Tarcia and Another v City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality (2023/044543) [2025] ZAGPJHC 847 (25 August 2025)

Case Note

City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Tarica
Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg (unreported, judgment delivered 25 August 2025 by Mahon AJ)

Reportability

This judgment is reportable because it clarifies the scope of a High Court’s power under Rule 42(1)(b) of the Uniform Rules of Court to correct a patent error in its own order after the order has been handed down. It further explains the interaction between section 102 of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 and the running of prescription under the Prescription Act 68 of 1969, questions that frequently arise in municipal billing disputes. By confirming that the lodging of a dispute with a municipality does not suspend prescription and by delineating the onus questions that arise once prescription is raised, the judgment settles issues of practical significance to municipalities and account-holders alike.

In addition, the decision contributes to the rapidly developing body of jurisprudence on municipal services accounts, the allocation of payments, and the enforcement of credit-control measures. Because the judgment deals with a leave-to-appeal application, it also restates the proper test under section 17(1)(a) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013, offering guidance to practitioners on what amounts to “reasonable prospects of success” and what may constitute “compelling reasons” for leave.

Finally, the case illustrates how a court must balance the principle of finality (functus officio) against the equally important objective of ensuring that its orders convey the court’s true intention. The analysis of procedural fairness, particularly the importance of notifying parties before a variation is effected, will be useful across civil practice beyond the municipal-law context.

Cases Cited

The court referred to and discussed the following authorities in full: Body Corporate Croftdene Mall v eThekwini Municipality (603/2010) [2011] ZASCA 188 (10 October 2011); City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Vresthena (Pty) Ltd and Others 2024 JDR 1616 (SCA) (18 April 2024); MEC for Education, Gauteng Province, and Others v Governing Body, Rivonia Primary School and Others 2013 (6) SA 582 (CC); 39 Van Der Merwe Street Hillbrow CC v City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality and Another 2023 JDR 3278 (GJ); Mwelase Korffie (Pty) Ltd v Free State Development Corporation (Free State Division, case no 5020/2022, 11 April 2025); Barstow v City of Johannesburg (Gauteng Local Division, case no 534/2020, 7 July 2023); Euphorbia (Pty) Ltd t/a Gallagher Estates v City of Johannesburg (Gauteng Local Division, case no A5052/2015, 17 June 2016); and the Constitutional Court matter cited as R[…] v R[…] [2023] ZACC 5.

Legislation Cited

The judgment engaged principally with the Prescription Act 68 of 1969, the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 (especially section 102), the Uniform Rules of Court (with emphasis on Rule 42), and the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013.

Rules of Court Cited

Rule 42(1)(b) of the Uniform Rules of Court was central; incidental reference was also made to Rule 42 in general and to practice directives on electronic delivery of judgments.

HEADNOTE

Summary

The City of Johannesburg applied for leave to appeal against two judgments of Mahon AJ that (a) declared all municipal debts relating to Ms Tarica’s property that became due before May 2020 to have prescribed, (b) ordered the City to rectify the municipal account accordingly, and (c) dismissed the City’s counter-application with costs. After receiving correspondence pointing out a date-related inconsistency between the reasons and the order, the court had, under Rule 42(1)(b), corrected the cut-off date in the order from May 2018 to May 2020. The City argued that the High Court was functus officio, that the order was vague and unenforceable, that the onus regarding prescription had been wrongly allocated, and that section 102 of the Systems Act barred the relief granted. The court rejected all grounds, found no reasonable prospects of success, and consequently refused leave to appeal.

Key Issues

The court had to determine whether it retained the power to correct a patent error after handing down its order; whether the correction was procedurally fair; whether the prescription cut-off date and the rectification order were sufficiently clear; whether the onus of proving prescription had been misplaced; and whether a section 102 dispute suspends prescription or removes the High Court’s jurisdiction.

Held

Mahon AJ held that Rule 42(1)(b) expressly empowers a court, mero motu, to correct a patent error in its own order provided that the substance of the judgment remains unchanged. Because the City had been placed on notice of the proposed correction and had chosen silence, procedural fairness was satisfied. The order, once corrected, was clear and executable, and the onus had not been reversed: Ms Tarica had already proved prescription. Section 102 of the Systems Act does not interrupt prescription and does not oust the High Court’s jurisdiction to declare debts prescribed. Accordingly, none of the City’s grounds met the statutory threshold for leave to appeal.

