Mei and Others v Mei and Others (3021/2025) [2025] ZAECMKHC 68 (26 August 2025)

Case Note

Mei and Others v Mei and Others (3021/2025) [2025] ZAECMKHC 97 (26 August 2025)

Reportability

Although the court itself marked the judgment “Not reportable”, the decision is nevertheless important from an estates- and trusts-law perspective. It canvasses, in one carefully reasoned judgment, the intersection between succession law, trust administration, company law and the law of interim interdicts. The judgment synthesises a century of South African authority on interlocutory relief and applies it to a modern, fact-dense family dispute in which the applicants sought to preserve a mixed portfolio of trust, company and personally-owned assets. For academics and practitioners alike, the case illustrates how the High Court will approach urgency, prima facie rights and the balance of convenience where family members dispute control of a high-value property empire immediately after the death of a patriarch.

Cases Cited

Setlogelo v Setlogelo 1914 AD 221; Tshwane City v Afriforum 2016 (6) SA 279 (CC); East Rock Trading 7 (Pty) Ltd v Eagle Valley Granite (Pty) Ltd 2011 JDR 1832 (GSJ); Caledon Street Restaurants CC v D’Aviera 1998 JDR 0116 (SE); Webster v Mitchell 1948 (1) SA 1186 (W); Gool v Minister of Justice and Another 1955 (2) SA 682 (C); Spur Steak Ranches Ltd and Others v Saddles Steak Ranch, Claremont, and Others 1996 (3) SA 706 (C); Nestor and Others v Minister of Police and Others 1984 (4) SA 230 (SWA); Minister of Law and Order v Nordien 1987 (2) SA 894 (AD); National Council of Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v Openshaw 2008 (5) SA 339 (SCA); Eriksen Motors (Welkom) Ltd v Protea Motors, Warrenton 1973 (3) SA 685 (A).

Legislation Cited

Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988; Companies Act 71 of 2008; Uniform Rules of Court.

Rules of Court Cited

Rule 6(12) and Rule 6(5) of the Uniform Rules of Court.

HEADNOTE

Summary

The applicants, being the widow and grandchildren of the late Mr Aubrey Mei’s predeceased son, approached the High Court on an urgent basis for interim relief aimed at preserving the estate of the deceased pending the Master’s appointment of an executor. They alleged that the first respondent, a son of the deceased and the sole remaining trustee of the Aubrey Mei Family Trust, had assumed unilateral control of twenty-two properties, was collecting rental income without accounting, and had allowed other family members to use estate assets.

The court considered whether urgency had been demonstrated and whether the trite requisites for an interlocutory interdict were present: a prima facie right, a reasonable apprehension of irreparable harm, a favourable balance of convenience and the absence of an adequate alternative remedy.

Granting a rule nisi against the first respondent, Laing J held that the applicants had established a prima facie right stemming from both the deceased’s will and the trust deed; that the respondents’ opaque handling of rental flows created an objectively reasonable fear of dissipation; that the balance of convenience favoured temporary preservation; and that no meaningful alternative remedy existed.

Key Issues

The urgent-court threshold under Rule 6(12) in estate-preservation matters.
Whether trust beneficiaries and prospective testamentary beneficiaries hold a protectable prima facie right before an executor is appointed.
The extent to which a sole trustee may continue to administer trust assets after a founder’s death in the face of allegations of non-accounting.
How courts weigh the balance of convenience where preservation rather than possessory relief is sought.

Held

Laing J held that, notwithstanding the matter being marked “not reportable”, the applicants had met the urgency requirement because the first respondent’s unfettered control over numerous high-value assets posed a real risk of dissipation. The applicants proved a prima facie right through the unrebutted will and through the trust deed which named them as income and capital beneficiaries. The apprehension of harm was reasonable given the respondents’ failure to open a trust bank account and to account for rental income. The balance of convenience lay with preservation, as the interdict would not unduly hamper legitimate trust administration. A rule nisi was therefore issued interdicting the first respondent from dissipating assets and compelling him to pay all rental income into the company account, keep proper records and allow inspection thereof, pending the return date.

THE FACTS

During his lifetime Mr Aubrey Mei amassed an extensive portfolio of seventeen trust-owned and several company-owned immovable properties, together with further properties held jointly with family members. He also wholly controlled AG Mei (Pty) Ltd, the vehicle through which most rentals were channelled. He died on 21 May 2025. A daughter, the second respondent, promptly reported the estate and was, at least initially, issued letters of executorship after stating that the deceased had left no will. In truth a will existed, held by the widow of the deceased’s late son, naming a testamentary trust in favour of that widow’s children and appointing them and a neutral attorney as trustees.

