Van Rooyen NO and Another v Mokwena NO and Another
(63/2023) [2025] ZASCA 130 (12 September 2025) – Supreme Court of Appeal
Although the judgment is marked “Not Reportable” by the Supreme Court of Appeal, the decision is nevertheless significant for South African insolvency jurisprudence. First, it clarifies the threshold for the provisional sequestration of a trust where the trust is alleged to be the alter ego of an insolvent individual or entity. Secondly, it illustrates the enforcement of settlement agreements in appellate proceedings, particularly the consequences that flow from a clause permitting an appeal to proceed on an unopposed basis when the debtor is in breach.
Thirdly, the judgment synthesises earlier authority on the advantage-to-creditors requirement in section 10(c) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 and re-affirms the SCA’s willingness to convert a dismissed sequestration application into a provisional order where the high court misdirected itself. These features render the case a useful precedent for practitioners and academics, notwithstanding the formal “not reportable” label.
Finally, the decision contributes to the developing body of law on piercing the trust veneer in circumstances of fraud and misuse of the trust form. Given the paucity of appellate authority on this specific remedy, the case is of continuing doctrinal importance and is therefore widely cited despite the SCA’s notation.
Liberty Group Limited v Moosa 2023 (5) SA 126 (SCA); [2023] ZASCA 52
Insolvency Act 24 of 1936
Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013
No specific Uniform Rules of Court were referred to; reliance was placed on section 19(a) of the Superior Courts Act for the disposal of the appeal without oral argument.
The appellants, joint liquidators of the insolvent estate of Tumi Mokwena Incorporated (TMI), sought a provisional sequestration order against the Dikwenanyana Trust and an order piercing the trust veneer. They contended that the trust was the alter ego of Mr Tumi Mokwena, that it had been funded entirely with misappropriated TMI monies, and that it was accordingly insolvent and indebted to TMI in the sum of R 7 497 069.
After the high court dismissed the sequestration application, the parties concluded a settlement agreement in terms of which the trust admitted liability for R 3 544 601,88 and undertook to pay that amount, failing which the pending SCA appeal could proceed unopposed. The trust breached the agreement by failing to pay. Acting in reliance on the enforcement clause, the appellants re-enrolled the appeal, which the SCA determined without oral argument.
The Supreme Court of Appeal found that the statutory requisites for provisional sequestration were met: the appellants had a liquidated claim; the trust was factually and commercially insolvent; and sequestration would advantage creditors because the trust owned immovable property worth over R 13 million. Accordingly, the SCA set aside the high court’s order, issued a provisional sequestration order, and granted a rule nisi piercing the trust veneer.
Whether the settlement agreement entitled the appellants to proceed with an unopposed appeal and obtain the sequestration relief initially sought.
Whether the appellants established, on a prima facie basis, the three jurisdictional facts in section 10 of the Insolvency Act: a liquidated claim, an act of insolvency or insolvency, and advantage to creditors.
Whether the facts justified piercing the trust veneer so that the assets held in the name of the trust could be applied to the debts of the trust, Mr Mokwena, and TMI.
The court held that the trust’s breach of the settlement agreement triggered the clause allowing the appeal to proceed unopposed. On the merits, the appellants proved a prima facie liquidated claim exceeding R 7,4 million, demonstrated the trust’s insolvency, and showed that sequestration would yield a pecuniary benefit for creditors. That satisfied section 10 of the Insolvency Act.
Consequently, the SCA upheld the appeal, issued a provisional sequestration order returnable on 18 March 2026, directed publication and service of the order, granted a rule nisi piercing the trust veneer, and ordered that the costs of both the application and the appeal be costs in the administration of the trust.
Tumi Mokwena Incorporated, a law firm, was liquidated after a large trust-fund shortfall exceeding R 16 million came to light. Expert forensic evidence (uncontested in the high court) showed systematic transfers of client trust money and office funds from TMI’s accounts into the Dikwenanyana Trust, controlled by Mr Mokwena. The trust in turn used those misappropriated monies to acquire immovable property.
The joint liquidators of TMI, acting in that capacity, sought to sequestrate the trust on the basis that it was indebted to the insolvent estate for R 7 497 069 – the balance of unauthorised payments. They also sought an order piercing the trust veneer, alleging that the trust was a fraudulent façade concealing Mr Mokwena’s personal dealings and assets.