THE FACTS

The litigation arose from a long-running dispute over a residential municipal services account. The account was historically in the name of Ms Tarica’s late husband. After his death, irregular billing, alleged misallocations of payments, and the City’s refusal to recognise a formally lodged dispute led Ms Tarica to launch motion proceedings in May 2023. She sought declaratory and mandatory relief compelling the City to remove prescribed charges and to render an accurate account. The City counter-applied for orders compelling her to register the account in her own name and to accept liability for all arrears.

On 6 December 2024 Mahon AJ granted relief largely in Ms Tarica’s favour, dismissed the counter-application, and declared debts due on or before “4 May 2018” prescribed. The reasons, however, repeatedly fixed prescription by reference to “three years prior to the notice of motion”, i.e., May 2020. Noticing the mismatch, Ms Tarica’s attorneys wrote to the Registrar on 9 December 2024, copying the City, requesting a correction. Receiving no response from the City, the court on 27 January 2025 issued a revised judgment substituting “4 May 2020” for “4 May 2018”.

The City then sought leave to appeal both the original and the revised judgments, contending that the court was functus officio, that the order lacked clarity, and that various substantive findings were wrong in law.

THE ISSUES

The central legal questions were:

First, whether a High Court may correct, under Rule 42(1)(b), an obvious clerical error in an order once that order has been issued; and whether procedural fairness required a formal application or hearing before such correction. Second, whether the prescription declaration was justified on the pleadings and whether the onus regarding prescription had been correctly applied. Third, whether section 102 of the Systems Act suspends prescription or otherwise deprives a court of jurisdiction while a dispute is pending. Fourth, whether the rectification order was sufficiently precise to be enforceable. Finally, the court had to decide if, in terms of section 17 of the Superior Courts Act, the City had reasonable prospects of success or compelling reasons warranting an appeal.

ANALYSIS

The court began by examining the functus officio doctrine. It reiterated that a court is generally without power to revisit its final orders, but Rule 42(1)(b) carves out a narrow exception for the correction of patent errors or ambiguities. Because the error related only to the cut-off date—and because the body of the judgment unmistakably fixed the relevant date at three years prior to service of the notice of motion—the correction did not alter the substance of the judgment and therefore fell squarely within Rule 42.

Procedural fairness, the court held, was satisfied because the City had been copied on the correspondence alerting the court to the error and had ample opportunity to object or make submissions. Choosing silence, the municipality could not complain of ambush.

Turning to the clarity of the order, Mahon AJ reasoned that an instruction to remove “all charges that became due before May 2020” is perfectly intelligible: municipal invoices show billing periods and due dates, and the City as record-holder is best placed to identify and excise the relevant entries. The fact that arithmetic or clerical work must still be carried out does not render an order vague.

On the onus question, the court reaffirmed that a debtor bears the initial burden of proving prescription. That burden had been discharged when Ms Tarica demonstrated, by reference to undisputed billing histories, that the debts in issue were older than three years. Once prescription was established, the practical duty to adjust the account necessarily fell on the creditor municipality.

The argument that section 102 of the Systems Act suspends prescription was rejected. Section 102 regulates credit-control enforcement tools; it does not purport to amend or override the Prescription Act. The municipality therefore remained obliged to recover any debt within the statutory prescription period regardless of whether a dispute was lodged.

Finally, the court assessed the authorities cited by the City. None contradicted the proposition that Rule 42 permits correction of patent slips, nor did they show that section 102 can interrupt prescription. Consequently, Mahon AJ concluded that the City had no reasonable prospects of obtaining a different result on appeal.

REMEDY

The court refused leave to appeal to either a Full Bench or the Supreme Court of Appeal. It confirmed the corrected order, further aligning the cut-off date with the precise date three years before service of the notice of motion, and ordered the City to pay the costs of the application for leave to appeal.

LEGAL PRINCIPLES

First, Rule 42(1)(b) empowers a court, on its own initiative, to correct a patent error in an order after handing down judgment, provided the correction does not alter the substance of the judgment and the parties have had notice.

Second, the doctrine of functus officio yields where a court exercises its Rule 42 power; a court is not divested of jurisdiction to correct clerical or typographical mistakes that thwart the true intention of its reasons.

Third, section 102 of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act does not suspend or interrupt prescription under the Prescription Act; it merely restricts certain credit-control mechanisms while a dispute is pending.

Fourth, once a debtor proves that a debt is older than the applicable prescription period, prescription is complete and the creditor bears the practical duty to adjust its records and refrain from further collection.

Fifth, clarity is judged objectively: an order that identifies a determinable period or category of charges is sufficiently certain even if further clerical calculations are required for implementation.

These principles, now reinforced by Mahon AJ’s judgment, provide concrete guidance on municipal billing disputes, the reach of section 102, and the permissible scope of post-judgment corrections under Rule 42.