Booysen v Kimberley Regional Court Magistrate for the Northern Cape Region and Another (1404/2023) [2025] ZANCHC 114 (19 November 2025)

REPORTABILITY SCORE: 65/100 Criminal Procedure — Recusal of magistrate — Application for recusal based on alleged delay in trial proceedings — Applicant contended that the trial magistrate's unavailability would lead to an unfair trial — Test for recusal established as whether a reasonable person would apprehend bias — Applicant failed to provide factual basis for apprehension of bias — Presumption of judicial impartiality not rebutted — Delay attributed to systemic issues rather than solely to the magistrate — Review application dismissed; refusal to recuse held not to be irregular.

Nov. 20, 2025 Criminal Procedure
Booysen v Kimberley Regional Court Magistrate for the Northern Cape Region and Another (1404/2023) [2025] ZANCHC 114 (19 November 2025)

Case Note

Case name: Re/ton Booysen v The Kimberley Regional Court Magistrate for the Northern Cape Region and Another
Citation: Case no: 1404/2023
Date: 19 November 2025

Reportability

This case is reportable due to its significant implications regarding the recusal of a magistrate based on allegations of bias in the context of criminal proceedings. It highlights the essential legal standards for establishing a reasonable apprehension of bias, illustrating the requirement for tangible and objective evidence rather than mere assertions. The case underscores the importance of judicial impartiality and the legal principles surrounding recusal applications. Additionally, it addresses the procedural intricacies involved when a magistrate is required to step down from presiding over a case, which reflects broader concerns related to the administration of justice in South Africa.

Cases Cited

  • President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v South African Rugby Football Union and Others 1999 (4) SA 147 (CC); 1999 (7) BCLR 725 (CC)
  • South African Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union and Others v Irvin & Johnson Ltd (Seafoods Division Fish Processing) 2000 (3) SA 705 (CC); 2000 (8) BCLR 886 (CC)
  • S v Sasson 2007 (1) SACR 566 (CC)
  • Ncube and Another v Health and Hygiene (Pty) Ltd (Application for Recusal) [2022] JOL 57016 (GJ)
  • Bernert v Absa Bank Ltd [2010] ZACC 28 (CC); 2011 (3) SA 92 (CC); 2011 (4) BCLR 329 (CC)
  • Ex parte Goosen and Others (Legal Practice Council and Others as Amici Curiae) [2019] 3 All SA 161 (GJ)

Legislation Cited

  • Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, Section 342A
  • Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Section 35(3)

Rules of Court Cited

  • Northern Cape Division of the High Court Rules

HEADNOTE

Summary

In this case, the applicant, Relton Booysen, sought a review of the refusal by the first respondent, a trial magistrate, to recuse herself from presiding over his criminal proceedings. The applicant faced multiple charges, including crimen injuria, sexual assault, and attempted rape. He alleged that the trial magistrate's previous unavailability led to unreasonable delays in his trial, fostering a reasonable apprehension of bias. The court found that the applicant failed to establish a factual basis for his apprehension, thereby dismissing the review application.

Key Issues

The key legal issues revolve around the test for recusal based on apprehended bias, the presumption of judicial impartiality, and the nature and extent of delays in criminal proceedings. The court assessed the legitimacy of the applicant's concerns regarding the magistrate's impartiality and the effects of delay on the fairness of the trial.

Held

The court held that the application for review should be dismissed. It concluded that the applicant did not discharge the onus of proving a reasonable apprehension of bias. The delays in the trial were found not to be solely attributable to the magistrate and thus did not warrant her recusal.

THE FACTS

The applicant was embroiled in various criminal charges since 2015, with proceedings that suffered multiple delays. On 17 April 2023, he formally requested the trial magistrate's recusal, citing her unavailability as the primary reason for an alleged bias against him. The magistrate had facilitated a section 342A inquiry into these delays, which suggested an unreasonableness but did not directly implicate her personal conduct as biased. The applicant's allegations were based on the sustained delays which he attributed to the magistrate’s actions, compounded by a misunderstanding regarding scheduling that he believed indicated bias.

THE ISSUES

The court needed to determine whether the magistrate's refusal to recuse herself was justified. Essential questions included whether a reasonable and informed person would apprehend that the magistrate could not act impartially, and whether systemic delays in the trial were fair grounds to conclude bias.

ANALYSIS

In its analysis, the court reiterated established principles regarding the presumption of judicial impartiality and the objective test for reasonable apprehension of bias. It noted that the applicant's claims lacked the necessary factual underpinning required to demonstrate a legitimate concern about fairness in his trial. The court emphasized that while there were delays, not all were attributable to the magistrate alone, suggesting that the context and specifics of how delays occurred were crucial in evaluating concerns of bias.

The court ultimately determined that it could not accept the claims of bias as they were based primarily on the applicant's interpretation of events rather than solid, demonstrable facts, underlining the need for strong evidence in recusal applications to maintain judicial efficacy and integrity.

REMEDY

The court ordered the dismissal of the review application, affirming the magistrate's right to continue presiding over the case. It upheld the view that without compelling evidence of bias or irregularity, the integrity of trial proceedings should not be compromised.

LEGAL PRINCIPLES

Key legal principles established or reinforced in this decision include the following:

  • The presumption of judicial impartiality must be taken into account when considering recusal applications.
  • A party seeking recusal must demonstrate a reasonable apprehension of bias, supported by objective facts rather than subjective beliefs or perceptions.
  • Judicial officers should not recuse themselves without compelling reasons, as unfounded recusal applications risk undermining the judicial process and straining judicial resources.
  • Delays in proceedings must be substanced and contextually assessed as affecting trial fairness before concluding on bias or misconduct.