, and was correctly rejected by the court a quo.
[48] Consequently, I am satisfied that the court a quo 's finding, that the State
proved the guilt of the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt was correct and ought
not to be purged. I am further persuaded that the appellant's version is far-fetched
and not reasonable possible true. The court a quo was therefore correct in
rejecting it as false.
Conclusion
[ 49] I am satisfied that the guilt of the appellant was proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. In the final analysis, and having regard to all the considerations discussed
above, I am of the view that the appeal against conviction must fail.
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Order
[50] In the result, I propose the following order.
a) The appeal against conviction be dismissed.
I agree and it is so ordered:
Appearances
Counsel for the Appellant:
Counsel for the Respondent:
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
!
A.LEG NGE
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
Ms L.N. Adams
Legal Aid South Africa
Cape Town Justice Centre
Ms Van Der Merwe
Office of Director of Public Prosecutions
Western Cape
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