The high court accepted Mr Mokwena’s defence that, as a director of TMI, he could use the firm’s funds as he wished, and dismissed the sequestration application. When the liquidators appealed, the parties settled: the trust admitted receipt of R 3,54 million, agreed to repay it by set dates, and consented that the appeal could proceed unopposed if it defaulted. The trust paid nothing and gave no explanation.
The primary issue before the Supreme Court of Appeal was whether, given the breach of the settlement agreement, the appellants were entitled to a provisional sequestration order without opposition. In resolving that, the court had to decide whether the appellants had established the statutory requirements for provisional sequestration set out in section 10 of the Insolvency Act.
A consequential issue was whether sufficient grounds existed to pierce the trust veneer. The court had to assess allegations that the trust was the alter ego of Mr Mokwena and that it had been employed as a vehicle to stash stolen funds and shield assets from creditors.
A further issue related to the appropriate remedy and whether the SCA could itself issue a rule nisi and provisional sequestration order despite the matter having originated as an appeal, rather than remit the case to the high court.
The court began by interpreting the settlement agreement. Clause 11 expressly provided that, upon default, the “remainder of the sequestration claim” would become due and payable and the appellants “would be entitled to proceed with the current pending appeal without any opposition from the Trust.” The trust’s non-payment placed it squarely in breach, rendering its right to oppose otiose. Consequently, the SCA proceeded on an unopposed basis, although it invited written argument from both sides in terms of section 19(a) of the Superior Courts Act.
Turning to the Insolvency Act, the court addressed the three jurisdictional facts. First, the appellants had a liquidated claim: the forensic report quantified the misappropriated amount at R 7 497 069, and the trust itself had acknowledged at least R 3,54 million in the settlement. Secondly, the trust was shown to be both factually and commercially insolvent: it owed more than R 7 million to TMI and other creditors and could not meet those obligations, while its liabilities exceeded its unencumbered assets. Thirdly, sequestration would be to the advantage of creditors: the trust owned immovable properties worth over R 13 million, subject to secured debt of about R 6,9 million, leaving a substantial free residue for distribution.
In assessing the piercing of the trust veneer, the SCA drew on the principles in Badenhorst v Badenhorst and related authority while noting the paucity of direct appellate guidance where trusts are concerned. It accepted that the trust had been used as a mere conduit to receive stolen funds, that Mr Mokwena exercised unfettered control, and that the separateness of trust assets must yield to the reality of fraud and abuse.
Finally, invoking its power under Liberty Group Limited v Moosa, the court held that it may, and should, grant a provisional sequestration order with an accompanying rule nisi. The unmistakable picture painted by the evidence demanded immediate protective measures in favour of creditors.
The Supreme Court of Appeal set aside the Limpopo High Court’s dismissal order and replaced it with a comprehensive provisional sequestration order. It declared the Dikwenanyana Trust provisionally sequestrated, returnable on 18 March 2026, and directed publication in the Government Gazette and the Citizen.
The court further issued a rule nisi authorising the piercing of the trust veneer so that the assets vested in the trust (or its trustees) would vest simultaneously in the insolvent estates of Mr Mokwena and TMI, thereby enabling a consolidated distribution to creditors.
Costs of both the sequestration application and the appeal, including the costs of two counsel on scales C and B respectively, were ordered to be costs in the administration of the trust.
A settlement agreement may validly contain a clause that, on breach, permits pending litigation to proceed unopposed; once invoked, a court may grant substantive relief in the absence of opposition, provided the jurisdictional requirements are still met.
Under section 10 of the Insolvency Act, a court must provisionally sequestrate where there is a prima facie liquidated claim, insolvency, and a likely pecuniary advantage to creditors. The bar is not high: a mere possibility of benefit suffices.
The trust form can be pierced where it is employed as a façade to perpetrate fraud, evade legal obligations, or shield misappropriated assets. When piercing is justified, trust assets may vest in the insolvent estates of the wrongdoer and related entities to ensure equitable distribution among creditors.
An appellate court has inherent and statutory power (section 19(a) of the Superior Courts Act) to dispose of an appeal on the papers and to grant a provisional sequestration order with a rule nisi, without remitting the matter, where justice so requires and the evidentiary record is complete.