Dlodlo v Judicial Service Commission and Others
[2025] ZAGPJHC 345 (21 July 2025)
This judgment is reportable because it clarifies the threshold for condonation of late procedural steps in motion proceedings and, more particularly, the manner in which the courts will balance the interests of justice against dilatory conduct by organs of State. The judgment synthesises several Constitutional Court and Supreme Court of Appeal authorities on condonation, thereby providing a consolidated statement of principle that will guide future litigants and judges alike.
In addition, the court gives detailed guidance on the proper interpretation of an order compelling delivery of a rule 53 record. That guidance is of immediate practical importance to practitioners conducting judicial-review proceedings, especially in the Gauteng Division where rule 53 disputes are common. By treating the order as a document to be construed in the same way as any other legal instrument, the court adds doctrinal coherence to what was previously an uncertain area of practice.
Finally, the judgment has broader constitutional significance. It delineates the limits of an applicant’s entitlement to internal deliberative material from the Judicial Service Commission, striking a careful balance between openness, relevance and institutional integrity. Its reasoning on the scope of discoverable material will influence analogous disputes involving other oversight or disciplinary bodies.
Melane v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1962 (4) SA 531 (A)
Van Wyk v Unitas Hospital and Another 2008 (2) SA 472 (CC)
Competition Commission of South Africa v Pickfords Removals SA (Pty) Ltd 2021 (3) SA 1 (CC)
Martrade Shipping and Transport GmbH v United Enterprises Corporation and MV ‘Unity’ [2020] ZASCA 120
Firestone South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Gentiruco AG 1977 (4) SA 298 (A)
Finishing Touch 163 (Pty) Ltd v BHP Billiton Coal South Africa Ltd and Others 2013 (2) SA 204 (SCA)
Eke v Parsons 2016 (3) SA 37 (CC)
Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA)
Judicial Service Commission Act 9 of 1994
Uniform Rules of Court: rule 27, rule 30A, rule 53(1)(b)
The applicant, Mr Dlodlo, sought an order striking out the respondents’ defence in a pending review and obtaining far-reaching declaratory relief arising from a complaint he had lodged with the Judicial Service Commission. He relied on rule 30A on the basis that the respondents had failed to comply with an earlier order compelling them to deliver the full rule 53 record. The respondents resisted the strike-out and simultaneously applied for condonation for the late filing of their answering affidavit.
The court first addressed the condonation application. After traversing the authorities, it concluded that the delay—one month—was satisfactorily explained by the unavailability of senior counsel and that the respondents enjoyed reasonable prospects of success. Granting condonation, the court emphasised that the interests of justice favoured a determination of the matter on its merits rather than by default.
Turning to the rule 30A application, the court interpreted the earlier order of Mahomed J. It held that the order, properly construed, obliged the respondents to furnish only material relevant to the applicant’s complaint and not the entire recording of the JSC meeting concerning unrelated matters. Finding that the respondents had indeed complied, the court dismissed the strike-out application with costs.
The first issue concerned whether the respondents had shown “good cause” for the late filing of their answering affidavit and whether the interests of justice warranted the grant of condonation.
The second issue was the proper interpretation of the earlier court order compelling production of the record under rule 53(1)(b) and, relatedly, whether the respondents had complied with that order.
The third issue, contingent on the second, was whether non-compliance (if any) justified the drastic remedy of striking out the respondents’ defence and granting the substantive relief sought by the applicant.
The court held that condonation should be granted because the delay was short, satisfactorily explained and non-prejudicial, the respondents possessed arguable prospects of success, and the importance of the matter, coupled with the public-law setting, required a full ventilation of the issues.
It further held that, properly interpreted, Mahomed J’s order did not entitle the applicant to material irrelevant to his complaint. On the facts, the respondents had complied by furnishing the relevant extracts and recordings.
Consequently, the application in terms of rule 30A(2) failed. The court ordered the applicant to pay the costs of that application on scale C, while directing the respondents to bear the costs of their successful condonation application.
Mr Dlodlo lodged a complaint with the Judicial Service Commission alleging that a High Court judge had issued an invalid “further dismissal” order in prior litigation. The Secretariat of the JSC summarily dismissed the complaint on 14 December 2023. An internal appeal to the full JSC met a similar fate on 3 September 2024. Aggrieved, Mr Dlodlo instituted review proceedings in the High Court, contending that both decisions were unlawful and seeking declaratory relief that the impugned judicial order was invalid.
