Monareng v Minister of Police (Case No 2081/2020) [2025] ZAFSHC 229 (5 August 2025) — High Court of South Africa, Free State Division, per Opperman J
This judgment was marked reportable because it revisits the permissible scope of police use of force under section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 after the 2012 amendments. The decision is significant: first, it applies the Constitutional Court’s guidance in Walters to a modern‐day, high-risk arrest; secondly, it clarifies the evidential onus on the State when deadly force is alleged; and thirdly, it provides practical guidance on separating merits and quantum under Rule 33(4) in police liability trials.
Govender v Minister of Safety and Security (342/99) [2001] ZASCA 80; 2001 (4) SA 273 (Supreme Court of Appeal); 2001 (2) SACR 197; 2001 (11) BCLR 1197
Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security and Others: In re S v Walters and Another (CCT 28/01) [2002] ZACC 6; 2002 (4) SA 613 (Constitutional Court); 2002 (7) BCLR 663; 2002 (2) SACR 105
Loureiro and Others v Imvula Quality Protection (Pty) Ltd (CCT 40/13) [2014] ZACC 4; 2014 (3) SA 394 (CC); 2014 (5) BCLR 511
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 — sections 10, 11, 12 and 205(3)
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 — section 49 (post-2012 version)
Uniform Rule of Court 67A (scale of costs)
Uniform Rule 33(4) — separation of issues at trial
The plaintiff, Simon Molefi Monareng, sued the Minister of Police for damages arising from gunshot wounds sustained during an SAPS interception of a suspected stolen vehicle on 16 May 2019. Monareng alleged the shooting was wrongful and unlawful. The Minister conceded the onus to justify the force used but denied unlawfulness, contending that the vehicle was linked to violent crimes, that shots were fired from it at officers, and that the force employed was both necessary and proportionate as contemplated by section 49. After hearing extensive evidence over several sittings, Opperman J dismissed the claim, holding that the police’s version was more probable and that the statutory requirements for the use of deadly force were met.
Whether SAPS members had a reasonable suspicion justifying the attempted arrest.
Whether the plaintiff’s vehicle was fleeing or resisting in circumstances envisaged by section 49(2).
Whether the force used, including the discharge of firearms, was reasonably necessary and proportionate.
Where the evidential burden lies once bodily integrity is prima facie infringed.
The court held that SAPS officers acted within the bounds of section 49. The evidence established a reasonable suspicion, a clear attempt to evade arrest and the firing of shots from the suspect vehicle. Deadly force was, on the probabilities, reasonably necessary to avert a threat of serious bodily harm to the officers and the public. Consequently, the plaintiff’s action failed, and costs, including those of two counsel, were awarded against him on scale C.
The events unfolded on 16 May 2019 during an intelligence-driven operation targeting suspects implicated in cash-in-transit robberies and multiple murders, including the killing of police officers. Intelligence indicated that a stolen vehicle travelling from KwaZulu-Natal to Gauteng was carrying such suspects.
SAPS units, including the Special Task Force and visible policing teams, set up a rolling roadblock near Heilbron in the Free State. The vehicle, later confirmed to be driven by the plaintiff, ignored signals to stop, accelerated, and allegedly produced muzzle flashes from the rear passenger window. Officers responded with return fire aimed at disabling the vehicle and neutralising the threat.
When the vehicle eventually came to a halt, the plaintiff was found injured. No firearms were recovered on his person, but ballistic evidence linked cartridge cases inside the vehicle to a weapon later traced to an associate of the plaintiff. The plaintiff maintained he thought he was being hijacked and denied any shots were fired from his side.
The court had to decide whether the State discharged its burden of proving that the shooting was justified in terms of section 49. This involved analysing: the genuineness and reasonableness of the officers’ suspicion; the existence of resistance or flight; the proportionality of the force; and the credibility of the competing versions.
Opperman J commenced with an exposition of the constitutional and statutory matrix governing arrests, emphasising Walters and the 2012 codification of section 49. The judge reiterated that any infringement of bodily integrity is prima facie unlawful, shifting the onus to SAPS to justify its conduct.
After a detailed evaluation of eyewitness testimony, ballistic reports, vehicle-tracking data and contemporaneous radio logs, the court found the police version coherent, internally consistent and corroborated by objective evidence. In contrast, the plaintiff’s denial of any gunfire was undermined by forensic residue on the vehicle’s rear seats and his inability to explain the presence of cartridge casings.
Applying section 49(2), the court held that the suspect vehicle was indisputably fleeing and that officers faced a real threat of grievous harm from shots emanating from it. Deadly force was therefore both reasonably necessary and proportionate. The judge rejected arguments that warnings were inadequate, noting that flashing blue lights, sirens and amplified loud-hailer instructions were ignored.
The plaintiff’s claims were dismissed in their entirety. Costs, including those of two counsel, were awarded against the plaintiff on scale C in terms of Uniform Rule 67A, with all previously reserved costs included.
An infringement of bodily integrity places an onus on the State to justify the act; justification must be grounded in section 49.
Section 49(2) permits deadly force if an arrestor reasonably believes the suspect poses an immediate threat of serious harm and cannot otherwise be apprehended.
Proportionality is assessed objectively, but due weight is given to the exigencies of a fast-moving, life-threatening police operation.
Credibility findings, supported by objective forensic evidence, are decisive where versions are mutually destructive.
The judgment reaffirms that, while the Constitution demands a measured response, it does not render the police powerless when confronted with armed, fleeing suspects. Opperman J’s reasoning demonstrates the practical application of Walters to real-world policing and underscores the evidential rigor required to defeat civil claims arising from the use of deadly force.