Phillips v City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality (Case number 2024/004824) — High Court of South Africa, Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg — 20 October 2025
This judgment has been marked “Reportable” by the court. Its significance lies in three inter-related considerations. First, it adds to the growing body of jurisprudence in Gauteng concerning systemic failures in municipal billing and the constitutional duties owed by metropolitan municipalities to consumers. Secondly, it squarely addresses the recurring procedural problem of municipal legal advisers deposing to affidavits without personal knowledge, an issue previously condemned in Millu and Ordicode. Thirdly, the court’s order clarifies the nature and scope of relief that can competently be granted in billing disputes, distinguishing between impermissible “re-calculations” of accounts and permissible declaratory and mandatory relief. For these reasons the decision is of precedent value and is therefore of interest to other courts, practitioners, and litigants faced with comparable billing controversies.
Plascon-Evans Paints Limited v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Limited 1984 (3) SA 623 (A)
Wightman t/a J W Construction v Headfour (Pty) Limited 2008 (3) SA 371 (SCA)
Millu v City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality and Another 2024 JDR 1329 (GJ)
Ordicode (Pty) Limited v City of Johannesburg (unreported, Gauteng Local Division, 9 September 2025, case number 2023/077080)
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (sections 152 and 195 implicit in the judgment’s reasoning on municipal obligations)
Uniform Rules of Court, rule 6 (motion proceedings), referenced implicitly through the discussion on affidavits and the Plascon-Evans approach
The applicant, an 81-year-old pensioner, approached the High Court for declaratory and punitive relief after years of unsuccessful attempts to persuade the City of Johannesburg to correct multiple errors on his municipal account. His complaints centred on the municipality’s failure to apply a pensioner rates rebate, the wrongful imposition of charges in respect of a duplicate water meter, and delays in installing a prepaid electricity meter. The municipality conceded some issues belatedly but failed to provide documentary or evidential support sufficient to defeat the application. The court, applying the Plascon-Evans rule, found the municipality’s version untenable, granted substantive relief setting aside several categories of charges, and ordered attorney-and-client costs against the respondent.
Whether the municipality had in fact rectified its prior failure to apply the pensioner rebate and reverse all attendant interest and inflated valuation charges.
Whether the applicant’s property was billed simultaneously on two water meters and, if so, whether the respondent provided a cogent explanation for that duplication.
Whether a legal adviser without personal knowledge can depose to affidavits on factual billing matters and whether the respondent’s overall conduct warranted punitive costs.
The court held that the municipality had not demonstrated that it had properly credited the applicant’s account. Its bare assertions were contradicted by its own statements and unsupported by admissible evidence. The duplicate-meter explanation was speculative and advanced only from the Bar. Consequently, the court ordered the reversal of all impugned charges, the application of the pensioner rebate from January 2019 to December 2023, the setting aside of interest and water-meter charges from July 2021 onwards, and costs on the attorney-and-client scale against the respondent.
The applicant is the registered owner of a residential property in Randburg and has, since reaching pensionable age, been entitled to a municipal rebate in respect of property rates. Despite repeated written and in-person engagements, the municipality failed to apply this rebate, continued to bill him on an inflated property valuation, and levied interest on the unwanted arrears that consequently accrued.
In mid-2021 the municipality commenced charging the applicant for water consumption on two separate meters. The applicant produced invoices and photographs to show that the second meter was neither situated on nor serving his property. The municipality later averred—without evidential backing—that the original meter had been replaced and that only one meter was operative at any given time. Municipal statements, however, reflected concurrent billing periods for both meters, thereby contradicting the respondent’s version.
A third dispute concerned the applicant’s request to convert to prepaid electricity to avoid further “network charges”. Although the municipality finally installed a prepaid meter a week before the hearing, that belated step came only after litigation had been launched, leaving the other disputes unresolved. Faced with contradictory accounts and mounting financial prejudice, the applicant sought the court’s intervention.
The court was tasked with determining, first, whether the pensioner rebate, interest reversals and valuations corrections had in fact been implemented or whether declaratory and mandatory relief remained necessary. Secondly, it had to decide whether the dual-meter billing amounted to an unlawful charge and whether the municipality’s explanation, lacking affidavit support, could defeat the applicant’s claim. Finally, the court examined whether the municipality’s litigation conduct—especially the practice of legal advisers deposing to factual affidavits—was so egregious as to justify a punitive costs order.
Acting Judge Chohan meticulously applied the Plascon-Evans rule. Because final relief was sought on motion, the respondent’s version, if plausible, had to be accepted. Nonetheless, the court found that the respondent had provided no meaningful version at all. The answering affidavit, deposed to by a legal adviser with no personal knowledge, was replete with conclusory statements but bereft of supporting documentation or first-hand facts.
On the pensioner rebate, the respondent contended that it had credited the account, yet numerical discrepancies between the alleged credit entries and actual statements were left unexplained. The court emphasised that once the municipality conceded entitlement to the rebate, the evidentiary burden shifted to it to show full redress, a burden it failed to discharge.
Regarding the water-meter dispute, the municipality’s case collapsed under its own documents. Statements showed overlapping billing periods for the old and new meters, and the supposed “hyphen distinction” raised ex improviso during argument found no echo in the papers. Relying on Wightman, the court held that a litigant cannot make up its case orally during argument; facts must be set out under oath. Consequently, there was no bona fide dispute of fact capable of resisting the relief sought.
The court further bemoaned the respondent’s persistence in having legal advisers depose to affidavits despite previous judicial rebuke in Millu and Ordicode. Such conduct, it held, undermines the integrity of motion proceedings and warrants the court’s censure through costs.
The court issued a detailed mandatory order. All property-rates charges for the period January 2019 to December 2023 were set aside and the correct pensioner rebate ordered to be applied retrospectively. Water-consumption charges levied against the second meter from November 2021 to December 2023 were struck down. All interest on the account from July 2021 to the date of judgment was reversed. Importantly, the court directed the municipality to give effect to these adjustments, thereby ensuring that the applicant’s account reflected a credit rather than a debit balance. Costs were awarded on the punitive attorney-and-client scale against the respondent to mark the court’s displeasure and to indemnify the applicant fully for the expense of litigation that should never have been necessary.
The judgment re-affirms the Plascon-Evans principle that, in motion proceedings for final relief, only real and acceptable factual disputes can avert a grant of the order; speculative or undeposed explanations do not suffice. It underscores municipalities’ constitutional obligations to render accountable, responsive, and open administration of basic services, aligning with sections 152 and 195 of the Constitution.
A further principle concerns evidential responsibility: deponents must possess personal knowledge of the facts. Where a legal adviser lacks such knowledge, his affidavit is likely to attract judicial scepticism, if not outright rejection. This is not a mere procedural nicety; it is essential to the truth-finding function of affidavit-based litigation.
Finally, the judgment consolidates the discretionary basis for punitive costs where a public body’s conduct is vexatious, reckless, or in breach of constitutional obligations. Courts will not hesitate to impose attorney-and-client costs to discourage institutional stonewalling and to vindicate the rights of vulnerable litigants.