An interlocutory skirmish ensued over the production of the rule 53 record. On 14 March 2025 Mahomed J ordered the respondents to deliver, within ten days, the full record of the decisions under review, including any notes made by the first respondent and the audio-recording of the JSC meeting on 24 April 2024. The respondents delivered what they considered to be the relevant portions, redacting or withholding unrelated segments.
The respondents filed their notice of intention to oppose on 25 March 2025, but owing to the unavailability of senior counsel, they delivered their answering affidavit only on 15 May 2025—one month out of time. On the same day they sought condonation for the delay. The applicant responded with a rule 30A notice and, later, the present application to strike out the respondents’ defence, contending that the record remained incomplete and that the delay in filing the answering affidavit demonstrated disregard for the rules.
The court was required first to decide whether the respondents had made out a proper case for condonation under rule 27. This entailed assessing the length of the delay, the adequacy of the explanation, the prospects of success, and the broader interests of justice.
The second issue was whether the respondents had complied with Mahomed J’s order compelling discovery under rule 53(1)(b). Central to this enquiry was the correct construction of the order: did it require disclosure of the entire recording of the 24 April 2024 JSC meeting, including matters unrelated to the applicant, or only the portions germane to his complaint?
Depending on the resolution of the compliance question, the third issue was whether the respondents’ defence should be struck out, and whether the court should grant the sweeping substantive relief sought by the applicant without a full ventilation of the merits in the review application.
In dealing with condonation, the court applied the classic Melane factors, reinforced by subsequent Constitutional Court jurisprudence. It noted that the delay was modest, the explanation credible, and that the matter raised issues of public administration and judicial accountability—considerations that tilt the scales in favour of hearing the matter. The court rejected the applicant’s contention that mere recourse to the condonation procedure, rather than a prospective extension under rule 27, was abusive. Procedurally, an after-the-fact condonation application was perfectly competent.
Turning to the interpretation of the Mahomed J order, the court invoked the well-established principles in Firestone, Endumeni and Martrade. It stressed that an order must be construed like any other legal instrument, reading the text in context to ascertain its manifest purpose. The words “full recording … of the 2nd respondent’s 24 April 2024 meeting” had to be understood against the backdrop that the applicant’s complaint was only one of many items on the JSC agenda. The manifest purpose was to give the applicant material relevant to his complaint, not to breach the confidentiality of unrelated disciplinary deliberations.
Having accepted that construction, the court assessed compliance on the facts. The respondents had supplied the audio and transcript segments dealing with the applicant, together with the first respondent’s notes. The court found no basis to conclude that additional material relating to third parties was either relevant or ordered to be produced. Consequently, the premise of the rule 30A application collapsed.
On condonation, the court granted the relief sought by the respondents, permitting the late filing of the answering affidavit. While the respondents succeeded, the court took the view that their own delay warranted an adverse costs order, and it therefore directed them to pay the costs of the condonation application. In doing so, the court underscored that condonation is not granted as of right and that parties must bear the costs of their procedural lapses.
On the strike-out application, the court dismissed it in its entirety. Because the application was ill-founded and unnecessarily protracted the proceedings, the court ordered the applicant to pay the respondents’ costs on scale C, including the costs of senior counsel. The scale-C award reflected the complexity of the issues and the public importance of the institutions involved.
No declaratory or substantive relief was granted on the merits of the review. Those issues remain to be determined in the main application, which will now proceed with the pleadings closed.
The judgment reaffirms that condonation is a discretionary remedy governed by a flexible but rigorous enquiry into delay, explanation, prospects of success and, above all, the interests of justice. Courts should incline towards substance over form but must still mark their disapproval of non-compliance through appropriate costs orders.
It clarifies that an order compelling the rule 53 record must be interpreted purposively. Applicants are entitled only to material relevant to the decisions under attack; they cannot, under the guise of a “full record”, demand confidential or collateral information unrelated to their cause of action. This holding harmonises procedural fairness with institutional confidentiality.
Finally, the judgment emphasises that the striking-out of a defence is a drastic measure. It will not be granted where a less intrusive remedy—such as an adverse costs order—will suffice, particularly in public-law disputes implicating the administration of justice. Pre-emptive substantive relief on motion is therefore disfavoured unless non-compliance is flagrant and incurable.