In the immediate aftermath of death, the first respondent, also a son of the deceased and the only remaining trustee of the existing family trust, began collecting rentals across the property portfolio. The applicants’ attorneys demanded undertakings that he cease dissipating income, deposit all rentals in a transparent account, and account fully. No undertakings were forthcoming. Allegations surfaced that the first respondent had appropriated R100 000 in rentals, was permitting private use of the deceased’s motor vehicle, and had perhaps disposed of movables.

An urgent application followed, seeking a rule nisi interdicting the first, second and third respondents from dissipating assets, directing that all rental be paid into AG Mei (Pty) Ltd’s account, preserving the status quo and compelling full account-keeping.

THE ISSUES

The court had to determine first whether the matter was sufficiently urgent to warrant invocation of Rule 6(12). If urgency were found, the next enquiry was whether the traditional requisites for interim interdictory relief were satisfied. This involved deciding whether the applicants had a prima facie right in circumstances where an executor had yet to be appointed; whether a reasonable apprehension of irreparable harm existed; how the balance of convenience weighed between the disputing family factions; and whether any adequate alternative remedies short of interdictory relief were available. Finally, the court had to decide upon the appropriate terms of any provisional order and on costs.

ANALYSIS

On urgency the court applied East Rock Trading and Caledon Street Restaurants principles, emphasising that an applicant must show not merely pressing circumstances but the lack of substantial redress at a hearing in due course. Laing J acknowledged a three-week delay between the estate’s reporting and the application’s launch, but held that delay to be overshadowed by the first respondent’s opaque control over twenty-two properties and significant rental flows, coupled with his failure to open a dedicated trust account as required by section 10(1) of the Trust Property Control Act.

In examining prima facie right, the judgment adopted the Webster v Mitchell / Gool v Minister of Justice approach, evaluating the facts and undisputed evidence to decide whether final relief could probably follow. The unchallenged will and the beneficiaries’ status under the family trust deed furnished sufficient standing. Ownership of AG Mei (Pty) Ltd’s shares mattered little because the company itself was expressly a trust beneficiary, thereby entitling the applicants to insist that its rental stream be preserved.

Turning to apprehension of harm, the court referred to Nestor v Minister of Police and Minister of Law and Order v Nordien, stressing the objective nature of the test. The first respondent’s blanket denial without disclosure of rental receipts, accounts or bank statements, coupled with his acknowledgement that no trust account existed, created a real risk that funds could be lost beyond recovery. The use of the deceased’s motor vehicle by the third respondent, though benign, illustrated a general disregard for proper estate administration.

As to balance of convenience, the court relied on Eriksen Motors, noting that preservation measures would hardly prejudice the first respondent; he remained free to collect rentals and attend to day-to-day management, the only constraint being that monies had to flow through an identifiable, controlled bank account. Conversely, the applicants risked irreparable loss given the respondents’ admitted lack of liquid assets.

Alternative remedies such as complaining to the Master, instituting section 20 TPCA proceedings or launching a Companies Act application were deemed illusory in the face of immediate risk. The interdict was therefore the only satisfactory remedy.

REMEDY

A rule nisi was issued returnable on 21 October 2025. Pending the return date the court interdicted the first respondent, and any person acting under his instruction, from destroying, dissipating or diminishing any estate, trust or company asset including rental income. All rentals, whether from trust-owned, company-owned or personally-owned properties of the deceased, had to be collected and paid into AG Mei (Pty) Ltd’s ABSA account. The first respondent was ordered to keep proper written records of all rentals and to permit the applicants reasonable access thereto. The order specifically preserved the Hamburg homestead motor vehicle but declined broader relief regarding “day-to-day” business assets because of insufficient particularity. Costs were reserved against the first respondent, while the applicants were directed to pay the second and third respondents’ costs to date.

LEGAL PRINCIPLES

The judgment reaffirms that the Webster v Mitchell / Gool test for prima facie right remains good law for interim interdicts and clarifies that trust or testamentary beneficiaries can satisfy that test even before the Master issues letters of executorship.

It confirms that a sole trustee who continues to administer trust property after the founder’s death must still comply with section 10 of the Trust Property Control Act by opening and operating a dedicated trust bank account; failure to do so strengthens an inference of potential dissipation.

The decision illustrates that the balance-of-convenience enquiry tilts strongly toward preservation where the respondent retains effective control of assets and suffers little prejudice from enhanced accounting obligations, while the applicants would face recovery difficulties if dissipation occurred.

Finally, the case stands as a contemporary application of the principle that urgency is ultimately tied to the absence of substantial redress in the future, with courts willing to condone some delay where opaque asset-handling threatens to strip an estate of value.